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Abstract 
The thesis uses a neoclassical realist framework to investigate the link between 
economic influence and political power in China’s foreign policy, taking Kazakhstan 
as a case study.  Over the last decades, China developed formidable relative 
economic capabilities that it increasingly projects externally.  An in-depth look at 
Chinese trade, finance and investment elucidates the drivers of China’s economic 
influence in Kazakhstan. The analysis shows that Beijing created strong economic 
dependencies, which in turn introduced a steep hierarchy in the bilateral 
relationship that leaves Astana in a subordinate and Beijing in a dominant position.  
This dependency is driven by the legitimacy and revenue needs of the Kazakhstani 
elite, on the one hand, and China’s relative economic capabilities, guided by 
Beijing’s “Go Global” and “Go West” initiatives, on the other.  The thesis discusses 
the complex array of economic institutions that project Chinese economic power 
into Kazakhstan and their relationship with Beijing to determine whether 
Kazakhstan’s economic dependence is the outcome of a deliberate policy directed 
by Beijing. 
After establishing the extent of the hierarchy and dependency of the relationship, 
the thesis addresses China’s ability to translate the dependency into meeting its 
foreign policy interests.  Beijing does indeed successfully leverage this dependency 
to meet its political objectives, most notably in gaining access to Kazakhstani 
resources.  Furthermore, an in-depth cases study of the Sino-Kazakhstani 
transboundary water dispute illustrates that Beijing can maximise its foreign policy 
objective of maintaining absolute sovereignty over its rivers on the back 
Kazakhstan’s economic dependence. However, this outcome is driven largely by 
Kazakhstan itself, particularly by its elite.  This turns China into a hydro-hegemon, 
undermining its foreign policy principles of “win-win” and “mutually beneficial” 
cooperation. 
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 Introduction Chapter 1 
 “The Chinese government has money and power.  
There is nothing they cannot buy.” 
(Liu Xia, wife of Liu Xiaobo)1 
This dissertation takes the People’s Republic of China’s (China) 
foreign policy towards the Republic of Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan) as a case study to 
investigate whether China can translate its economic influence into political power. 
It will argue that China’s growing economic capabilities enable it to create economic 
dependencies to pursue political ends, which is the key hypothesis of this thesis. In 
the case of Kazakhstan, these ends are largely geostrategic goals of ensuring 
resource security and maximising its claim to absolute sovereignty over shared 
water resources that are vital to the livelihood and prosperity of the two countries. 
1.1 The Economic Variable in China’s Foreign Policy 
International Relations (IR) recognises that a state’s power, as reflected in its 
relative position in the international system, can be broken down into different 
capabilities, including military, political and economic. China’s renewed rise in the 
modern international system occurred on the back of its dramatic economic 
growth, initiated by Deng Xiaoping’s open door policy in the 1970s.  Yet China’s 
external use of its economic capabilities to facilitate its foreign policy objectives is 
still an understudied field, particularly in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, where it has 
wielded significant economic influence over the last decade. The need to 
understand the foreign policy implications of China’s economic rise informed the 
initial research interest for this thesis. Initially, the thesis set out to investigate 
                                                     
1
 (Tran, 2010)  
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these Chinese foreign policy implications for the whole of Central Asia, an area that 
has played a prominent role in China’s past.2 However, it soon became clear that 
such a broad perspective on several states would compromise the quality of the 
dissertation in favour of quantity. To narrow the scope of the thesis, Kazakhstan 
was chosen as a case study within Central Asia because it has a comparably well-
developed economy and because of its popular scepticism of China, or even 
Sinophobia which should increase the threshold for Beijing 3  to translate its 
economic influence into political power. 
As a result of running a continuously high trade surplus, China has accumulated the 
world’s largest foreign currency reserves amounting to US$3.3 trillion, a fact that 
Chinese diplomats now also increasingly attempt to use as leverage for political 
ends. Chinese officials emphasise China’s economic capabilities and influence to 
deter any actions or statements that may interfere with its territorial claims4 or 
domestic affairs, especially its human rights record. For example, Beijing lobbies 
several members of the United Nations Human Rights Council5  actively and 
threatens them with deteriorating trade relations to prevent the tabling of critical 
resolutions.  A western diplomat interviewed by Chatham House noted recently 
that “China [has] pursued a very direct strategy of rewards and punishments” 
(Sceats & Breslin 2012:5). This strategy appears to have been effective with 
Germany and France, as they no longer table resolutions, anxious to maintain 
access to China’s market for their exports (HRW 1997:4, Geinitz 2012). Such threats 
from China are generally also followed by diplomatic sanctions, including suspended 
bilateral meetings and, more frequently, trade sanctions. Liu Xia’s comment above 
succinctly summarises this point:  Beijing has the economic capabilities necessary to 
increasingly force foreign policy outcomes in its favour. However, Beijing does not 
                                                     
2
 Throughout Chinese histories contemporary Central Asia, along China’s north-western frontier had 
always played a key role in China’s security thinking and foreign affairs (Fairbank & Goldman, 2006). 
3
 The thesis uses the term “Beijing”, “Chinese government” and “CPC” synonymously.  
4
 These claims primarily revolve around the status of Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. 
5
 The United Nations Human Rights Council is the successor of the United Nations Commission for 
Human Rights (UNCHR). 
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always succeed. Contrary to Liu’s prediction, Beijing could not deter the Nobel 
Committee from awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to her husband, Liu Xiaobo in 
2010, most likely because of Norway’s overall strong economy and relative 
economic independence from China.  Following the award of the Noble Peace Prize, 
however, China refused to issue a visa to the former Norwegian Prime Minister, 
Kjell Magne Bondevik (Ho 2012) and Norwegian salmon exports dropped 
substantially because of stricter inspections by Chinese custom officials (Amland & 
Ritter 2011, Bardsley 2011). Similarly, the Dalai Lama presents another discernible 
point of contention, and engagement with the Dalai Lama has elicited Chinese 
sanctions in the past. In a telling example, Beijing closed the Chinese offices of the 
Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (FNS), a German foundation, after it co-sponsored a 
conference for the Dalai Lama. 
Research has in fact shown that China actually makes good on its threats of 
economic consequences, setting a clear pattern in which bilateral trade drops for 
two consecutive years after a trade partner receives the Dalai Lama in an official 
capacity, an insight that will be elaborated upon further in this thesis and is known 
as the Dalai Lama Effect (Fuchs & Klann, RFI 2008). Another recent example is the 
significant decline in Sino-Japanese trade following the territorial dispute over the 
Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea.6 However, here Beijing leveraged its economic 
capabilities more saliently. In 2010, China temporarily suspended its exports of rare 
earth elements to Japan, an essential for its hi-tech manufacturers (Inoue2010). 
Interestingly, China’s financial power plays an increasingly important role as well. In 
a China Daily op-ed, Jin Baisong, Deputy Director of the Chinese Academy of 
International Trade, recommended that Beijing use its financial clout. He suggested 
that Beijing use as leverage its position as Japan’s biggest external buyer of bonds 
valued US$230 billion (bn) to cut off Japanese funding (Jin 2011). China had 
increased its purchase of Japanese government bonds by 70% between 2010 and 
2011 and is thus a significant source of financing for Japan’s government and by 
                                                     
6
 Known as the Senkaku islands in Japan 
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extension, its economy. Pang Li’s cartoon that accompanied the op-ed piece 
candidly captures Beijing’s realisation of its economic clout (See Figure 1). 
Japan is not an isolated case. China is also the biggest holder of US treasuries, a fact 
that prompted the Congressional Research Service (CRS) to draft a report in 2008 
examining the implications of US dependence on Chinese funding. The report 
addressed the concern voiced by policy makers and economists “that China might 
try to use its large holdings of US securities, including US public debt, as leverage 
against US policies it opposes” and concludes that “attempts by China to unload a 
large share of its US securities holdings could have a significant negative impact on 
the US economy […]” (Morrison & Labonte 2008). However, China’s economic 
interdependence with Japan and the US makes such a move unlikely. China’s 
purchase of US debt indirectly finances Chinese exports and as such forms an 
important part of China’s economy.  
China’s relationship with Kazakhstan diverges significantly from the type of inter-
dependent relationship between China and the US or Japan. However, these 
examples do illustrate that China increasingly attempts to leverage its economic 
power to pursue broader foreign policy objectives, which also defines the research 
question of this thesis. The thesis will specifically address the causal relationship 
between economic influence and political ends in the context of a hierarchical7 
economic relationship. Beijing is Kazakhstan’s most important trade partner, key 
external creditor and an important source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), while 
Kazakhstan represents only a small fraction of Chinese trade and finance. The result 
is an asymmetrical relationship which Beijing exploits to further its foreign policy 
goals in Kazakhstan. These broader foreign goals include obtaining further access to 
Kazakhstani energy resources and maximising Beijing’s control over shared water 
resources. 
                                                     
7
 The term hierarchy and asymmetry will be used interchangeable throughout the thesis 
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Figure 1 China’s threat to leverage its economic and financial clout to harm Japan’s 
economy 
 
The emergence of an asymmetrical relationship is not new in Chinese history. For 
centuries, economic variables have played a crucial role in China’s engagement with 
the world and its periphery, including Central Asia. Up until the Qing Dynasty8, 
Chinese Dynasties conducted trade within the Tribute System (Fairbank & Goldman 
2006:171), which blended economic capabilities with politics from an early stage. 
The system was based on conditionality: China’s neighbours gained the right to 
trade with Beijing as long as they recognised the Chinese emperor as the son of 
heaven and thus China as the leading regional civilisation. The tribute system was, 
at least in theory, based on Confucian principles that inform a desirable, stable 
social order which organised relationships along hierarchical pathways. As such, the 
tribute system was designed to organise and maintain relationships of inequality or 
hierarchy. From a Chinese point of view, this often fluctuated between economic 
dependence and interdependencies and thus led to varied degrees of hierarchy9. 
The system also generated a number of political outcomes: it created stability along 
                                                     
8
 The Qing Dynasty shaped, managed and presided over a long-lasting international order in East 
Asia, a distinctive international system with its own organizational principles (Zhang 2001:44). Due to 
its stability and longevity the system is also referred to as Pax Sinica of which the tribute system was 
part and parcel.  
9
 The relative strength of the Dynasty determined how hierarchical the relationship was.  For a 
discussion on the ordering principles of the tribute system and how the system takes disorder as its 
starting point see Qin, 2010 (Qin 2010). 
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China’s north-western frontier by fostering economic dependencies, and when this 
was not possible, by ‘buying off local tribes’. The general structure that grew out of 
the Tribute System made Central Asia part of a Sino-centric regional system with 
China at its apex, gaining economically from profits generated along the Silk Road. 
In light of growing academic conjecture about the possibility of a return to a 
hierarchical system in Eastern and Central Asia (Kang 2007), a study of China’s 
bilateral relationship with Kazakhstan will provide important insights into the 
implications of China’s rise for international politics. 
 
1.1 Thesis Objectives and Methodology  
The immediate objective of this research is to understand how Beijing can use as 
leverage its economic capabilities in an asymmetrical economic relationship to 
pursue political ends, with Kazakhstan serving as a case study. They hypothesis that 
lies at the heart of this objective is that China’s accumulated economic activities in 
Kazakhstan have generated an economic dependency of Kazakhstan on China, 
which China can leverage towards political ends. 
This research aims to answer a number of inter-related research questions including 
(1) whether economic dependency is a deliberate process facilitated by Beijing 
(Chapter 5), (2) what economic levers drive dependency (Chapters 3-5), (3) whether 
China can control these levers (Chapter 5), and (4) whether and how Beijing can 
effectively leverage its economic influence for foreign policy objectives (Chapter 7). 
The first question will elucidate if Beijing is aware that economic dependencies can 
be instrumentalised to meet foreign policy objectives and is incentivised to deploy 
these. The second question will contribute to understand what economic 
capabilities drive dependencies. The third question will provide insights into 
whether Beijing can control its economic levers, such as its National Oil 
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Corporations (NOCs) which is a prerequisite to turning economic influence into a 
foreign policy instrument. Influence over the investment decisions of SWFs or NOCs 
should allow policy makers to condition benefits of trade and investment in 
negotiations.  The last question investigates whether Beijing is able to leverage its 
economic influence and how along a conflict of interest between Kazakhstan and 
China. 
As such the scope of the thesis is limited to understanding whether and how China 
can translate its economic influence into political power, by taking Sino-Kazakhstani 
relations as a case study. The thesis is not a comparative case study that 
investigates whether economic dependencies exist between China and other 
Central Asian states, or to what degree relations with China differ between these 
states.   
In answering these questions, the thesis also sheds light on the specific 
characteristics of the bilateral relationship between China and Kazakhstan. Several 
different drivers that shape China’s economic influence in Kazakhstan are identified, 
including actors involved in China’s foreign policymaking, such as government 
agencies and the large State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). This detailed study enables 
an analysis of where and how China proactively facilitates economic dependencies 
and hierarchies and an analysis of how Kazakhstan fits into the formulation of 
China’s foreign policy. The key hypothesis will be split into two parts which will be 
investigated in two main sections of this thesis.   
The first part of the thesis presents a quantitative and qualitative analysis of China’s 
economic influence in Kazakhstan to investigate the hypothesis that China’s 
accumulated economic activities in Kazakhstan have generated an economic 
dependency. This section will also investigate the drivers and actors of economic 
dependence such as Kazakhstan’s domestic political context a variable that become 
only salient as this research project progressed, China’s National Oil Companies 
(NOCs) and Financial Institutions (FIs).  Based on the results of this analysis, the 
21 
 
thesis proposes a hypothesis about the political leverage that China can derive from 
its economic influence in Kazakhstan which will then be tested in the second part of 
the thesis. The hypothesis is supported through a number of sub-hypotheses that 
were further refined through qualitative data such as interviews and written 
correspondence within and outside of Kazakhstan, newspaper articles, journals, 
online resources, reports and government documents. The opacity of the Chinese 
foreign policy-making process presented a significant obstacle to the research. As a 
result, the research focused primarily on the outcome of Chinese foreign policy in 
Kazakhstan, drawing inferences about Chinese foreign policy objectives from there. 
Unfortunately, this approach also has shortcomings. It is possible that policy 
outcomes are interpreted as the result of a deliberate choice and process when 
they are in reality coincidental. The precise drivers of the observed outcomes can 
only be established beyond doubt if more details are known about the policy-
making processes in Beijing.  
Interviews were conducted in English and German with officials, diplomats and 
experts in and outside of Kazakhstan. Most interviews were conducted under strict 
anonymity. Resources used are in English, Russian, Chinese and German. However, 
interviews in Kazakhstan were conducted in English, which may have introduced a 
certain bias towards opinions of a group of individuals who have been very well-
educated inside and outside of Kazakhstan and whose views do not necessarily 
reflect those of the wider Kazakhstani population.  
The second part of the thesis subsequently tests China’s ability to leverage 
economic dependencies towards political ends, against an in-depth case study on 
the Sino-Kazakh water dispute. This case study was chosen for the following 
reasons:  
1. China and Kazakhstan pursue diametrically opposing objectives. In a 
competitive situation where interests do not overlap, it is possible to 
observe whether China can maximise its objectives against Kazakhstan’s 
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national interests. In such a competitive situation, it is possible to observe 
whether China can maximise its objectives against Kazakhstan’s interests 
and determine to what extent Beijing manages to get Kazakhstan’s 
government to make concessions against its own interest. This is in line with 
Robert A. Dahl’s concept of power based on the idea one can affect 
outcomes (Dahl 1957). It is thus more suitable for this inquiry than situations 
in which China’s and Kazakhstan’s interests overlap.  
2. The dispute takes place in an area of international relations that is regulated 
but suffers from significant enforcement weaknesses. This setting can 
elucidate insights into China’s foreign policy because its actions are less 
constrained than in many other areas.  This also applies to Kazakhstan’s geo-
strategic setting. Unlike along its south-eastern periphery, Beijing’s foreign 
policy is less constrained in Kazakhstan through a softer presence of great 
powers such as the US.  
3. The Sino-Kazakh water dispute has arguably been overlooked in IR research 
and the thesis aims to fill this academic gap. 
The thesis will proceed as follows: 
Part I starts with a discussion of Kazakhstan’s political system to provide a wider 
context against which China grows its economic influence in Kazakhstan. This is not 
reflecting the chronological progress of this research as Kazakhstan’s domestic 
politics became a variable only towards the end of this research project. However, 
the author decided to place this chapter at the beginning of the thesis to provide 
the reader with some context against which the following chapters will be 
discussed. The chapter on Kazakhstan’s political landscape illustrates that 
Kazakhstan’s political elite is an important variable that facilitates China’s growing 
economic influence. Part I goes on to analyse Chinese finance, trade and investment 
in Kazakhstan based on criteria developed in the theory chapter, demonstrating 
that Kazakhstan has become economically dependent on China thereby introducing 
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a steep hierarchy in the bilateral relationship. The financial crisis of 2009 was an 
inflection point that accelerated China’s dominance as Kazakhstan’s key external 
creditor and top trade partner. This dependency is driven by Beijing’s objectives and 
Kazakhstan’s ruling elite, which uses Chinese investment to consolidate its power 
and to maintain power by meeting its revenue needs.   Part I concludes with a 
discussion of Chinese actors involved in extending China’s economic capabilities 
into Kazakhstan, as well as the immediate outcomes for Beijing. China’s overall 
economic involvement in Kazakhstan implies that it has become a stakeholder in 
the country and Beijing  is now  deeply invested in Kazakhstan’s political and 
economic stability, which also feeds into the on-going debate in China on the role of 
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in protecting Chinese assets abroad.  
Below is an overview of the hypothesis and sub-hypotheses that this thesis will 
investigate including chapter references. Some of these sub-hypotheses were 
adjusted whilst research progressed. An analysis into the causes of economic 
dependency revealed that Kazakhstan’s political system is an important variable. 
However, an analysis into the full extent of this role is somewhat limited by the 
scope of this research whose primary objective is to understand whether China can 
leverage economic dependencies. The next chapter will provide further background 
on how the below hypotheses were developed.  
Lead Hypothesis: China’s accumulated economic activities in Kazakhstan have 
generated an economic dependency of Kazakhstan on China (A), which China can 
leverage towards political ends (B). The lead hypothesis will be split into two 
secondary hypotheses that are tested through Part I and Part II of the thesis. 
(A) China’s accumulated economic activities in Kazakhstan have created an 
economic dependency. This will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 based on the 
following sub-hypotheses: 
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1. China’s financial influence in Kazakhstan has built significant dependencies 
especially after the Global Financial Crisis driven by the fact that China has 
become the lender of last resort. This will be discussed in Chapter 4 
2. China is Kazakhstan’s most important trading partner and a key source of 
foreign direct investment which further facilitates economic dependencies 
driven by the economic complementary of both economies and their 
geographic proximity. This will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
3. Before 2005, China’s prominent trade and investment position was driven 
without significant political support from Beijing; however since 2009 
Beijing’s political support has become more direct. This will be discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
 
(B) China can leverage these dependencies if it effectively controls the drivers of 
economic influence or if Kazakhstani policy makers perceive of such control 
  
4. On the aggregate level, Beijing does not control the levers of economic 
influence in Kazakhstan. This will be discussed in Chapter 5 
5. Chinese drivers of trade and investment are especially China’s NOC which 
proactively enlisted Beijing’s help to overcome Kazakhstan’s resistance to 
further Chinese resource investments. This will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
6. Kazakhstani decision makers perceive of China as a unitary actor in terms of 
economic activity and perceive it credible that Beijing can control the levers 
of its economic influence. This will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
Part II of this thesis analyses whether China can use its economic position as 
leverage to meet foreign policy objectives, using an in-depth case study. Beijing 
extracts water from a transboundary water source over which Astana and Beijing 
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have been in dispute for over twenty years. A detailed analysis of the dispute 
reveals that Beijing can use its economic power as leverage in Kazakhstan to 
maximise its foreign policy goals at the expense of Kazakhstan’s national interest. 
The Kazakhstani government deliberately decides not to challenge Beijing and thus 
enables China to continue with its water abstractions at the expense of 
Kazakhstan’s access to a fresh water supply (Dahl 1957). The case study takes place 
in an area of international environmental cooperation, which is increasingly 
regulated by state practice, universally-acknowledged conventions and 
international environmental law. And whilst this space has seen some of the earliest 
from of inter-national cooperation and even supra-national institution building, it 
also suffers from perceived weaknesses associated with the implementation of 
international environmental law that China seeks to exploit. The thesis will conclude 
that Kazakhstan’s domestic context is a key variable that fosters China’s economic 
influence and allows Beijing to manipulate its economic influence towards political 
ends. This is less the outcome of a deliberate Chinese foreign policy strategy 
towards Kazakhstan than a result of Kazakhstan’s increased demand for revenues, 
driven by the elite.  
Hypotheses of Part II    
Secondary hypothesis: China can leverage its economic dependence in Kazakhstan 
to pursue political interests, especially in its water dispute with Kazakhstan, where 
China is able to pursue its foreign policy interests. This will be discussed in Part II of 
the thesis.  
Sub- hypotheses that were developed as research for this thesis progressed: 
1. Kazakhstani decision makers avoid antagonising Beijing and instead 
acquiesce with Beijing’s interests because of Kazakhstan’s economic 
dependence on China. This will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
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2. Kazakhstan’s economic dependence can better explain its behaviour in the 
dispute than alternative theories, especially those that draw on Kazakhstan’s 
Soviet legacy. This will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
3. Kazakhstan undermines its own bargaining position through its reluctance to 
improve water consumption at home. This will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
4. It is unlikely that Beijing exerts direct threats in the water dispute, rather 
Kazakhstani policy makers pre-emptively acquiesce Beijing to maximise 
future revenue opportunities through China’s economic involvement in 
Kazakhstan. This will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
5. In its water dispute with Kazakhstan, China applies lessons learnt from a 
similar conflict along the Mekong River. This will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
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 Theory Chapter 2 
2.1 The Link between Economic Influence and Political Power   
IR acknowledges that economics is part of a state’s overall capabilities, which in 
turn determine its relative position in the international system. Baldwin suggests 
that economic means are one way to exert power in international relations by: 
“Augmenting or reducing the goods and services available to other countries has a 
long history in world politics” (Baldwin 2013: 277).10 Although the link between 
economic capabilities and political objectives appears intuitive at first, the subject is 
still under-theorised in IR and mostly focuses on security (high level politics) and 
sanctions (Baldwin 1985).  The imposition of sanctions or trade restrictions seeks to 
change the behaviour of the target state, by depriving it of revenues linked to trade.  
For example, Economic Diplomacy, a subfield of IR analyses the role of economics in 
foreign policy. However, it places most emphasis on sanctions, and scrutinises 
multilateral economic negotiation and cooperation in a global setting, such as the 
G8. For example, Economic Diplomacy analyses how business actors contribute to 
global negotiations such as climate change (Falkner 2003, Fuchs 2005, Bayne & 
Woolcock 2007).   
Similarly, Dependencia scholars analyse the economic relationships between states. 
However, although Dependencia literature would lend itself to this thesis by name, 
it does not support the research question at hand because of its different research 
objective, epistemology and premise. The origin of Dependencia scholarship is 
closely linked to Raul Prebisch, the Director of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America.  The Commission observed in the second half of the 
twentieth century that South American economies stagnated in their development 
whilst others, especially the US and Europe made great strides (Ferraro 2009). This 
informed an ensuing academic debate with the primary objective to locate and 
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 Carlsnaes, Risse and Simmons (2013): Handbook of International Relations. 
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understand the causes of underdevelopment in countries in the developing world, 
especially South America. The prevailing view was that developing countries were 
locked into an international capital system that curtailed their autonomy and 
significantly limited the ability of governments to shape their own path to economic 
development. Economic development is understood as producing economic growth 
but also industrialisation in the broadest sense. As such Dependencia scholars 
operate with a developmental concept of dependence. Dependencia scholars 
shifted the focus away from domestic factors to exogenous variables. However, as 
will be discussed in greater detail further on, Dependencia offers limited insight into 
the research question at hand, especially into questions about how economic 
dependencies can be defined, facilitated and operationalised to serve as political 
leverage. Moreover, an emerging body of research challenges Dependencia’s 
approach to and explanatory capacity for underdevelopment, by refocusing on  the 
importance of domestic institutions in fostering economic development and 
competitiveness.11  
IR theories have focused less on how states use their economic power to affect the 
economy of another state in order to further their foreign policy objectives, in a 
manner that falls short of or precedes outright trade sanctions. For example in their 
comprehensive analysis of China’s economic impact on Latin America, Rhys Jenkins 
and Enrique Dussel Peters (eds.) narrowly focus on the economic impact that China 
has on this region but exclude its political consequences (Jenkins and Dussel Peters 
2009). 
The potential of economic influence to generate political outcomes lies at the heart 
of the First Great Debate in IR and has shaped the development of the discipline 
until today.  In ‘The Great Illusion’, published in 1910, Norman Angell argued for the 
                                                     
11
 For examples “Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity”, by Acemoglu and Robinson, 
and “Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters” by Beseley and Persson.  
Both publications focus on organisational design and argue that the quality of public institutions 
determines economic development. These theories are geographically agnostic and propose 
answers beyond Latin America’s historical experience   
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constraining effects of economic interdependence on political conflict.  Using cost-
benefit calculations, Angell concluded that bilateral trade made war too expensive a 
choice for either trade partner. His book was extremely popular among the 
intellectual and political elites in Europe.12  However, the outbreak of WW1 just 
four years later highlighted that the relationship between trade and political 
outcomes can take unpredictable forms and led to E.H Carr’s famous Realist 
response. Nevertheless, Angell laid the foundation for modern IR scholars such as 
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, who link economic interdependence to a 
relational concept of power and argue that “power deriv(es) from patterns of 
asymmetrical interdependence between actors in the issue-areas in which they are 
involved with one another” (Keohane & Nye 1973, 1977 and 1987).  Keohane and 
Nye build on Albert Hirschman’s work who argues that the economic relationship 
between two nations can generate political influence because the potential of 
interrupting that economic relationship (i.e. trade) increases the bargaining power 
of the economic partner who can more easily cope with the loss of that economic 
relationship (Hirschman 1945). However, like Hirschman Keohane and Nye do not 
define the causal mechanism by which states manage to translate that asymmetry 
into political power (Crescenzi, 2003). 
 
For analytical clarity, such asymmetrical interdependence can be simply labelled as 
‘dependence’. The term ‘interdependence’ implies a mutual level of dependence, 
which rarely exists in relations between states. Lake makes this point clear:  
“Trade has long been understood to create the potential for political 
influence […]. If a state has many trade partners it is likely to have 
greater political autonomy and any attempt to manipulate trade for 
political purposes will be ineffective. If a state is highly dependent on 
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 For example Barbara Tuchman’s “The Guns of August” assumed cult status within a very short 
period of time, and although widely read by decision makers could not stymie the dynamics leading 
to World War I (Tuchman 1965). 
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trade with another, however, it is vulnerable to the influence of that 
state.” (Lake 2009:47)  
As exemplified in Lake’s statement above, relevant IR theories usually focus on 
trade which can be used for foreign policy gains, if it creates relationships of 
dependencies that in turn have the potential to provide political leverage (Lake 
2009, Hirschman 1980, Keohane & Nye 1977, Baldwin 1985). However, because IR 
literature predominantly focuses on trade, it implicitly equates a country’s trade 
capabilities with its economic capabilities and thereby neglects other levers 
including finance and investment. There is no reason why a trade-related theory 
cannot apply to finance and investment as well. Taken together, these components 
can create dependencies that result in an asymmetrical relationship between two 
states. It is this asymmetrical or hierarchic nature of an economic relationship that 
connotes a “relationship of subordination” (Baldwin 1996) and which serves as the 
intermediary between economic influence and political power. Hierarchy creates 
the possibility to employ economic means towards political ends (Kahler & Kastner 
2006, Lake 2007, Baldwin 1995).13 These asymmetrical relationships also underlie 
the rationale for international sanctions. The UN imposes sanctions against specific 
regimes in the hope of exploiting such dependencies and bringing about 
behavioural changes in the target country. In other words, sanctions can only be 
operationalised because they impose more damage on the target state than on the 
host state. However, as will be discussed further below, sanctions are the last resort 
of policy options.  In the case of Kazakhstan’s dependence on China, this thesis will 
demonstrate that it is the fear of a reduction in overall future economic investment 
rather than sanctions themselves that drives the thinking of Kazakhstani decision 
makers.   
This poses the question as to why China is interested in proactively pursuing such 
dependencies in the first place. Drawing on contractual theory, Lake argues that 
countries deliberately pursue hierarchical relationships to fend off the opportunity 
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 The term ‘dependence’ will be operationalised further below. 
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costs associated with the defection of their partner. These costs in turn are 
determined by the degree to which their partner’s assets are relationally specific, 
which describes how easily they can be substituted (Lake 1999:8). Lake illustrates 
the concept alongside the US military strategy since 1945, which involved building a 
forward-based defence strategy in the Pacific based on a seamless net of naval 
bases. However, geo-strategically the net was only effective with the participation 
of specific countries including the Philippines, Japan and Guam.  To prevent these 
countries from defecting or exploiting their status, the US locked them into 
hierarchical relationships of dependence (Lake 1999). Although Lake has primarily 
developed his concept with security cooperation in mind, his underlying logic is 
applicable wherever cooperation and transactions take place: the more relationally 
specific a country’s assets are, the higher the opportunity costs associated with a 
‘defection’ for its partner. In Kazakhstan’s case, Beijing has an incentive to lock 
Kazakhstan into such a hierarchical relationship, because it is heavily invested in 
Kazakhstani oil and gas resources and infrastructure on the ground. Energy 
resources are highly specific geographically and difficult to substitute.  Energy 
cooperation with Kazakhstan plays an increasingly important role in Beijing’s energy 
security and the hierarchical relationship prevents Astana from defecting from 
these arrangements (Chapter 4).  
2.2 Hierarchy, Hegemony and Empire in IR 
The Westphalian legalist concept of state sovereignty obscures our understanding 
of the fact that states are not equal in practice (Lake 2009, Tucker 1977). In reality, 
many international relations bear striking asymmetries and are thus hierarchic 
(Clark 1989, Tucker 1977). For example, the relationship between the US and 
Canada or China and Cambodia is not one of economic or political equals. This is 
also highlighted by the UN Security Council, where the permanent five members 
(P5) wield significantly more power in and beyond the organisation. 
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By extension, economic hierarchies are embedded in the wider debate on the 
nature of empire and hegemony in IR. For example, Michael Doyle, the leading 
authority on empire studies, defines an empire as a relationship of effective political 
control imposed by some societies over the effective sovereignty of other societies 
(Doyle 1986:12). The key indicator is the dominant metropole’s direct or indirect 
control of the foreign and domestic policies of another country (Doyle 1986: 12). 
Imperialism is driven by a mix of economic, military, political, social and cultural 
instruments.  Hegemony in contrast limits such control to a state’s foreign policy 
(Doyle 1986:40). Both views capture extreme forms of dependency where states 
lose their external or internal sovereignty, or both. This perspectives also fail to 
recognise that sovereignty is multifaceted and divisible into different components 
(Lake 2007: 57);  a state can lose its sovereignty in one issue area, for example,  to 
set an independent monetary policy but maintain its sovereignty in another, such as 
its decisions concerning what alliances or organisations to join. Analytically, this 
offers a helpful framework to discern how China uses its economic influence 
effectively as leverage in only a selected or narrow set of issues, without 
comprehensively eroding Kazakhstan’s internal or external sovereignty.  
The thesis will argue that while China leverages its economic weight in Kazakhstan 
to maximise its foreign policy objectives at the expense of Kazakhstan’s national 
interests, this falls short of attaining comprehensive control over Kazakhstan’s 
foreign policy. Nevertheless, even if hierarchical relationships lead to the selective 
infringement of a state’s sovereignty, they can be the precursors to hegemony and, 
in extreme cases, to empires. As the case study in this thesis will show, Beijing now 
controls the bilateral agenda and a narrow set of outcomes on certain issues in the 
bilateral relationship which, taken together, can be interpreted as  early signs of a 
developing hegemony.  
Lake alludes to such partial infringements when he proposes the possibility of a 
middle way by defining a hierarchy as a complex relationship between two actors 
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 “[…] when one actor, the dominant state, possesses authority over 
another actor, the subordinate state. Authority is never total, of course, 
but varies in extent.” (Lake 2007:56)  
However, he recognises that political power and forms of coercion are inextricably 
linked and often difficult to disentangle (Lake 2007:50), because authority is based 
on the subordinate state’s recognition that the dominant state’s authority is 
legitimate. This implies a certain willingness by the subordinate state to comply 
with the authority or interests of the dominant state. According to Lake, a state’s 
failure to diversify its trade partners or by extension to change the root of its 
dependence is in fact an implicit acknowledgement of the dominant state’s 
legitimate authority.  Such a view of legitimate political authority draws heavily on 
Max Weber’s acknowledgement that legitimate authority (Herrschaft) is a special 
sub-type of power (Macht). Indeed, this thesis will show that Kazakhstan does not 
diversity its economic partners away from China. However, Astana likely submits to 
Chinese interests not because it recognises Beijing’s authority as legitimate but 
because it acknowledges that economic dependence on China may be the price or 
opportunity cost to maintaining its political power structure.  This power structure 
refers to the particular distribution of power in Kazakhstan in the hands of small 
elite that turns to Chinese trade, finance and investment to stay in power (Chapter 
2). Although Lake’s distinction between legitimate power and coercion is difficult to 
apply to the Sino-Kazakh relationship, Kazakhstan’s economic dependence allows 
Beijing to exert some form of political control. This thesis highlights several 
situations where Kazakhstan acquiesces to Chinese interests despite acting against 
its own national interests, as would be expected by Dahl’s definition of relational 
power (Dahl 1957).14 
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 Dahl defines power as getting one party to do what it would not to otherwise (Dahl 1957). 
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2.3 Operationalising Economic Dependence  
Focusing on trade alone oversimplifies the analysis of the politics of international 
economic relationships between China and Kazakhstan. A comprehensive analysis 
must take the sum of all economic components into consideration.  Finance and 
investment, have a big impact on the overall level of economic dependence, which 
can then be translated into political gains. This thesis will, therefore, analyse the 
weight of China’s economic presence in Kazakhstan for finance, trade and 
investment. Such an approach can provide greater analytical insights into the actors 
and drivers within each of these economic levers. The following section proposes 
definitions for dependence that can be applied to trade, finance and investment.  
However, a distinctive challenge emerges in any attempt to operationalise 
economic dependency. The body of IR literature on the link between economic 
influence and political power is small and overwhelmingly concerned with trade 
relationships. Hence, some of the reasoning of this thesis extends the existing 
theory to the finance and investment fields as well.  
Notions of dependence are referenced and employed across many IR paradigms. 
Indeed, one of the contentious points that fuel the on-going debates between 
Realists and Liberalists focuses on the role that dependence can play in mitigating 
the effects of anarchy on international cooperation.   
Nye and Keohane deal extensively with the notion of complex interdependence and 
its positive effects on international cooperation (Nye and Keohane 2011). They posit 
that a specific version of dependence, namely inter-dependence, mitigates the 
effects of international anarchy and allows states to cooperate successfully. This is 
based on the premise that states seek absolute, rather than relative cooperation 
gains. Realists refute this assumption and maintain that interdependence has no 
lasting effect on systemic anarchy because of their premise that states are primarily 
concerned with relative and not absolute gains and thus refuse to enter a 
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cooperative agreement which allows the cooperation partner to benefit more in 
relative terms.15 
Because of semantic similarities, a discussion of dependence invokes connotations 
of Dependencia literature, which belongs to the Marxist and Post-Modern traditions 
in IR. However, as briefly discussed earlier, Dependencia differs significantly from 
the research interest of this thesis in terms of the theory’s research objective and 
methodology. More specifically Dependencia’s structural view of historic 
interactions between the metropole and its periphery is not applicable to the Sino-
Kazakhstani relationship. Dependencia also lacks a definition of the term 
dependence and applies dependence differently from the thesis. The following 
paragraphs will elaborate these differences and use Dependencia to illustrate that, 
the concept of dependence itself is still under-theorised, despite its frequent use 
across IR theories, which posits obstacles to its operationalisation.  
Dependencia theory emerged in response to the observation that developed 
countries especially the USA progressed in their economic development whereas 
the developing economies of Latin America stagnated or even reversed. 
Dependencia critiqued the then predominant development theories which located 
the causes for economic under-development in a country’s domestic setting, 
especially in its “soft” social factors such as religion and culture (Friedmann & 
Wayne 1977).  Instead Dependencia scholars such as Frank (1969) and Brett (1974)  
broke with this view and shifted the focus to external factors by drawing on a model 
of the international capital system that explained various stages of economic 
development through exogenous historic factors (Kuhnen 1987). 
The root for dependence is seen in the historic relationships between the 
developed world (metropolis) and the underdeveloped world (periphery), perhaps 
best captured in the period of Colonialism. Advanced economies such as the US or 
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 For a discussion about the different assumptions of Neoliberalism and Realism on conditions for 
international cooperation see Hasenclever et. al. (2000) 
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Europe (metropolis) are at the centre of the world economy. By integrating 
developing economies (periphery) the metropolis constraints their economic 
development. For example, colonisation forced under-developed economies to 
integrate into the international capital system and to transfer their surplus in 
technological knowledge, productivity or resources to the core (developed world) 
through disadvantageous trade agreements. This led to the systematic exploitation 
of developing countries and their economic stagnation. 
 This historical interaction between metropole and periphery creates a structure 
that continually recreates and thus reaffirms the state of underdevelopment 
(Wayne 1977). Developing countries cannot break free from this asymmetric 
relationship as long as they participate in the international capital system.  
Although Dependencia scholars contribute to our understanding of the causes of 
various levels of economic development, they do not further the research objective 
of this thesis which does not investigate the level of economic development in 
Kazakhstan or China. Instead it investigates how economic influence can be 
operationalised for foreign policy purposes. A Dependencia guided analysis of 
China’s economic influence in Kazakhstan could produce paradoxical results and 
prescribe solutions that could further exacerbate those factors that facilitate 
Kazakhstan’s dependence on China. Because Dependencia scholars consider the 
integration into the international capital system as a key inhibitor to economic 
development, they view an exit as the solution such as greater nationalisation and 
state involvement in the economy.   However, as the thesis will show, it is the 
nationalisation of resources and centralisation of economic assets under state 
control that facilitate Kazakhstan’s economic dependence on China. Thus 
liberalisation of the economy can break this dependency and limit the scope for 
nepotism and corruption which made Kazakhstan’s economy and especially its 
financial system vulnerable- a vulnerability that allowed Beijing to expand its 
economic influence with acquiescence of the Kazakhstani regime. 
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 A Dependencia guided analysis does not capture the Sino-Kazakhstani relationship. 
Accordingly, China should be conceptualised as the periphery and Kazakhstan as the 
metropole, given that China’s level of economic development is lower than 
Kazakhstan’s. Kazakhstan ranks 69th on the UN’s 2012 Human Development Index 
(HDI) with “High Human Development” and China 101st as a Medium Human 
Development country.   Thus Dependencia takes China’s dependence on Kazakhstan 
as a point of departure. However, the thesis will demonstrate that in economic 
terms the reverse holds true.  Similarly, if one considers income instead of 
development Kazakhstan and China are on par as “upper middle-income” countries 
(WorldBank 2013a, WorldBank 2013b) which does not accommodate a dependency 
relationship based on Dependencia. 
Furthermore, the history of Sino-Kazakhstani relations is relatively young and lacks 
a colonial component. Both established diplomatic relations only in 1992. Similarly, 
Kazakhstan and China sought to integrate into the world capital system at a similar 
time given the broader historic context: Kazakhstan, following its independence 
from the Soviet Union in 1992 and China thirteen years earlier following Deng 
Xiaopeng’s open door policy. A metropole-periphery view might be better suited to 
an analysis of Kazakhstan’s relationship with Russia if conceptualised as a 
relationship between a former colony and colonial power. However, this view is not 
uncontested among Dependencia scholars. 
Even if one conceptualises China as the Metropole Kazakhstan is not locked in a 
hierarchical relationship that leaves it with little control over its economic 
development. It was perhaps the most striking finding of this thesis that 
Kazakhstan’s economic dependence on China is not so much the result of 
Kazakhstan’s structural and historic circumstances but rather the result of intrinsic 
weaknesses in Kazakhstan’s politico-economic structure and the foreign policy 
decisions of its ruling elite. In theory, Kazakhstan has the choice to diversify its 
foreign trade, finance and investment sources widely, however instead Astana 
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seeks an economic dependence on China by choice, because the regime likely views 
the associated opportunity costs as acceptable trade-offs. Dependencia does not 
account for such a voluntary submission to dependence. Instead, the author found 
Neoclassic Realism much better suited to produce insights into Chinese foreign 
policy towards Kazakhstan.  
Neoclassical Realism may be limited in acknowledging the full extent to which 
Kazakhstan’s political system drives these outcomes with China, especially its 
authoritarian characteristics. Field research revealed that Kazakhstan closely 
resembles a neopatrimonial Rentier State16, a governance structure which appears 
to further exacerbate Kazakhstan’s growing economic dependency on China 
because of economic weaknesses and different cost-benefit calculations associated 
with such a regime. However, it is also possible that Kazakhstan concedes to 
Chinese interests because both nations are governed by authoritarian regimes. For 
example, the research for this thesis found indicators that Kazakhstani politicians 
have incentives to accept credit lines from China because they are disbursed in an 
in-transparent manner, shielded from public scrutiny, which is a common 
characteristic of authoritarian states. However, the potential effect of this variable 
falls outside the analytical lens of Neoclassical Realism. The genesis of authoritarian 
regimes and the role that regime consent plays between such regimes, rather than 
economic factors is perhaps better captured by scholarship on authoritarian 
diffusion17. Brinks and Coppedge for example developed a data base which shows 
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Terry Lynn Karl a leading scholar on oil exporters defines a Rentier State as a “state that lives from 
externally generated rents rather than the surplus production of the population.”  (Karl 2007:2). In a 
neopatrimonial state the ruler directs "all political decisions through a network of personal 
relationships” (Pawelka, cited in Franke et al 2009). The right to rule is embodied in a person not an 
institution and authority is exercised through transfers of public resources. Personal loyalty and 
dependence relationships define the entire system. “Neopatrimonial” initially described a distinct 
form of governance in Sub-Saharan countries but has recently been applied to Central Asian regimes 
where the head of state derives authority and legitimacy from patronage networks. The right to rule 
is embodied in a person not an institution and authority is exercised through transfers of public 
resources. Personal loyalty and dependence relationships define the entire system.   
17 Scholars who investigate regime diffusion in Central Asia include Tomila Lankina (2006). Thomas 
Ambrosio (2009) and Jeffrey Kopstein, et al. (2000), Brinks & Coppedge (2006), Kathleen Colllins 
(2006) 
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that the geographic proximity of countries appears to affect the diffusion of specific 
regime types (Brinks and Coppedge, 2006). Students of diffusion studies may find 
especially Chapter 3 on Kazakhstan’s political system and the case study of this 
thesis insightful in terms of how two authoritarian states engage with each other. 
However, the effects of diffusion and an analysis of whether and how the 
geographic proximity to China can explain why Kazakhstan features a specific 
regime type today, namely that of a Neopatrimonial Rentier State, rests outside the 
scope of this research.  
Dependency  
Like other theories in IR that reference dependence, Dependencia scholars rarely 
operationalise the term itself (Caporaso 1978). “Dependency” and “dependent” are 
often treated synonymously. Where scholars distinguish, “dependency” connotes 
the lack of a state’s autonomy over its economic development goals (Caporaso 
1978) and “dependence” implies reliance on others. However, “dependency” which 
rests at the heart of Dependencia “[…] can only be understood (i.e. it’s original and 
intended meaning preserved) only within a certain body of historical, political, and 
sociological thought” (Caporaso 1978:19). Caporaso goes even further and argues 
that “[…] dependency is not a concept in a theory at all but a synoptic term for a 
body of theory” (Caporaso 1978:19). Similarly, Duvall argues: “In the Dependencia 
“language” tradition then, the term dependence is intended to connote a general 
“frame” rather than a precise data container” (Duvall 1978: 57).  
Dependencia scholars are divided over the question on whether dependence 
should be operationalised at all. Duvall argues that “Dependencia theory can be 
about dependence without dependence being a central concept in theory […]” 
(Duvall 1978:63) and a theory that is called Dependencia does not necessarily have 
to feature dependence as a concept. To elucidate Dependencia’s specific 
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understanding of dependence, Duvall borrows Keohane and Nye’s distinction 
between sensitivity dependence and vulnerability dependence, where the latter 
constitutes a form of subordination (Duvall 1978:62f) and implies the vulnerability 
of one state to an influence attempt by another state (Crescenzi: 28). However, 
Dependencia scholars reject this form of dependence over dependence as a 
conditional relationship.  
“When dependence is used in the sense of a relation of support or 
subordination, a different orientation to measurement is called for. In 
particular, to measure dependence in the subordinate view is to assess 
an actor’s costs or needs and to determine the extent to which these 
are affected by the actions of another actor(s). “[T]his concept is not of 
much relevance to dependencia theory, which is my primary concern 
[…]”. (Duvall 1978:67) 
Consequently Dependencia does not lend itself to a positivist research 
methodology. Instead the thesis will draw on IPE scholarship to operationalise 
dependency. It will draw on a notion of dependence that necessitates 
subordination and explicitly incorporates costs and benefit calculations which 
capture the costs that any change in the relationship incurs on the dependent party 
(Lake2006). As such, dependence serves as the intermediary between economic 
influence and political power and can only work if distinctive costs are associated 
with breaking that dependence relationship, which incentivise the subordinate 
country in acquiescing with the dominant country’s interests. For example, 
Baldwin’s views dependence as an asymmetrical relationship where it is more costly 
for one party than the other to break the relationship (Baldwin 1980). This is 
comparable to a net position, where the costs for one economic partner have to be 
significantly higher than for the other, relative to their own economy and political 
system. Because it is more costly for Kazakhstan to forego its economic relationship 
with China, then vice-versa, China gains the necessary leverage to use this 
dependence to meet foreign policy objectives. The methodology and 
operationalization of dependence will be discussed further below.  
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Neoclassic Realism can accommodate a hierarchical view of international relations, 
where dependency connotes a form of subordination and align this view with a 
positivist research design that operationalises dependence in cost-benefit terms. 
For example, Gerry Simpson posits that  
“[…]the term hierarchy is…(typically used) by International Relations 
scholars to describe a system in which political, economic, and social 
status among the actors is highly differentiated even though these 
actors enjoy some measure of formal sovereign equality. Hierarchy, 
here…simply refers to the grading of states on the basis of relative 
capacity”. (Simpson 2004 cited in Lake 2006:123).” 
Thus hierarchies are the outcome of skewed distributions of capabilities in the 
international system, a view that is compatible with a Realist research design (Lake 
2006). China’s relative economic capability is the most important independent 
variable in this thesis and is the prerequisite to building economic dependencies.   
However, because the term dependence is under-theorised the thesis will borrow 
from IPE scholars such as Katherine Barbieri (1995), John Oneal and Bruce Russett 
(1997), and David A Lake (2009) to operationalize dependency.  
Barbieri, Orneal and Russett take the bilateral trade volume as a starting point and 
compare this to each trade partner’s GDP or total trade. Through additional 
mathematical manipulation this can be expressed along a spectrum from zero to 
one, where zero represents a perfect symmetrical interdependence and one an 
absolute asymmetrical dependence, or a perfect hierarchy.  These measurements 
describe whether an economic relationship between two states is hierarchical. 
However, they do not identify the actual mechanism that can turn hierarchy into 
dependency.  
Similarly, Lake assesses a country’s relative trade dependence on the US by taking 
each country’s total trade with the US, dividing it by its own GDP, and subtracting 
similar ratios for a peer group containing the P5 of the United Nations Security 
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Council (UNSC). The scale ranges from zero (no dependence) to one (highly 
dependent).  This means a state is considered dependent if its trade with the US as 
a percentage of its GDP outweighs all remaining P5 members. Lake found that 
Canada’s relationship with the US was highly dependent, especially in the mid-
1990s (Lake 2009). 18  However, this ignores the level of mutual economic 
dependency (interdependency). Although Lake found that Canadian trade was 
highly dependent on the US, his approach does not capture the fact that both 
countries are each other’s largest trade partners. Thus, manipulating trade for 
political objectives would be a high risk strategy. The above approaches measure 
economic symmetry but fail to take the wider context into consideration which is 
essential (MacDonald 2008, Crescenzi 2005). The existence of hierarchy alone does 
not drive political power. Instead opportunity costs conceptualised as the costs 
associated with the interruption of economic relationships, are the causal 
mechanism that translates economic hierarchy into dependence. These opportunity 
costs can be located both on the systemic and domestic level and capture the 
context against which economic asymmetry plays out (Crescenzi 2005).  
For example, if China decreases the import of Kazakhstani oil this will incur costs for 
Kazakhstan, in the form of decreasing revenues. However, if Kazakhstan can switch 
easily to an alternative export partner these opportunity costs should be low and 
thus Beijing’s ability to leverage the asymmetrical relationship (Crescenzi 2005:31). 
Other contextual variables that affect Kazakhstan’s opportunity costs are its 
landlocked geography; its proximity to China; its resource-dependent economy and 
its political system.    A focus on opportunity costs also reflects the difference 
between sensitivity and vulnerability dependence: 
“A state has to be affected by changes in the behaviour of another 
state. This is a necessary but not sufficient condition for dependence. 
However, if the costs associated with these changes are high because 
                                                     
18
 Lake measures dependence along four indicators: independence, trade dependence, security 
dependence and alliances and recognises the cross-over effects into political issues (Lake 2007).  
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the state cannot substitute/find alternatives quickly, the state is 
economically dependent and vulnerable.” (Crescenzi 2005: 28) 
 
Baldwin, Kastner, and Crescenzi take opportunity costs into consideration when 
assessing trade dependence (Lake 2009, Baldwin 1980, Kastner 2009).19  Baldwin 
maintains that  
“The concept of cost is particularly relevant to analysing dependency, 
since dependency implies that the opportunity costs of foregoing the 
relationship are high. If state B must forego warm homes, fully 
employed factories, adequate transportation systems, and high living 
standards, when state A stops exporting oil, state B is dependent on 
state A for oil. If, on the other hand, state B can easily get its oil 
elsewhere or if it is indifferent to warm homes, etc., it is not very 
dependent on state A with respect to oil. “(Baldwin 1980: 499) 
Based on the discussion above the thesis proposes a mix of quantitative and 
qualitative criteria to assess economic dependency. The thesis will investigate the 
absolute value of Kazakhstan’s economic relationship with China.  However, this 
value alone is meaningless. For example understanding that Sino-Kazakhstani trade 
amounted to approximately US$25bn in 2011 does not elucidate the impact on 
Kazakhstan’s economy.  A peer group comparison with the top bilateral trade 
partners, as well as an analysis of how important the trade value is to the local 
economy  and political system offers greater insight into the impact that such a 
trade relationship has on Kazakhstan’s economy based on the opportunity costs 
associated with it.   
Opportunity costs capture how difficult it is for the government to switch to 
alternative trade partners and what impact a loss of trade would have on the local 
economy. A trade partner’s relative position provides a first indicator. Arguably, it 
                                                     
19
 Kastner shows how economic integration raises the costs of war between China and Taiwan. 
Taiwan can in theory, exploit these transaction costs to move closer to sovereignty  (Kastner 2009).  
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will be more difficult to substitute for declining income if the economic partner is 
the largest economic partner of the target country rather than if the partner ranks 
in the top quartile. Growth rates furthermore indicate the trajectory of the 
relationship. An economic relationship that has stagnated is easier to forego than 
an economic relationship with momentum. This also links in with the expectation of 
future economic benefits, another dimension that facilitates dependence (discussed 
below). 
A qualitative assessment includes an analysis of asset specificity, market structure, 
and political costs. The first two criteria build on Crescenzi’s work and investigate 
what role China’s economic influence plays in Kazakhstan’s wider economy 
(Crescenzi 2003, 2005). Market structure refers to the ability to easily substitute for 
decreasing economic activity from China both externally and internally by shifting 
the factors of the economy to other industries (Crescenzi 2005). This takes the 
specific structure of Kazakhstan’s economy into consideration such as its reliance on 
commodity exports or its over-leveraged financial system.  External alternatives are 
different economic partners.  In the absence of alternatives dependency is most 
pronounced such as in Kazakhstan’s financial sector, where China has become the 
lender of last resort. Geography can also be affected opportunity costs such as 
Kazakhstan’s landlocked position, or its proximity to China which facilitates cross-
border trade and an export infrastructure for oil. Asset specificity refers to how 
easily an asset can be shifted towards alternative uses or users (Crescenzi 2005).  
For example, a pipeline is an asset which is difficult to be shifted towards an 
alternative use or user. Political costs on the other hand assess China’s economic 
influence on Kazakhstan’s political system, especially regime legitimacy (discussed 
below). 
Opportunity costs can be considered too high if they become inacceptable to policy 
makers. This is aligned with Baldwin’s definition of dependence as “the ease of 
breaking the relationship” (Baldwin 1980:476). If it is significantly easier for one 
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trade partner to forego the bilateral trade relationship the dominant state can 
feasibly manipulate trade to achieve political objectives (Kahler &Kastner 2006: 
527). Although, most of the cited research focuses on trade, it is possible to apply 
these criteria to the finance and investment levers as well, where dependence 
similarly occurs in the absence of viable alternative sources of funding, or where 
these alternatives are associated with high opportunity costs for Kazakhstan’s 
economy or government (Chapter 4).  
Thesis will use the criteria summarised below to assess whether Kazakhstan is 
economically dependent on China. Further elements will be added in the remainder 
of this chapter. 
 The absolute value of the economic relationship to both economic partners 
(i.e. symmetry) 
 The relative position of the economic partner, determined by China’s 
economic weight relative to other economic partners   
 The impact of China’s economic influence on Kazakhstan based on market 
structure, asset specificity and political cost      
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2.3.1 Deliberation and Effectiveness 
In order to leverage economic dependence, states must pursue a “policy of 
deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary20 in order to change the 
behaviour of the target state […].” (Kahler & Kastner 2006:524).  Kahler and Kastner 
call this a strategy of “economic engagement” which they further classify into three 
separate categories:  
1. conditional policies that directly link economic ties to changed behaviour in 
the target state;  
2. more passive unconditional policies where economic interdependence acts 
as a constraint on the behaviour of the target state; 
 
3. unconditional policies where economic interdependence effects a 
transformation in the foreign policy goals of the target state (Kahler & 
Kastner 2006:525).   
Although this fits somewhat uneasily with the Sino-Kazakhstani relationship, as both 
states are not adversaries but maintain good diplomatic relations, the classification 
helps to analytically differentiate between the different causal mechanisms that can 
drive political outcomes. This thesis will show that Beijing uses a combination of 
conditional and passive unconditional economic policies to further its political 
objectives in Kazakhstan. The authors’ related use of ‘deliberation’ also introduces 
an important element to distinguish coincidental outcomes from purposeful policy. 
This is especially relevant in an analysis of Kazakhstan’s acquiescence to Chinese 
interests, which does not always directly result from Beijing’s deliberate use of its 
economic influence (Chapter 5). Rather, the case study in Part II shows that Astana 
also proactively accommodates Chinese interests in the absence of Chinese 
conditionality. 
                                                     
20
 Defined as the absence of diplomatic relations   
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The details of the causal pathway that triggers the effectiveness of economic 
dependence is not entirely clear (Russet&Oneal 2001, Barbieri 1996 cited in Kahler 
&Kastner 2006).  The causal link can be located on both the systemic and sub-
systemic, or domestic, level. In the case of Kazakhstan the thesis will demonstrate 
that strong sub-systemic factors are at play. Economic dependence at the systemic 
level certainly gives the dominant state some leverage to threaten to withdraw 
trade or finance benefits and thus affect the target country’s economic growth and 
in turn its overall power capabilities. This incentivises decision makers to acquiesce 
with the dominant state’s interests in order to prevent decreases in economic 
influence that might be hurtful to the domestic economy. However, the causal link 
can also rest within the subordinate state. Kazakhstan’s political system introduces 
high political opportunity costs. Also on the domestic level are the future 
expectations of trade benefits. Policy makers’ expectations about the future trade 
relationship can determine whether they acquiesce with the trade partner’s 
interests or not (Copeland 1996, Snyder 2009). Copeland maintains that prospects 
of future trade determine on how economic dependence plays out with regard to 
conflict or cooperation. If trade is expected to expand, policy-makers are more 
inclined to pursue a foreign policy that fosters cooperation with their trade partner, 
if not they are more conducive to conflict. In other words, depending on how 
important decision makers perceive the trade partner to be in the future, 
determines political conflict or cooperation.  
Future expectations are the causal mechanism in Snyder’s study on China’s 
relationship with North and South Korea. Snyder demonstrates that expected 
economic gains with South Korea were the key driver in China’s decision to 
normalize its relationship with the South, despite a close alliance with North Korea.. 
Although Synder’s reasoning applies to the most fundamental question in foreign 
policy, on whether to establish formal diplomatic relations with country, it is 
applicable to explain foreign policy choices in a more normalised setting.  Once 
diplomatic relations have been normalised, economic influence can provide 
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substantial leverage for political influence-which is what this dissertation is 
concerned with. 
Regarding the domestic context, Kahler and Kastner argue that economic 
dependencies are most effective if the target state is a democracy, based on the 
premise that economic performance plays an important role in the provision of 
public goods (Kahler & Kastner 2006). The potential loss of an important trade 
partner could lead to the defection of voters over concerns that the economy and 
their income could be negatively affected. Although Kazakhstan is not a democracy, 
this thesis will show that the nature of Kazakhstan’s political system further 
underpins China’s rapidly growing economic influence. The financial needs of a 
Rentier State facilitate economic dependence on China because the elite require 
external revenues to consolidate and maintain their power (Palazuelos & Fernandez 
2012) (Chapters 3, 4 and 5).   
In a Rentier State the redistribution of resources along political or familial loyalties 
(patronage) facilitates political legitimacy and a collapse or decrease of revenue 
may threaten the regime’s legitimacy if it cannot access alternative sources. Thus a 
Rentier State like Kazakhstan is more susceptible to fiscal crises (e.g. oil price 
shocks, inability to issue bonds) as these directly affect public budgets and funds 
available for redistribution.  This should incentivise the regime to concede to any 
foreign policy interest that, if left unmet could affect the fiscal position and thus 
legitimacy of the regime in power. 
This link between fiscal crisis and regime survival is part of the wider academic 
discourse on the relationship between resource wealth and political instability 
which is approached through various angles: One posits a positive correlation 
between resource income and civil conflict. Accordingly, the risk of political 
instability increases along with oil income and oil exporters are more susceptible to 
political instability. Collier and Hoeffler argue that mineral wealth can foster conflict 
by funding rebel groups, whereas Faeron and Laitin note that oil exporters often 
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have weaker state institutions thereby increasing the likelihood of political 
instability (Fearon& Laitin 2003). Michael Ross critiques that the civil war literature 
suffers from limitations due to inconsistent conceptualisations of key variables such 
as resource wealth (Ross 2006). Nevertheless Ross concludes that on average the 
presence of oil and lootable resources favour violent conflict (Basedau & Lay 
2009:758). However, quantitative research questions this correlation. In their large 
n-study Arezki and Brückner (IMF) found no conclusive evidence that an increase in 
oil rents is correlated with instability such as civil war (Arezki & Brückner 2009). 
A different angle associated with Dutch Disease21  or Resource Course literature 
posits that the economic structure and development of a resource rich state make 
it more vulnerable to instability. Resource Curse research analyses why many oil 
rich nations cannot translate their oil wealth into economic development. The 
volatility of oil prices undermines stable government budgets and economic 
investment, leaving governments vulnerable to public dissent during periods of 
depressed oil prices. Dutch Disease literature argues that overt reliance on 
resources undermines economic diversification and fosters underdevelopment and 
negative political outcomes (e.g. corruption) which in turn facilitates conflict. (Lynn 
Karl 1997). Demkiv summarises this as follows 
“With regards to oil, the likely reason for negative economic outcomes 
is that the entrenched interests of petrostate bureaucrats and actors 
involved in the oil industry create a symbiotic relationship that stifles 
normal economic development. The elite’s oil interests operate outside 
the norms of a free-market system and the main goal is the 
perpetuation of this oil-dominant system.” (Demkiv 2012: 43)  
                                                     
21
 Dutch Disease derives its name from the negative effect that the North Sea oil boom had on the 
Dutch economy.  The term connotes a sudden influx of hydrocarbon wealth which increases the 
exchange rate and introduces relatively high salaries which together render other areas of the 
economy uncompetitive and undermine diversification of the economy (Lynn Karl 2009) 
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As the thesis will show, Kazakhstan does show signs of the Dutch Disease including 
corruption and an authoritarian government as well as misallocation of capital. 
Indeed, in Kazakhstan   
“Rulers will support policies that produce personalized rents even if 
these policies result in lower overall social welfare and because they 
need to share these rents with supporters and subordinates […]”. (Lynn 
Karl 2007) 
Rentier State theory appears to contradict this positive correlation because Rentier 
States redistribute their income precisely to foster political legitimacy by buying off 
opposition through patronage. Thus a Rentier State should be more politically 
stable and less susceptible to political instability (Basedau & Lay 2009). Karl notes 
that Rentier States can maintain stability for extended periods, but only as long as 
they have the means to do so (Lynn Karl 2007: 23), because 
“Oil states can buy political consensus, and their access to rents 
facilitates the co-optation of potential opponents or dissident voices. 
With basic needs met by an often generous welfare state, with the 
absence of taxation, and with little more than demands for quiescence 
and loyalty in return, populations tend to be politically inactive, 
relatively obedient and loyal and levels of protest remain low -- at least 
as long as the oil state can deliver [emphasis added].” (Lynn Karl 2007: 
21) 
This suggests that external shocks to revenues have the potential to increase 
political instability due to decreases in subsidies, public funding and co-opting 
opposition. Thus Kazakhstani policy makers may be more incentivised to facilitate 
an economic dependence on China to secure revenues in the short and medium 
term- even more so if alternative sources of revenue decline. 
Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman posit 
“Though crises are neither necessary nor sufficient to account for 
authoritarian withdrawal, poor economic performance reduces the 
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bargaining power of authoritarian incumbents and increases the 
strength of oppositions” (Haggard & Kaufman, 1997: 267) 
Although regime change is understood as the transition from an authoritarian to a 
democratic government, this highlights that fiscal crises can empower the 
opposition. Kazakhstani political analysts expected that Kazakhstan’s unfolding 
economic crisis in 2008/09 presented an opportunity for new leaders to emerge 
(Hoagland, 2009h). 
Karl maintains that nearly all oil dependent states face “significantly higher levels of 
social protests when oil revenues fall, and some of these regimes collapse” (Karl 
2007). In one of the most insightful studies Demkiv found a correlation between 
dropping oil price revenues and incidents of political instability. Demkiv conducted 
in-depth case studies of Type I petrostates including Algeria, Iran, Nigeria, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia and Venezuela covering a time period of nearly three decades (1981-
2010).  Type I states are defined as resource wealthy nations that produce at least 2 
million barrels per day (B/D) and where oil rents contribute more than 10% of GDP 
(Demkiv 2012). These petrostates showed higher levels of political instability, 
especially demonstrations, following oil price fluctuations. Demkiv further asserts 
that Type II states, where oil rents contribute more than 10% to GDP but with an 
overall daily oil production below 2million (B/D) are the most vulnerable group to 
oil price fluctuations and instability.  Kazakhstan is such a Type II state (Demkiv 
2012)22 , where oil rents constitute around one third of GDP, a higher share of oil 
rents in GDP than most Middle Eastern countries (World Bank 2013, Figure 2). 
Arguably Rentier States attempt to mitigate any revenue risks. To this end 
Kazakhstan set up the National Fund (Asfaha 2007). However, the fund is young 
with open questions about its actual size which may play a role in the willingness of 
Kazakhstani policy makers to accept Chinese credit lines (Chapter 3). 
                                                     
22
 The 10% threshold is used by several authors including Jonathan Di John (DiJohn, 2009) 
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Figure 2 Oil Rents as Percentage of GDP  
 
2.3.2 Finance and Investment  
The literature on how a country can use its financial capabilities as leverage for 
foreign policy outcomes is limited and focuses on the security implications of 
external debt but neglect issues that fall outside security concerns such as 
diplomatic, economic and resource objectives  (Drezner 2009, Kirshner 2009). 
Finance should be of particular interest because it is in this area that Beijing has 
developed its strongest relative capabilities, which includes the world’s biggest 
foreign currency reserves. As a result China lent more to developing countries 
between 2009 and 2010 than the World Bank (Dyer, Anderlini & Sender 2011). 
Finance is particularly interesting, since financial streams are less tangible than 
traded goods and services; consumers more easily grasp China’s impact by the 
presence of the increasing number of products labelled ‘Made in China’ that they 
encounter, but the influence wielded by external creditors on a day to day basis, 
however, is often invisible. More importantly, finance is a prerequisite to economic 
growth and thus plays a key role in any economy, an insight that the Global 
Financial Crisis dramatically underlined (Lipsky 2009). It was also the crisis that 
boosted China’s role as key creditor to Kazakhstan and thus gave Beijing additional 
leverage.  Even Daniel Drezner, an analyst who is critical of the security implications 
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of external debt, admits that “when targeted at small or weak states, financial 
statecraft can be useful […]“ (Drezner 2009:10).  
Beijing’s control over its financial instruments, including policy banks and Sovereign 
Wealth Funds (SWFs), also allows it to use its financial power as leverage externally 
to further political objectives (Helleiner & Chin 2008:89 and 2009, Shih 2009).  China 
Export-Import Bank (ExIm) and the China Development Bank (CDB) are Beijing’s 
main vehicles for dispensing credit abroad. Unlike funds allocated by private 
lenders, these are ‘policy banks’,23 which operate directly under the state and often 
provide financing and investment for political purposes. 
As a major creditor, Beijing uses its financial resources to project power and 
influence abroad and create goodwill from recipient countries (Helleiner & Chin 
2008). However the positive externalities from the provision of credit extend 
beyond goodwill. Access to external debt is particularly important to governments 
that want to finance their budget without resorting to alternatives such as spending 
cuts or increased taxes. Avoiding such difficult and politically unpopular decisions is 
a point that is especially salient in an autocratic system like Kazakhstan’s, where the 
government’s legitimacy rests on the provision of public goods in the absence of 
free and fair elections (DiGiuseppe & Raymond 2012). Weiner further argues that 
Beijing exercises diplomatic deterrence and controls the agenda at bilateral 
meetings on the back of its dominant status as a creditor. As the biggest holder of 
US debt, Beijing was thus able to deter the US from labelling China a currency 
manipulator in 2009 (Weiner 2011) and effectively managed to get sensitive issues 
off the international agenda - including sanctions against Iran (Weiner 2011).  This 
thesis will argue that China’s potential as a source of new funding is even more 
important for decision makers in Kazakhstan than the stock of its outstanding loans.  
                                                     
23
 In 1994 Beijing created three policy banks to raise financing for government directed programmes 
such as infrastructure projects.  These policy banks report to the State Council. Because of their 
proximity to the government and their mandate to finance government projects they are often 
referred to as “policy banks”. Examples include the Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC), 
the China Development Bank (CDB) and China Export-Import Bank (ExIm). 
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IR analysis on SWFs primarily focuses on the security implications of their 
investments, which so far have been limited (Kirshner 2009).  However, China’s 
SWFs, including the China Investment Corporation (CIC) and the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), have only recently become major actors 
in the international financial system.  Despite this, by 2010 China had already 
become the fifth biggest provider of FDI abroad (China Daily, 2011).  Like most 
SWFs, China’s are government-controlled and invest large amounts abroad, which 
can force desired political outcomes (Weiner, 2011). For example, in 2007, Beijing 
utilised SAFE to invest US$150m in Costa Rican government bonds.  Subsequently, 
Costa Rica cut its official diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Anderlini 2008, Jennings 
2007,Scissors 2009).  
China’s state control over its SWFs should also enable Beijing to enlist them into 
foreign policy objectives outside the security realm (Shih 2009).  Victor Shih thus 
argues that the behaviour of Chinese SWFs can be highly unpredictable and that 
foreign policy objectives have top priority (Shih 2009).  Elite fragmentation makes 
bankers highly sensitive to party politics, perhaps explaining why Chinese banks 
dropped out of a planned International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) 
meeting in Japan in 2012 in protest over the Diaoyu Islands (Jones 2012). It is 
unclear whether Chinese banks were directly advised to do so by Beijing or whether 
bankers wanted to support the party line to curry favour in Beijing. Shih points out 
that the “devotion of a small share of the SWF’s resources on foreign policy can 
have a significant diplomatic impact, especially in developing countries” (Shih 
2009:329).  
Developing countries tend to have less access to finance because of their uncertain 
economic growth and the investment environment that makes them open to 
Chinese financing. Given China’s vast financing resources, a small share of these 
resources can still have a considerable impact on these economies.  At the same 
time, Chinese funding is very attractive because, unlike international finance 
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institutions (IFI), Beijing does not link structural economic or political reforms to 
credit lines. SWFs can cultivate and exploit monetary dependencies especially 
during economic crisis, when access to capital is more difficult (Kirshner 2009). 
Economic crises, like the financial crisis of 2008-2009, thus generate additional 
opportunities for China to expand its influence by offering emergency assistance to 
countries in distress, including Kazakhstan – in exchange for political concessions. 
The European sovereign debt crisis illustrated how funding needs force 
governments to accept conditional bail-outs.   
This chapter suggests the following approach to assess Kazakhstan’s economic 
dependence on China. Firstly, it will provide an overview of China’s trade, finance 
and investment activities in Kazakhstan and analyse opportunity costs in each of 
these levers based on:   
  The absolute value of economic influence to each economic partner 
 Ranking vis-à-vis other economic partners 
 Relevance to the local economy 
 Relevance to the political system 
 Perceptions of future expectations of local decision makers 
 
The thesis will demonstrate that, China has indeed built economic dependencies. 
Whether these dependencies can be translated into foreign policy objectives 
depends on a degree of deliberation which means China’s ability to either build 
economic dependencies in the first place in view of their political potential or 
China’s deliberate use towards foreign policy of the economic institutions which 
built these influence in the first place. This would require Beijing to control these 
institutions. In the absence of such control Beijing would be able to use its 
economic influence as leverage if local Kazakhstani decision makers perceived of 
Beijing to be in control of these economic institutions. The thesis will demonstrate 
that the latter is the case in Kazakhstan. 
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2.4 Overarching Theoretical Framework: Neoclassical Realism  
This dissertation seeks to explain how China can transform its economic influence 
into political power in Kazakhstan via economic dependency. Political outcomes 
form the dependent variable and China’s economic capabilities the independent 
variable. A neorealist narrative initially appeared most suitable for this thesis, given 
its focus on material economic power and on China’s relative position vis-à-vis 
Kazakhstan. Neorealism puts the relative distribution of power in the international 
system at its centre, which also shapes the asymmetric relationship between two 
states. Neorealism has de-linked foreign policy behaviour from domestic variables 
and instead explains state behaviour through variables that are firmly placed on the 
system level, such as the distribution of power and structural anarchy. Waltz 
conceptualises states as like-units, seeking to maximise their relative power in the 
international system, independent of their internal political organisation (Waltz 
1979). Although this approach may provide a parsimonious methodology that also 
complies with David Singer’s level-of-analysis premise, ignoring unit level variables 
is problematic in China and Kazakhstan’s case (Singer 1961).  
During the field research, it became clear that systemic variables, such as China’s 
relative economic power cannot alone explain the degree of China’s economic 
influence in Kazakhstan or its ability to translate this influence into political 
outcomes. Instead it became evident that China’s growing economic influence in 
Kazakhstan is also driven by unit-level variables that fall outside the lens of 
neorealism. The particular political system of Kazakhstan, which closely resembles 
that of a classic Rentier State found in the Middle East (Franke, Gawrich, & 
Alakbarov, 2010), facilitates the country’s economic dependence on China. This is 
largely because of the regime’s susceptibility to revenue shocks and a preference of 
the elite of Chinese over international investment for reasons that are outlined in 
Chapter 3. China’s ability to use this economic influence as leverage relies on 
Beijing’s control over the range of economic institutions that project China’s 
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economic capabilities into Kazakhstan such as SWFs, banks and energy companies 
(Chapters 4 and 5).   
Neoclassic Realists24  on the other hand, break open the like-unit model of states 
and expand neorealist tenets with domestic variables (Zakaria 1998, Christensen 
1996, Schweller 1998) which can modify foreign policy behaviour. Zakaria, for 
example, investigated why the US did not expand its power abroad following the 
Civil War in the late 19th century, a period that saw the ascent of US economic 
prosperity. Yet despite a lack of obstacles in the form of other international powers, 
the US did not expand its power concurrently with its economic rise.  Zakaria 
explains this puzzle under neorealism by drawing on intervening domestic variables. 
The bureaucratic structure and power-sharing arrangement between the Executive 
and Congress left the executive with little room to pursue and implement an 
expansionist foreign policy agenda. Only after the Executive consolidated its power 
vis-à-vis Congress did the US suddenly expand its power internationally.25 Although 
China’s institutional power-sharing arrangements differ from those of the US, 
Beijing must overcome similar dynamics to effectively leverage its economic 
influence towards foreign policy ends. Neoclassical realism conjectures that to build 
economic dependencies, China requires the domestic structures that can effectively 
wield economic capabilities in the first place. A neoclassical narrative thus considers 
domestic variables to explain the specific set of policies that China pursues but can 
also explain whether Beijing can leverage its economic capabilities to further its 
political goals in Kazakhstan. This first and foremost depends on the relationship 
between Beijing and its main economic actors but also on the interests and 
perception of Kazakhstani decision makers.  
                                                     
24
 Relevant authors are Brown 1995, Christensen 1996, Schweller 1998, Wohlforth 1993, Zakaria 
1998. 
25
 The applicability of this theory to China is problematic: Unlike the US, power within the Chinese 
government is highly centralized and consolidated within the politburo of the CCP and decision 
making processes are significantly more opaque    
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As shown in Chapter 5, some of China’s economic institutions, including CNPC, have 
become politically powerful in their own right, impeding Chinese efforts to direct 
CNPC’s investment in Kazakhstan. Any analysis of whether Beijing can leverage its 
economic influence needs to take into consideration such domestic power-sharing 
arrangements, even if they are informal. A neoclassical perspective further reveals 
that the effectiveness of China’s economic influence is facilitated by structural 
weaknesses in Kazakhstan’s political system, especially driven by its elite dynamics 
(Chapter 2). In this way, a combination of systemic and sub-systemic variables can 
be used to explain the outcomes of Chinese foreign policy in an asymmetrical 
economic relationship. This thesis will show that elite interest in many cases 
overrides the national interest in Kazakhstan. These elite actors seek out Chinese 
investment at the expense of Kazakhstan’s long-term economic development and, 
as a result, even facilitate Beijing’s efforts to transform its economic influence into 
political power. 
In addition to a state’s bureaucratic apparatus, neoclassical realists also 
acknowledge that the perceptions and misperceptions of policymakers can 
determine a state’s foreign policy behaviour (Wohlforth 1993:2, Schweller 1998).   
This thesis’ case study highlights the fact that Kazakhstani decision makers may not 
appreciate the domestic power-sharing dynamics in China. Instead they appear to 
perceive of China and Chinese economic institutions as one unitary actor (Chapter 
7) which can withdraw or extend trade, finance and investment in Kazakhstan at the 
will of Beijing.  
Realism establishes China’s relative material capabilities as the “basic parameters” 
of its foreign policy (Rose 1998: 145). However these parameters are not sufficient 
to explain how China manages to generate economic dependencies in Kazakhstan 
and how it can leverage these dependencies towards meeting specific foreign policy 
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goals. 26  China’s rise in the international system is intricately linked to the 
development of its economic capabilities, which, in turn, are a prerequisite to exert 
economic influence in Kazakhstan.  Neoclassic realism can provide a richer 
understanding of the complexities that allow China to translate its economic 
influence in Kazakhstan into political power, by taking into consideration the unit-
level variables that facilitate Chinese economic influence and enable its 
transmission into political power. China’s economic capabilities remain the 
independent variable and political outcomes remain the dependent variable. 
However, the sub-systemic variables of Beijing’s control over its economic 
institutions and Kazakhstan’s domestic context become the two intervening 
variables in addition to economic dependency. 
 Kazakhstan’s Political System  Chapter 3 
This chapter analyses Kazakhstan’s political system to show how its 
particular structure and associated elite dynamics facilitate China’s growing 
economic influence. These dynamics provide an important sub-systemic variable, 
which also affects China’s ability to leverage its economic influence in its favour.  
This chapter will illustrate that Kazakhstan is a Rentier State where government 
legitimacy rests on the redistribution of revenue rents along political and economic 
loyalties. The subsequent discussion on Chinese trade, finance and investment will 
take place against this background. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 illustrate China’s rapidly-
emerging dominance in Kazakhstan’s economy, which runs against the national and 
economic interests of the country. Indeed, China’s growing influence, especially in 
the resource sector puts Kazakhstan’s economic development at risk and 
undermines any effort to diversify the economy. Thereby China’s economic 
influence contributes to symptoms of Dutch Disease and the Resource Course. This 
is puzzling, as Kazakhstan can in theory choose from many investors and can be best 
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 Waltz noted that Neo-Realism is not well suited as a foreign policy theory but rather a systemic 
theory to predict system outcomes (Waltz 1996) and calls for, a separate theory about foreign policy 
that incorporates domestic politics (Waltz 1979). 
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explained through Kazakhstan’s domestic setting, especially the existence of an elite 
network whose needs overrule the national interest and drive its economic 
dependence on China.  This chapter examines the domestic context in greater 
detail.  
The chapter shows that political and economic power in Kazakhstan is highly 
centralised in a small elite network that evolved and operates around President 
Nazarbayev. This creates three pertinent conditions that facilitate an inflow of 
Chinese financing and investment (Figure 3). Chinese investment assisted the elite 
to consolidate its power in the late 1990s and became even more important to the 
elite’s maintaining of power throughout the financial crisis of 2008/09, when 
Kazakhstan’s access to external funding quickly diminished (Chapter 4).  As a Rentier 
State, Kazakhstan is particularly vulnerable to revenue shocks (Chapter 2), such as 
the one that was brought about through the Global Financial Crisis during which the 
regime had to find alternative sources of funding, one of which was China. The 
distribution of funds through patronage creates undesirable economic outcomes 
such as corruption which makes Kazakhstan more susceptible to economic 
stagnation and crises. Against this background the regime has to ensure that it can 
continuously access new funds for redistribution. Kazakhstan’s political structure 
also creates elite dynamics that benefit Beijing in multiple ways: they create a 
context of personalised versus institutionalised decision making, where elite 
support and elite contacts are important. Beijing’s economic interests are favoured 
through powerful facilitators such as Karim Massimov. However, these dynamics 
also benefit Beijing in-directly because conflicts between different elite groups 
primarily affect other foreign partners, especially the US and Russia and their 
investments, a fate that Chinese companies appear to escape. 
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Figure 3 Domestic facilitators of China’s economic influence 
  
3.1 Power Consolidation  
Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev and a select elite27 network around 
him hold comprehensive political and economic power in the country. This segment 
will discuss the emergence of the elite and its power over the political and 
economic process.  
Nazarbayev was appointed to a leadership role in the Kazakh Communist Party 
(KCP) shortly before the collapse of the USSR in 1991. In 1989 he was appointed the 
First Secretary of the KCP, effectively making him the political head of a centralised 
system.  In April 1990, possibly in anticipation of Kazakhstan’s independence, 
Nazarbayev converted his chairmanship into a presidency which was confirmed 
through uncontested elections in December 1991, just days before Kazakhstan was 
granted independence (Cummings 2005:22).  From then onwards, the office of the 
president became increasingly powerful and now firmly controls the political 
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 ‘Elite’ here refers to a group of individuals who indirectly or directly play a regular and substantial 
part in national political outcomes and which includes political, government and economic actors 
(Junisbai, 2010, quoting Higley & Burton 1989; Mosca 1939; Pareto 1935, 1966; Putnam 1976). 
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process, effectively seizing any checks and balances. Along the way, Nazarbayev 
abolished the KCP, which led to the creation of his own party and also increased the 
threshold for political contenders and opposition parties to participate in elections 
(Cummings 2005; Brill-Olscott, 2010). With each challenge to his power, Nazarbayev 
carried out another ‘reform’, which invariably always encroached upon the 
independence of another branch of government28. For example, Kazakhstan’s first 
constitution created a parliamentary system in 1993 that divided power evenly 
between the parliament and President (Isaacs 2011). Nazarbayev won the ensuing 
power-struggle that erupted over his privatisation programme and threatened 
parliamentary deputies who largely owned personal stakes in State Owned 
Enterprises (SOE).  Through shrewd negotiating tactics and backroom deals 
(Cummings 2005, Isaacs 2011), in 1994 Nazarbayev persuaded parliament to 
dissolve itself and call an election which was later annulled by the Supreme Court.  
He then ruled by decree until 1995 (Bertelsmann 2012),  and oversaw the drafting 
and decreeing of the second constitution in 1995, which is in effect today (Jones 
Luong 2002:216).  This signified the prelude to a more repressive era and spelled 
the end of a brief period when media and political parties operated relatively freely 
(Jones Luong 2002), a fact that is reflected in Kazakhstan’s worsening performance 
on relevant indices (see Figure 4 ).  
The second constitution gave the president extensive powers and effectively turned 
Kazakhstan into a presidential system (BTI, 2012). From then onwards, Nazarbayev 
consistently expanded his power formally and informally at the expense of an 
independent judiciary, legislature or press. In 1995, the President gained the right 
to dissolve national and regional parliaments with “little justification” (BIT), which 
he exercised on multiple occasions.29 The President can directly appoint a quota of 
parliamentarians and up to nine members of the Senate, including the Senate 
Speaker (Cummings, 2005). Along with the seats that his party can claim in 
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 These branches include the Legislature (Senate and Majilis) and the Judiciary (Supreme Court). 
29
 Article 64, Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Constitutional Council, 1995). Nazarbayev 
has dissolved the parliament in June 2007, November 2011 
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elections, this has ensured a parliamentary majority  for the Presidential party, Nur 
Otan, which has consistently claimed more than 80% of the popular vote – enough 
to change the Constitution and to further expand the President’s power.30 For 
example, in 1998 Parliament extended the President’s constitutional term from five 
to seven years and finally, in 2007, revoked the presidential term limit altogether, 
specifically for the country’s first president (FreedomHouse 2012a). This allows 
Nazarbayev to stay in office for life31  (Yermukanov 2007). As a result, the President 
wields enormous political power over the country’s legislature and judiciary but 
also provides the basis for the evolution of a strong elite-network that controls 
Kazakhstan key political and economic institutions and which often defines the 
country’s foreign policy choices and investment needs. During the remainder of the 
1990s, Nazarbayev either forcibly merged ‘friendly’ opposition parties with Nur 
Otan or intimidated opposition candidates32  such that they fled the country. A 
number of opposition candidates and journalists have been killed as well.33 
Stringent requirements for party registration and representation make it virtually 
impossible for a genuine opposition party to emerge,34 instead ‘friendly opposition’ 
parties are represented in parliament. 
Today, Kazakhstan’s “benign dictatorship” (Henderson 2000:490) or “autocratic 
presidentialism” (Franke et al 2009: 109), is reflected in consistently low rankings in 
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 In the most recent elections of 2011, Nur Otan won 95.5% of the popular vote (Freedom House, 
2012a)  
31
 Article 41, Section 1, 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (Kazakhstan Constitutional 
Council, 2012).  
32
 Vladimir Kozlov, a prominent opposition figure, was jailed in 2012 for allegedly inciting the oil 
strikes in Zhanaozen which ended when government forces opened fire on demonstrators. It is 
difficult to verify the events since media was denied access to the area. However, Aleksandr 
Bozhkov, one of the few witnesses, claimed that he was tortured to provide false evidence in a 
government trial. He was found murdered in October 2012. Kozolov appeared in front of the 
European Parliament (EP) and the European Commission (EC). The Kazakhstani government 
subsequently used these statements in a trial against him (Pilch & De Los Fayos 2012, RFERL 2012, 
FreedomHouse, 2012b). 
33
 This includes Aleksei Pugaev (human rights activist), Nuri Muftakh (journalist), Askhat Sharipzhan 
(journalist), Erzhan Tatishev (BTA), Batyrkhan Darimbet (journalist), Zamanbek Nurkadilov 
(politician), Altynbek Sarsenbaev (politician) RFERL (2006) .  
  
34
 This includes a 7% threshold for presentation and high financial requirements for parties to 
register. 
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international comparisons (Figure 4).  These rankings are also in line with the 
literature on Rentier States which observes a strong correlation between Rentier 
States, corruption and media-repression (Chapter 2). Beyond today’s de-facto one-
party system (i.e. Nazarbayev’s Nur Otan Party), the President also controls many of 
the country’s major industries through a close-knit circle of family, friends and allies 
(see 3.2, below).  These members of the Kazakhstani elite have benefitted from the 
privatisations of state owned assets particularly in the resources industry (Brill-
Olcott 2010), where a boom in oil revenues turned many members into millionaires 
or even billionaires (Lillis 2012b). This was further exacerbated with the entry of 
Russian and especially Chinese oil companies, which made Kazakhstani resources 
more competitive (Palazuelos& Fernandez, 2012). Beyond the resources sector, 
Nazarbayev also has significant influence over the media and the finance industry, 
as some of the largest corporations and banks are controlled by his family and 
closest friends. 
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Figure 4 Key Indices on Kazakhstan’s Political System35 
 
The table summarises key indices including aggregate rankings such as the Polity Project (Teorell, et 
al. 2012) and the Bertelsman Transformation Index (BTI, 2012). Each index captures Kazakhstan’s 
individual score over time and where applicable, its relative global ranking. The graphs vary and 
higher scores often imply a worsening condition. For example, Kazakhstan’s score in the Press 
Freedom Index increased from c.40 to nearly 80 points which meant that it dropped from the 116
th
 
to 162
nd
 place
 
globally and is now one of the 25 worst performing states in the world, on par with 
Libya. Kazakhstan’s democratisation has been stagnant and even reversed in recent years. Freedom 
House assesses political freedom, ranging from free (1) to least free (7) (FreedomHouse 2012).  
Kazakhstan has consistently received low scores and the flat lines suggest that the country has made 
no significant improvements.    
Defenders of Nazarbayev maintain that political stability during Kazakhstan’s 
transition years took precedence over political pluralism. The Soviet Union’s 
dissolution had significant economic repercussions. GDP shrunk by 11% in 1992 and 
the country suffered from hyperinflation, which reached between 300% and 1200% 
until 1994.  Although Kazakhstan has arguably overcome these challenges, 
Nazarbayev created a system, the political stability of which wholly depends on him, 
and it is not clear whether this will survive Nazarbayev’s death and/or any 
unplanned leadership transition – creating a problem that drives intra-elite conflicts 
and also worries foreign investors, including China.    
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 BTI, Reporter’s Without Border’s Press Freedom Index, Polity Project Ranking, The Economist 
Democracy Index, Transparency International’s Corruption Ranking and Freedom House’s Freedom 
in the World ranking.  
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3.2 Emergence of the Elite Network 
When Kazakhstan first privatised medium-sized companies between 1993 and 
1995, those loyal and close to Nazarbayev already benefited economically, a 
phenomenon that would become significantly stronger during the privatisation that 
would follow later.  Whilst early privatisation waves focused on SMEs, subsequent 
waves gradually expanded to larger firms after 1995 and ultimately Kazakhstan’s 
largest state owned assets in 2003, which resulted in the most corrupt phase 
(Olcott 2002, Pomfret 2006), where the process was “overtaken by spontaneous 
alienation of state assets by anybody in a position to steal them” (Pomfret 2006). 
This not only empowered the elite financially but also led to the emergence of new 
business elite capable of challenging Nazarbayev’s rule.  
In the first privatisation wave, Kazakhstan replicated the Czech voucher system and 
handed out ‘coupons’ to Kazakhstanis36 which could be used to buy shares in 
Investment Privatization Funds (IPF).37  Fund managers used the accumulated 
coupons to bid for shares in state companies. Although 200 funds existed to 
diversify investments, a ‘mega fund’ was created, Butya-Kapital, owned by Bulat 
Abilov, rumoured to be a Nazarbayev relative. The fund had somehow managed to 
accumulate 10% of the coupons that had been distributed, making it the biggest 
player in the privatisation process (Brill Olcott cited in Cummings 2005:30). 
Irrespective of whether Abilov was a relative or not, it is clear that he was very close 
to Nazarbayev during the privatisation process:  between 1994 and 1996 he served 
as Presidential Advisor and by 2001 had become a member of the President’s 
Business Council. Butya-Kapital never paid any “dividends” on the coupons that 
citizens had invested, however Abilov in turn had become a millionaire 
                                                     
36
 The first phase of privatisation (1991-1992) focused on the housing sector, the second on 
Kazakhstan’s small and medium-sized SOEs (Pomfret 2006) and the third (1996-1998) on the largest 
state assets (Jermakowic, et al. 1996).  
37
 IPFs were used to privatise state assets in Poland and the Czech Republic. Coupon holders could 
buy rights issued by IPFs. IPFs in turn uses the accumulated ‘coupon capital’ to buy shares in those 
enterprises that are being privatised (Pistor & Spicer 1996).  
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(Mamashuly,2012). Despite the privatisation objective, the state managed to 
maintain “effective control” over most enterprises at the end of the process 
(Jermakowicz, Kozarzewski and Pańków 1996:16). 
Following his consolidation of power with Kazakhstan’s 1995 Constitution, 
(Constitutional Council, 1995)Nazarbayev embarked on the privatisation of the 
country’s largest state assets and moved family, loyal friends and old allies from the 
Soviet era into key economic positions from which they often benefitted materially. 
Nazarbayev’s role in providing access to resources 
was crucial to establishing and managing an elite 
network loyal to the President and which controls 
the country’s political and economic decisions and 
resources. 
“As with political elites in the Middle East, 
the Kazakhstani elite exploited their position 
in the political sector to reinforce their social 
and economic position. To achieve this, 
Middle Eastern political elites used as their 
major policy mechanism nationalization; the 
Kazakhstani political elite by contrast, sold 
off state assets to foreign buyers to enrich 
themselves personally.” (Cummings 
2005:122) 
This created an elite network that controls most 
areas of Kazakhstan’s economic and political life. Members of this network compete 
for access to assets such as industries, enterprises or politically influential positions 
that may result in their personal financial gain. For example, Imangali 
Tasmagambetov (Biografia.kz 2012) a long-serving bureaucrat under Nazarbayev 
and widely considered to be a potential successor, has become very wealthy, even 
though he has never held a position in the private sector. He rose to fame through a 
Imangali Tasmagambetov 
 
o 1993 Assistant to the President 
o 1995 Deputy Prime Minister 
o 1997 Deputy head of 
Presidential Administration 
o 1998 First Assistant of the 
President 
o 1999 Akim/Mayor Atyrau 
o Deputy Prime Minister 
o 2002-2003 Prime Minister  
o 2003 Secretary of State 
o 2004 Head of Presidential 
Administration 
o 2004 -2008 Mayor Almaty: 
2008 Akim Astana  
o Member of the Security 
Council 
o Potential successor 
Figure 5 Imangali Tasmagambetov 
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series of scandals38 such as the ‘Baikonour Millions’ (Adilov 2005, Vlasov 2007). In 
2001, Russia agreed to repay its US$65m debt for leasing the Baikonour Space 
Station, through railway equipment to Kazakhstani Railways (KTZ). However, only 
US$19m worth of equipment was received by KTZ but was accounted for as 
US$65m, the remainder of US$46m being allegedly siphoned off by 
Tasmagambetov (Safin 2004). Nazarbayev continues to support Tasmagambetov 
despite the scandals (Mamashuly 2012). 
Bulat Utemuratov, a close confident of Nazarbayev, is also known as the “diplomat 
who became a banker” (Esbergen 2011a) and is now the fourth wealthiest man in 
Kazakhstan (Forbes 2012) after he sold his share in ATF, Kazakhstan’s fifth biggest 
bank to Unicredit (Figure 6). Utemuratov likely gained a stake in the bank as a 
reward for his loyalty to Nazarbayev (Roberts 2008).  Several of Nazarbayev’s 
Ministers have also accumulated substantial 
wealth: Adilbek Dzhaksybekov, the current 
Minister of Defence is listed on the Forbes 
Billionaire list as the 28th wealthiest person in 
Kazakhstan, with business interests in finance 
investment and agriculture (Lillis 2012) (see 
Figure 10). The Minister for the Environment is 
ranked as the 36th wealthiest person in 
Kazakhstan with business interests in oil, 
financial services and real estate (Lillis 2012c). 
These arrangements are also susceptible to 
corruption scandals, which can pose risks to the 
regime’s legitimacy and thus provide incentives 
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 As Akim of Atyrau Tasmagambetov monetised the fishing of caviar and sturgeon in the Caspian. He 
extended fishing rights to friends and set up a company, JSC Aytrau Balik, which held the monopoly 
on fishing at the Caspian. It is alleged that he made millions and also caused damage to the fish stock 
through overfishing. His friend and close business partner died under mysterious 
circumstances(Altyn-Orda.kz)  
 
Bulat Utemuratov 
 1995-1999 Ambassador 
Switzerland 
 2004 Secretary of the Security 
Council 
 2004-2008 Chairman 
Commission for Democracy 
and Civil Society 
 2006- 2008 Manager of 
Presidential Property  
 2008 Advisor to Nazarbayev 
 Business interests: Verny 
Investment, Channel 31,  
Almaty Merchant Bank, 
KazZinc/Glencore  
Figure 6 Bulat Utemuratov 
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for the elite to choose Chinese investment over its international alternatives. 
However, moving elite members into business positions also ensures that the elite’s 
political influence is projected into Kazakhstan’s key economic institutions. The 
roles of Vladimir Ni (Figure 8) and Vladimir Kim (Figure 7) exemplify this point very 
well.  
Until his death in 2010, Vladimir Ni was possibly Nazarbayev’s closest and most 
influential confidante, and had already served Nazarbayev in an official capacity 
during Soviet times. In 1998 Ni was appointed to the executive board of Kazakhmys 
one of the largest copper miners in the world, where he not only personally 
benefitted from the company’s initial public offering (IPO) in 2004 but also 
extended the President’s power into the boardroom (Global Witness 2010). 
Vladimir Kim, the biggest shareholder of Kazakhmys, is also a close ally of 
Nazarbayev and has either received his Kazakhmys shares for his loyalty to 
Nazarbayev and his role in privatising the company, or, as some suspect, because he 
serves as Nazarbayev’s frontman (Roberts 2008, Global Witness 2010). Neither Ni 
nor Kim has relevant industry experience that could explain their appointments 
from a commercial point of view. Kim holds a degree from the Almaty Institute for 
Architecture and Construction (Global Witness 2010) and worked as a stone mason 
and instructor. Ni worked for four years in coal mining before he embarked on a 
near 30 year career in politics and Nazarbayev’s administration (Global Witness 
2010:6). It is more likely that both ‘owe’ their appointments to their close 
relationship with Nazarbayev. At Kazakhmys, Kim and Ni likely act as conduits for 
Nazarbayev’s decisions (see Case Study). The close link between these two men and 
the President prompted a 56-page Global Witness report investigating the true 
ownership and control structure of the company (Global Witness 2010). By way of a 
further example, Bulat Nazarbayev, the President’s brother was appointed to the 
executive board of Kazakhmys just months before it was listed on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) (Global Witness 2010).  
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Since Kazakhstan’s independence, Nazarbayev relied on a small group of such loyal 
figures who had often also served with him in the Soviet administration, such as 
Vladimir Shkolnik and Nazarbayev’s privatisation programme was crucial to 
expanding the group’s power into Kazakhstan’s economy. This established a 
politico-economic elite that effectively turned Kazakhstan into a Rentier State 
(Franke, Gawrich et al. 2009). This is particularly relevant to this thesis, as Rentier 
States are more vulnerable to revenue shocks (Chapter 2) which should give any 
foreign partner who can extend funding or revenues under such circumstances 
more influence. As will be demonstrated below and in the next chapter, China took 
on this role by extending emergency credit lines 
to Kazakhstan. 
Kazakhstan inherited state assets from Soviet 
times and was endowed with a wealth of natural 
resources which promised significant revenues. 
Since Nazarbayev has effectively concentrated 
the country’s political power, he can award 
access to these state assets.  Thus, proximity to 
the President, that is, membership of the elite 
network, is essential and provides a lucrative 
opportunity to benefit materially. Access to 
resources are gained as a reward for loyalty towards Nazarbayev and usually these 
privileges are repaid by providing political support and by extending Nazarbayev’s 
control over the decision-making processes in politics or, where applicable, in the 
industry or firm where he placed loyal friends. The ownership of Kazakhmys, ENRC 
and Brill-Olcott’s example of Amalbek Tshanow serve as informative examples. 
When Tshanow was appointed Akim39 of Zhambyl in 1995, he replaced all 140 
bureaucrats of the Akimat with people from his own clan and on whose loyalty he 
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 The Akim (Mayor) heads of the local government. The PM suggests and the President appoints 
Akims. 
Valdimir Kim 
 Educated architect and stone 
mason  
 1989-1992 Cultural, Social and 
Scientific Development Fund, 
Kazakhstan 
 1992-1995 CEO of JV between 
Samsung and ZhezKazGantsvetmet- 
later incorporated into Kazakhmys 
 1997 CEO Kazakhmys 
 2002 Political Council of Otan Party 
 2006 Transferred  2.5% of his 
Kazakhmys shares to Vladimir Ni 
 Wealthiest man in Kazakhstan with 
net worth of US$ 3.5bn 
 
 
Figure 7 Vladimir Kim 
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could count (Brill-Olcott 2002).  Nazarbayev extends his control into the board 
rooms of key companies through appointing senior executives and as a result it is 
widely rumoured that major companies such as the Eurasian Natural Resources 
Corporation40 (ENRC) or Kazakhmys refuse to 
make decisions without his consent. 
Kazakhmys’ case study is especially interesting 
for this thesis, because China is the company’s 
biggest customer and Astana has used Chinese 
credit lines to purchase a significant share in 
the company directly from Vladimir Kim, 
turning him into a billionaire. Furthermore, 
the company exemplifies the close inter-
linkage between politics and economics which Beijing manages to work to its 
advantage, perhaps more successfully than Kazakhstan’s other international 
partners. 
Case Study: Kazakhmys 
Kazakhmys is listed on the LSE and has annual revenues between US$ 3-4bn. The 
company’s three key shareholders are all close Nazarbayev allies, such as Vladmir 
Kim, Vladimir Ni and Oleg Novachuck. It is widely assumed that Nazarbayev 
executes control over Kazakhmys through both Kim and Ni so that they make no 
decision without Nazarbayev (Global Witness 2010). In fact there is a close web of 
share transactions between Kazakhmys and Astana. In 2010 for example, Kim sold 
an 11% share of the company to the government which turned the government into 
the largest shareholder (Dawber, 2010). Kim in turn owes his shares and position in 
the company to Nazarbayev which explains why Kim turned over 2.5% of his own 
company shares, worth £135m, to Vladimir Ni in 2006.  It is not clear how any of the 
main shareholders came into possession of the company shares, and the 
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 Kazakhmys subsidiaries are, Kazchrome, Zhairem GOK, SSGPO, Aluminium of Kazakhstan, 
Kazakhstan Aluminium Smelter (KAS), Eurasian Energy Corporation (EEC) 
Vladimir Ni 
 Close Nazarbayev confident and 
advisor  
 1985 Assistant to Nazarbayev 
 1990-1998 Presidential Administration 
 1999 Kazakhmys, Board of Directors 
 2006 Received 2.5% of Kazakhmys 
shares from Vladimir Kim 
 2010 Died in September 
Figure 8 Vladimir Ni 
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government’s alleged privatisation of Kazakhmys between 1992 and 2002 was 
marred with irregularities (Global Witness 2010:31).41 Samsung was an early key 
investor in Kazakhmys, and Kim bought Samsung’s 15% share in 2001 for 
US$94.73m, roughly two thirds of the actual value. 42 It is unclear how Kim managed 
to secure the funds to purchase these stakes in the first place. Samsung sold its 
shares because it was convinced that Kazakhmys could not meet the requirements 
for an IPO43. However, soon after the sale Kim announced the IPO plans, making 
everyone in the company rich, including Nazarbayev’s brother who had been 
appointed to the executive board just beforehand (Global Witness 2010).  More 
interestingly, Kazakhmys paid Nazarbayev’s hotel bill of £30,000 during a trip to the 
UK in 2006. The bill was paid in advance by a Kazakh bank transfer (Global Witness 
2010: 30). The example highlights the close link between the company and 
Nazarbayev himself and his inner circle.  
It is important to understand these personal relationships for this thesis, because 
such individuals often enter into business agreements with China or benefit from 
concessional Chinese loans.  Kazakhmys, for example, received a number of 
substantial loans from China, including a US$2.7bn credit line from the China 
Development Bank (CDB) to develop the Bozshakol mine (BE 2011). This was 
followed in 2011 by an additional loan agreement with CDB for US$1.5bn, to 
develop the Aktogay mine. This brings the total loan volume to US$4.2bn, more 
than Kazakhmy’s annual revenues of US$3.2bn in 2010. China in exchange bought 
80% of Kazakhmys’ copper (Kazakhmys 2012) (Figure 9). CDB is a policy bank 
(Chapter 3) with close ties to Beijing and as such it can be argued that the deal was 
made on a political level, in cooperation with Nazarbayev, who arguably controls 
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 The Kazakhstani government sold its stake in several instalments through auctions and tenders. By 
2005 the company was owned by its managers. Although employees received shares they were 
forced to sell before the lucrative IPO.  The buyer of the biggest block of 24.65% of shares, for 
US$184m, remains unknown.  11.5% of Kazakhmys shares were sold, just one week before the 
announcement that the company sought a listing on the LSE (Global Witness, 2010). 
42
 The company had an estimated value of over US$1bn at the time and a 15% share should have had 
a value of US$ 150m respectively. 
43
 Samsung sold its shares in Kazakhmys because it assumed that Kazakhmys could not meet the LSE 
listing criteria. Kazakhmys managed to get listed within 16months. 
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Kazakhmys through his network. These loans also directly benefit its shareholders, 
including Kim, Ni and Nazarbayev’s brother. 
Figure 9 Chinese credit Kazakhmys 
 
Nazarbayev’s network also benefited directly from the country’s resource boom. 
The collapse of the USSR left the Kazakhstani economy in free fall and the state did 
not have the financial resources or necessary expertise to explore its oil and gas 
fields. This is why Kazakhstan invited International Oil Corporations (IOC) to invest 
and signed Product Sharing Agreements (PSAs) that led to significant revenue 
increases for the government.  Elite members were well positioned on executive 
boards or (less visibly) as shareholders to benefit from the enormous investment 
foreign investors were pouring into the country 
(Gorst, MacNamara et al. 2011).  
Throughout the 1990s, the elite consolidated its 
power based on the redistribution of revenues 
along the socio-political loyalties and 
Nazarbayev’s popularity. China’s growing 
interest in the Kazakhstani resource sector also 
boosted the government’s revenues and thus, 
perhaps inadvertently, contributed to the elite’s 
consolidation (Palazuelos & Fernandez, 2012). 
Indeed, Chinese funding would become even more relevant to keep the elite in 
Adilbek Dzhaksybekov 
 1996 Deputy Akim Akmola 
 1997-2003 Akim of Astana 
 2004 Minister of Industry and Trade 
 2004 Head of the Presidential 
Administration 
 2008 First Deputy Chairman Nur Otan 
 2008 Ambassador to Russia 
 2009 Minister of Defense 
 28
th
 Wealthiest person in Kazakhstan 
with business interests in investment, 
finance and agriculture 
Figure 10 Adilbek Dzhaksybekov 
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power and to maintain Nazarbayev’s popularity throughout the Global Financial 
Crisis in 2009/09 (Chapter 3). 
These elite structures have turned Kazakhstan into a neopatrimonial Rentier State, 
similar to many in the Middle East, because power rests with the President and a 
small elite network that operates on patron-client relationships 
(Isaacs,2011;Franke, Gawrich et al. 2009). The President’s power relies on 
personality cult, extensive patronage networks and factional elite politics. Such 
patronage relationships are characterised by a highly personal form of loyalty that 
drives an official’s commitment to purpose, instead of a sense of obedience to 
abstract norms (Weber 1978). Thus patronage is the opposite of meritocracy, 
where individuals receive jobs and promotions based on their affiliation. The 
resulting nepotism leads to a misallocation of capital and resources that exacerbate 
systemic weaknesses, for example in Kazakhstan’s banking sector, and thus increase 
the elite’s revenue needs, which China is in a position to meet (Chapter 3). This 
hinders economic development, which is also suggested by Resource Course 
literature (Chapter 2) and increases the risk of political instability in the long term, 
especially if undesirable economic outcomes coincide with revenue shocks that are 
caused by volatile commodity prices. Against this background it is important for the 
regime to gain access to alternative source of funding. As will be seen Chinese trade 
and finance are such a source. 
The ramifications of this neopatrimonial system extend beyond Kazakhstan’s 
borders, as elite interests often interfere with the foreign policy process and 
investment decisions based on self-preservation and interest.  Occasionally, 
international actors fall victim to these dynamics, a problem that China and Chinese 
SOEs have managed to avoid to date, most likely because of China’s heavy 
investment in Kazakhstan and the fact that China has not factored in inter-elite 
conflicts yet. 
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Typically for a Rentier State, the development of massive oil revenues was crucial 
for the government to consolidate its power by redistributing revenues along family 
lines and socio-political loyalties (Franke, Gawrich and Alakbarov 2009, Isaacs 2011), 
from where they either trickle down directly to the remainder of society (Interview 
International Diplomat) or indirectly through subsidies and free public services 
(Palazuelos&Fernandez 2012). This redistribution lends the regime legitimacy in the 
absence of free and fair elections. Although definitions of a Rentier State vary 
slightly, they all focus on the creation of government funding through a resources 
rent rather than through the taxation of the population (Franke, Gawrich and 
Alakbarov, 2009). Rents in Kazakhstan are redistributed in terms of food subsidies, 
free healthcare and increased pensions and employment. For example, Astana 
subsidises the agricultural sector, which accommodates 30% of the national 
employment and has expanded state employment to 24% of the work-force (ILO 
2013). As a result public sector salaries are significantly higher than productivity 
levels, which is also characteristic of resource-rich states (Hertog, Bodor et al. 
2012). Direct taxation plays a minor role in government income and allows the 
government to operate somewhat autonomously from its citizens, who can only 
make limited accountability claims against a regime that does not primarily live off 
domestic tax revenues.  Legitimacy is achieved through the provision of services 
and the redistribution of funds for which the government does not have to be held 
accountable, which is typical for oil exporting Rentier States (Chapter 2). This also 
benefits growing Chinese investment, which is very unpopular among the 
Kazakhstani population and it would be more difficult for a government to accept 
that is held more closely accountable by its electorate (Interviews Investment 
Expert 1, Local Investment Expert). The lack of political accountability also explains 
how the government was able to spend 22% of GDP on the construction of the new 
capital, Astana (Trofimenko 2007 in Franke et al. 2009).  To generate the necessary 
revenues, Astana tapped extensively into its resource sector. As a result, Kazakhstan 
has since lost direct control over its oil and gas resources to foreign investors, who 
control 80% of the country’s daily production (Palazuelos &Fernandez 2012).  
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Nazarbayev’s popularity (Bertelsmann, 2012) constitutes the second pillar of 
legitimacy for the patronage system (Isaacs, 2011). His popularity rests on several 
factors.  The President is closely linked to Kazakhstan’s independence from a 
complicated relationship with the USSR and receives credit for Kazakhstan’s 
contemporary political stability and for improving Kazakhstan’s international 
prestige (BTI 2012:2)  He is also credited for replacing the Russian elite with ethnic 
Kazakhstanis, thereby ‘handing back’ Kazakhstan to Kazakhstanis.  His popularity 
can be attributed, in some degree, to the oil boom that resulted in segments of the 
population being lifted out of poverty.  However, Nazarbayev’s popularity is not 
inviolable and can be threatened by corruption scandals that reveal how the elite 
enrich themselves personally or by generally declining state revenues. In 2012, the 
regime’s legitimacy was deeply shaken by violent unrest amongst western 
Kazakhstan’s oil workers over low wages and constituted the biggest political 
challenge to Nazarbayev since independence. As will be shown later, Nazarbayev 
turned to Beijing during the financial crisis to secure loans that allowed him to save 
face and escape questions about his appointments in the banking sector and the 
true extent and whereabouts of Kazakhstan’s state assets (NF discussion, below). 
These configurations of legitimacy have two immediate consequences that facilitate 
China’s economic influence:  Firstly, because legitimacy is intrinsically linked to the 
redistribution of revenues, the government becomes susceptible to declining 
revenues (Chapter 2). The global financial crises, for example, depressed oil and gas 
prices and thus funding in Kazakhstan, which also affected the Kazakhstani banking 
sector (Chapter 3). Arguably this gives disproportionate influence to any foreign 
partner who can bridge those funding gaps. The thesis will show that China is that 
partner. In 2009, Astana turned to Beijing for financial help because alternative 
sources of funding, most notably from Russia, had fallen by the wayside (Chapter 3). 
Although governments seldom remain unaffected by declining economic fortunes, 
the negative repercussions are more pronounced in Rentier States, whose elites can 
come under direct threat when incomes abate - which also played a role in the Arab 
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Spring that brought elites across the Middle East and Africa to fall (Meija, 2012). 
However, even before the financial crisis, China’s economic influence contributed to 
the power consolidation of Kazakhstan’s elite (Palazuelos &Fernandez, 2012) and 
assisted the elite in maintaining power in the hostile economic environment of the 
financial crisis two decades later.  Kazakhstani rent revenues experienced a 
significant boost when Russia and especially China developed a greater interest in 
the country’s resources towards the end of the 1990s. China was a relative 
latecomer to Kazakhstani resources and entered the market several years after 
Chevron, ENI Agip and Royal Dutch Shell. However, following its first major 
investment in 1997 through CNPC’s acquisition of a 60.3% stake in AktobeMunaiGas 
(AMG), it paid increased attention (CNPC).  At the time, this was the biggest Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) by a Chinese National Oil Company (NOC). More 
importantly however, as part of the acquisition China committed to finance a 
pipeline from Kazakhstan to China. The pipeline was strategically important as it 
broke Russia’s monopoly on Kazakhstan’s export infrastructure. Until then Russia 
controlled Kazakhstan’s export pipelines and could dictate tariffs and by extension 
the price of oil.  Kazakhstan’s landlocked position makes it vulnerable to such export 
dependencies (Chapter 5).  The Sino-Kazakhstani pipeline gave Astana more 
leverage for negotiating tariffs with Russia and thus allowed the elite to tap more 
fully into the revenue potential of the country’s hydrocarbon resources.  The entry 
of Chinese NOCs also increased competition for Kazakhstani resources. Thus, 
perhaps unknowingly, China has become an important financier of the Kazakhstani 
elite. It may not be coincidence that Kazakhstan’s GDP experienced its strongest 
growth rates after CNPC’s investment in 1997, when GDP dipped briefly and 
increased from -1.9% in 1997 to 13.5% by 2001 (Figure 21). This also allowed the 
elite to continue to live off its energy-driven revenue stream, whilst foregoing any 
meaningful structural changes that would diversify its income.  Instead, Kazakhstan 
has become even more dependent on resource revenues and hence more 
dependent on investment in this sector, substantially increasing the effects of the 
Dutch Disease (Chapter 2). Although Kazakhstani energy resources are competitive 
78 
 
and attract interest from IOCs from diverse geographies including India, Italy, Brazil 
and the US, the government has increasingly facilitated Chinese investment in this 
sector, although this has negative consequences for Kazakhstan’s economy in the 
long term and is generating economic dependencies on China (Chapters 3, 4 and 5).    
Secondly, the particular economic and legitimacy needs of the elite also interfere 
with Kazakhstan’s foreign policy.  Where elite and national interest conflict, the 
elite usually prevail in Kazakhstan, which also affects foreign relations and 
investment. This also positively affects China’s ability to translate its economic 
influence into political power, a point that becomes salient in the case study in Part 
II. The chapter seeks to demonstrate that unlike its international alternatives, 
Chinese economic influence is more aligned with the elite’s needs and interests. 
This point will be elaborated throughout this chapter and the thesis and is a 
significant factor in explaining why and how China has been able to increase its 
economic influence in Kazakhstan to the point that it has created economic 
dependencies that are damaging to the Kazakhstani economy in the long term.  
These elite dynamics are also relevant to understanding China’s success in using its 
economic influence as leverage towards political ends and which fall outside the 
lens of any analytical frameworks that operate on the systemic level in IR. 
Aside from benefitting the elite’s consolidation of power, members of the elite 
likely also directly benefitted from increased Chinese investments through side-
payments that accompany such resource deals (Interview International Diplomat, 
Astana). For example, Timur Kulibayev, married to Nazarbayev’s daughter, is under 
investigation for allegedly having received side-payments from CNPC in conjunction 
with the sale of a 25% stake in KazMunaiGas (KMG) in 2003 (Chazan, 2010).  
Although not proven in a Kazakhstani court, a number of Kazakhstani officials 
(including the President himself and his relatives) are under investigation for money 
laundering abroad. Lawsuits against IOCs who operate in Kazakhstan revealed 
substantial side-payments. Italian prosecutors are considering whether ENI’s 
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Kazakhstani subsidiary, Agip KCO should be banned from negotiating contracts in 
Kazakhstan as part of a corruption investigation (D’Alessandro & Jewkes 2012).  The 
reality of side-payments and corruption is reflected in international rankings (Figure 
4) and can explain how many Kazakhstani officials have managed to become 
billionaires (Kazakhgate, below).  The elite also benefit from Chinese investment 
through their shares in companies. It is these companies that are often at the 
receiving end of concessional Chinese loans. For example, Astana’s purchase of 
Kazakhmys shares from Vladmir Kim in 2010 was financed through concessional 
loans from China (Chapter 5) and turned Kim into a billionaire. Corruption scandals 
however, pose risks to the regime’s legitimacy at home and its reputation abroad 
and incentivise the elite to seek out economic transactions with investments that 
are more discreet. In theory, any such source should be welcomed by the elite. 
However, whilst other investors have fallen aside in recent years, Beijing has 
substantial foreign currency reserves that it can invest abroad and which offer such 
discretion in the absence of anti-bribery laws and media-scrutiny of such 
transactions. This further facilitates an inflow of Chinese investments into 
Kazakhstan, especially in recent years.  
3.3 Concentration of State Assets and Economic Power   
Kazakhstan’s privatisation created a new class of wealthy businessmen and 
oligarchs who not only extend the President’s power into key industries but 
occasionally also openly challenge his power. Prominent examples of such oligarchs 
are Alexander Mashkevich, the key shareholder of the Eurasia Natural Resource 
Corporation (ENRC)44, Vladimir Kim from Kazakhmys and Mukhtar Ablyazov, who 
made his fortune in the finance sector. Mashkevich’s close link to the President is 
captured in the frequently-cited account of his shopping spree for the President at 
Versace in London (Gorst, MacNamara et al. 2011).  These newly-empowered 
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 He is one of the three main shareholders of ENRC. All three were under investigation in Belgium 
between 1995 -2011 for money laundering which is why none of the three shareholders served on 
ENRC’s executive board.  
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businessmen began to form financial–industrial elites (FIE), groups of individuals 
aligned through common economic and sometimes political interests (Junisbai 
2010:263), who compete for access to the President and, if that fails, also oppose 
him. Kazakhstan’s finance sector in particular has produced a number of such 
challengers such as Mukhtar Ablyazov (BTA Bank)45 Rakhat Alievy or Prime Minister 
Akezhan Kazhgeldyn. In order to re-gain better control over state assets but also to 
pre-empt further elite fragmentation and the emergence of challengers, 
Nazarbayev began to renationalise and centralise national assets under his control 
which culminated in the merger of two state-funds and his control of the National 
Fund (NF).  These developments perhaps inadvertently benefited China’s economic 
influence, because it created greater demand for outside financing (Kazakhmys, 
above), a centralised system of economic decision making which could be targeted 
and an investment environment that benefitted indirectly those Chinese companies 
who appear to have largely escaped such renationalisation efforts.   
The National Fund 
The NF is said to be similar to the sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) of other resource-
rich economies, such as Norway’s government pension fund or Australia’s future 
fund (MOF 2012). In August 2000, when oil revenue began to increase significantly, 
the government established the NF (NF 2000) to stabilise the economy during 
crises, accumulate savings to anticipate the end of the resource boom and to 
contribute to the government budget (SWF 2013). Such a fund can be particularly 
important in a Rentier State where the regime is more vulnerable to economic 
shocks and access to alternative funds is important to manage and pre-empt the 
risk of political instability. Yet it is different from Norway’s SWF in a number of 
aspects.  First of all, the President46, not the Parliament, controls the fund, oversees 
all its activities (Kalyuzhnova, 2006) and can determine any discretionary payments 
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 Formerly Bank TurAlem (BTA) 
46
 He is in charge of regulation, oversight and approves external auditing. 
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into the fund (Kalyuzhnova, 2011)47. The fund is inadvertently an instrument of elite 
consolidation as it contributes to the government budget, which can be used to 
facilitate political and economic loyalties. 
The fund is an interesting variable in Kazakhstan’s decision to turn to Beijing for 
financial help at the peak of the financial crisis, which accelerated China’s economic 
influence in Kazakhstan (Chapter 3). Kazakhstanis interviewed by the author were 
puzzled why Astana turned to China for credit at that time, since the NF had 
substantial reserves to see the economy through the crisis (Interviews European 
Diplomat 2, Local Finance Expert 1, and Investment Expert 1).48  In fact, during the 
crisis, Nazarbayev activated the NF for the first time in its capacity to stabilise the 
economy by providing an overall stimulus 
package of US$10bn, the same amount that 
Beijing had extended as a loan. There are 
indicators to suggest that this was necessary 
because Kazakhstan’s state assets were smaller 
or less liquid than commonly believed, and 
China’s loan not only bridged a significant 
funding gap, but also helped Nazarbayev to 
safe face and pre-empted critical questions 
about the true state of Kazakhstan’s finances 
which could undermine his popularity (Chapter 
3, 4 and 5). 
Samruk-Kazyna 
The financial crisis also provided an 
opportunity for Nazarbayev to centralise state assets and bring them under closer 
                                                     
47
 The fund has two accounts, one designated for savings and one stabilise the economy.  A formula 
based on the oil price and the government budget determines how much money goes into each 
account.   
48
 As of 2011 the joint assets of the NF and NBK are approximately US$ 70bn.  
Figure 11 Samruk-Kazyna 
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control through the creation of Samruk-Kazyna (SK), a national holding company of 
all Kazakhstani state assets (Hoagland 2009g). SK was the result of a merger 
between Samruk, the Kazakhstan Holding for the Management of State Assets, and 
Kazyna, the Sustainable Development Fund of Kazakhstan.  The new super fund 
owns wholly or partially the country’s most important companies including KMG, 
KazAtomProm (KAP) and many financial groups including the Development Bank of 
Kazakhstan (KDB) (Figure 11).  Its assets are roughly valued at half of Kazakhstan’s 
GDP (Pazaluelos & Fernandez 2012). Perhaps not surprisingly, SK also holds shares 
in ENRC and Kazakhmys to which Nazarbayev maintains close personal links 
(Kazakhmys, above).  
Nazarbayev appointed his son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev, at the helm of SK as the 
Chairman of the Board of Directors and Karim Massimov, his (trusted) Prime 
Minister to the Board to exert control over SK (Bnews.kz 2012). The latter is of 
interest because Massimov is widely considered a key facilitator of China’s 
economic interests in Kazakhstan (discussed below). In 2012 Nazarbayev replaced 
Massimov with Umirzak Shukeyev, who also has close links with the President 
(Tengrinews 2011c): previously Shukeyev had served as the Deputy Head of the 
Presidential Administration and Vice Prime Minister (Samruk-Kazyna 2012). Beyond 
SK, Nazarbayev also nationalised Kazakhstan’s then biggest bank BTA, which had 
run into financial difficulties (Hoagland, 2009g).  Many of Nazarbayev’s challengers 
have emerged from Kazakhstan’s banking and financial sectors and the 
nationalisation of BTA can be viewed as a move to control the emergence of 
challengers (Interview International Finance Expert). 
The centralisation of state assets in one entity should arguably allow Astana to exert 
firm control over FDI into assets under SK management. However, the centralised 
structure of SKs also created a single point of contact (or target) for foreign 
investors who want to acquire Kazakhstani assets. It appears that Beijing has 
understood how to work with and through these centralised structures. For 
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example, in the past, CNPC targeted Timur Kulibayev as the head of SK, which has 
come to light in an anti-corruption investigation in conjunction with the sale of oil 
assets to CNPC in 2003. Furthermore, Beijing initiated the creation of a joint 
investment fund between SK and CITIC - called the Samruk-Kazyna CITIC Investment 
Fund - to channel investments into Kazakhstan (Chapters 4,5). Indeed, the 
centralisation programme was successful and Nazarbayev exerts even more direct 
control over the economy. For example, in 2008, the President appointed Kairgeldy 
Kabyldin as the head of KMG, who has a reputation for being a strong proponent of 
resource nationalisation. His appointment is consistent with Nazarbayev’s strategy 
to regain control over Kazakhstan’s resources, which Kabyldin implemented 
effectively. Before he took charge of KMG, IOCs could acquire minority shares49 in 
the Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System (KCTS), which was no longer possible 
thereafter (Hoagland, 2010c). This also offers insights into China’s rapidly growing 
economic influence even though the Kazakhstani government officially became far 
more critical of China’s resource ownership to the point that Kazakhstan pledged to 
cut Chinese investment. The official rhetoric however, could not stymie Beijing’s 
forays into Kazakhstani resource. This posits the question whether Beijing can 
bypass such government restrictions, possibly by targeting junior administrators. 
However, this is unlikely. There are indicators that the elite are indeed more firmly 
in control of SK than before. For example, a senior Chevron executive complained 
that business transactions and programme implementations have stagnated, as 
mid-level bureaucrats are too afraid to make decisions that are against the top of 
the elite (Hoagland 2009g). In view of the elite’s effective control over the resource 
sector, it is more likely that Beijing does not bypass these restrictions but rather 
that it can increase its investment with elite consent. With the new degree of 
centralised control through SK, furthermore, it is likely that Chinese ambitions to 
acquire lucrative resources will be successful in the future, given that the elite 
controlling SK has demonstrated that it is receptive to continued investment and 
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 Initially IOCs including Chevron and ExxonMobil had approval for a 49% share of the Eskene-Kuryk 
Pipeline Segment from the Minster of Energy and Mineral Resources, Sauat Mynbayev. However, 
Kabyldin interfered unexpectedly to stop the project (Hoagland 2009f). 
84 
 
consents to such investment. That SK is receptive to Chinese investment was 
underlined by the creation of the joint sub-fund, CITIC, Kazyna Investment Fund 
(previous paragraph) (KCM 2008).  
Nazarbayev’s renationalisation programme of national resources was also 
motivated by the perception that Kazakhstan had sold its resource assets on 
unfavourable terms to foreign investors from a position of weakness in the 1990s 
(Interview European Diplomat 1). The government pursues a mixed strategy that 
involves exerting indirect pressure on companies through taxes, fines and changing 
regulations, and direct repurchasing programmes which are expensive to finance. 
This increased demand for external sources of funding, which in theory could have 
benefitted the economic influence of any foreign financing source. However, there 
is evidence that it was Chinese loans that assisted Astana with the renationalisation 
efforts (see Kazakhmys, above), more so because Beijing possessed the necessary 
financial capabilities at conditions that meet the needs of the elite. It is doubtful 
that Beijing’s growing financial clout in Kazakhstan up until 2008/09 was the result 
of a deliberate foreign policy, but rather the outcome of an opportunity created by 
Astana’s financing needs. This changed somewhat during the crisis, when private 
Chinese institutions, especially CNPC, likely recognised these funding needs as a 
strategic opportunity to gain access to Kazakhstani resources (Chapter 3). The on-
going tension between privatisation and central control also created a difficult 
investment climate that particularly deters private international companies. The 
first attempt at slowing down privatisation came in 1997, when Nazarbayev 
appointed the Minister of Energy, Nurlan Balgimbayev, as PM and as head of 
KazakhOil. Balgimbayev was famous for his stance on nationalisation and eventually 
created KMG. His return to Nazarbayev’s administration in 2008 was widely 
interpreted as a sign that the President intended on reviving the renationalisation 
of resources, which he underlined by creating SK (Sharip 2007). The 
renationalisation drive, on top of prevalent rent-seeking behaviour of the elite, 
aimed at extracting ever greater rents (taxes or fines) to increase government and 
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personal revenue streams, created a difficult investment environment that is also 
reflected in a low ranking in the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Competitive 
Index (GCI) (Apostolou 2001). However, this environment seems to further benefit 
Chinese companies who appear to escape these renationalisation and rent-seeking 
trends, a point that will be discussed in more detail further below (Sharip 2011). 
3.4 The Elite’s needs drive China’s economic influence 
The misallocation of capital in a Rentier State like Kazakhstan creates systemic 
weaknesses  (Chapter 2) which further facilitate economic influence from China 
rather than alternative sources, even though this influence generate dependencies 
on Beijing (Chapter 5).  These weaknesses can be grouped into three areas:  
 Corruption threatening the regime’s legitimacy  
 Nepotism leading to a misallocation of capital and funds   
 Vulnerability to declining revenues   
The centralisation of power in a small elite network also fosters corruption, which is 
reflected in Kazakhstan’s poor performance across relevant indices (see Figure 13 
and Figure 4). For example it consistently ranked in the bottom 15% in 
Transparency International’s Corruption Index (Transparency International, 2012). 
From 2011 to 2012, Kazakhstan dropped from 120th place and a peer group 
including Ethiopia and Bangladesh, to 133th place in 2012 along with Honduras, 
Guyana and Russia; China in comparison ranks 80th.   Personal enrichment and 
corruption at the elite level, although widespread, are tolerated by Nazarbayev as 
long as the individual does not fall out of favour and transactions remain discreet 
and do not damage the President’s image through publicity. Although it is possible 
that Kazakhstanis do take the existence of small levels of corruption for granted 
they are susceptible to corruption scandals on a grand scale involving millions of 
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dollars and which are often subject to commentary on websites (Interview Legal 
Expert). Such revelations can threaten the legitimacy of the regime, which is why 
the elite exert significant control over the media (see Media Landscape, below).  
The author noted that this has also led to a certain degree of cynicism among 
Kazakhstani interviewees.  Indeed, with every challenge to Nazarbayev’s power, the 
regime has committed more resources to censor media reporting, such as after the 
Zhaozan Riots in 2011 (Economist, 2012).  
IOCs in particular in Europe and the US have become subject to stricter anti-bribery 
laws, which have led to a number of high-profile investigations abroad that even 
involved Nazarbayev himself and his family and which reverberated into Kazakhstan 
and are topic of conversations on websites. Arguably this incentivises the 
Kazakhstani elite to become more receptive to Chinese investment because it is 
discreet and easily available. 
The First Family 
Nazarbayev’s family itself takes an important position within the elite network and 
many key positions in the economy are filled with Nazarbayev’s immediate and 
(distant) relatives who have benefitted significantly. Nazarbayev’s three daughters 
are exceptionally wealthy and are married to individuals who have been installed 
into strategic positions and now exert control over media, security forces and key 
resource industries (Olscott 2002, Junisbai).  For example, Dariga Nazarbayeva, 
Nazarbayev’s eldest daughter, currently ranks as the 13th wealthiest person in 
Kazakhstan (Forbes 2012)  with an estimated fortune of US$600m and wields 
significant control over Kazakhstan’s media (BBC 2012, Lillis 2012b). She also 
controls 36% of Nurbank, where she serves on the board of directors.  Her (ex-) 
husband, Rakhat Aliyev, had a significant falling out with the President in 2007 and 
lives in Austria. Beforehand, Aliyev was deputy head of the Tax Police and Deputy 
Chairman of the National Security Committee (KNB), where he oversaw 
Kazakhstan’s anti-corruption efforts. Aliyev allegedly abused his position to exert 
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pressure on businessmen and extort shares in their businesses, but denies these 
accusations. This triggered a serious inter-elite conflict and challenge to 
Nazarbayev’s power in 2001 (Isaacs 2011). Affected businessmen, including 
Mukhtar Ablyazov, wrote an open letter to the President requesting to censure 
Aliyev.  When Nazarbayev backed his son-in-law instead, these businessmen set up 
an opposition party, “Democratic Choice” which dissolved after some of its 
benefactors (including Bulat Abilov and Galymzhan Zhakiyanov) fled the country or 
where stripped of their assets (Junisbai 2010).  However, when Aliyev announced 
his intention to run against Nazarbayev several years later, he had to flee the 
country. Aliyev lives in exile in Austria, from where he accuses Nazarbayev of 
corruption and occasionally releases incriminating documents (Kompromats).  
Nazarbayev’s second eldest daughter, Dinara Nazarbayeva, is married to Timur 
Kulibayev, who was viewed as gatekeeper to Kazakhstan’s hydrocarbon resources 
until the end of 2011 and who some still consider a  potential succession candidate 
(Hoagland, 2010d, LeVine 2010); Nazarbayev introduced Kulibayev as his successor 
during a state visit to Russia (Interview Finance Expert London).  He is a part-time 
advisor to Nazarbayev and served as the Vice President of KMG, as well as 
KazTransOil, which transports 80% of Kazakhstan’s national oil. Until 2011 he was 
chairman of SK before his dismissal following the Zhanaozen unrests. Kulibayev is 
under investigation for having received US$166m from CNPC in conjunction with 
the sale of a 25% stake in KMG (AMG) in 2003, which CNPC acquired significantly 
below market price (Sharip 2011).  Kazakhstan initially sought US$400m for the 
AMG share and sold for only US$150m in 1997. Within the same year, CNPC already 
generated profits of US$240m from the oilfield, indicating that the stake was sold 
below market value. In 2012, Swiss authorities investigated Kulibayev on suspicion 
of money laundering and misappropriating funds related to his posts at KazTransOil 
and the CNPC case with KazMunaiGas as well as Nazarbayev himself (Haeuptli, 
2011). The couple has a joint net worth of US $2.6bn (Lillis 2012b). Dinara is a main 
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shareholder of Halyk Bank 50 and has come under scrutiny in Switzerland, for the 
purchase of a US$80m (SFr74.7m) villa in Geneva (Bradley, 2010). In Kazakhstan, 
where the average monthly income fluctuates around the US$300 mark, such 
revelations have the potential to create resentment among the population 
(Mukhtarov, 2012). For example, in 2012 a rare anti-Nazarbayev demonstration 
took place in Almaty which drew over 1,000 protestors and demanded for the 
President to “(r)eturn the country’s riches to the people” (Ma-Shan-Lo, 2012). 
3.4.1 Media Landscape  
The threat inherent in such revelations is reflected in the regime’s efforts to control 
Kazakhstan’s media. The constitution provides for a free media but in practice 
Kazakhstan’s media landscape is characterised by censorship and self-censorship, 
often because the elite controls stakes in media outlets (US State Department, 
2006): Six out of the seven nationwide television broadcasters are wholly or partly 
owned by the government and it also controls the country’s printing presses. 
Dariga’s Khabar monopolises national TV and heads the Committee for Social and 
Cultural Development, which drafts regulation on media content in the Majilis (US 
State Department, 2006).51 The elite own one of the country’s biggest newspapers, 
Karavan, and virtually abolished independent regional radio and television stations 
(Cummings 2005:27). Bulat Utemuratov owns Chanel 31, the Megapolis newspaper 
and Navigator, an online news portal (Satpaev, 2007). Media repression has 
increased along with the centralisation of Nazarbayev’s power and as a result, 
Astana now imposes some of the greatest restrictions on freedom of speech in the 
world (Reporters Without Borders, 2012). Reporters are regularly harassed, 
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 Halyk Bank had a market share in banking assets of 16.8% and of 21.6% in 2010. Announcement: 
Moody's Disclosures on Credit Rating of Halyk Savings Bank of Kazakhstan. 
51
 In a 2012 debate the committee determined which channels are included in satellite receivers. It is 
unlikely that government critical stations were included (Ayanov 2012).  
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attacked and imprisoned.52 As a result Kazakhstan now ranks 162nd/ 179 in terms of 
free press (Figure 4).  This is consistent with characteristics that authors of Rentier 
State Literature have identified. Accordingly, Rentier States divert a significant 
portion of their rent income to build a repressive apparatus to prevent challenges 
to their authority (Karl 2007)   
Despite Astana’s tight control several high profile scandals have been revealed in 
the past through western media outlets. A string of corruptions scandals were 
triggered by stricter anti-bribery laws in the west, combined with greater media 
scrutiny of IOCs, which exposed the elite and even Nazarbayev himself to a number 
of corruption scandals that reverberated in Kazakhstan, often helped by exiled 
former members of the elite who pursue their own agenda (Alexeev 2010). Online 
newspapers like Respublika, which moved its offices to Russia, report these 
scandals online. For example, in 2012 Kulibayev was subject to another 
investigation in Italy. Italian prosecutors threatened ENI to suspend its activities in 
Kazakhstan based on allegations that its subsidiary Agip KCO has paid at least 
US$20m to Kulibayev for access to the prestigious Kashagan oilfield (D'Alessandro 
2012). Kulibayev denies these allegations. International investigations also implicate 
Nazarbayev himself and threaten his popularity, one of the two pillars of legitimacy. 
It is likely that in response, media content is regulated through laws that prohibit 
journalists from writing about the wealth or health of Nazarbayev and which 
stipulate that no more than 20% of total television broadcasts can contain foreign 
programmes. Senior officials regularly file lawsuits against newspapers and 
journalists who report on corruption in government circles (Taukina, 2012). This is 
relevant to the thesis in that the elite increasingly searches for more discreet 
business transactions that do not shine an unfavourable light on their wealth.  
Russia and China, can offer such transactions. However, Russia has fallen by the 
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 Daniyar Mokdashev, editor of Respublika a critical newspaper disappeared from his home in 2011 
around the general elections. Several days later he resigned via SMS from Belarus and Respublika’s 
website was inaccessible for much of 2011 (FreedomHouse 2012). 
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wayside as an investor, which has led the elite to turn increasingly to China for 
investment and funding (Chapters 4,5) and incentivise the elite to acquiesce with 
Chinese interests (Chapters 7, 8).  
The most famous of these investigations is the James Giffen Affair, also known as 
‘Kazakhgate’ which was reported in Kazakhstan’s online media space (Alexeev, 
2010) and even entered Kazakhstani politics. Zamanbek Nurkadilov, the former 
Akim of Almaty and Minister of Emergency Situations was fired from his post when 
he demanded an investigation into the allegations. He was found shot several days 
later and within weeks of an upcoming Presidential election in which he was a 
popular contender (Kramer 2005). The murder investigation concluded somewhat 
dubiously that Nurkadilov had committed suicide, first shooting himself twice in the 
chest and then in the head (Harris 2012).  Lukpan Akhmedyarov, a regime critic and 
award-winning journalist who also reported on corruption, survived a murder 
attempt in 2012  (Lillis 2012a).  
3.4.2 Case Study: Kazakhgate  
The most notorious international investigation was launched inadvertently by 
Nazarbayev himself53 and ended in a US court where he was named as co-
conspirator. The ensuing scandal seriously damaged the reputation of Nazarbayev 
abroad and became also known at home. Since then, the President has tried to 
repair the damage to his reputation through enlisting a number of Washington-
based PR agencies and advisors, including Tony Blair (Mendick 2011). 
                                                     
53
 Akezhan Kazhegeldyn, former Prime Minister, fell out of favour in 1998, when he ran against 
Nazarbayev. He fled to Switzerland and was convicted in absentia to ten years in prison for abuses of 
office. Kazhegeldyn made a fortune during Kazakhstan’s transition. Nazarbayev decided to discredit 
Kazhegeldyn and contacted Swiss authorities to investigate Kazhegeldyn’s Swiss funds. The strategy 
backfired. Swiss authorities noticed irregularities and informed their US counterparts about "a 
pattern of questionable transactions between Kazakhstan and American and European oil 
companies" which led to the indictment of James Giffen (Shelley 2000, Stodghill 2006).   
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Between 2003 and 2007, US authorities investigated James Giffen, an American 
businessman with extensive links to the former Soviet Union and Kazakhstan under 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibits US companies and individuals 
from engaging in corruption abroad.  Giffen was accused of channelling around 
US$80m into accounts of Nazarbayev and Prime Minister Nurlan Balgimbayev, for 
Mobil, now ExxonMobil to acquire 25% of the Tengiz oilfield in 1996 (EurasiaNet 
2003). The lawsuit was dropped for political reasons and whilst Giffen did not deny 
the allegations he claimed that he had acted on behalf of the CIA. Although the 
court acquitted Giffen, it is widely believed that these money transfers have taken 
place and that his acquittal was politically motivated (Alexeev, 2010). During the 
George W. Bush administration, the State Department pressured the prosecution to 
let the case fold to ensure Nazarbayev’s support in Central Asia for US troop 
movements in the war against Afghanistan.54   
 
Figure 12 Nazarbayev White House Visit 2006 
 
The Giffen indictment initially accused two anonymous officials KO-1 and KO-2, later 
identified in Swiss court documents as Nazarbayev and Balgimbayev, of corruption 
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 George W. Bush received Nazarbayev in the White House in 2006, where Bush described 
Kazakhstan as a free nation, in order to maintain support for the logistics in Afghanistan (Draper 
2006).  
 
Source: White 
House,http://georgewbush-
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and money laundering and summarises its political implications (US Justice 
Department, 2003): 
“The unlawful payments GIFFEN made to KO-1 and KO-2 ensured that 
GIFFEN […] remained in a position from which they could divert large 
sums from oil transactions into accounts for the benefit of senior Kazakh 
officials and GIFFEN personally. The scheme thus defrauded the 
Government of Kazakhstan of funds to which it was entitled from oil 
transactions, and defrauded the people of Kazakhstan of the right to the 
honest services of their elected and appointed officials” (US Justice 
Department, 2003). 
Accordinlgy, Nazarbayev allegedly received a large part of US$80m in several 
instalments through a network of off-shore bank accounts (Simpson & Susan 2008).  
At times money was even channelled out of Kazakhstani state-owned entities such 
as TMG CCP when AMCO purchased an interest in the Caspian Pipeline CPC  
(Simpson and Susan 2008). Implicated officials in Kazakhstan deny these 
accusations. 
In what could be interpreted as an admission of guilt, Nazarbayev subsequently 
enshrined his immunity against embezzlement and corruption constitutionally in 
2010 (Orange 2010).  Nazarbayev pressured the US government to avert the lawsuit 
and, when he failed, hired media consultancies in the US, which triggered the next 
round of scandals. The Project on Government Oversight (POGO) has approached 
the Attorney General’s Office with concerns that the Kazakhstani government may 
have “unlawfully financed sitting members of Congress” (POGO, 2011). 55 
Balgimbayev has remained a close advisor to Nazarbayev and stayed in the resource 
sector, where he served as President of KazakhOil (KMG). In 2009, he became the 
President’s Special Advisor for the Caspian Sea which is home to the prestigious 
Kashgan Oil field that is currently developed by a consortium of IOCs, including 
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 The letter details how Astana allegedly enlisted the help of Alexander Mirtchev’s PR consultancy in 
D.C. to expropriate two brothers of their investment in Kazakhstan.  Astana initially hired Mirtchev to 
repair Nazarbayev’s image abroad. Among the allegations against Mirtchev is a list of phone calls by 
opposition figures in the US that was handed to the Kazakhstani government (Pogo 2011).  
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those named in the indictment against Giffen, including ExxonMobil and 
ConocoPhillips.  This also moves Balgimbayev into the close proximity of Beijing, 
since the Kashgan oil is earmarked for the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline.  
Since the Giffen trial, the situation in Kazakhstan has not improved and the World 
Bank’s (WB) anti-corruption programme continues to rank Kazakhstan as one the 
world’s most corrupt countries (see Figure 13).  The ranking only captures 
Kazakhstan’s relative performance vis-à-vis other nations, which could gloss over 
absolute improvements. However in conjunction with country-specific indicators 
(Transparency International and WGI, Figure 13, 14), it is obvious that the situation 
has not improved and rather reversed.  
These corruption scandals shine an unfavourable light on the elite at home and 
abroad and have the potential to threaten its power. The inexplicable wealth of 
government officials and Nazarbayev’s family give the elite reason to worry about 
any future revelations.  The lack of transparency, in conjunction with international 
corruption rankings, casts serious doubt over the legitimate income of Kazakhstan’s 
elite. The above may simply be the small number of instances that have been 
exposed.  The real extent of illegal transactions probably far outstrips the known 
volume. Although direct side-payments are not exclusive to transactions with China, 
as in the case of Kulibayev,   Chinese funding will likely play a greater role in the 
minds of the Kazakhstani elite in the future. Legislative changes in the West56, 
stronger anti-bribery laws and subsequent public investigations incentivise the 
Kazakhstani elite to conduct business with alternative sources instead of IOCs.  The 
lack of such laws in China ensures that deals are discreet and carry little risk of 
becoming subject to public trials and scrutiny. Hence Chinese transactions are 
increasingly attractive for Kazakhstan’s elite.  In conversations with the author, 
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 Vaguely refers to international investors who are incorporated in the world’s most developed 
nations including the EU and USA. For example under the UK Bribery Act “[i]t is an offence for UK 
nationals and bodies incorporated under UK law to bribe anywhere in the world”. Any action that 
can be considered a bribe in the UK will also be a bribe when conducted abroad (UKTI 2012).  
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international investment advisors agreed that the stronger anti-bribery laws will 
benefit Chinese and Russian companies on the ground  arguably because the 
Kazakhstani elite appears amenable to such bribes (Kazakhstan Investment Day 
Conference, London, 2011).  This could also explain why the elite continues to 
welcome growing Chinese investment into Kazakhstan’s resource sector despite 
official commitments to cap Chinese inroads, which are hugely unpopular among 
Kazakhstanis (Chapter 5). Consequently, elite interests in Kazakhstan are often 
aligned with Chinese interests, not only driving Chinese finance and investment 
further, but also facilitating Beijing’s ability to use its economic influence as 
leverage towards foreign policy objectives (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). The expectation of 
the Kazakhstani elite on the prospects of future funding from China is also a factor 
that operationalises economic dependence (Chapter 2) and is thus relevant to the 
thesis. 
However, it is possible that this particular incentive to turn to Chinese credit lines 
can be better captured through the dynamics of authoritarian cooperation and 
regime diffusion (Chapter 2). It is possible that the Kazakhstani elite prefer China’s 
economic influence because China is, similar to Kazakhstan an authoritarian regime. 
However this would require further analysis which is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. 
Kazakhstan’s worsening corruption performance further underpins this trend (see 
Figure 4). Maksat Idenov served as VP of KMG and was widely recognised as an able 
businessman who was committed to introduce international commercial standards 
to KMG (Ordway 2008). He resigned in order to work for ENI, after announcing that 
he would leave his post to work for western oil companies, as he thought that the 
Kazakhstani government was no longer interested in developing the oil fields along 
commercial principles rather than politics.  
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Figure 13 World Bank Corruption Rank 57 
 
                                                     
57
 The corruption index is an aggregate of several indices including the ADB, Global Integrity Index, 
Gallup World Poll, Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide and Institute for 
management & development World Competitiveness Yearbook (WBI 2012).  Kazakhstan's corruption 
is also captured in the Business Anti-Corruption Portal (Global Advice Network 2012). 
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Figure 14 World Bank Voice and Accountability Ranking58 
 
Although Kazakhstan pursues an official anti-corruption policy (OSCE) it appears 
that anti-corruption measures are selective and often serve as a tool to censure 
challengers to Nazarbayev’s authority (Economist, 2009). Nazarnbayev appointed 
close allies or family to head the National Security Committee’s (KNB) anti-
corruption department, such as Rakhat Aliyev, Nazarbayev’s former son-in-law and 
Kairat Satybaldy, Nazarbayev’s nephew.  This view is supported by a comprehensive 
record of investigations into high ranking officials who have moved too close to the 
opposition such as Mukhtar Dzakishev, the former head of KazAtomProm (KAP), 
Akezhan Kazhgeldyn, the former Prime Minister, Mukhtar Ablyazov, former head of 
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 (WBI 2012).   
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BTA and Kazhimurat Mayermanov, the Deputy Defense Minister (Hoagland 2009e). 
Kazhgeldyn came under investigation after he decided to run against Nazarbayev in 
the presidential elections. Key witness at the trial was Vladimir Kim, who has been 
accused of having provided false testimony (Goodley and Hollingsworth 2012). 
3.4.3 Misallocation of Capital and Talent  
Another factor that facilitates Chinese investment is the embezzlement and 
nepotism in important economic institutions, especially banks that defaulted on 
their international debt during the crisis, which deterred international creditors and 
increased pressure to search for alternative sources of financing which Beijing 
provided. This is also in line with the assumptions made by the Dutch Disease and 
Resource Course literature (Chapter 2). For example, these weaknesses exacerbated 
the effects of the financial crisis and the government’s need for immediate funding 
(Chapter 3). Kazakhstan’s neopatrimonialism misallocates resources, including 
funding and human capital, which creates systemic weaknesses. Positions are 
frequently allocated based on elite affiliation rather than merit, and elite affiliation 
determines business transactions which are not necessarily conducted based on 
commercial criteria alone.  
In the 1990s, it was estimated that 50% of bureaucrats in government institutions 
had relatives working for the government (Henderson 2000). Perhaps the elite 
network is especially prevalent in Kazakhstan’s lucrative hydrocarbon sector (Brill 
Olcott 2007), where 50% of key business figures are officially members of Nur Otan, 
the President’s party, compared to only 12.5% in other business areas (Fjæstad & 
Øverland 2012).  Appointments are facilitated through personal networks and less 
so through merit, which results in the suboptimal allocation of talent.  In 2008, for 
example, Nazarbayev appointed Serik Burkitbayev the head of KMG despite his 
previous record of corruption and mismanagement.  As head of Kazakhtelecom, 
Burkitbayev bankrupted KazPochtaBank, one of the biggest and most stable banks 
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in the country, by moving all of Kazakhtelecom’s accounts to another bank without 
notice. Similarly, it was Nazarbayev who first pardoned and then agreed to appoint 
Mukhtar Ablyazov to the head to BTA bank, after Ablyazov had been accused of 
corruption and exiled to Russia. Interestingly, the elite are also concentrated in the 
banking sector, where they hold stakes in the country’s most important banks. 
Dinara Nazarabayeva and Timur Kulibayev are main shareholders in Halyk Bank and 
Nurzkhan Subkhanberdin in KazKommertsbank. Since 2009, the government owns 
BTA Bank. 59 Rating agencies have noted that the banking sector suffers from lax 
due diligence standards for lending and credit disbursements (S&P 2012). It is likely 
that credit lines are also disbursed along elite networks and not purely on 
commercial terms, which causes the sub-optimal capital allocation that is 
symptomatic for thelow development of Kazakhstan’s financial market, where it 
ranks comparatively low, 121st/140 globally (Sala-i-Martin, 2011). By contrast, the 
development of Kazakhstan’s economy ranks 72nd/140 (Sala-i-Martin 2011).  
Arguably, the misallocation of talent and capital significantly contributed to the 
finance sector’s structural weaknesses that saw four of Kazakhstan’s biggest banks 
nearly default in 2009 because of a Non-Performing-Loan (NPL) ratio of 30-60% 
(Interview International Finance Expert) 60.  A string of corruption scandals involving 
the senior management of banks, who allegedly embezzled the banks’ capital, 
further eroded the confidence of international investors who fled the Kazakhstani 
finance sector and led Nazarbayev to turn to Beijing for help (Chapter 3) (Croft 
2012). The government sued Mukhtar Ablyazov in the United Kingdom for his 
embezzlements at BTA Bank and a  2012 BTA audit attributed the Bank’s second 
default in 2012 to the poor management practices by state-appointed officials 
(Gizitdinov 2012). The mismanagement at Kazakhstani banks continues 
uninterrupted after the financial crisis and analysts expect that KazKommerzBank 
will default by 2015/2016, when a number of key loans will be due (Interview 
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 Samruk-Kazyna holds currently 81.48 % of BTA bank. (BTA Bank, 2012) 
60
 KazKommertsBank’s credit rating was downgraded by Moody’s in September 2012, with a share of 
non-performing loans that has been hovering just slightly below the 30% mark since 2009 
(Kazkommertsbank 2012).   
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International Finance Expert).  This may force the government to divert revenue to 
bail out its banks or to raise financing from abroad, which may very well come from 
China (Chapter 3).  
The misallocation of capital also undermines Kazakhstan’s economic diversification 
programme, a cornerstone of Astana’s policy to reduce the economy’s resource 
dependence and to ensure sustainable economic growth in the long-term. Energy 
revenues are easily accessible for the elite without making major upfront 
investment or structural changes.  This makes the resource sector an easy revenue-
generating target, which the elite fully exploits.  Public revenues through oil rents 
alone increased from 2.2% to 44% of the state budget between 1999 and 2008 
(Palazuelos &Fernandez 2012). However, because resource revenue is readily 
available for the government to redistribute, the elite further drive Kazakhstan’s 
dependence in this sector instead of making the necessary investment and policy 
changes to favour economic growth in other areas. The state of Kazakhstan’s 
economy is also reflected in Kazakhstan’s relatively poor management expertise 
and business practice, where it ranks among the lowest countries internationally 
(GCI Business Sophistication). Businesses lack sophisticated production methods to 
compete internationally and rely on the input of cheap resources to compete.61 As a 
result, alternative industries do not emerge and the country remains trapped in a 
vicious cycle of dependence on resource revenues. This also translates into a 
dependence on those foreign partners who control the largest stake in the resource 
sector such as China, which in 2011 controlled nearly 30% of Kazakhstan’s daily oil 
production (Sharip, 2011). 
                                                     
61
 Despite government targets, reliance on oil has increased, as percentage of GDP derived from the 
resource sector and Kazakhstan’s low rank (121
st)
  in the GCI “Business Sophistication”/”nature of 
competitive advantage”. The category assesses the competitive advantage of a country’s companies 
in international markets. 1 = low-cost or natural resources; 7 = unique products and processes. 
Porter argues that this sub-indicator alone can explain 65 % of the variance in GDP/capita between 
countries and thus is a strong indicator for economic performance of the economy. (Porter, 2005)  
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The misallocation of talent and funding 
discussed above increased the revenue needs of 
the Kazakhstani elite for which it has 
increasingly turned to Beijing, especially since 
2009. Foreign lenders fled the country’s 
financial markets because of ongoing concerns 
of mismanagement and corruption, which 
created a funding problem for Kazakhstani 
banks.  This also poses the question to what 
degree Beijing’s growing economic influence in 
Kazakhstan is the result of a deliberate Chinese 
foreign policy, or the result of the revenue and 
legitimacy needs of the Kazakhstani elite. The 
following chapters will address this question in 
greater detail.  
3.4.4 Elite Dynamics 
Kazakhstan’s specific elite dynamics can interfere with Kazakhstan’s foreign policy 
and investment, both of which allowed Beijing to expand its overall economic 
influence  (Chapters 3, 4 and 5). Consequences of these dynamics are a distinctively 
short-term view on policy, which explains why the elite are open to Chinese funding 
even if this is detrimental to Kazakhstan’s economic interest in the long term. This 
short-term view also forms a consistent point of frustration expressed in interviews 
with international observers in Kazakhstan (interviews International Development 
Expert, Trade Expert, Regional Finance Expert, European Diplomat 1). Furthermore, 
the elite dynamics produce an informal versus institutional modus of decision 
making that affects private companies and which China manages to exploit. Many 
important investment decisions are not made in the boardrooms of Kazakhstani 
companies but during political, face-to-face meetings with China.  Chapter 5 will 
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Figure 15 Nurtay Abykayev 
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show how CNPC, for example, manipulates this setting very effectively to overcome 
Astana’s resistence to CNPCs’ acquistion interest in Kazakhstani resources (Chapter 
5). At the same time elite support for investment targets is essential to successfully 
implement deals. As will be seen, some of the country’s politically most influential 
elite members champion China’s economic interests (Karim Massimov, below).  
Uncertainty: A Kazakhstani Catch-22  
Nazarbayev grants and retracts access to resources and positions of influence in 
exchange for loyalty. Elite members are incentivised to stay loyal, since access can 
be retracted at any point if an individual falls out of favour (Satpaev 2007) ,which 
can be caused by opposing Nazarbayev as in the case of Akezhan Kazhgeldin or 
Rakhat Aliyev or by being associated with the wrong elite group (Economist, 2009). 
When elite members fall out of favour, they are typically accused of corruption and 
embezzlement, stripped of their assets and often jailed. Since personal enrichment 
and access to assets make elite affiliation attractive in the first place and underpins 
the elite-network, investigations into corruption are powerful tools for eliminating 
opposition since most investigations will invariably yield results.  By appointing 
allies to head the anti-corruption committee, the President should be able to 
protect or expose individuals to such investigations (Economist 2009). Former Prime 
Minister Akhezhan Kazhegeldyn, (1994-1997), accumulated a fortune during his 
time in office (Olcott, 2002). When he announced his intention to run in the 
presidential elections planned for 1998, he was investigated for corruption and 
abuse of authority and fled the country. Kazhegeldyn siphoned off resources that 
might otherwise have been provided to the President or his allies, something which 
may have further motivated the investigation (Olcott 2002: 187).  
Nazarbayev also occasionally ‘demotes’ some of his inner circle so as to ‘be seen’ to 
react to political unrest or scandals. Following the Zhanaozen62 violence in 2011, 
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 Oil workers had been on strike for months over labour conditions and pay. By December 2011 
these demonstrations became violent and several people were killed. It cannot be excluded whether 
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Kulimbayev and Kairgeldy, both high-profile elite members served as scapegoats 
and were dismissed.  The Zhanaozen incident constituted the biggest challenge to 
Nazarbayev’s rule and demanded an appropriate response from the President. 
However, the fall of these individuals is likely symbolic.  It may be possible that 
Nazarbayev had planned Kulibayev’s dismissal over the corruption investigation 
involving CNPC and after it transpired that Kulibayev had an extra-marital affair with 
Goga Ashkenazi in London (Interview International Finance Expert; Mendick 2011). 
With the exile of Aliyev, Kulibayev remains the only family member who can be a 
feasible successor to Nazarbayev and it is possible that Kulimbayev will return to 
the political stage (Brill Olcott 2012) (Interview International Finance Expert). 
Kulibayev’s case reflects the uncertainties of careers within the elite network which 
can come to an abrupt and unforeseen end. This might also account for the 
distinctive short-term view on policy taken by the elite and about which 
international observers frequently complain (Interview Trade Expert). 
Interestingly, Nazarbayev appointed Umirzak Shukeyev as the head of Samruk-
Kazyna, whose career was also accelerated through his China credentials. Shukeyev 
headed the China-Kazakhstan Cooperation Committee (CKCC), the main bilateral 
cooperation mechanism where he oversaw an agreement with China to build 
another gas pipeline (Meta.kz 2012). Together with Karim Massimov, this may have 
placed another potential facilitator of Chinese interests in a key decision-making 
position. Massimov was Kazakhstan’s longest-serving Prime Minister and his steep 
political career also occurred on the back of his strong China credentials (Karim 
Massimov, below).  Another example is Nurtay Abykayev, an old friend and long-
serving assistant of Nazarbayev, who was suddenly ‘demoted’ to an 
Ambassadorship in Russia in 2007, following the murder of Altynbek Sarsenbay-uly, 
an opposition leader (O'Rourke, 2004).  After one year, Abykayev returned to 
                                                                                                                                                      
opposition figures abroad had their hands in inciting these strikes. As one diplomat observed, the 
strikers were very quickly organised in a very sophisticated manner including international media 
attention which indicates outside involvement (Interview European Diplomat 2). 
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Nazarbayev’s inner circle and was appointed Head of the KNB (Figure 15). These 
examples show that there is an element of risk involved and that access to 
resources or a career is only somewhat predictable in the short-term. These effects 
are further underpinned through the regular reshuffling of key posts.  
The Rotating Chairs of Kazakhstan  
Nazarbayev, his family and close allies sit at the centre of Kazakhstan’s political 
system, from where their power radiates outward into the economic realm through 
personal networks. 63  This creates an inner circle with a small number of 
gatekeepers64 and loyal supporters who also champion different elite groups, 
economic interests and foreign policy views and who compete against each other 
for access to Nazarbayev (Hoagland, 2009g). The most influential posts, after the 
President himself, are the head of the Presidential Administration, the Prime 
Minister and Deputy Heads of Administration, closely followed by individuals who 
are close to the President in and outside of formal structures on the level below 
(Cummings 2005). A core group of Nazarbayev’s allies have regularly been assigned 
key positions in the country’s most important industries creating a tight nexus 
between economics and politics. 
                                                     
63
 Cummings defines the political elite in terms of those who exercise "preponderant political 
influence" (Cummings, 2005) in a formal or informal way. However, since the elite network also 
controls Kazakhstan’s economy the thesis will expand the definition to individuals in the economic 
sector who exercise preponderant influence.  
64
 Gatekeepers are individuals located on the level immediately below the President. This includes 
the Head of Presidential Administration which, as of November 2012 was Karim Massimov who is 
one of the facilitators of Chinese interests in Kazakhstan (Cummings 2005: 40). 
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Nazarbayev also regularly reshuffles key positions among his administrators in order 
to prevent any individual from building a power base that could challenge the 
President, as has occurred in the past. Officials therefore need to be cautious of 
maintaining Nazarbayev’s favour to avoid being assigned to an unfavourable post or 
shuffled out.  Regular reshuffles create career uncertainty amongst officials, feed 
into elite-conflicts and foster short-term decision making, something which is also 
reflected in Kazakhstan’s somewhat puzzling behaviour in a water dispute with 
China and which forms the case 
study in the second part of the 
thesis (Chapter 6,7 and 8). 
Figure 16 illustrates the elite 
structure graphically.  The small 
inner circles represent officials 
important to Nazarbayev who 
have rotated through different 
offices, indicated by the 
connecting arrows. Consequently, 
it is common for one person to hold several different offices both in industries and 
politics. For example, Vladimir Shkolnik served in all of the following positions:  
Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, Deputy Prime Minister, Deputy Head of 
the Presidential Administration and (more recently) Head of KazAtomProm (KAP).  
Kairat Kelimbetov, the former chairman of SK, previously headed the Presidential 
Administration and was appointed Deputy Prime Minister (see Figure 17). He is also 
the son of Tokmukhamed Sadykov, a long-time friend and confidante of Nazarbayev 
- a fact that may have helped him be appointed to SK in the first place. Imangali 
Tasmagambetov, who some consider another potential successor to Nazarbayev, 
repeatedly served as assistant to the President, Deputy Prime Minister and head of 
the Presidential Administration (Figure 5). Similarly, Marat Tazhin has worked in 
Nazarbayev’s administration since 1994 in various roles, including Chairman of the 
Figure 16 Elite Structure 
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National Security Committee (KNB), Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nurlan Kapparov headed KazTransOil and KazakhOil, 
and was Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources and Chairman of KazInvest 
before being appointed Minister of Environmental Protection (Government of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, 2012). One interesting and notable exception to these 
reshuffles is former Prime Minister Karim Massimov, who has kept his position for 
six years (see Figure 19) for reasons that are likely linked to his strong China 
credentials (Karim Massimov, below). 
The uncertain career prospects of elite members, as well as the regular reshuffles, 
may also be able to explain the somewhat short-term view that informs 
Kazakhstan’s domestic and foreign policy decisions (Interviews Regional Finance 
Expert, Trade Expert, International Diplomat). This short-term view can be rooted in 
the uncertainties of how long an individual will stay in power and the immediate 
threats to the regime’s overall power. Funding gaps pose such threats.  It is also 
possible that elite members are aware that their careers can come to a premature 
halt and thus possibly maximise the opportunities to benefit personally from their 
position whilst they can. Personal enrichment in theory further benefits any foreign 
investor who is not bound by anti-bribery laws, such as, in Kazakhstan’s case, Russia 
and China, which are important foreign investors along with IOCs such as Royal 
Dutch Shell or Total. China’s growing economic capabilities in Kazakhstan come with 
significant opportunity costs, especially for Kazakhstan’s economy in the long term 
(Chapter 5). The fact that the elite welcomes China’s growing economic role may 
stem from its preoccupation with generating immediate revenue streams to ensure 
political self-preservation. 
 Informal Decision Making 
Reshuffles occur within Kazakhstan’s formal political institutions. Yet most of the 
key decisions take place in the informal realm (Issacs, 2011).  Nazarbayev’s closest 
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friends, allies and many of the country’s oligarchs65 influence the country’s most 
important political and economic decisions without serving in an official capacity 
(Cummings 2005, Isaacs 2011). The political influence granted to oligarchs also 
further tightens the web between political and economic interests and allows 
Nazarbayev to project his power onto Kazakhstan’s major companies (Kazakhmys, 
above). Relevant individuals include Valdimir Kim or Mukhtar Ablyazov and Bulat 
Utemuratov who served in the Presidential administration and the Council of 
National Security and is considered to be Nazarbayev’s personal financial manager 
(see Figure 6). Aleksandr Mashkevich, and one of the three key stakeholders of 
ENRC, Nurzhan Subkhanberdin, the controlling shareholder of KazCommerzBank. 
He was the country’s first billionaire and Kazakhstan’s opposition appealed to the 
LSE on the suspicion that Utemuratov’s 
investment company Verny Capital acts as a 
“front for President Nazarbayev personally” 
(Foley 2011). 
The close link between political and economic 
interests in Kazakhstan’s elite and their informal 
decision-making processes means that private 
sector decisions are often made informally at the 
elite level and will be implemented in companies 
that are seemingly independent from the 
government, such as ENRC or Kazakhmys. In 
practical terms, this means that investment 
decisions are made in political meetings 
between Nazarbayev or key elite members and foreign partners. This should benefit 
those foreign investors with support of their political leaders who negotiate on their 
behalf. Major investment decisions are made by Nazarbayev, especially where 
resources and oil and gas are concerned (Dave 2007, Franke, Gawrich et al. 2009 ). 
                                                     
65
 Interviewees in Kazakhstan referred to business magnates as oligarchs 
o 2001 First Vice Minister of 
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Tokmukhamed Sadykov) 
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Nazarbayev and head of Nur 
Otan Almaty 
 
Figure 17 Kayrat Kelimbetov 
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The establishment of SK further increased the political control over commercial 
investments that are not made without the high-level support of Nazarbayev or his 
inner circle.  It is thus difficult for foreign governments and investors to ignore or 
bypass Kazakhstan’s elite structure, which determines major economic decisions. 
The successful implementation of a deal depends on whether it has elite support. 
An example from Kazakhstan’s early privatisation illustrates this point; in 1993, 
PhilipMorris wanted to acquire Almaty Tobacco and pledged to invest US$240m 
over five years (Cummings 2005:31), the biggest FDI in the former USSR at that 
time.  The deal nearly fell apart because PhilipMorris complained about the 
investment conditions, context and lack of reliable tax norms. The dispute between 
the government and PhilipMorris could only be resolved through the intervention 
of Nazarbayev’s family (Cummings 2005). Good personal contacts are necessary to 
expedite business transactions in a complicated web of bureaucratic requirements 
and rent-seeking strategies. Today, it takes a company on average 390 days and 38 
different steps and procedures to enforce a commercial contract in Kazakhstan, 
which in the end costs the plaintiff on average 22% of the claim (World Bank, 2012; 
IFC 2012). Similarly, those surveyed by the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global 
Competitive Index (GCI), have listed corruption as the biggest obstacle to 
conducting business in Kazakhstan (Sala-i-Martin 2011:222). Equally obstructive is a 
rent-seeking environment where taxes, regulations and levies change often to 
maximise rent extraction (Palazuelos & Fernandez 2012 ). Beijing and CNPC are apt 
at effectively using these close inter-linkages between politics and economics to 
their advantage (Chapter 5). Beijing benefits from this setting because key members 
of the elite, especially Massimov, and to a certain degree Timur Kulimbayev, 
facilitate Chinese interests. Furthermore, it is possible that China benefits from a 
low profile in elite conflicts that interfere with Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, 
(discussed below).  
It is possible that this informal and personalised way of decision making might suit 
Beijing, which is displayed a preference for relationship-oriented decision making 
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elsewhere (Interview International Water Expert 1).   There is evidence that 
decisions to accept Chinese investment for private companies are often made 
through the elite network without the knowledge of senior employees or the 
executive board of the companies involved. In 2009, China Investment 
Corporation’s (CIC) 11% acquisition in KMG 
Exploration and Production (KMG EP) for 
US$993m, surprised executives at the firm, who 
expressed shock in conversations with diplomatic 
staff (Hoagland 2009a). This was a significant 
development for the company. The share gave 
CIC the right to appoint one person to the board 
of directors, which means that CIC will need to 
approve all future investment decisions of KMG 
EP. Similarly, in 2009, China’s CNPC acquired 
MMG in a Joint Venture (JV) with KMG as part of 
a credit line. The deal was negotiated during 
Nazarbayev’s state visit to Beijing and came after 
Chinese investment faced increased opposition by the Kazakhstani public (Chapter 
5). However, KMG VP Idenov was excluded from the transaction. In 2011, China also 
made a loan of US$1.9bn to ENRC via SK, to expand ENRC’s chrome and iron ore 
production.  However, ENRC is a privately-held company and the loan had been 
negotiated during Nazarbayev’s state visit to China. After the deal, ENRC’s 
spokesperson denied any knowledge of the agreement, further highlighting high-
level elite control over investment decisions and the absence of the usual corporate 
decision-making processes (Orange, 2011).  
  
Vladimir Shkolnik  
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Minister, acting Minister of 
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 2009 KazAtomProm (KAP)           
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Russian officials. E.g. Son-in-
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RosAtom, Russia.  
 
Figure 18 Vladimir Shkolnik 
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Karim Massimov  
Within Kazakhstan’s administration, Karim 
Massimov is considered a driving force behind 
China’s growing economic influence and his 
biography features strong China credentials. As 
Prime Minister, Massimov was the key architect 
of Kazakhstan’s China strategy and has become a 
key figure in Sino-Kazakh transactions. It has 
been rumoured in diplomatic circles that he has 
worked for either the KGB or the Chinese secret 
service at some point (Interview European 
Diplomat 2).  Massimov is an ethnic Uyghur and fluent in Chinese. After graduating 
from the People’s Friendship University in Moscow, he applied to work for the KGB 
(Aliyev 2009) and subsequently studied at the Beijing Language and Culture 
University and Wuhan University Law School, where he graduated from in 1992 
(WuhanUniversity 2007). It has been suggested that Massimov was approached and 
enlisted by the Chinese secret service whilst studying or working in China (Interview 
European Diplomat 2). Massimov has extensive work experience in China, in 
Urumqi as a senior trade expert at the local office of Kazakhstan’s Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Cooperation, as well as in Hong Kong, where he managed the 
Kazakhstani trading house. Based on this experience, Massimov can draw on a 
number of links to China which may have influenced Nazarbayev’s decision to use 
Massimov as the primary point of contact with China. Nazarbayev has used other 
ethnic minorities as leverage to conduct business with their countries of origin, such 
as Vladimir Kim, who managed business transactions with Korea.  
Massimov’s exceptionally successful career in Kazakhstani politics is closely 
interwoven with China, his talent for attracting FDI and his ability to manoeuvre 
well within the Kazakhstani elite (Milas, 2007b). Indeed, Massimov was involved in 
the largest Sino-Kazakhstani transactions. He facilitated Beijing’s decision in 2007 to 
Prime Ministers 
 1991-1994 Sergei 
Tereshchenko 
 1994-1997 Akezhan 
Kazhgeldi(y)n 
 1997-1999 Nurlan 
Balgimbaev 
 1999- 2002 Kassym-Jomart 
Tokayev 
 2003-2007 Daniyal Akhmetov 
 2007-2012 Karim Masimov 
 2012- Seirk Akhmetov  
 
Figure 19 Prime Ministers 
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finance and build the strategically important gas pipeline from western Kazakhstan 
to China, referred to as the “project of the century”. It is likely that this deal, for 
which China provided US$5bn, propelled Massimov from the post of Deputy Prime 
Minister to Prime Minister within a month after the deal was announced (Sapiev & 
Mazhitova, 2011). Just two years later, Massimov was also involved in facilitating 
CNPC’s purchases of a 50% stake in MMG when Astana turned to Beijing for 
financial aid and in general has ‘orchestrated’ a number of high-level meetings 
between the Chinese and Kazakhstani heads of states (Hoagland 2009d). Massimov 
was the only politician who was present at the signing ceremony that established 
the joint CITIC-Samruk-Kazyna Investment Fund (KCM 2008).  Perhaps proof of his 
political skill, Massimov was also the longest-serving prime minister before he 
resigned in 2012 (see Figure 6). Massimov’s father is a businessman who operates 
in the background with an “in-transparent web” of Chinese business dealings 
(Interview European Diplomat 2). In any case, for Chinese foreign policy makers, 
Massimov is an important point of contact within Kazakhstan’s administration. 
Analysts attest Massimov’s longevity as Prime Minister to his role in seeing 
Kazakhstan successfully through the global financial and economic crisis.  Given 
China’s role in helping Kazakhstan to manage that very crisis with credit lines, as 
well as Massimov’s close contacts to Beijing, his success is closely interlinked with 
China’s increased economic significance to Kazakhstan (Chapter 3) (Hoagland 
2009b). However, the ‘China Factor’ in Massimov’s career has also drawn media 
attention inside Kazakhstan where suspicions of all things Chinese are latent (Sapiev 
& Mazhitova 2011).  
Following his resignation, Massimov was appointed head of the presidential 
administration, the equivalent of the White House Chief of Staff, one of the most 
influential posts in the country.  A Kazakhstani study on political influence identified 
Massimov as the second most influential person in country after the President 
himself (Lillis, 2012c).   The fact that he has been elevated to an even more strategic 
role may also be interpreted as Nazarbayev’s recognition of China as an important 
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foreign policy partner in the future. As head of the presidential administration, 
Massimov enjoys the trust of Nazarbayev, which could make him an even more 
effective facilitator of China’s economic influence in the future.  
Intra-Elite Conflicts Affect Foreign Policy and Investment 
Kazakhstan’s elite is not a cohesive group. Rather, over the years, sub-groups have 
emerged that pursue different agendas and compete with each other for access to 
Nazarbayev (Hoagland, 2009g). The resulting elite conflicts are typical for 
neopatrimonial systems (Chapter 2) and allow the President to maintain power by 
balancing these groups against each other (Isaacs 2011:8, Olcott 2002). Elite 
conflicts often occur between groups who are aligned to and promote a closer 
relationship with different foreign policy partners, often pitting Russia against the 
US. Of specific interest to this thesis is that Chinese interests appear to avoid the 
fate of their international counterparts and seemingly escape these elite dynamics 
as well as renationalisation programmes and rent-seeking behaviour. This could 
have a number of reasons (discussed below). However, as a result Beijing can 
quickly expand its economic interests in Kazakhstan.  
The elite-network expanded during Kazakhstan’s privatisation when it co-opted a 
new class of wealthy businessmen who formed financial-industrial groups (FIG), a 
new type of elite grouping (Junisbai 2010)66. These groups control or own certain 
industries and often have champions who have served in government and are part 
of Nazarbayev’s inner circle. The FIG resemble political parties by recruiting 
members into their network and serve as conduits for careers and political 
influence, functions that usually parties perform (Junisbai 2010). One prominent FIG 
is clustered around Timur Kulibayev, Karim Massimov and Kairat Kelimbetov. Bulat 
Utemuratov and Mukhtar Ablyazov form another group (Cummings, 2005).  These 
groups also promote their own interests. For example,  Aleksandr Mashkevich 
                                                     
66
 Finansovo–promyshlennye gruppy or FPGs (Junisbai 2010).FIG is the abbreviation of the translated 
term.  
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promotes the interests of ENRC, Kazakhstan’s metal energy and coal markets, the 
Eurasian bank and several media outlets (Junisbai 2010:244).  ENRC received, 
concessional Chinese loans. Given Mashkevich’s influential position and proximity 
to Nazarbayev, it cannot be excluded that ENRC benefitted from concessional 
financing from China because of his close relationship with Nazarbayev. ENRC’s 
shareholders benefitted from assets that Astana seized from disputes with foreign 
mining companies (Gorst, MacNamara et al. 2011), which illustrates how the elite 
can interfere with foreign investors. ENRC also went through a much-published 
board reshuffle in London because of ownership tensions involving the Kazakhstani 
government (Gorst, MacNamara et al. 2011). This earned ENRC the reputation of 
being more “Soviet than City” (White, Mason et al. 2011). Similarly, Chinese loans 
financed the government’s purchase of shares in Kazakhmys, discussed further 
above, and which turned Vladimir Kim into a billionaire.  
Elite groups also promote different foreign policy partners and their associated 
school of thought. In foreign policy, Nazarbayev uses ethnic minorities as leverage 
to facilitate investment from their country of origin. Ethnicity was important in 
Kazakhstan’s early years, when Nazarbayev replaced Russians in key positions with 
Kazakhstanis. Today, there are strong Korean and Uighur networks as well. Vladmir 
Kim is ethnically Korean with stakes in Kazakhmys where Nazarbayev used him as a 
facilitator for Samsung’s early investment in the corporation.  Two prominent 
Uighurs are Alican Ibragimov, one of the three main stakeholders of ENRC, and 
Karim Massimov, head of the Presidential Administration. It is likely that 
Nazarbayev deployed Massimov to deal with Beijing because of his extensive China 
exposure. The Uighur minority in Kazakhstan is well organised and has the potential 
to complicate relationships with China, because of secessionist Uighur movements 
in Xinjiang and the fact that many Uighurs seek refuge in Kazakhstan.  
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Kazakhstan’s elite has been viewed as rooted in Kazakhstan’s old clan structures. 67 
An exhaustive analysis is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, recent 
scholarship (Cummings 2005, Olcott 2002, Junisbai & Junisbai, 2005) suggests that 
the elite structure is a consequence of Nazarbayev’s Soviet experience and an 
enduring Soviet legacy (Franke et. al. 2009). The first Secretary of the KCP, Kunaev 
established a network of patron-client ties and Nazarbayev witnessed first-hand its 
benefits: Kunaev’s loyalty to Breshnev resulted in Kunaev’s appointment and 
benefitted his loyal clients, including Nazarbayev who was appointed Chairman of 
Kazakhstan’s Council of Ministers, the second most powerful post in the country 
(Isaacs 2011). Nazarbayev replicated the patronage system into modern 
Kazakhstan. Henderson notes:  “Ten years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, there is 
growing evidence that many of the patronage networks and political controls that 
existed under communism are more powerful than ever” (Henderson 2000).  
  The Soviet Union divided Kazakhstan into administrative subunits, which 
developed regional identities to prevent the emergence of a powerful centre that 
could challenge Moscow (Jones Luong, 2002). When Nazarbayev centralised power, 
he also reorganised regions, which triggered conflicts with Akims and regional 
parliaments.  Fractions can also occur between clans (Schatz and Collins 2002, 2003, 
2004), a fact that older research tends to overemphasise in Kazakhstan. More 
recent research suggests that clan affiliation today is loosely defined and plays a 
subsumed role in the country’s political landscape. However, the competition 
between different groups inadvertently drives economic and policy outcomes in 
Kazakhstan, depending on the interests of the group which prevails (Junisbai 
2010:263).  
                                                     
67
 The territory of contemporary Kazakhstan was socially organised into senior, middle and junior 
hordes called Zhuz (translates as 100).  Zhuz consisted of several tribes and clans, organised along 
kinship (Cummings 2005:18).  Kinship was only theoretically defined. It mattered more on the top 
levels of the hordes. In lower levels people often lived in settlements of mixed horde linage. Kinship 
became more relevant under the Soviet administration which manipulated these linages to exercise 
control by creating political divisions and competition in Kazakhstan (Cummings 2005). 
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Elite groups are also aligned with different foreign policy partners, mainly the US 
and Russia, whose interests can get caught up in elite conflicts as illustrated by case 
studies on Anthony Sharp, Uranium One and Nation’s Energy. What divides these 
particular groups is also a differing view on Kazakhstan’s political or economic 
future. A useful, albeit perhaps over-simplistic division runs between ‘young 
reformers’ who promote a more liberal political climate and greater privatisation 
and the ‘old guard’ which had come of age serving in Soviet political institutions and 
who are in favour of a strong, centralised political system and greater national 
control over resources. Nazarbayev is in charge of foreign policy and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) is located in the Presidential offices. Thus MFA officials are 
close to Nazarbayev, which is also reflected in his inner circle, many of which have 
served in an official capacity for the MFA.  Based on Kazakhstan’s Soviet experience, 
the country officially pursues a multi-vector foreign policy, that balances the great 
powers so that Kazakhstan will not become dependent on one country again 
(Nazarbayev 2006). Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that conflicts 
between these differently minded groups can interfere with Kazakhstan’s foreign 
policy and occasionally undermine these efforts.   
Nazarbayev is surrounded by a small number of gatekeepers who can influence his 
decisions and deny elite groups access. These gatekeepers, most prominently Karim 
Massimov, Vladimir Shkolnik and Kanat Saudabayev also champion different foreign 
policy partners (Cummings, 2005). Saudabayev, Kazakhstan’s long serving 
ambassador to the US is widely considered the key architect of the Kazakhstani-US 
relationship and favours strong ties with the US. His affinity for the US is balanced 
by Nazarbayev’s other close friend, Vladimir Shkolnik, who pursues closer ties with 
Russia. Shkolnik became the head of KazAtomProm (KAP) after Mukhtar Dzhakishev 
had been dismissed in what some view as a Russian effort to secure uranium 
deliveries and to prevent Kazakhstan’s emancipation on the international uranium 
market. Shkolnik also has close personal links to Russia through his son-in-law, who 
is a senior executive at RosAtom, Russia’s nuclear agency (Figure 18).  Karim 
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Massimov, head of the Presidential Administration, facilitates Chinese finance and 
investment in Kazakhstan. These diverging foreign policy affiliations are also 
reflected in governmental organs. For example, the KNB, whose roots date back to 
the KGB and Soviet times continues to maintain a strong ‘pro-Russian’ outlook. 
Conflicts between these gate-keepers and their elite groups have affected 
Kazakhstani foreign policy in the past. Perhaps one of the most poignant examples 
of such a conflict is the Anthony Sharp Affair (below) and the mishap of Uranium 
One following the dismissal of KAP head Mukhtar Dzhakishev  (Economist 2009).   
Case Study: Anthony Sharp 
The Sharp provides insight into these elite dynamics and how they detrimentally 
affect the relationship even with important foreign policy partners such as the US. A 
close partnership with the US is important for Nazarbayev, since this translates into 
an affiliation with the west which also helped Kazakhstan to obtain the prestigious 
OSCE chairmanship in 2010.  
In 2008, Anthony Sharp, a Peace Corps Volunteer in Kazakhstan, was arrested for 
the possession of firearms after evidence was allegedly planted on him by his 
supervisor. The circumstances of the case are documented in a number of cables 
from the US Embassy in Astana (Hoagland 2009i) but are now also in the public 
domain (Pickens 2011a, Pickens 2011b). US diplomats considered the arrest 
politically motivated to harm US-Kazakhstani relations.  The events that unfolded 
subsequent to his arrest revealed an inter-elite conflict between different 
governmental organs and officials, especially the pro-western grouping including 
(Kanat Saudabayev and his deputy Marat Tazhin) and Amangeldy Shabdarbayev, the 
head of Kazakhstan’s KNB.  Following the intervention of Ambassador Hoagland, 
Anthony Sharp was offered a deal in which he would stand a short trial, plead guilty 
and then immediately be deported to the US. Although Sharp accepted the deal, 
the Kazakhstani government did not live up to its end of the bargain and it took 
over six months and the intervention of Nazarbayev to send Sharp home. The KNB 
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had been in charge of bringing Rakhat Aliyev, Nazarbayev’s former son-in-law, back 
to Kazakhstan and was frustrated “if not deeply annoyed” that the US did not 
support Kazakhstan’s extradition request to Austria (Hoagland, 2009i).  
Consequently, the KNB tried to undermine the US-Kazakhstani relationship. The 
incident also contributed to the abrupt suspension of the Peace Corps programme 
in Kazakhstan in 2011 (Lillis 2011). 
Case Study: Uranium One, Nation’s Energy  
Uranium One, a Canadian uranium producer, was pulled into the politically-
motivated investigation of elite opponents. Uranium One was a joint venture 
partner of KAP, when Kazakhstan’s KNB began to investigate the head of KAP, 
Mukhtar Dzhakishev, for alleged corruption.  In response to media reports about 
the incident, Uranium One’s share price fell dramatically by 40%, thereby 
destroying its capital base and making it a potential acquisition target (Hill 2009).  It 
has been argued that Dzhakishev’s downfall was a consequence of his close 
association with Rakhat Alievy and Mukhtar Ablyazov, who had both fallen out with 
the President.  
Nations Energy exemplifies how centralised control and the elite structure allow 
individuals to exploit any favourable position they hold with Nazarbayev.  Nations 
Energy, which had oil stakes in Kazakhstan, decided to sell its Kazakhstani 
subsidiary, Karazhambasmunai JV (Palazuelos & Fernandez 2012:7) when it became 
entangled in a lengthy lawsuit, instigated by members of the elite who conspired 
with Zoran Savicic and enlisted Kazakhstani courts to drive down the company’s 
value. Savicic, a Serbian national, claimed a 50% share of the company based on a 
somewhat unrelated and nullified agreement with some of its shareholders that 
was made years before their involvement with Nations Energy. It was alleged that 
Zhakyp Marabayev, a managing director at KMG, and Askar Balzhanov, General 
Director at KMG EP, conspired to drive down the share price of Nations Energy to 
buy it and then resell it for a higher price to China’s CNPC, which had been 
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interested in the asset. CNPC rejected the offer and instead forwarded some 
evidence implicating the two men to the US Embassy. It is difficult to verify the 
involvement of these two individuals outside of Wikileaks (Milas 2006b). However, 
the lawsuit initiated by Savicic is documented in a due-diligence and risk assessment 
report for CITIC, which was interested in acquiring the Karazhanbas oil field. The 
document is available online. CITIC ended up buying the company for US$1.91bn 
(CITIC-Resources,2007) .  
Interestingly, Chinese companies seem to have largely escaped these dynamics. This 
may be for several reasons.  For once, interviews showed that officials consider 
Chinese companies generally as state-owned enterprises and fear that any 
aggressive move against their assets could be considered a diplomatic offence 
against Beijing (Interview Local Finance Expert 1), which could possibly risk future 
investment from China. Another explanation could be China’s low profile in elite 
dispute, something which might be explicable through the background of 
Kazakhstan’s contemporary political elite, which obtained their policy experience in 
the former Soviet Union and during the Cold War.  The bi-polar world order 
determined which foreign partners to seek out for cooperation. As a result, it is 
likely that Russia still features prominently among the ‘old guard’, even if this does 
not necessarily mean that the ruling elite want to be controlled by Moscow again.  
Arguably, policy makers in Kazakhstan still consider the US the epitome of ‘the 
West’ which serves as the political and intellectual counterweight to Russia, as 
opposed to China playing this role. As ‘the West’ is associated with political 
liberalisation and privatisation, elite factions may therefore align themselves along 
a Russia-versus-US dichotomy. If this is the case, this will work to Beijing’s 
advantage, in that China is not associated with any distinctive elite faction and 
could even be considered a compromise solution. China’s rapidly growing role as 
key creditor and investor to Kazakhstan supports this view.   
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3.5 Chapter Conclusion  
This chapter discussed specific factors in Kazakhstan’s domestic political and 
economic setting that favour China’s growing economic role in Kazakhstan and 
likely also align the elite’s interest with Beijing (Chapter 6, 7 and 8). Nazarbayev’s 
centralisation of power has led to the emergence of an elite network and 
established a neopatrimonial political system that operates like a Rentier State. This 
system creates specific revenue demands that enable the elite to consolidate and 
stay in power and which is further exacerbated by structural weaknesses such as 
weak economic institutions and vulnerability to revenue shocks (Chapter 2). In 
theory, these funding needs should benefit any foreign source with the economic 
capabilities and interest to provide such funding. However, the following chapters 
will show that economic capabilities of traditional sources such as the US, Russia or 
private international investors have significantly decreased, especially since the 
onset of the Global Financial Crisis, which left China as one of the few countries 
with the ability to invest. More importantly, however, the following chapters will 
show that Beijing not only has the capabilities but also offers the type of revenue 
that the elite are interested in: discreet and speedy transactions in conditions that 
may be detrimental to Kazakhstan’s economy but that are beneficial to the regime 
(Chapters 3, 4 and 5).  
Beyond the elite’s revenue needs, there are a number of other variables that 
appear to benefit an inflow of Chinese trade, finance and investment. These include 
a centralised economic structure that allows foreign partners to identify and target 
key decision makers such as SK, a personalised and informal decision-making 
process and a low Chinese profile in elite conflicts. Without Kazakhstan’s domestic 
context, it is difficult to explain why and how China manages to create economic 
dependencies in Kazakhstan that are the subject of analysis in the following 
chapters. Although China’s economic capabilities are a necessary prerequisite, they 
do not suffice in taking account of the effectiveness of these capabilities. Thus, elite 
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consent is an essential sub-systemic variable that drives Chinese finance and 
investment. For example, during the financial crisis, Nazarbayev turned to China in 
order to avoid painful revenue disruptions that could undermine the regime’s 
legitimacy. This poses the question whether Beijing’s growing economic influence in 
Kazakhstan is the outcome of a deliberate Chinese foreign policy approach towards 
Kazakhstan or rather driven by opportunities presented by Kazakhstan’s elite. The 
following chapters will try to answer this question, which is crucial for building a 
hypothesis on whether or not Beijing should be able to use its economic influence 
in Kazakhstan as leverage towards specific foreign policy objectives. As discussed in 
the introduction of the thesis, the deliberate use of economic capabilities is an 
important prerequisite to understand whether these capabilities have become a 
foreign policy tool of Beijing.  
However, the chapter also highlighted limitations of the overarching theoretical 
paradigm. An alternative explanation for the willingness of Astana to foster China’s 
economic influence could be the fact that China is an authoritarian regime.68 
Bandwagoning with China as Roy Allison puts it could serve as a means to fend of 
the diffusion of democratisation and good governance (Allison 2008). It is possible 
that this also an intervening variable that further incentivises the regime to accept 
China’s growing economic clout.  Arguably, the regime is not interested in any form 
of democratisation that can curtail its power. However, to what degree this fosters 
Astana’s cooperation with authoritarian states is unclear, especially when the 
regime is in fiscal crisis where the primary objective is likely to access alternative 
sources of funding. Here the type of regime that extends funding is secondary.  
                                                     
68
 A detailed discussion of authoritarian cooperation and regime diffusion is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. For an introduction Chapter 2, footnote 17 
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 The Power of Finance-China as Key Creditor Chapter 4 
Against the background of Kazakhstan’s political system, this 
segment introduces the quantitative part of the thesis, which analyses the extent of 
Chinese trade, finance and investment in Kazakhstan. 69  As discussed in the 
introduction, China’s ability to leverage its economic influence towards political 
ends is contingent on whether it has created an asymmetric economic relationship 
with Kazakhstan which informs an economic dependence (Chapter 2).   
This chapter analyses the hypothesis that China’s financial influence in Kazakhstan 
has created significant dependencies, especially following the Global Financial Crisis 
(Sub-hypothesis 3, Chapter 2). It shows that China has become the lender of last 
resort during the Crisis, and its source of new financing plays an indispensable role 
in Kazakhstan’s economy and politics. The elite’s vulnerability to funding shocks 
(Chapter 2) further exacerbates this development and provides incentives to gain 
access to more Chinese lending in the future. Unlike other alternatives, Chinese 
credit carries opportunity costs that are beneficial to the elite, yet detrimental to 
Kazakhstan’s national interest. Beijing, in turn, deliberately uses as leverage 
Kazakhstan’s financial need to meet specific foreign policy objectives.  
 
 
 
                                                     
69
 FDI and finance (credit) often overlap in that Beijing provides financing in order to tap into 
Kazakhstan’s resources. For example Beijing provides credit lines for Kazakhmys, a copper miner and 
also purchases 80% of Kazakhmys copper annually, possibly at concessional prices. Many of China 
Development Bank (CDB) loans to Kazakhstan are “loans for oil”-where interest payments are made 
in concessional oil deliveries. This blurs the line between finance and investment significantly.  
However the segment will distinguish as much as possible the two. 
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 “When countries with external deficits run out of foreign providers of 
private credit, they become dependent on foreign sovereigns.”  
(Martin Wolf, 2010) 
Beijing’s unmatched foreign currency reserves established Beijing as a major player 
in the global debt market (Helleiner & Chin 2009) and a key provider of capital to 
emerging economies (Kaminska 2009, David 2011) (Figure 20). China’s exceptionally 
strong relative financial power can be used to extend credit widely and thus has the 
potential to contribute to building economic dependencies. Between 2009 and 
2010, China lent circa US$110bn to developing countries, more than the World 
Bank (WB) (Dyer & Anderlini 2011). This also allowed Beijing to become a more 
prominent creditor to Kazakhstan. The following segment analyses the role China 
plays in financing Kazakhstan’s external debt, in view of the wider research question 
of whether China has created economic dependencies that it can use as leverage 
towards specific foreign policy objectives. 
Figure 20 Chinese Foreign Currency Reserves 
 
Source: ECB, Ministry of Finance Japan, Reserve Bank of India, PBC 
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4.1 China’s Creditor Status in Kazakhstan 
The IMF defines long-term external debt as debt that has an original or extended 
maturity of more than one year and that is owed to non-residents by residents of 
an economy and repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services (IndexMundi 
2011). An analysis of Kazakhstan’s debt structure provides insights on key 
relationships and dependencies that may arise with its external creditors. The 
Kazakh banking system nearly collapsed as a consequence of underlying structural 
weaknesses, which came to the fore during the 2008/09 financial and economic 
crisis. Four of Kazakhstan’s biggest banks defaulted on their debt: Bank Turalem 
(BTA) - Kazakhstan’s then biggest bank by assets; Alliance; Temir Bank; and Astana-
Finance JSC. Several others ran into trouble including Halyk Bank and 
KazKommertsBank.  The first three banks alone accounted for more than one third 
of the system’s assets (S&P 2012). The extent of the problem is also highlighted by 
the fact that between 2007 and 2008, the overall profit for all 37 Kazakhstani banks 
dropped by 93% (Gizitdinov 2009). As the following section elaborates, a key driver 
of the banking sector’s troubles was the relatively unstable funding structure of 
Kazakh banks, which relied heavily on foreign debt, along with bad management 
practices linked to Kazakhstan’s elite structure (S&P, 2012).  These structural 
weaknesses accelerated China’s rise to Kazakhstan’s most important external 
source of finance. 
4.2 Kazakhstan’s Banking Crisis  
Chapter 3 briefly touched upon the concentration of elite interests and structural 
weaknesses in the Kazakhstani banking sector as well as the elite’s vulnerability to 
revenue shocks, which can increase the risk of political instability, especially in a 
Rentier State. Kazakhstan’s banking sector has a record of being unstable. In 1996, 
for example, Serik Burkitbaeyv, then head of Kazakhtelecom, was involved in the 
bankruptcy of KazPochtaBank, one of the biggest and most stable banks in the 
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country. The bankruptcy was triggered when he moved all of Kazakhtelecom’s 
accounts to another bank without warning, consequently rendering KazPochtaBank 
bankrupt.  However, the real test for Kazakhstan’s banking system was to come 
over a decade later, during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008/09.  Kazakhstan went 
through a construction boom following the discovery of large oil fields and realised 
an annual real GDP growth of around 10% between 2000-2007, which dramatically 
dropped to 3.2% in 2008 and then finally to 1.2 % in 2009 (see Figure 2) (WBI 2010). 
To finance the associated construction boom, domestic banks took out loans from 
overseas institutions at relatively low interest rates, passing on the cash to domestic 
borrowers. As a result, Kazakhstani banks, and therefore the Kazakhstani economy, 
became highly dependent on overseas credit. Consequently, foreign funding of 
banks reached 45% of GDP in 2007 (WorldBank,2009). This is reflected in the 
external debt to GDP ratio, which was extremely high when the crisis hit in 2009, 
particularly for a transition country (See Table 1). 
Figure 21 Kazakhstan's Annual GDP Growth70 
 
During the Global Financial Crisis, the economy went through a downturn, driven by 
steeply-falling oil and commodity prices, leading many borrowers to default on their 
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payments (NBK 2010a, NBK 2010b). The oil price dropped from a high of US$133.9 
in July 2008 to US$77/barrel in early 2009 and by the end of 2009, the value of 
Kazakhstan’s crude oil export had dropped by 46% (NBK 2010a, NBK 2010b). This 
constitutes a critical moment for a Rentier State where political legitimacy rests on 
the re-distribution of rents (Chapter 2) and revenue shocks can decrease the funds 
that are available for such redistribution. 
External ‘over-borrowing’ combined with aggressive lending practices, weak due 
diligence standards and top level corruption scandals brought about the crisis 
(Standard and Poor’s) and Kazakhstani banks were left unable to meet their foreign 
interest and principal obligations. Consequently, international investors fled - 
scared off by recurring corruption scandals of the senior management of many 
banks, including BTA71. As a result, Kazakhstani banks struggled to raise financing 
after the restructuring. This hit the Kazakhstani economy particularly hard, as 
Kazakhstani banks remained the key source of financing for the real economy in the 
absence of developed capital markets.  
Table 1 Kazakhstan’s External Debt to GDP Ratio 
US$ bn. 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
GDP   57 81 105 133 115 148 186 
External 
Debt   
43 74 97 108 113 110 125 
Share 76% 91% 92% 81% 98% 74% 67% 
Source: World Bank, National Bank of Kazakhstan 
Table 1 and Table 2 show that the Kazakhstani banking sector has deleveraged 
drastically with external debt falling by over half and overall debt to GDP ratios 
falling to 67% in 2011. However, debt in general continued to increase by 17% until 
2012. This raises an interesting question: why has the overall external debt 
remained so high, whilst bank debt decreased drastically?  
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Mukhtar Ablyazov, allegedly embezzled loans that BTA received from international lenders 
(Kuznetsov, 2011). 
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Continuous high levels of borrowing can be explained through an increase in 
corporate lending and alternative sources of financing that is symptomatic of 
Kazakhstan’s uninterrupted financing needs that now need to come from a 
different source. Corporations have stepped in to partially compensate for the 
funding gap left by the banks by increasing inter-company loans (WSJ 2010). These 
are loans from companies or their units to affiliates in Kazakhstan which increased 
to 49% of Kazakhstan’s external debt by mid-2012.72  As will be shown this also 
represented an opportunity for Chinese NOCs to significantly increase their lending. 
An example of how corporations compensated for the borrowing deficit is CNPC’s 
agreement in 2009 to lend US$5bn to KazMunaiGas (KMG), which was used jointly 
to acquire MangistauMunaiGas (MMG).73 Not only is China a substantial factor in 
inter-company loans, it has also provided large direct loans to Kazakhstan. In 
particular, many of these loans have gone to the banking sector, making China the 
key lender to this sector that has otherwise been in deleveraging mode.  
Even four years after the financial crisis, the financing structure of the Kazakhstani 
economy remains very vulnerable as the banking system struggles to recover and to 
access international capital markets. With private international lenders falling aside, 
Kazakhstan needed to access alternative sources of funding, a need that was 
particularly pronounced for Kazakhstan as a Rentier State (Chapter 2). Thus, it is 
feasible to assume that any new external provider of debt who fills this funding gap, 
wields disproportionate influence on economic growth and the elite in Kazakhstan.  
The following segment will show that China has adopted this role. 
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 Jedh and Annual Report NBK. 
73
 As part of the deal, KazMunaiGas and CNPC Exploration and Development Company, a subsidiary 
of CNPC, agreed to jointly buy MangistauMunaiGas. The loan for the transaction came directly from 
CNPC. Interestingly, the right to buy a 50% stake in MangistauMunaiGas was part of the conditions 
for the US$ 10bn loan package from China to Kazakhstan in 2009.  
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4.2.1 China as Key Creditor of Kazakhstani Banks   
This section discusses China’s position as creditor to Kazakhstan relative to 
Kazakhstan’s other creditors, in line with criteria for dependence developed in 
Chapter 2. 
Figure 22 shows that China was Kazakhstan’s third largest overall creditor in 2011, 
having provided US$13bn. (NBK, AR 2011). However, the chart only lists the stock of 
outstanding loans and does not reflect the annual flow. For example, it does not 
take into account that UK and Dutch banks and businesses have extended only 
minimal or no new credit to Kazakhstan since 2009. Instead, the chart summarises 
the total disbursements of loans drawn by the end of 2011. However, since China is 
a latecomer to the creditor scene, it will take a while for Beijing to catch up with the 
accumulated outstanding debt of other creditor nations who have been active in 
Kazakhstan since the early 1990s.  The UK’s top rank may be surprising but can be 
explained through the registration (registered trustee) of Eurobonds that are issued 
by banks (NBK AR 2011) and thus rather reflect an accounting principle rather than 
‘real’ external credit. Controlling for this accounting principle, China can be viewed 
already as Kazakhstan’s second biggest lender in terms of outstanding loans.  
Figure 22 Top 6 Countries Originating Kazakhstani Debt 
 
*Source: National Bank of Kazakhstan 
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However, instead of looking at credit that was extended in the past, a more 
meaningful statistic would rank countries according to their credit disbursement 
within a given year.  While an exact breakdown of this data could not be retrieved, 
the National Bank of Kazakhstan’s (NBK) annual report identified China as the 
second biggest lender to Kazakhstan in 2010 and 2011 with US$13bn in new loans 
(NBK 2010a).  These loans were earmarked to finance segments of the Kazakhstan-
China pipeline. China may very well be on its way to surpassing the UK and the 
Netherlands as the single biggest financier of Kazakhstan, given that in the first two 
months of 2011 alone, China has pledged roughly US$7bn in new loans74 to 
Kazakhstan. Thus, on an annual basis, China is now the second biggest lender of 
new credit to Kazakhstan after the Netherlands and ahead of the US and the UK. 
New credit is a more meaningful indicator in understanding how important Chinese 
financing is for Kazakhstani politics and economics. Although outstanding credit 
needs to be serviced, this also hinges on the availability of new credit lines that 
finance the elite’s current revenue needs (Chapter 3).  Figure 21 illustrates that 
these funding needs were especially acute immediately before and after the 
financial crisis, when Kazakhstan’s annual GDP growth contracted from around 10% 
to nearly 0%. To avoid exposure to declining revenue and the associated possibility 
of political instability (Demkiv 2012), the government will look towards current and 
future sources of lending, such as China, more so than towards old lenders. Within a 
very short period of time, Beijing has become a key financier of Kazakhstan’s overall 
external debt and has replaced the US. This trend is even more pronounced in the 
Kazakhstani banking sector which will be discussed below.    
A more detailed breakdown of Kazakhstan’s external debt shows that Kazakhstani 
banks, along resource exploration75, was the biggest beneficiary and thus key driver 
                                                     
74
 The Kazakh government identified 30 important industrial projects for which it wanted financing 
from China (Orange 2011). However, it is unclear whether ENRC was consulted prior to Nazarbayev’s 
visit or not. Zaure Zaurbekova, head of the financial department at ENRC, stated in an interview with 
the Daily Telegraph that ENRC had not participated in the preparation leading to these loans and has 
not given its official approval yet (Orange 2011). 
75
 The destination of loans will be discussed in more detail. 
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of foreign lending until 2007, taking up 47% of Kazakhstan’s total external debt 
(NBK 2010a).  China’s financing of this sector is crucial because of its importance to 
Kazakhstan’s current and future economic growth. In view of still under-developed 
capital markets banks remain the most important creditors to the Kazakhstani 
economy. 
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Table 2 External Debt of Banks 
US$ bn. 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* 
Total Debt 33 43 74 97 108 113 119 125 132 
Banks  8 15 33 46 39 30 20 15 15 
Share 23% 35% 45% 47% 36% 27% 17% 12% 11% 
Source: http://www.jedh.org; Joint External Debt Hub, *1st half 2012.  
The relative and absolute decrease in bank debt after 2007 is due to the defaulting 
of four major Kazakhstani banks during the financial crises. The restructuring, in 
conjunction with general risk aversion during the crisis, deterred investors, making 
it more difficult for Kazakhstani banks to tap international loan markets. This is 
reflected in the fact that that the volume of external bank debt decreased 
dramatically, from a pre-crisis peak of US$46bn to US$15bn in 2011. Also, the 
banking system’s maturity term structure changed significantly. Whereas long-term 
loans constituted 78% of bank debt before 2008 this share more than halved to 37% 
in 2010.76 Instead, the proportion of generally shorter-dated credit lines like bonds 
and certificates of deposits (CDs) increased to 55% of external debt. This shift to 
shorter maturities implies a riskier banking system, as Kazakhstani banks have to 
access the notoriously unstable international investor base77 more frequently to re-
finance their debt.  Rather, the banks, along with the Kazakhstani government are 
interested in long-term credit lines that provide a degree of certainty and thus, 
financial stability. However, in the aftermath of the crisis, Kazakhstani banks had to 
re-approach international investors continuously to raise the funds to finance their 
long-term assets, thus frequently putting themselves at risk of a crisis in investor 
confidence and as a consequence, worse terms and conditions. This is also a direct 
consequence of structural weaknesses in the finance sector that are reflected in 
Kazakhstan’s bad credit rating (S&P 2012).  
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 In 2007 external debt of Kazakh banks amounted to US$ 46bn, of which US$ 35.9bn were long-
term loans (NBK, 2011b).  
77
 Investors have greater faith in their domestic institutions and are often willing to provide them 
with more beneficial loan terms. International investors in turn tend to be stricter. 
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The next section discusses the role of Chinese credit lines in Kazakhstan’s banking 
system, the structure of which increases the opportunity costs for Kazakhstan to 
forego Beijing’s credit lines (Crescenzi 2005).   
China as key lender to Kazakhstani Banks  
Kazakhstani banks showed signs of structural weaknesses as early as June 2007 
when the share prices of BTA and KazKommertsBank began a continuous decline 
and thereby preceded the Global Financial Crisis by several months. The earliest 
signs of the sub-prime crisis occurred on 9 August 2007, when BNP Paribas 
suspended trading in three mortgage-related funds. But the crisis would only come 
to a head over one year later with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 
2009. It seems that international investors were sensitive to the (Chapter 2) 
structural weaknesses78  in the Kazakhstani banking sector and withdrew their 
money more quickly  from markets that were perceived as less safe (Interview 
Finance Expert, London).  International rating agencies generally criticised lax 
lending standards and a bad repayment culture in Kazakhstani banks. Perhaps, 
then, the near collapse of key Kazakhstani banks during the peak of the financial 
crisis was not surprising. However, years later, these weaknesses continue to 
persist. They have further eroded international confidence in the banking system 
and leave Kazakhstani banks struggling to access international markets. In the 
aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, this left China as the only key creditor along 
with the UK from which Kazakhstani banks could borrow (Figure 23).  
China’s role in the banking system cannot be underestimated, given that banks are 
the key source for financing economic growth in the absence of capital markets 
(WorldBank 2012c). Although banks have somewhat recovered from the crisis and 
increased their capital ratio, new credit lines to Kazakhstan’s economy remain 
subdued with little signs of changing (ADB 2011). Intercompany loans substitute for 
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 Standard and Poor describes Kazakhstani banks as “aggressive”, with “relaxed lending practices” 
and “underwriting standards” in a “weak payment culture” (S&P 2012). 
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these shortfalls, however, only multinational companies and thus larger firms 
benefit from access to funding through their affiliates abroad. Small and medium 
sized businesses, on the other hand, find it difficult to access financing, which 
further hinders the development of alternative industries in Kazakhstan and thus 
puts Kazakhstan on a course towards the Dutch Disease (Chapter 2). It is difficult to 
conclude whether Beijing could have taken such a prominent role in Kazakhstani 
debt without the financial crisis. Few examples of Chinese loans before 2009 can be 
found in the public domain. However, the overall lack of transparency makes it 
difficult to say conclusively how much money Beijing has extended to Astana. What 
is certain, however, is that both the volume and frequency of Chinese loans has 
increased significantly since 2009. This would also be in line with the observation 
that China began to provide external financing more assertively, based on the 
insight that the financial crisis offered a number of critical opportunities for Beijing 
to invest its foreign currency reserves abroad, at a time when investments were 
generally less competitive. The Global Financial Crisis significantly decreased the 
number of available creditors for Kazakhstan which simultaneously increased the 
opportunity costs for Astana to turn down external credit from China (Crescenzi 
2005, Chapter 2). China’s role in Kazakhstani debt may not only be driven by 
Kazakhstan’s financial needs but also by China’s determination to seize finance and 
investment opportunities abroad. This point will be discussed in greater detail 
towards the end of Part I of the thesis.  
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Figure 23 External Creditors of Kazakhstani Banks 
 
4.3 The Impact of Chinese Finance  
China has extended sizable loans to Kazakhstani banks since at least 2006, when the 
China Development Bank (CDB) and Kazyna Sustainable Development Fund created 
a joint fund with a volume of US$5bn to finance infrastructure projects (Trend.Kz 
2006). During the subsequent financial crises, China was the only country to 
consistently expand its loan volume while other international investors withdrew 
credit. In particular, China’s importance grew when four Kazakhstani banks (BTA 
Bank, Alliance Bank, Temirbank and Astana Finance) defaulted on their 
international debt, thus writing off 85% of their obligations. The subsequent 
restructuring especially affected Dutch special purpose entities, which had 
extended large credit lines to Kazakhstani banks. As a result, loans provided by 
Dutch investors, such as ABNAmro and ING were wiped out and the Netherlands 
dropped from the list of top foreign bank loan providers. However, while the 
Netherlands and other investors fled, China provided an instant lifeline to 
Kazakhstan through loan commitments. For example, in April 2009 the Chinese 
Government extended a US$10bn loan package to help the country manage the 
impact of the financial crisis. In September 2009, China Exim Bank extended a 
US$1.5bn loan to the Kazakhstani Development Bank (KDB) as part of an individual 
credit agreement. The NBK further noted in its 2009 annual report that due to 
China, 2.5bn 
U.S. 
U.K., 8bn  
Russia 
Other, 3.3bn 
External Debtors to Kazakh Banks by June 2012* in US$ 
*NBK, 2012 (1H) 
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improved bilateral relations between China and Kazakhstan, the KDB and the 
National Wealth Fund (NWF) Samruk-Kazyna could raise about US$4.2bn from 
China’s Exim and CDB (NBK 2010a). This money was earmarked for investment 
projects in various industries and infrastructure development as part of the anti-
crisis programme. However, it is likely that a large part of this loan was either 
directly or indirectly used as working capital by cash-strapped Kazakhstani banks, 
thereby helping them through the crisis (Figure 24). Table 3 summarises publicly-
reported loans from China and shows how the frequency of such loans increased 
dramatically after 2009.79 Curiously, this is similar to the forays of China’s energy 
companies in Kazakhstan, who made a first initial investment, followed by increased 
investment. Perhaps this is indicative of a strategy of testing the waters with an 
initial investment or credit-line that is then quickly followed. Alternatively, this 
could simply mean that China has discovered its resource and financing interests in 
Kazakhstan, on which it followed up with more activity. The table also shows that 
whereas the first credit line of 2006 was directed at joint investment into infra-
structure projects, nearly all subsequent credit lines had a distinctive resource 
focus. 
More importantly, China is the only creditor to continue to lend high volumes to the 
banking sector. By the end of 2011, China had lent more than US$2.5bn directly to 
Kazakhstani banks, compared to US$51m by the UK and US$149m by the US. The 
Netherlands stopped lending to Kazakhstani banks all together (NBK 2011). 
Kazakhstan’s only alternative to Chinese credit lines then is to provide funding for 
its banks through domestic sources. This, as will be discusses is either not feasible 
or comes at substantial opportunity costs, especially for the ruling elite (Crescenzi 
2005, Chapter 2). 
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 The table excludes loans that closely resemble FDI in connection with Chinese investments in 
Kazakhstan such as CITIC, CIC (Chapter 4). Sources include: KDB 2011, Paxton 2011, Hook &Gorst 
2011, Orange 2011 and  KIP 2008. 
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Table 3 Chinese Credit Lines 
Public Record of Chinese Credit to Kazakhstan  
Year Originator Value (US$bn) Description  
2006 CDB 5.00 Joint Kazyna Investment Fund 
2008 CDB 0.30 KDB 
2009 CDB 5.00 Samruk-Kazyna  
2009 China ExIm 5.00 Samruk-Kazyna /KMG 
2009 China ExIm 0.87 ENRC 
2009 China ExIm 1.50 KDB 
2009 CDB 2.70 Samruk-Kazyna /Kazakhmys 
2011 China ExIm 0.50 Samruk Energo 
2011 CDB 1.50 Samruk-Kazyna /Kazakhmys 
2011 ?
80
 5.00 Petrochemical Complex 
2011 CDB 1.70 Samruk-Kazyna 
2011 CDB 1.90 ENRC 
2012 China ExIm 1.13 KMG/ Refinery 
2012 China ExIm 10.00 SCO Members 
 
China’s fast rise as key creditor is reflected in the annual reports of the NBK, which 
only mentioned Chinese credit sporadically before 2009. In 2009, the Netherlands 
accounted for 50.3% of outstanding external bank loans, followed by the UK 
(11.6%), Germany (4.7%) and international organisations (2.4%). However, halfway 
through 2012, China was already the second largest lender to Kazakhstani banks. 
The dramatic shift in Kazakhstan’s external debt structure shows that western 
creditors have abandoned the Kazakhstani banking system.  These drastic changes 
are largely a reflection of the restructuring efforts of Kazakhstani banks with their 
foreign lenders, which amounted to over US$15bn in write-offs by the end of 2011 
(WorldBank 2012c). Whether Beijing’s financial clout is strong enough to create 
dependencies is subject to an analysis into opportunity costs and alternative 
sources of finance at the end of the chapter. Beyond its immediate implications for 
Kazakhstan’s finance sector, Chinese loans are highly relevant to the Kazakhstani 
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 This loan could not be verified independently 
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economy and politics which increases the cost of foregoing Chinese finance 
significantly. 
Economic Relevance 
The previous segment discussed the effects of the financial crisis on the Kazakhstani 
banking sector and thus the relevance of Chinese credit lines. However, access to 
external financing from China was crucial to alleviate inflationary pressure and 
maintain systemic stability. When the financial crisis began to affect the Kazakhstani 
economy, Astana initially attempted to prevent a devaluation of the Tenge. By 
February 2009, however, the pressure to devalue had taken its financial toll. After 
substantial efforts that had depleted Kazakhstan’s foreign currency reserves by 
US$3.5bn (16%), the NBK decided to let the Tenge depreciate against the US Dollar. 
On 4 February 2009, the currency depreciated by 18% in one single day (Bloomberg 
2009). This was a difficult decision given the government’s investment in stabilising 
the currency. Crucially, however, a lower Tenge exchange rate made it even more 
difficult for Kazakhstani banks to service their external debts held in foreign 
currencies. The inability to service external debt was a key driver to Kazakhstan’s 
financial problems.  Kazakhstan’s relatively high inflation rate, which fluctuated 
between 18.7% in 2007, 9.5% in 2008 and 6% in 2009  added to these systemic 
pressures and turned external financing into the best solution. Raising external 
credit allowed Astana to alleviate inflationary pressures at home, whilst gaining 
access to the necessary funds that would allow it to bail out banks and stabilised 
the finance sector. Astana suddenly required substantial additional funds to bail out 
BTA. In 2009, SK initially purchased 78% of BTA’s shares for Tenge 251bn 
(US$1.6bn) which it later increased to 100%.  In search of external funding, Arman 
Dunayev, chairman at BTA, predicted that the Government would turn to Russia for 
access to finance since Kazakhstan “doesn’t have any extra money to invest” 
(Gizitdinov, 2009).  As the former deputy head of SK and former Finance Minister, 
Dunayev should be well-placed to know Kazakhstan’s overall financial position (see 
Controversy of Chinese Loans). Indeed, Kazakhstan turned to Russia in the hopes 
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that Moscow would provide direct help or that Sberbank would buy BTA.  Although 
Sberbank showed initial interest, it has since declined.  The alternative to external 
funding would have been a substantial internal stimulus package through monetary 
easing (i.e. printing of money) which the government did deliver in the end, but 
which was likely smaller because of Astana’s access to Chinese credit.  Quantitative 
easing on the other hand carried the risks of significantly increasing Kazakhstan’s 
underlying inflation pressures and consequently impede Kazakhstan’s rebound from 
the crisis.  
Having failed to secure financial help from Russia in 2009, Nazarbayev turned to 
China. During his state visit several weeks later, Beijing extended an immediate 
credit package of US$10bn to Kazakhstan, the size and timing of which was crucial 
to help Astana to mitigate the impact of the financial crisis. Further analysis of the 
impact of China’s loan on the Kazakhstani economy supports this view. 
The severity of the situation was further highlighted by Astana’s decision to inject 
an US10bn stimulus package into the economy and to finance this package by 
drawing on its National Savings Fund (NF) for the first time. Remarkably, the value 
of this package matches the volume of China’s 2009 credit line, which poses some 
interesting questions. Interviewees in Kazakhstan were puzzled by Astana’s decision 
to take financing from China because the NF’s accumulated savings, together with 
Kazakhstan’s state assets, put Kazakhstan into a strong enough position to easily 
cover such sums by itself (Interviews European Diplomat 2, Investment Expert 2, 
Local Finance Expert1 ). The chapter will revisit this point further below.  
However, lack of insight into the NF in conjunction with the timely proximity of the 
credit line and questions raised by interviewees warrant further analysis (discussed 
below). Furthermore, China’s credit line and the stimulus package were channelled 
through the same institution. US$9bn of the NF package went to SK from where it 
was disbursed to the finance sector, which received US$5bn alone,  SMEs and 
agriculture received US$1bn respectively (Figure 24) and although the remainder 
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(US$3bn) was earmarked for construction and infrastructure projects it had not 
been disbursed by the end of 2010 (Kalyuzhnova, 2011: 6656).81 It is possible that 
alternative investment into these sectors rendered it unnecessary for the 
Government to fully disburse the stimulus. For example, CITIC Kazyna Investment 
Fund I(CITIC 2012b), a US$200m joint Sino-Kazakhstani investment fund focusing 
solely on infrastructure investments in Kazakhstan may have filled the gap (Chapter 
3). This has important implications for the Rentier State as Astana did not have to 
draw these funds from its budget, which left the regime with more funds available 
for patronage to mitigate the potential risks of political instability that are 
associated with sudden revenue decline (Demkiv 2012). 
Figure 24 Stimulus Package and China's Loan to KDB 
 
The Development Bank of Kazakhstan (KDB) received half of Beijing’s credit line 
(US$5bn), whereas MMG received the other half. Both are embedded in the holding 
structure of SK and thus under government control (Figure 24).82 SK was also in 
charge of redistributing the stimulus package and thus received the respective 
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This includes refinancing of mortgages which were listed separately.   
82
 A breakdown of China’s credit line into the direct loan to KDB and KMG for the acquisition of MMG 
is macro-economically irrelevant. KMG is state owned and as such both ‘individual’ credit lines were 
injected into the Kazakhstani economy during the financial crisis in 2009. 
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funds from NF as well. Within SK, it is difficult to track the flow of both cash 
injections. However, it is possible that both the NF stimulus and parts or all of the 
Chinese credit line went into a single point from where they were redistributed. 
Interviewees at SK confirmed that it was not known where China’s credit went 
exactly (Local Finance Expert 2) and Kazakhstani analysts also voiced concern that 
Chinese credit lines were largely destined for companies closely linked with the elite 
(Costello quoted in Hoagland, 2009b). These concerns were likely fuelled by the fact 
that Timur Kulibayev, Nazarbayev’s son-in-law, headed SK at the time, thereby 
enabling Nazarbayev or the elite to determine the recipients of China’s credit line as 
well as the stimulus (Chapter 3). This suggests that Chinese credit lines were used 
directly for patronage. 
It is possible that Beijing provided some of the necessary cash that was supposed to 
be with the NF and which for some reason, was tied up. Alternatively, the stimulus 
package could have included both the NF and Chinese loan volume together, which 
would bring the total volume to around US$20bn, which would in turn indicate that 
the crisis was much more acute than the government had publicised.  In any case, 
the volume of the government stimulus also provides a suitable context in which to 
gauge the importance of China’s credit. Yelena Kalyuzhnova attributes Kazakhstan’s 
economic recovery to the NF stimulus package, which served as a “risk buffer and 
collateral for the economy during the crisis.” (Kalyuzhnova, 2011: 6655). It is thus 
possible to conclude that, based on the size of China’s credit in relation to the size 
of the NF funded stimulus, that China’s credit was an important factor in allowing 
the Kazakhstani economy to weather the effects of the financial crisis.  Several 
other yardsticks further support this conclusion. In 2008, the banking sector made 
accumulated profits of roughly Tenge 15bn (circa US$100m) and overall, new 
lending to the Kazakhstani economy totalled US$9bn in 2010 (Figure 25) (Gizitdinov 
2009).  The volume of China’s 2009 credit line alone dwarfs these figures and relays 
what impact its credit line had in relation to the size and performance of 
Kazakhstan’s banking sector. Thus Chinese loans played an important role in 
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Kazakhstan’s economic recovery. It is very likely that without these loans 
Kazakhstan’s economic recovery would have dragged on.  A prolonged recovery 
period in turn also poses risks for political instability especially in a resource 
dependent Rentier State (Demkiv 2012). 
Figure 25 New Lending to the Kazakh Economy 
 
Source: World Bank  
Chinese credit continues to be critical even beyond the financial crisis, not just 
because of the terms and volumes involved but because China is the only remaining 
external creditor to provide large-scale credit directly to Kazakhstani banks. This 
further adds to the opportunity costs for Kazakhstan if it were to break off from 
Chinese funding.   
Political Relevance   
The above discussion put the volume and timing of China’s credit into context to 
examine the relevance of Beijing’s financing for the Kazakhstani economy. However, 
the political implications of China’s credit line may be even greater, especially 
because the regime is vulnerable to revenue shocks (Chapter 2). This significantly 
increases the opportunity costs associated with an exit from Chinese funding.  
Chinese funding allowed the elite to overcome declining revenues and allowed 
Nazarbayev to preserve his popularity. The regime’s legitimacy rests on both of 
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these pillars. Figure 21 captures the dramatic decline in Kazakhstani GDP during the 
crisis. Dropping oil prices amidst a contracting global economy and depressed 
demand for energy also caused a decline in tax revenues for the government. 
Although the volume of these declines is not on the public record, it can be 
assumed that a decline in oil production drives declining government revenues, 
particularly in an economy that primarily depends on the resource sector. Chapter 2 
argued that a neopatrimonial system is particularly susceptible to declining 
revenues because they affect the elite’s ability to redistribute funds that underpin 
its legitimacy. Kazakhstan’s GDP dropped significantly from the end of 2006 and has 
still not recovered to pre-crisis levels.  Within this context, it is important for the 
elite to access additional sources of funding to avoid government cuts or 
alternatively raise domestic taxes, both of which can undermine its legitimacy. 
Chinese credit lines, which have dramatically increased in frequency, very likely 
provided such funding (Table 3). 
After Moscow failed to provide the hoped-for financing, President Nazarbayev 
turned to Beijing. China’s emergency credit line may have helped the President to 
save face in view of government mismanagement and a number of top-level 
corruption scandals in the banking sector. BTA’s collapse was also brought about by 
a narrower capital base than assumed, which impeded the bank’s ability to service 
its debt. This led to allegations of embezzlement against BTA’s senior management, 
in particular BTA’s CEO, Mukthar, who now lives in exile. Nazarbayev and Ablyazov 
share a tumultuous past, which also moves Nazarbayev closer to the BTA default. 
Ablyazov was fired from previous posts, jailed for counts of corruption and moved 
to Moscow into exile, from where he was pardoned and rehabilitated by 
Nazarbayev himself, who agreed with his subsequent appointment as head of BTA. 
Thus, the embezzlement charges against Ablyazov are at best, embarrassing for 
Nazarbayev and at worst, illustrate a serious error in the President’s judgement. 
However, even after BTA was nationalised, gross mismanagement continued under 
government oversight, which caused the bank to default yet again in 2012 
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(Gizitdinov 2012). Corruption among senior management is widespread in 
Kazakhstan (Standard & Poor’s), however, the close links between the Government 
and BTA are a huge embarrassment. After the news broke that BTA defaulted in 
2009, returning from Beijing with US$10bn for the Kazakhstani economy must have 
been a personal success. However, any reputational damage over appointments 
pales in comparison to the problems that the President can face over questions 
about Kazakhstan’s state assets.  
The Puzzle of Kazakhstani Assets   
Individuals interviewed in Kazakhstan were puzzled as to why their government 
turned to China for credit lines because Kazakhstan had accumulated significant 
assets and funds through the NF (European Diplomat 2, Investment Expert 3 and 
Local Finance Expert 1). Because of increasing oil and gas revenues, the government 
decided to invest these revenues in the NF from 2002 onwards (Chapter 3). The 
NF’s purpose is to stabilise the economy and to save for when resources might be 
exhausted in the future (Chapter 2).  By the time the financial crisis hit, the fund and 
central bank had joint reserves of at least US$60bn - enough to bail out failing banks 
and to stimulate the economy. 83Thus, taking credit lines from China during the 
crisis was not reconcilable with the general understanding that the fund had 
substantial reserves or with the observation that Chinese credit is directed at 
Kazakhstan’s resources through provisions in the credit agreement.  
Interviewees pointed out that resource investments are highly lucrative because of 
the low risks involved for China and a guaranteed return on investment. In their 
view, the Government is handing out Kazakhstan’s assets to foreign investors.  
Given the opaque management nature at the NF (Chapter 2) it is possible that the 
funds were not available or not as liquid as widely held. The financial crisis, 
especially the quick collapse of key banks that followed, caught the Government by 
surprise. To prevent any further destabilisation of the finance sector, it was 
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 As of 2011 the joint assets of the NF and NBK are approximately US$70bn.  
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important to act as quickly as possible. The general lack of transparency 
surrounding the fund makes it difficult to find a definite answer. However, there are 
further indicators to support the hypothesis that when the financial crisis hit, the 
funds were not available:   
Already before the financial crisis, incongruity had emerged between Astana’s 
ambition to renationalise state assets and its ability to do so. This view is supported 
by the more difficult investment climate in Kazakhstan, which saw increases in 
taxes, environmental fines, levies and regulation aimed at extracting greater rents 
to boost government revenues. Kazakhstan’s financial commitment to oil fields, 
where it has reclaimed shares from international investors, also casts doubt on the 
state of its asset and revenue position. IOC partners in these oil fields often 
complained about the delays that the government caused by its inability to meet 
the finance and investment obligations that it took on with its respective share. As a 
result, the next phases of key oil and gas projects have been delayed several times 
(Interview Energy Expert).  Currently, this is epitomised in the prestigious Kashgan 
oil field, which had been the largest find of its kind in the last six decades and has 
proven notoriously difficult to develop (Paxton and Gordeyeva 2012) . Up until now, 
it required a total investment of US$46bn, nearly twice the initial estimate of 
US$24bn, while production is facing frequent delays.  One of the reasons for these 
delays was KMG’s reluctance or inability to provide funding. The North Caspian 
Operating Company (NCOC) a consortium of IOCs, including Exxon Mobil, Royal 
Dutch Shell, ConocoPhillips and KMG, currently operates the field, however, 84 
ConocoPhillips recently announced its exit. Although KMG has eyed an expansion of 
its share in the project, which is also in line with the government’s renationalisation 
ambitions, the government-owned company may not have the necessary funds: 
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 The consortium consists of eight oil companies: Exxon Mobile, Royal Dutch Shell, Eni, Total, INPEX, 
ConocoPhillips and KMG. Each of the IOCs has a 16.85% stake in the field except for ConocoPhillips 
(8.49%) and INPEX (7.56%). 
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“we, as the national company, wouldn't refuse the idea of increasing 
our share. How we might finance this is another question” (Daniyar 
Berlibayev quoted in (Paxton and Gordeyeva 2012)).  
The oil field is one of Kazakhstan’s most prestigious projects and KMG’s concern 
highlights Kazakhstan’s strained finances further. Instead, CNPC has engaged CITIC 
to explore purchasing options of ConocoPhillips’ share. 
Arman Dunayev’s comment about Kazakhstan’s assets in view of the BTA bailout 
further supports this view. Here it is worth noting that Kazakhstan also used 
Chinese credit in the past to pursue its renationalisation programme (Chapter 3) 
and although Chinese credit lines are attractive, they are not unconditional, and it 
should be preferable for the Government to finance the renationalisation 
programme itself. The fact that it has not, supports the view that the Government 
lacks the necessary funds.  
From the above observation, it is possible to conclude that President Nazarbayev 
may have turned to Beijing to access external sources of financing because 
Kazakhstani assets are not as vast or as accessible as widely believed. Chapter 3 
showed that Nazarbayev directly controls the NF and thus is also accountable for its 
assets. Beijing’s extension of credit during the crisis provided enough funding to 
finance the stimulus package, which should have been financed through the NF in 
the first place.  The opaque nature of the fund makes it difficult to draw any 
conclusions beyond any doubt however, in view of the facts Beijing’s financial credit 
line may have very direct implications for the elite and politics in Kazakhstan 
(Chapter 2). Accepting Chinese credit lines comes with a different set of opportunity 
costs that are detrimental to the sustainability of Kazakhstan’s economy in the long-
term and thus detrimental to the Kazakhstani national interest. That Kazakhstan 
turns to Chinese credit nevertheless and even more so since 2009 can be explained 
through the elite’s revenue interests, which override the national interests, as well 
as the fact that Beijing offers credit lines at conditions that meet the elite’s needs. 
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Put bluntly, the terms of Chinese credit are favourable to the elite and unfavourable 
to Kazakhstan’s long-term development. This also weighs into the assessment of 
alternative sources of funding at the end of the chapter. 
Concessional Long-Term Loans  
The terms and size of Chinese loans are especially attractive for Kazakhstan. Beijing 
provides medium to long-term loans with a maturity of around 13-15 years at 
concessional interest (1-3%) (Development Bank of Kazakhstan(DBK) 2009). As 
other investors prefer more liquid, shorter-dated bonds and CDs, access to long-
term loans have become even more critical for Kazakhstani banks to avoid exposure 
to market volatility (see China as Key Creditor of Kazakhstani Banks, above). Given 
its vast financial capabilities, Beijing can quickly disperse loans which do not come 
with the political conditionality of International Financial Institutions (IFIs).  Beyond 
the financial terms, however, Chinese loans are discreet and not subject to the 
media scrutiny that may question whether such loans benefit the elite (Chapter 3).  
Foregoing Chinese credit lines would thus incur significant opportunity costs, 
especially for the regime. 
4.4 Chinese Conditionality 
Chinese loans are generally perceived to contain fewer conditions than those from 
other sources such as IFIs, which condition credit on political and/or economic 
reforms.  Nevertheless, Chinese credit to Astana features a different set of 
conditions that reflect China’s foreign policy objectives. 
In line with Beijing’s other economic partners, Kazakhstan has to adhere to the One-
China policy (一个中国政策)  and acknowledge that Taiwan is part of China, in order 
to engage in any meaningful form of economic activity with Beijing. In conjunction 
with Beijing’s extension of the US$10bn credit line, in April 2009, Kazakhstan signed 
a joint communiqué in which it not only reiterated its support for the One-China 
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policy but declared its outright opposition to Taiwan’s independence (FMPRC 2009). 
However, Chinese conditions go beyond diplomatic statements of support and 
there are indicators that at least in the financial realm, Beijing recognises the 
potential to link more tangible foreign policy objectives to its credit lines. 
Interestingly, Chinese credit lines to Kazakhstan are not emitted by the private 
sector but directly by the sovereign through China’s policy banks, such as China 
ExIm and CDB who are under direct state control.  These loans agreements are 
usually made during bilateral meetings between senior Chinese and Kazakhstani 
politicians, mostly Nazarbayev himself or Karim Massimov, a key facilitator of 
Chinese interests (Chapter 3). This setting stands in stark contrast with Kazakhstan’s 
other creditors, most prominently the Netherlands, Kazakhstan’s biggest lender. 
Here loans are directly issued by corporate banks, such as ING and ABNAmro, or 
corporations in the form of intercompany loans. In some cases, investment is also 
channelled through Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV).85 Notably, this means that 
credit is issued without political fanfare in the absence of summits or other 
diplomatic occasions, and that these creditors do not receive the same degree of 
government support, if any. This underlines the strictly private, for-profit character 
of Dutch loans. SPVs in particular are likely to be far removed from state influence. 
These vehicles are owned by a range of investors, often from different jurisdictions 
and nationalities. SPVs incorporated in the Netherlands are among the largest 
creditors to Kazakhstan (NBK 2010a). Thus, unlike the Chinese loans issued by state 
policy banks, Dutch loans have a distinctly apolitical character. 
This specific type of bank and setting firmly embeds China’s credit to Kazakhstan in 
a political framework and thus should allow Beijing, in theory, to use as leverage its 
financial capabilities towards foreign policy objectives. Securing the relevant energy 
resources to keep China’s economic development on course became one of these 
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  SPVs are subsidiaries of companies with a specific liability structure which ensures that the SVP 
will survive the parent company’s bankruptcy and vice-versa.  Companies use SPVs to finance large 
projects without putting the parent company at risk. SVPs constitute a large part of Kazakhstani debt 
that originates in the Netherlands, presumably in the Netherlands Antilles where SVPs enjoy a 
beneficial tax regime. 
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objectives in 2008, which takes on particular relevance in transactions with 
resource-endowed Kazakhstan (Hsiao 2008).86   Perhaps unsurprisingly, Beijing 
facilitates access to Kazakhstan’s lucrative resource sector by injecting credit, with 
elite consent, directly into major Kazakhstani resource companies such as 
Kazakhmys and ENRC, which are cited throughout this thesis (Chapter 2). However, 
it may not be coincidence that just one year after China elevated energy security to 
a foreign policy objective, Beijing conditioned credit lines to Kazakhstan for the first 
time. The much-discussed credit line of 2009 marks the first time that Beijing linked 
the provision of an emergency loan to the acquisition of Kazakhstani resource 
assets. This differs from the provision of credit into resource companies and instead 
takes direct ownership of resource assets. This conditioning occurs through package 
deals, where China bundles a number of distinctive loans into one package, to 
which it then adds explicit resource objectives. The package setting in theory should 
enable China to increase its bargaining power, and creates strong cross-over effects 
between its financial instruments and political gains.  
For example, China’s much-discussed US$10bn emergency loan contained two lines 
of credit (KCM 2010): US$5bn from China ExIm for CNPC to acquire 50% of 
MangistauMunaiGas (MMG), a Joint Venture (JV) with KMG and US$5bn for KDB 
(Chapter 4).  MMG is one of Kazakhstan’s largest oil companies and owns 
exploration rights for 36 oil and gas fields.87 Its acquisition marked a coup for CNPC 
because it beat India’s ONGC and Gazprom and had encountered significant 
resistance from Astana: between 1997 and 2005, CNPC had quickly expanded into 
Kazakhstan’s oil sector, a trend that Astana intended to cap (Konirova 2006). This 
also caused CITIC’s tumultuous acquisition of Nations Energy’s Karazhanbas oil field, 
88 which Astana wanted to prevent. To prevent the CITIC acquisition, Prime Minister 
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 For a discussion on the role of Energy Security in China’s Foreign Policy, see Charles Ziegler (Ziegler 
2006). 
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 The most important of these oil fields are: Asar, Burmasha, Kalamkas, East Zhetybai, Alatobe, 
North Asar, Zhetybai, Oimasha, South Zhetybai.  
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 Part of the deal was also Argymak Trans Service LLP Tulpar Munai Services LLP which provides 
transportation and drilling services (Xinhua 2006). 
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Massimov tried to set up a deal between Nation Energy and Vladimir Kim, the head 
of Kazakhmys and a close friend of Nazarbayev (see Political System) (Milas 2006b). 
Ultimately, CITIC’s acquisition went through shortly after CNPC’s 2005 acquisition of 
PetroKazakhstan, which triggered a heated debate in Kazakhstan’s lower house 
(Peyrouse 2008). To block further investment, the Government passed a law 
prohibiting companies in the hydrocarbon sector from selling exploration licenses 
to third parties without government consent, and another law giving KMG priority 
in acquiring any stakes up for sale in the hydrocarbon sector (Peyrouse 2008). 
Nevertheless, Beijing has expanded its ownership of Kazakhstani resources.  
MMG’s acquisition was also remarkable for its timing at the peak of the financial 
crisis and thus when international oil prices were at an all-time low - which is likely 
to have affected the acquisition price. This was a lucrative transaction for CNPC, 
since MMG was already producing oil and therefore did not require any upfront 
investment (Costello, 2009). For Astana, the timing of the sale amidst falling oil 
prices was disadvantageous and the decision to go forward with the transaction 
likely reflects Nazarbayev’s need for external finance at the time.  The credit 
package pushed Astana to go even further and officially retract its intentions to cap 
Chinese investment in the resource sector. Astana pledged to Beijing that it would 
welcome  Chinese involvement in its Darkhan oil and gas field and further vowed 
full support to expedite the implementation of the project and enter into principled 
agreement at an early date (FMPRC 2009). In 2005, CNOOC and CNPC signed a MOU 
with the Kazakhstani Government to develop the prestigious oil field in the Caspian 
Sea, which holds around 11 billion barrels of oil reserves. 89 However, subsequently 
Astana stalled any progress. Just months earlier, on 31 October 2008, Wen Jiabao, 
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 KazMunaiGas states that “By now, the Parties have discussed main commercial, technical and 
economic conditions of the project implementation and working at the Draft of Agreement on 
cooperation principles on «Darkhan» project”(KMG 2012) 
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had pressed Karim Massimov to speed up the implementation of the project during 
his visit in Astana (ChinaDaily 2008, Nurshayeva 2008).  
Closely following the April 2009 loan, China Investment Corporation (CIC) acquired 
11% in KMG Exploration and Production (KMG EP) which was also agreed in a 
bilateral meeting without any input from the company itself (Chapter 2). KMG EP 
specialises in drilling and distribution but also holds stakes in Kazakhstani oil and gas 
fields, including Uzenmunaigas and Embamunaigas, thus further expanding Chinese 
ownership.    
Since April 2009, China has extended a string of credit lines that target Kazakhstan’s 
resource sector (Table 3). This reflects Kazakhstan’s ongoing demand for external 
financing in view of a banking system that has not recovered from the crisis (see 
The Future of Chinese Loans, below), as well as Beijing’s growing interest in 
extending such loans. Beijing’s positive experience and the effectiveness of its 
conditional loans in meeting its foreign policy objectives may also have played a 
role.  Based on a conservative calculation, China has provided US$22bn of new 
credit since 2009 targeted at Kazakhstani resources.90 Already within the same year 
(2009), Beijing lent US$2.7bn to Kazakhhmys,91 of which the company has drawn at 
least US$700m by 2011 (Mundy 2011).  At a bilateral meeting in February 2011, Hu 
Jintao again extended a number of credit lines bundled into one package. This 
included a US$1.7bn loan directly to Samruk-Kazyna and a US$5bn loan for a 
petrochemical facility.92 Again, that loan bundle included a conditional resource 
component: an agreement from Nazarbayev to deliver 55 metric tonnes of uranium 
to China (Hook, 2011). In June of the same year, CDB extended a pre-existing credit 
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 The calculation is based on the table below and excludes China’s SCO loan and the US$5bn loan 
from 2011 since it could not be verified through other sources.  
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 Kazakhmys PLC is an international natural resources company, listed in the UK, principal 
operations in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. The core business is the production and sale of copper. 
The copper division also produces significant volumes of other metals as by-products, including zinc, 
silver and gold. Kazakhmys’ biggest stakeholder is Samruk-Kazyna which holds 28% of its shares. Its 
copper division operates sites across Kazakhstan with 17 open pit and underground mines, 10 
concentrators and 2 smelting and refining complexes (Kazakhmys 2012).  
92
 This loan could not be verified and will thus be excluded from any further calculations. 
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facility for Kazakhmys by an additional US$1.5bn to increase its copper production, 
80% of which China purchases annually (BBC 2011). Furthermore, it is widely 
believed that Kazakhstan also repays these loans through concessional oil and gas 
deliveries to China (Interview European Diplomat 1), which benefits China’s 
objective to secure energy in the long term. This is especially beneficial because 
Beijing, as a relative latecomer to the international oil and gas markets, struggles to 
access low-priced resources.  
It is possible to observe other forms of conditionality beyond resource access.  
Projects that receive Chinese credit are executed partially or completely by Chinese 
contractors, thereby adding little value to the Kazakhstani economy. For example, 
the joint Sino-Kazakhstani pipeline which Beijing co-financed was built by the China 
Petroleum Pipeline Bureau. At the beginning of 2012, China’s Exim Bank extended a 
loan of US$1.1bn to Kazakhstan to upgrade its Atyrau refinery, and Sinopec 
Engineering will execute the project (Maralove 2012, Paxton 2012). Kazakhymys’ 
US$1.5bn loan will develop a new mine in Aktogay, the equipment for the 
development will come from China (Xinhua 2011b). It is widely known that Chinese 
oil and gas investors also import their own workers and subcontractors (Interview 
European Diplomat 1). Although this violates Kazakhstan’s local content laws, CNPC 
has escaped any fines so far, a point that the thesis will revisit again. As such, 
Beijing’s creditor behaviour bears similarities to that of western countries in the 
1980s, which provided concessional loans, also known as development loans, often 
on the proviso that recipient countries ordered equipment from the creditor in 
return.  
Chapter 5 will discuss the dynamics behind China’s credit lines in greater detail. 
However the conditionality of the 2009 finance package for Astana indicates that 
policy makers in Beijing understood the investment opportunities that the financial 
crisis presented and thus pushed its financial institutions to ‘go global’ and invest.  
This also confirms Kirshner’s argument that economic crises generate opportunities 
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for well-funded states to offer emergency assistance to those in distress – in 
exchange for some political concessions (Kirshner 1997).     
As indicated in the introduction, these conditions also have significant economic 
disadvantages. The loan for resources approach is detrimental to sustainable 
economic growth and undermines any meaningful diversification of the economy 
(i.e. Dutch Disease), which is firmly anchored in Kazakhstan’s national strategy 
‘Kazakhstan 2030: Prosperity, Security and Ever Growing Welfare of All the 
Kazakhstanis’- a key government blueprint for Kazakhstan’s economic development 
until 2030. Nevertheless, between 1999 and 2012, Kazakhstan’s dependence on its 
resource sector grew dramatically and now constitutes 85% of export revenues or 
40% of GDP (Palazuelos and Fernandez 2012). This also leaves other areas of the 
economy under-developed (Chapter 2) and creates a macro-economic trap 
otherwise known as the Dutch Disease: High revenue inflows through the resource 
sector increase price levels, especially labour costs, which renders manufacturing, 
as an industry, uncompetitive (Interview Trade Expert).   
Through loan maturities of around 13-15 years, China will drive this trend in the 
long-term and strategically commit Astana to resource exports during that time, 
thereby allowing Beijing to meet its energy security objectives. Beijing’s pipeline 
construction further added to these complicated dynamics: in a single pipeline 
setting the end-consumer, namely China, has significant leverage over the producer 
to determine the “price” of these loan-for-oil deliveries (Interview European 
Diplomat 1).    One of the outcomes of these credit arrangements is that China now 
effectively controls between 25-30% of Kazakhstan’s oil production (Sharip 2011). 
Despite Beijing’s pledge to increase finance in Kazakhstan’s non-resource sector, 
resources continue to be the main destination of Chinese loans. As a matter of fact, 
research for this thesis could not find any meaningful loans that were directed to 
the non-resource sector. Not surprisingly, these credit facilities stir up controversy 
in Kazakhstan and create the sense that the country is selling out on its resources, 
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which also increases the opportunity costs for the Government to accept financing 
from Beijing. Through its ‘loan for oil’ conditionality, China is able to link credit to 
further resource commitments and locks Kazakhstan into long-term debt. This is in 
line with David Lake’s theory about relationally specific assets driving China to seek 
out a hierarchical relationship with Kazakhstan, based on economic dependence 
(Lake 2009).    
It can be concluded that Chinese loans are beneficial to the Kazakhstani elite, but 
not to Kazakhstan’s economic development. The reasons why the elite is so 
receptive to accepting Chinese investment, even though it undermines economic 
diversification and commits Kazakhstan to resource deliveries at concessional 
prices, may be rooted in the elite’s distinctive short-term funding needs and as such 
a short-term view on decision making that is symptomatic of its immediate concern 
for self-preservation (Chapter 3). Chinese loans also offer a certain degree of 
discretion, which may provide further incentive to turn to China for funding in the 
future, especially in view of a number of corruption scandals that could threaten 
the regime’s legitimacy. The financial crisis left China as an available source of 
credit. Although alternatives are difficult to come by, corruption and 
mismanagement in the banking sector, in conjunction with the elite’s rent-seeking 
behaviour created a complex investment environment that deterred international 
private investors.  
The chapter concludes with an analysis of whether China has achieved a creditor 
status that creates or contributes towards economic dependencies. Any such 
assessment will analyse alternative sources of finance, as well as the perception of 
decision makers on the future of Chinese credit (Chapter 2). 
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4.5 The Future of Chinese Loans 
The financial crisis and its aftermath eroded investor confidence in Kazakhstan’s 
banking sector and the government, which restricts access to international capital 
markets until the sector has recovered. The sector has struggled with an official 
Non-Performing-Loan (NPL) ratio of officially 30%-40% since the beginning of 2009 
(See Figure 26), which finance experts put at 60% (Interview Finance Expert 
London). Figure 26 also shows that Kazakhstan’s banking crisis is still ongoing and is 
indicative of serious structural problems, for which Kazakhstan’s neopatrimonial 
form of governance is partially responsible (Chapter 2). Standard and Poor’s risk 
assessment points to “lax lending standards” and a culture where loans are 
disbursed against weak due diligence standards, possibly because the creditor is 
linked to the bank through the web of patron-client relationships. This is further 
reflected in the NBK’s assessment that the stability of Kazakhstan’s financial system 
continues to be at significant risk of low profitability and capital adequacy and thus 
low levels of investment activity in the economy (NBK 2011). 
Figure 26 Non Performing Loans 
 
This will significantly impede the ability of Kazakhstani banks to raise funds at 
reasonable conditions on international markets. The consequences are observable 
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in the field of export-import guarantees, which are important to Kazakhstan’s 
economic diversification. In 2009, Euler-Hermes, a German export credit agency 
was heavily invested in BTA and exposed to roughly US$500m or half of the 
outstanding export credits in Kazakhstan’s banking sector. Euler-Hermes 
participated in the settlement negotiations with BTA in September 2009. However, 
the conduct of BTA and the Kazakhstani Government concerned Euler-Hermes to 
the point that it feared BTA’s immediate collapse and enlisted the German 
government, which promptly accused Astana of a lack of effort in the matter 
(Hoagland 2009d). BTA’s renewed default in 2012 confirmed these fears. Moreover, 
the 2012 default occurred over the relatively small amount of US$160m and under 
full government ownership and oversight. An audit found that the bank had 
breached regulations, including sections of the recovery plan that was approved in 
2009, because of inadequate control of BTA executives (Gizitdinov, 2012).  
Consequently, international Exim Banks now demand greater guarantees from the 
government (see Private Lenders). In a 2010 transaction involving General Electric’s 
plans to build locomotives in Kazakhstan, the US Exim Bank asked directly for a 
sovereign guarantee to finance the deal. This was not welcomed by Samruk-
Kazyna’s Kairat Kelimbetov, who maintained that "our word should be good 
enough” (Spratlen 2010). The deal in question had a volume of US$150m, reflecting 
how low confidence in Kazakhstan’s financial capabilities had dropped. Euler-
Hermes concluded in January 2012 that 
“The latest default may also adversely affect the sovereign's credibility 
in international financial markets. Nominally, Kazakhstan has ample 
reserves […]” (Euler-Hermes,2012). 
International ratings agencies resonate with this view and consider the banking 
sector an “extremely high credit risk” (S&P 2012). The share prices of most 
Kazakhstani banks continue to decline, indicating that investor confidence remains 
eroded. In view of international scepticism against Kazakhstani banks and the 
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Kazakhstani Government, access to alternative sources of funding will thus remain 
crucial. 
There seems to be consensus, at least among economists and analysts in 
Kazakhstan, that Chinese loans will increase in the future (Interview Local Finance 
Expert 1). The perception of future economic benefits further operationalises 
economic dependencies as discussed in Chapter 2.  In fact, the belief is that China 
already constitutes a viable alternative to loans from IFIs, such as the IMF or EBRD 
that are generally dependent on political and fiscal reform, opportunity costs which 
the ruling elite likely considers higher than those associated with Chinese loans. In 
Kazakhstan’s neopatrimonial system, both types of loans result in different trade-
offs. Conditional loans from IFIs will diminish the elite’s control over the corporate 
sector and thus lead to a loss in power. Chinese loans are detrimental to 
Kazakhstan’s economic development and may lead to a loss of independence. 
However, they strengthen the elite’s position domestically in the medium term by 
providing revenue incomes and assisting elite consolidation (Chapter 2). Keirat 
Umarov, Deputy Foreign Minister, underlines this view when arguing that 
Kazakhstan refused to cooperate with the U.S. Congressional human rights 
certification process to receive financial assistance and instead would rather pass 
on these funds (Hoagland, 2010a).  
Furthermore, Chinese loans are processed and disbursed much faster than those 
from IFIs and thus are a suitable source for unforeseen declines in revenues93 This is 
was also a consensus opinion emerging from interviews and various personal 
conversations in Kazakhstan (Interview Regional Finance Expert, Conversation Local 
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Investor). For China, in turn, this presents an opportunity to secure energy whilst 
also investing and diversifying94 some of its massive foreign currency surplus.  
It appears the Kazakhstani Government expects China to continue committing large 
loans in the future and is keenly aware of China’s financial capabilities in this 
respect. As one interviewee put it, “we are peanuts for Chinese investment” 
(Interview Local Finance Expert 1), and experts see the recent currency swap 
agreements with Beijing in this light.  Accordingly, the swaps are directly linked to 
increased Chinese credit in the future, which Kazakhstan can now service in Yuan. 
Kazakhstani officials have high hopes that China will provide more credit in the 
future, a view also expressed by the head of SK, Kairat Kelimbetov (Kazinform 
2010).  This view on China as future source of credit is a pertinent criterion that 
operationalises economic dependence towards political ends (Chapter 1). Copeland 
maintains it is such prospects that will drive Kazakhstan’s cooperation with China’s 
interests (Copeland 1996). However, critical voices in Kazakhstan recognise that the 
country is on its way to becoming debt-dependent on China (Atabayev 2010). 
Besides the commitment to resource deliveries that come with Chinese loans, there 
has also been a rumour that China expects to lease 1m hectares of arable land from 
Kazakhstan to plant soybeans as a favour. Rakhat Alyiev, accused the President in 
2010 of having signed a secret pact leasing the land for 99 years (Mamai 2010). 
Aliyev’s personal motives aside, the rumour has persisted and a diplomat in Astana 
confirmed that the request had been debated in the Kazakhstani parliament 
(Interview European Diplomat 2). This plays to the latent Sinophobia amongst 
Kazakhstanis and can turn into a political problem for the government (Interview 
European Diplomat 2). Given that China is the most populous country in the world 
with comparatively little arable land, Kazakhstanis are suspicious about policies 
tying the neighbouring countries too closely together. In particular, Kazakhs fear an 
influx of Chinese labour driving out Kazakh workers, in the worst case, transforming 
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them into yet another minority in their country, similarly to Soviet times. Above all, 
these developments invoke historic fears of a Chinese annexation of Kazakh 
territory.  The public’s distrust of China and the government’s reliance on China’s 
economic investment pose a conflict that can increase the opportunity costs 
associated with Chinese investment, especially for the ruling elite. In contrast, 
Kazakhstani politicians seek to benefit from China’s abundant surplus that allows 
Beijing to invest freely, and therefore have an incentive to keep this information 
from reaching the public domain. Research on China is therefore viewed sceptically 
in Kazakhstan and interviewees only agreed to conversations if they were kept 
anonymous.  
Alternatives Sources of Finance 
This chapter has already touched on opportunity costs in its discussion of the role 
that Chinese lending played in Kazakhstan’s banks, economy and political elite. The 
following segment examines the relationship between China and Kazakhstan 
against alternatives (Crescenzi 2005) and discusses the associated opportunity costs 
in greater detail to determine whether Beijing has created dependencies through 
this economic lever (Chapter 2). Baldwin defined this as “the ease of breaking the 
relationship” (Baldwin 1980:476). If the Kazakhstani Government were to forego 
Chinese credit, what are the alternatives and costs associated with them? This takes 
into consideration the quantitative and qualitative aspects of external credit and 
builds on the previous discussion on the significance of Chinese credit to 
Kazakhstan’s economy and political system.95 The availability of alternative sources 
of financing affects opportunity costs (Crescenzi 2005) for a country to exit or 
forego the economic benefits associated with an economic partner.  In terms of 
credit lines, alternatives for Kazakhstan are foremost Russia, the US, private 
investors and International Financial Institutions (IFIs).   
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With regard to the overall external debt, the picture appears mixed at first. Here 
China ‘only’ ranks as the third biggest lender in terms of outstanding loan stocks, 
behind the Netherlands and the UK. In terms of newly provided loans, however, 
China has ranked second since 2010. What is critical is that Beijing has managed 
become a top lender in a very short period of time and this momentum is unlikely 
to abate, given Kazakhstan’s need for external debt, ongoing systemic problems in 
the banking sector and China’s vast foreign currency reserves coupled with its 
demand for resources. In fact, new loan originations matter most to Kazakhstan’s 
finance needs. Outstanding loan volumes are loans that creditors have already 
provided to Kazakhstan in the past, with no guarantee that these creditors will 
refinance these loans in the future. When it comes to future loan expectations, the 
evidence presented here suggests that the Kazakhstani Government looks primarily 
to China. After all, China emerged as the second biggest lender in 2010 and will 
likely become number one in the near future, simply because it has the financial 
funds and is willing to extend concessionary loans. This has important implications 
for Kazakhstan’s decision makers and, consequently, for Chinese influence: to tap 
into these future expected loans, Kazakhstan must keep China happy. This means 
that Kazakhstan, and more specifically, the elite is incentivised to promote policies 
that are in line with China’s interests, thus giving China political leverage, as this 
dissertation aims to show.  On the other hand, China is the only one of Kazakhstan’s 
top creditors still providing loans to the struggling banking system that provides 
loans to SMEs, driving economic growth. This last point cannot be overemphasised, 
given that banks are the primary source of funding for the economy in the absence 
of capital markets. 
The following section discusses whether Kazakhstan has any alternatives and the 
associated opportunity costs associated with these. One alternative would be a 
deleveraging of the Kazakhstani banking system by foregoing international loans 
altogether. However, these costs in terms of economic growth and the implication 
for the elite’s legitimacy based on income redistribution are likely too high to make 
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this politically feasible. The second option would be to substitute a different 
creditor for China. This depends on whether a substitute exists and whether the 
loan conditions are acceptable to Kazakhstani decision makers. Potential substitutes 
include Russia, the US, private sources, or IFIs.96  
Russia 
Russia is a natural candidate. As part of the former USSR, Kazakhstan still maintains 
close ties to Moscow; and Russia considers the former Soviet Central Asian Republic 
within its sphere of influence. In the short and medium term, however, Russia is 
unlikely to be a viable source of financing and so far has rejected Kazakhstan’s bid 
for financial help. Russia therefore sends a message that although it considers 
Kazakhstan its ‘Near Abroad’, it is not willing to extend its financial power. Because 
Russia’s economy is similarly resource-dependent, both countries go through 
analogous revenue changes based on the fluctuations of global energy prices. 
However, when commodity prices drop, like during the financial crisis, Kazakhstan 
arguably has a greater need for credit than in times of oil windfalls. Yet, this is when 
the Russian economy has less money to spend. The Chinese economy depends less 
on resources and China’s vast foreign currency reserves allow Beijing to spend even 
in times of an economic downturn. 
Even prior to 2009, Russian loan commitments to Kazakhstan were minimal and 
Moscow does not feature in the NBK’s annual reporting. Secondly, Russia’s 
economic importance to Kazakhstan is only likely to decrease further, as it has yet 
to recover to pre-crisis levels after being significantly affected by the global financial 
downturn. Evidence for this can be found by the stalling negotiations between SK 
and Russia’s Sberbank in the sale of BTA Bank. Even if Russia were to commit the 
financing, it may come at high political cost to Kazakhstan. As part of the Kazakh 
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multi-vector foreign policy, it seeks to maintain a healthy distance from its former 
oppressor. The Kazakh public is also suspicious of Russia and memories of Soviet 
times are still fresh.97  Russia’s lack of financial commitment may have constituted 
an inflection point for Kazakhstani policy makers, who realised that Russia’s pledge 
towards Central Asia and Kazakhstan is more military and political than economic.  
The US 
The US had geostrategic interests in Kazakhstan because of its troops in Afghanistan 
and its proximity to China and Russia.  Kyrgyzstan’s decision to close down its US air 
base in favour of a Russian might incentivise the US to search for closer ties with 
Kazakhstan.  However, US troops are scheduled to leave Afghanistan soon and the 
current US administration’s pivot to Asia may shift the foreign policy focus towards 
other sub-regions, including South East Asia and Japan. Any financing to Kazakhstan, 
therefore, might not win political and public support.  From an economic point of 
view, the US is running a current account deficit and as of 2013, is on a tentative 
road of economic recovery.  It is thus unlikely to be in a position to commit large 
resources abroad. In view of the recent recession and two costly wars, policy 
makers have become extremely cautious when it comes to spending for political 
purposes abroad - an issue highlighted during the most recent presidential election. 
This thinking is also reflected in the US Exim Bank, which, unlike its Chinese 
counterparts, insists on collateral or sovereign guarantees from Kazakhstan to 
finance projects, even in conjunction with Samruk-Kazyna, the welfare fund 
(Spratlen 2010). 
Private Lenders 
In the long term, private sources such as Morgan Stanley or Deutsche Bank could 
potentially replace China as key lenders. However, given that private, for-profit 
sources originate loans priced at free market value, the cost for Kazakhstan will be 
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high, as Chinese loans are concessional. While Morgan Stanley appeared as a 
creditor in the 2009 NBK reports, the company’s involvement was later heavily 
criticised when it was revealed it had hedged its stake, generating a windfall profit 
when BTA defaulted. It is therefore likely that these investment banks mainly lend 
in situations of distress. During a normalised market environment, it is unlikely they 
can meet their return expectations at interest rates that would also be attractive to 
Kazakhstan. Furthermore, the recent experience with recurring bank restructurings 
has already driven away some of the existing lenders, including  Italian and French 
banks, who have decreased their financing  in conjunction with ENI’s and Total’s 
investment interests in Kazakhstan (NBK, 2010). Even policy banks in the west, such 
as export credit agencies are only willing to provide financing against collateral. This 
became especially relevant in 2010, in conjunction with the Kazakhstan Caspian 
Transportation System (KCTS), where KMG was surprised when the French export 
credit agency demanded collateral for project financing. A leading oil executive 
concluded that “KMG is slowly beginning to understand that they must treat us as 
investors and partners, not just paying customers” (John Dabbar quoted in 
(Hoagland, 2010c)). 
The prospect of raising external debt depends primarily on the reputation of a 
government to service and repay that debt, and Kazakhstan is no different. In his 
study spanning 300 years of international debt dynamics, Michael Tomz identified a 
government’s reputation as the single biggest driver in lenders’ decisions to extend 
credit (Tomz 2007). Given the past performance of government-owned BTA, it will 
be exceptionally difficult for the Government to raise debt in the near or medium 
term.  This does not apply to Beijing in equal terms because of China’s vast foreign 
currency reserves and the fact that its loans advance Beijing’s regional interests 
(Chapter 4). As such, Beijing will be the most approachable lender in the short and 
medium term. 
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International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
This leaves IFIs such as the IMF, ADB and EBRD as substitute candidates. However, 
although these institutions aim to provide fiscal assistance, especially to transition 
countries, their funds are exhausted in the aftermath of the financial crisis. While 
international development banks may be able to provide loans at favourable 
interest rates like China, it is unlikely they can provide the volume required.  For 
example, the entire loan volume ADB committed to Kazakhstan between 1994 and 
2010 totalled US$1.7bn (ADB 2011). One third (US$500m) of this amount was 
committed in 2008 as a one-off countercyclical anti-crisis programme. Arguably, 
more would have been needed during the financial crisis but the ADB was stretched 
to its limits. Similarly the WB has disbursed US$3bn in loans to Kazakhstan since the 
country joined in 1992.98 As a reminder, China committed over three times that 
amount during just in 2009. Most importantly, the loans of international financial 
organisations are bureaucratic and conditional with expectations for the debtor 
country to implement economic and political reforms. This involves political and 
economic opportunity costs that the Kazakhstani elite likely aims to avoid. 
Economic liberalisation undermines the elite’s attempt to centralise control over 
the economy and conflicts with the power structure of the neopatrimonial system. 
Moreover, IFI loans require lengthy processing, something which makes China’s 
quickly-disbursed loans even more attractive. Chinese conditionality is more 
acceptable to Kazakhstan’s government than its alternatives, and by the end of June 
2012, Kazakhstan consequently had five times more debt outstanding to China than 
to IFIs. 
The above shows how entrenched China already is as a creditor to Kazakhstan. It 
can be concluded that its replacement comes with substantial economic and 
political costs for the government. Given the fragile recovery of Kazakhstan’s 
economy, the government may seek to avoid any disruption that results from 
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changing creditors. China emerged as the biggest new source of credit to 
Kazakhstan’s cash-strapped banking sector, keeping the system liquid and 
demonstrating to Kazakhstan its reliability as a partner. Politically, Beijing’s credit 
allows the elite to pursue the status quo without having to undertake any structural 
changes, including diversifying the economy. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
Astana pursues a distinctively short-term view of the country, which is further 
facilitated through incoming revenues from China.  Because Chinese loans are 
accompanied by little media scrutiny, unlike western counterparts, it is easier for 
the Government to keep China’s financial influence out of public view and use 
Chinese funds to save face in view of questions surrounding BTA and the NF. 
Moreover, it is a distinct possibility that Chinese credit lines enrich the elite directly 
(Costelo 2009).  
Developments since 2009 have further eroded international investor confidence 
especially BTA’s second restructuring in 2012 also significantly eroded the credibility 
of the sovereign itself.  Conversely, the significance of access to Chinese credit lines 
has increased.  Kazakhstan’s failure to sell BTA is indicative of how unattractive the 
banking system has become for foreign investment and lending at the moment. This 
also generates a big problem for the government, which initially only planned to 
prop up the bank in the short-term but now is only more deeply tied-up in BTA. 
Kazakhstan may soon find itself turning to China for help with BTA, as an analyst 
covering the region has suggested99 (EBRD 2010). However it is likely that Chinese 
investors will steer clear of Kazakhstani banks because they are problematic. 
4.6  Chapter Conclusion: Financial Dependence  
This chapter analysed whether China’s financial influence in Kazakhstan has built 
significant dependencies in Kazakhstan, especially after the Global Financial Crisis 
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and found evidence to support this hypothesis based on a discussion of criteria 
developed in Chapter 2. 
Whilst research for this thesis could identify a number of substantial credit lines 
from China to Kazakhstan, it could not find any evidence for the reverse. During the 
period under analysis, no evidence could be found for Kazakhstani credit lines to 
China. This is not surprising, given the state of Kazakhstan’s financial system after 
the Global Financial Crisis which was over-leveraged. This suggests a steep 
asymmetry between both countries concerning the issuance of debt.  A discussion 
of the qualitative context of this asymmetry has shown that Astana faces significant 
opportunity costs if it would forego Chinese credit lines. This is based on the 
structure of Kazakhstan’s financial sector and the role that Chinese credit lines play 
in it as well the availability and trade-offs associated with alternative sources of 
debt. Furthermore, Kazakhstani decision makers perceive of more Chinese credit 
lines in the future.  The above criteria suggest that Kazakhstan’s dependence on 
Chinese credit lines is significant. 
The financial crisis turned China into Kazakhstan’s dominant external creditor 
through the provision of large loan volumes; the second biggest creditor of Kazakh 
banks; and most importantly, the key source of new credit lines. It is unlikely that 
Kazakhstani banks could obtain the long-term loans often provided at below-market 
interest rates elsewhere without facing some form of political conditionality. As 
noted above, the defaults in the Kazakhstani banking system meant Kazakhstani 
banks have had less access to long-term loans and have had to shift to bonds and 
CDs as a means to raise cash. These, however, are less attractive due to their 
shorter maturity and are less stable, creating bigger uncertainties. As such, long-
term loans are preferable for ensuring a stable banking system. Thus, China 
effectively assists Kazakhstani banks in bridging the time until international 
investors have regained confidence in the Kazakhstani government and its banking 
system. Until this point, the availability of alternative sources of external credit is 
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highly restricted for Astana. Arguably, China was “the lender of last resort”, the only 
source of financing available that could provide the volume of funds required at the 
time.  More importantly, Kazakhstan’s domestic politics render alternatives to China 
unfeasible: Although loans from IFIs and private investors might be better for the 
economy in the long term, they are not attractive to Kazakhstan’s government. To 
access alternative loans, the Government has to make significant changes in the 
finance sector and break the tight inter-linkage with the elite nexus to win back 
investor confidence. This would mean, however, that the elite cease its influence 
over the sector - an opportunity cost it is not yet willing to pay. Until that happens 
or until international investors return, China has an opportunity to further expand 
on its position as main creditor.  Returning to Martin Wolf’s observation that  
“when countries with external deficits run out of foreign providers of private credit, 
they become dependent on foreign sovereigns” (Wolf, 2010), Kazakhstan has 
become financially dependent on China in the absence of feasible alternatives. The 
size and maturity of Chinese loans mean that Beijing will find itself in a creditor-
debtor relationship with Kazakhstan for the foreseeable future. This chapter 
highlighted how China exploits this relationship politically, by committing 
Kazakhstan to deliver resources as part of its “energy-for-loans” approach. Binding 
Kazakhstan to China economically and financially fits well with Beijing’s energy 
security strategy.  
China’s role in the banking sector, combined with its role in Kazakhstan’s overall 
external debt, means the financial relationship between both countries is highly 
skewed towards the dependence of Kazakhstan. This is dependence can be further 
operationalised through government perception: interviewees in Kazakhstan 
expected more loans from China in the future, and Kairat Kelimbetov, the head of 
Samruk-Kazyna, expressed his hopes in 2010 that China will increase its credit 
volumes further (Kazinform 2010).  In the absence of feasible alternatives, 
Kazakhstan is financially dependent on China. The next segment will analyse 
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Chinese trade and investment to see whether Kazakhstan’s financial dependence on 
China is further reinforced through trade and investment dependencies.  
This also poses further questions about whether these dependencies are the result 
of a deliberate Chinese foreign policy. The predominant driver of this hierarchical 
finance relationship is Kazakhstani demand for external financing based on specific 
elite needs and structural weaknesses in the banking sector that have driven away 
international investors. However, the facts presented in this chapter show that 
Beijing made the deliberate decision to extend such funding and understood the 
opportunities inherent in the financial crisis, which allowed Beijing to condition its 
finance package to resource acquisitions. The following chapters will discuss the 
Chinese actors involved in these credit lines in greater detail, in order to answer this 
question and show that Kazakhstan fits in well with a number of Chinese objectives 
beyond energy security, such as diversifying its currency reserves, market access for 
goods, and regional economic and political security (Chapter 5 and 6).  
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 Trade, Investment and Dependency Chapter 5 
The chapter examines China’s trade and investment (FDI) status in 
Kazakhstan and shows that China has become Kazakhstan’s most important trade 
partner and is a key source of foreign direct investment. Together with finance 
these economic levers create significant economic dependencies in Kazakhstan 
(Chapter 2). Concerning trade, this is driven by the bi-lateral trade and FDI 
asymmetry between Kazakhstan and China, as well as the opportunity costs 
associated with Kazakhstan’s market structure, asset specificity of trade and 
geographic proximity to China (Chapter 2). Compared to finance and trade, China’s 
FDI status is weaker in relative terms. Nevertheless its FDI status is still significant 
for Kazakhstan’s economic growth, especially the momentum of China’s FDI.  
The remainder of this chapter analyses whether Beijing can leverage this economic 
dependency towards political ends and investigates if economic dependency is the 
outcome of a deliberate policy process in Beijing. This addresses a research 
question and criterion identified in Chapter 2, which should allow Beijing to 
leverage economic influence in political power (Kahler & Kastner, 2006).  The 
chapter supports the hypothesis that Beijing’s political support for projecting 
economic influence into Kazakhstan has become more direct, especially after 2009. 
The chapter also analyses the key drivers behind China’s economic influence in 
Kazakhstan and shows that Beijing is not in control of the aggregate economic 
drivers. This chapter argues that although most of China’s economic activity in 
Kazakhstan appears to fall within the government’s ‘Go Global’ framework, Beijing 
can exert such control only selectively and where mutual interests overlap. Rather 
the chapter will substantiate the sub-hypothesis that Chinese drivers of trade and 
investment are especially China’s NOC which proactively enlist Beijing’s help to 
overcome Kazakhstan’s resistance to Chinese resource investments.  CNPC for 
example, successfully enlists Beijing’s support to meet Astana’s resistance to 
Chinese investment in its resource sector. Nevertheless Kazakhstani decision 
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makers perceive of China as a unitary actor in terms of economic activity and 
perceive it credible that Beijing can control the levers of its economic influence 
which should allow Beijing to leverage economic dependencies. 
The chapter closes with an overview of the immediate outcomes of Kazakhstan’s 
economic dependence which will be analysed in greater detail in the case study of 
Part II.  
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5.1 Sino-Kazakhstani Trade 
Figure 27 Top 5 Trade Partners of Kazakhstan 
 
China replaced Russia as Kazakhstan’s most important trade partner in 2009. 
Although the Financial Crisis constituted an important inflection point this is the 
result of a much longer trend that had already started around 2001 (see Figure 28) 
and was consolidated after the Financial Crisis, even when trade with Kazakhstan’s 
other trade partners recovered. This trend is likely to continue in the foreseeable 
future.  By the end of 2011, Kazakhstan reported a Sino-Kazakhstani trade volume 
of c. US$21bn, or c. US$25bn based on figures reported by China (Figure 27). There 
are discrepancies between Kazakhstan’s overall reporting to the IMF and that of its 
trade partners. For Sino-Kazakhstani trade China reports a higher volume of exports 
than Kazakhstan. The most significant variance occurs in trade reporting with Italy 
for which Kazakhstan reports a total trade volume of c.US$16bn and Italy reports 
only c. US$5bn. With the exception of China, variance in reporting does not affect 
who Kazakhstan’s top 5 trade partners are, however it does change how these 
countries rank vis-à-vis each other.  For example, based on Kazakhstani numbers 
Italy would be Kazakhstan’s second most important trade partner after China, based 
on Italian numbers this would be Russia. The reason for these reporting differences 
could not be established conclusively. However, the IMF noted in its review of 
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reporting standards that Kazakhstan’s data reporting evidenced inconsistencies, 
inaccuracy and general weaknesses (IMF 2008). Italian, Dutch and French reporting 
on the other hand is in line with international standards and thus should bear more 
weight in an economic analysis. Similarly, analysts from international banks and 
investors such as ING also draw on China’s reported numbers in their commercial 
reports about Kazakhstan (ING 2012). Going forward the chapter will draw on 
variances in reporting where this leads to different conclusions. For example, when 
investigating the sub-components of trade the chapter will draw on Chinese trade 
figures, which are more reliable (Peyrouse 2008) to draw conclusions about the 
drivers for trade. However, in terms of symmetry for example, the difference 
matters little. Depending on the source Sino-Kazakhstani trade constituted either 
21% (US$21bn) or 24% (US$25bn) of Kazakhstan’s overall trade in 2011 whilst it 
constituted barely 0.6% (US$21bn) or 0.7% (US$25bn) in China’s overall trade 
volume which totalled c. US$6.3tr in the same period (IMF DOTS 2012). This 
suggests a steep asymmetry in the Sino-Kazakhstani trade relationship. The 
following sections analyse whether this asymmetry is associated with opportunity 
costs that create economic dependencies.  
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Figure 28 Kazakhstan's Trade Volume with China and Russia 
 
Initially, Sino-Kazakhstani trade was driven by small traders who crossed the border 
from China into Kazakhstan (Interview European Diplomat 1) and received a 
significant boost through China’s growing energy needs. Figure 28 illustrates how 
bilateral trade expanded even throughout the economic crisis, when China replaced 
Russia as Kazakhstan’s most important trade partner. This is all the more significant 
in view of Kazakhstan’s close economic integration with the Soviet Union and Russia 
after 1991.  The decline in Kazakhstani-Russian trade since 1997 saw, with a four-
year time lag, the concurrent increase of the Sino-Kazakhstani trade volume. It is 
noteworthy that Sino-Kazakhstani trade has expanded at an extraordinary pace. In 
1993 China accounted for only 3.4% of Kazakhstani trade and by 2011 for a quarter, 
or the equivalent of around 13% of the country’s GDP. This translates into a 
compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 35% which outpaced both Kazakhstan’s 
and China’s economic growth during the same period which at its peak never 
exceeded 14% for China and 13% for Kazakhstan (Figure 29).  The CAGR suggests 
significant momentum which magnifies the opportunity costs for Kazakhstan 
especially since this momentum is associated with its most important trade partner. 
By way of comparison, France is the only other trade partner who experienced a 
similar growth rate during the same period; however, bilateral trade with France 
only constitutes 6% of overall Kazakhstani trade. 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
U
S 
$
 B
n
 
Kazakhstani Trade with China and Russia 
Total Trade Volume Kz-Russia Total Trade Volume Kz-China
trade with China as % of total % of total trade with Russia
IMF DOTS, 2012 
171 
 
Figure 29 GDP growth China and Kazakhstan 
 
Even though this pace has slowed over the last few years, the underlying drivers 
and the overall trade structure will, with everything else being equal, further 
cement China’s status as Kazakhstan’s most important trade partner in the future. 
The particular context of Sino-Kazakhstani trade significantly increases the 
economic and political opportunity costs for Astana based on: 
 Overall trade volume 
 Peer-group comparison  
 Economic complementarity   
 China’s resource demand 
 Cross-border trade 
 Asset specificity 
 Political support   
 Lack of alternatives  
Economic Complementarity   
By the end of 2011, Sino-Kazakhstani trade had reached c.US$25bn, followed by 
trade with Russia at around US$10bn, and the France with US$7bn. Of the US$25bn 
in total, exports to China constituted the biggest component with c.US$15bn, 
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compared to imports valued c.US$10bn (IMF DOTS).100 As such, China runs a trade 
deficit with Kazakhstan. Perhaps unsurprisingly 69% of Kazakhstani exports and 
Chinese imports are mineral fuels (IMF DOTS):  Mineral fuels, of which China 
imported US$9.6bn in 2011, more than quadrupled since 2006 (US$1.4bn) and were 
merely US$0.34bn in 2003. This was followed by ores (US$2.0bn) and copper 
(US$1.6bn), which nearly doubled from (0.7bn) in 2009, followed by rare earth 
elements and radioactive elements (US $1.3bn) which doubled since 2009 (0.6bn) 
and iron and steel (US$ 0.9bn). 
Beijing, in turn, primarily exports processed products to Kazakhstan, including: 
machinery and appliances (US$1.2bn); followed by electronics (US$1bn), processed 
iron and steel articles (0.3), cars (0.3) and railway equipment (0.3). The latter import 
reflects China’s growing role in Kazakhstan’s infrastructure development, whereby 
Kazakhstan’s south eastern railway nexus is increasingly integrated with China 
because of the change from Russian to Chinese gauges (Muzalevsky, 2010). This 
break-down also reveals the complementary structure of both economies which 
also strengthens the overall prospects of Sino-Kazakhstani trade in the future, 
especially vis-à-vis Russia. This complementary structure of both economies also 
increases the opportunity costs for Kazakhstan if it were to decrease trade with 
China in order to counter any trade dependencies. Indeed, it is possible that Astana 
has tried to counter the rapidly growing trade volume with China by joining a 
Customs Union with Russia (discussed, below). 
The complementarity of both economies is captured by the fact that China exports 
processed consumer goods to Kazakhstan, which Kazakhstan’s economy either 
cannot produce, or cannot produce competitively due to a lack in economic 
diversification (Chapter 2). China in turn imports resources that are necessary to 
fuel its economic growth.  Both governments also acknowledge the economic 
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 Kazakhstan tends to underreport trade numbers with China which is why the statistics used China 
as the reported country, where numbers are more reliable (Peyrouse 2008). Differences in total 
values are due to rounding    
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potential of this complementarity and are thus committed to expanding trade in the 
future. In December 2012, Wang Qishan and President Nazarbayev set a target to 
nearly double bilateral trade to US$40bn annually by 2015 (FMPRC 2012).  This 
suggests that Kazakhstani leaders perceive trade with China to increase in the 
future, a key criterion for operationalising economic dependence (Chapter 2). The 
Kazakhstani-Russian trade-structure, on the other hand, is competitive because of 
the congruent nature of their economies. Both economies predominantly export 
hydrocarbon resources and are thus naturally in a more competitive relationship - 
which may also explain why Kazakhstani-Russian trade has dropped steadily since 
Kazakhstan’s independence.  
This complementarity introduces significant opportunity costs for Astana and makes 
it more difficult to mitigate decreases in Sino-Kazakhstani trade. Kazakhstan’s 
market structure and the factors of its economy are heavily skewed towards the 
export of resources and import of consumer goods. Mitigating decreasing trade 
volumes with China is only possible by changing the factors of the economy (i.e. 
diversification) or finding alternative trade partners in the short-term (Crescenzi 
2005). The following section discusses Kazakhstan’s market structure, whereas 
alternative trade partners will be discussed towards the end of this segment. 
The complementary nature of Sino-Kazakhstani trade rests in the lack of a 
diversified economy and creating dependencies on trade partners who have a 
complementary profile, unless Astana manages to develop a competitive 
manufacturing industry. The current price level in Kazakhstan combined with the 
close proximity of China, where workers’ salaries are a fraction of their Kazakhstani 
counterparts, casts doubt on such prospects, at least in the short and medium term 
(Interview Trade Expert).  In 2011, the average salary in Xinjiang was 1,000 
Yuan/month (~US$160) compared to Tenge 90,000 (~US$600) in Kazakhstan 
(Tengrinews 2011a, MOFCOM 2012). Building different industries aside from the 
hydrocarbon sector will require structural reforms to bring down wages and to 
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provide an environment in which small businesses have access to funding and 
talent. This, however, necessitates the political will to carry out reforms, loosen the 
elite’s grip over the economy and to make greater investments in these sectors. 
However, decreasing labour costs will likely suppress incomes and living standards, 
which in turn pose a legitimacy risk to the government (Chapter 2) The financial 
crisis also significantly decreased bank lending to the economy, something which 
particularly affects smaller businesses without alternative options, such as intra-
company loans (OECD, 2010). However, there are few signs that the elite are 
incentivised to undertake the necessary reforms to diversify the economy (Chapter 
2). An economic downturn could be an inflection point to provide such an incentive. 
However, as the previous chapter demonstrated, instead of widespread reforms the 
elite preferred to increase Chinese financing which has allowed the elite to maintain 
the status quo. 
Resources 
Chinese resource demand and the specialisation of Kazakhstan’s economy in the 
resource sector will likely continue in the future, drive bilateral trade and 
strengthen Beijing’s clout in Kazakhstan’s economy. At the same time this makes 
Kazakhstan’s economy more vulnerable to declining trade with China.  Figure 30 
depicts China’s 50-60% gap between oil and gas demand and supply, which also 
informs Beijing’s decision to elevate energy security to a foreign policy objective. 
Beijing has recognised Kazakhstan’s role as a reliable provider of these energy 
commodities which is reflected in joint statements and communiqués.  It is thus 
invested in the construction of oil and gas pipelines, which allow Beijing to import 
these commodities via land and not via sea lanes, which are susceptible to supply 
chain disruptions. Pipelines are a long-term investment and further underline the 
fact that oil and gas exports from Kazakhstan to China are set to increase in the 
future and make Kazakhstan a firm variable in China’s national security strategy. At 
the same time hydrocarbons are a highly specific asset which is less fungible than 
consumer goods especially its transportation which increases Astana’s opportunity 
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costs.  Besides China’s high economic growth rate, China’s resource demand is also 
driven by its rapid urbanisation.  Forty-five percent of Chinese people are now living 
in urban areas, which has increased demand for the construction of property and 
raw materials to support the accompanied construction and infrastructure boom. 
This will continue into the future, and it is estimated that another 300-400m 
Chinese will be urbanised.  Experts within Kazakhstan consider this a key driver for 
China’s increasing demand in Kazakh commodities, primarily raw materials and 
energy in the future (Esbergen 2011b).  As a point of reference, the construction of 
a 90sqm apartment requires six tonnes of steel, which, in turn, requires roughly 10 
tonnes of iron ore (Regan 2011). Besides classic commodities, China has begun to 
import rare earth elements and uranium, for which Kazakhstan is a key source 
(discussed below). 
Figure 30 China's Oil Demand and Supply Gap 
 
Cross-Border Trade  
A point that is often overseen in discussions of Sino-Kazakhstan trade is a 
flourishing cross-border trade and which initially drove the Sino-Kazakhstani trade 
relationship. However, today it is still an important component in the bi-lateral 
-4% 
2010 
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10 China Oil Demand and Supply 1992-2009 
Demand Supply Difference Shortfall % of demand
1992 
176 
 
trade structure and source of employment and living standards in Kazakhstan. The 
effects of cross-border trade also increase the opportunity costs associated with 
alternative trade partners, even though this type of trade is more difficult to 
instrumentalise towards political ends. 101  
Chinese consumer goods fuel local and regional markets and thus employment in 
Kazakhstan. A flourishing cross-border trade is vital to economic growth and 
employment in South East Kazakhstan and, at the same time, functions as a 
gateway for Chinese consumer goods into Kazakhstan and into wider Central Asia.  
Cross-border trade is trade which takes place within 30km of the border and 
involves individual traders who carry up to 50kg of cargo. The Korgas/Horgos border 
point handles around 150,000 traders annually and is considered a best practice 
example for bilateral cooperation in the region (Mitra &Kaminski 2008). A simplified 
visa regime allows Chinese traders to import goods valued < US$1,000 duty free and 
large amounts are subject to simplified customs and visa regimes.   Chinese goods, 
typically appliances and apparel, valued US$3.1bnin 2006, supply bazaars 
throughout Kazakhstan (Mitra &Kaminski 2008). The value of these goods easily 
exceeds that of US-Kazakhstani trade, which amounted to US$2.6bn in 2011 (IMF 
DOTS).  Almaty has the country’s biggest bazaars (Barakholka, Altyn Orda, Karkara 
and Sary-Arka), because of their proximity to the Chinese border and turn around 
US$ of 1.8bn annually (Mitra&Kaminski 2008:65). The author’s visit to these bazaars 
and conversations with Kazakhstanis confirmed that the majority of goods sold 
there originate in China. Bazaars are also important sources of employment. Experts 
estimate that the Barakholka bazaar alone indirectly employs 250,000 people (Mitra 
& Kaminski 2008) and arguably, trade with Chinese goods contributes to this 
employment. However, Chinese consumer goods also raised living standards in 
Kazakhstan and in recognition of the benefits of cross-border trade, China and 
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 It seems infeasible for China to “control” private, small scale traders that largely operate “below” 
the radar. Although not impossible, the CCP runs the risk of provoking a backlash from traders in the 
border region and in consequence unrest, in an area that Beijing struggles to keep stable. The CCP’s 
trade off costs would be potentially very high-serving as a deterrent.  
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Kazakhstan decided to expand cross-border trade in the future (Tinibai 2010). In 
November 2011, the Horgos International Border Cooperation Centre was 
inaugurated, which expands tariff free border trade to the point that China will be 
able to import copper and other resources tariff free from deposits near the border 
(Weitz 2012). 
Economic Impact and Trade Resilience 
Sino-Kazakhstani trade has increased dramatically since 1997, driven by 
Kazakhstan’s market structure and its economic complementarity with China. The 
asset specificity of oil as well as a thriving cross border trade further increases the 
opportunity costs for Astana. However, the thriving trade relationship with Beijing 
has a negative impact on the local economy because it further facilitates 
Kazakhstan’s economic dependence on the resource sector and undermines 
economic diversification. The Kazakhstani regime likely accepts this as a trade-off to 
access short-term revenue streams that can be redistributed (Chapter 2) and that 
do not require any economic reforms or significant upfront investment from the 
Kazakhstani government.  
The Global Financial Crisis further underlined the resilience of bilateral trade, when 
trade with Kazakhstan’s other partners dropped significantly. For example, whereas 
exports to China dropped by 19% between 2008 and 2009, Italian exports dropped 
by 44%, Dutch exports by 52% and Russian exports by 43% (IMF DOTS 2012). The 
Kazakhstani government pursues a multi-vector foreign policy, which aims to create 
amicable ties with the region’s great powers and to balance these powers 
economically and politically against each other. Trade with China was important for 
Kazakhstan to help emancipate the economy from Russia. However, by 2009, China 
had replaced Russia as Kazakhstan’s most important trade partner, and it is possible 
that the momentum of Sino-Kazakhstani trade may have caused scepticism in 
Astana becoming too dependent on Chinese trade. This may explain why Astana 
entered into a Customs Union with Russia and Belarus in January 2010, in order to 
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keep Russia economically involved and to prevent Kazakhstan developing a greater 
trade dependence on China. The negative consequences of the Customs Union 
outweigh its economic benefits which would support the view that Astana entered 
it primarily for political and not economic reasons.  
The Customs Union raised prices for goods imported from third parties, 
predominantly China, and stifled Kazakhstan’s accession process to the WTO, which 
had been well underway beforehand, whilst providing few macro-economic 
benefits. The WTO estimates that Kazakhstan was losing c.0.2% in real income per 
year as a result of joining the Union (WTO 2012). Before joining the Union 
Kazakhstan already had free trade arrangements in place with Belarus and Russia 
which poses the question why Kazakhstan decided to join. The only difference of 
the Customs Union is the implementation of a common external tariff (WorldBank 
2012) which affects Kazakhstan’s external trade partners, foremost China. The 
Custom Union effectively doubled tariffs from an average of 6.16% (MFN tariff) to 
11.5% and Astana had to raise tariffs on 45% of its imported items, mainly 
originating in China, to which the Customs Union applies a standard 17% tariff (ADB 
2011, WorldBanka 2012). However these tariff revenues are unequally divided 
among the union members: 87.97% goes to Russia, 7.33% to Kazakhstan and 4.7% 
to Belarus.  Within the first three months of the Customs Union, prices on cars and 
consumer goods increased by 40% in Kazakhstan. In the absence of Russian 
substitutes, consumers have no choice but to absorb these increases (Weisskopf 
2011). Where Russian alternatives are available they are more costly than and of 
inferior quality to their Chinese counterparts, which has led to complaints, 
demonstrations and petitions that also raise the political costs for Astana (Volkov 
2010, Weitz 2012). Among Kazakhstanis, the Customs Union stirs historic anxieties 
about a deeper re-incorporation with Russia that begins economically but may end 
politically (RFERL 2011). Indeed, Moscow already tried to instrumentalise the 
Customs Union for its foreign policy agenda. In 2011, amidst ongoing tensions 
between Russia and Georgia, Moscow pressured Kazakhstan to suspend the import 
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of Georgian wine, Georgia’s primary export commodity (Sharip, 2011). Georgia is 
Kazakhstan’s second biggest source of wine imports after Ukraine, and an import 
embargo would significantly hurt Georgia’s exports. Astana also hoped the union 
would attract more FDI because of Kazakhstan’s access to a bigger market. 
However, so far these effects are not discernible. Instead, Kazakhstanis are worried 
that the Customs Union will undermine the diversification of Kazakhstan’s economy 
even further because local producers cannot compete with relatively better Russian 
products and lower production costs. Perhaps most significantly, Kazakhstan’s 
Customs Union entry impedes its accession to the WTO for which negotiations had 
been underway. It will now have to re-negotiate most agreements. These trade-offs 
go beyond procedural setbacks. According to the WB, Kazakhstan’s WTO accession 
would have resulted in income gains, equivalent to 6.7% of consumption, and are 
four to five times higher than the WB’s most optimistic projection model for the 
Customs Union could produce (WorldBank 2012a) . 
Not surprisingly, the Union is widely criticised by Kazakhstani analysts and 
entrepreneurs.102 Because of the economic downsides, it is difficult to explain the 
decision to join the Customs Union from a purely economic perspective. Rather, the 
decision was politically motivated, with the aim of keeping Russia involved in 
Kazakhstan’s economy to balance China’s rise, to avoid the political and economic 
vulnerabilities that a dominant trade partner can cause (Lake, 2009). However, so 
far the Customs Union has had little effect on China’s momentum, thereby 
underlining the robustness or resilience of Sino-Kazakhstani trade. In view of the 
trade facilitators discussed above, it is likely that bilateral trade will continue to 
grow in the future.  The Customs Union may have the opposite effect. China can 
integrate Kazakhstan further into its own resource network because of arguments 
between Russia and Kazakhstan over import/export tariffs of Kazakhstani oil that is 
                                                     
102
 Outspoken critics include Gennady Shestakov  (Chairman of the Association of Customs Brokers), 
Timur Nazhanov (Vice-President of the Independent Association of Entrepreneurs), Derya Atabay 
(Economic commentator for radio Azattyk),Ualikhan Kaisarov (former MP and former presidential 
candidate (Park, 2011).  
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being refined in Russia.  Kazakhstan just announced that it will refine crude oil in 
China in the future, starting with 500,000 tonnes in 2013 (Shustow, 2013).  
Trade and Chinese Foreign Policy  
Trade data also provides insights into how Kazakhstan fits into the thinking of 
Chinese policy makers. Research for this thesis raised the question of whether 
Beijing was the driving force behind the Sino-Kazakhstani relationship, or whether 
this role is played by Chinese corporations, as suggested by one interviewee 
(Interview European Diplomat 1). Although this point will be discussed in greater 
detail, Sino-Kazakhstani trade data can provide some interesting insights in this 
respect.  Indeed, there are indicators that good Sino-Kazakhstani trade relations not 
only preceded good political relations but were the driver of the political 
relationship, at least until 2005, when Beijing upgraded the bi-lateral relationship to 
a strategic partnership. However, since then, especially since 2009, Beijing appears 
to be more in control of shaping the development of bilateral trade.   
Figure 31 summarises the Sino-Kazakh trade volume between 1998 and 2010 and 
the arrow marks the strategic partnership in June 2005.   
Figure 31 Diplomacy follows Economics 
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Between 1992 and 2002, trade developed steadily to around US$1bn. However, 
from then onwards it accelerated steeply, especially between 2004 and 2006, when 
it more than doubled from 2.7bn to 7bn. Within this segment in turn, trade had 
grown the fastest with a y-o-y increase of 154% from 2004 to 2005, which thus 
marks the fastest expansion of growth. Although bilateral trade continued to grow 
afterwards, the pace never matched the 2004 and 2005 rate again. Yet only toward 
the end of that phase of peak growth did Chinese policy makers upgrade their 
bilateral relationship. After the 2005 Strategic Partnership, trade continued to grow 
quickly, something which may have been facilitated by the strategic partnership. In 
any case, Beijing significantly stepped up its financial involvement in Kazakhstan 
after 2008 through the extension of loans during bilateral meetings (Chapter 4). 
This leads to the following sub-hypothesis (Chapter 2): Before 2005, Chinese 
enterprises shaped the relationship between Kazakhstan and China and policy 
makers followed the facts on the ground, by retrospectively sanctioning these 
developments. However, in the period following 2005 and especially since 2009, 
Beijing has taken a more proactive stance politically trying to shape Chinese 
economic interest through the extension of conditional credit lines.   
Although Beijing has become more proactive, there are signs that commercial 
interests still drive the relationship.  China upgraded the bilateral relationship again 
in June 2012  to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP), which also includes 
the institutionalisation of regular bilateral visits (Xinhua 2012a). However, the CSP 
came about only after China had become even further involved in Kazakhstan’s 
economy following the financial crisis. The document itself contains agreements 
that seem to have already been met beforehand, including the initiation of 
“cooperation in new areas, including nuclear energy, solar energy and wind energy” 
(Xinhua 2012a). However, cooperation in nuclear energy had already skyrocketed in 
2011, when Nazarbayev agreed to become China’s key supplier for uranium and for 
which KAP will increase its deliveries 100-fold by 2013/2014.   
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5.1.1 Alternative Trade Partners  
The chapter has established that China has quickly become Kazakhstan’s most 
important trade partner and that the trade relationship features a significant 
asymmetry where overall Sino-Kazakhstani trade constitutes between 21-24% of 
Kazakhstan’s’ total trade volume and between 0.6-0.7% of China’s. This suggests 
that it might be easier for China to break off the relationship than vice-versa 
(Baldwin 1980). Further analysis into the momentum, complementarity (i.e. market 
structure) and asset specificity of the primary export commodity (oil) suggests that 
significant opportunity costs for Kazakhstan are associated with this bilateral trade 
relationship which in turn implies that China has created a dependency with this 
economic lever.  The following section discusses whether Kazakhstan can draw on 
alternative economic partners to substitute for shortfalls of Chinese trade and the 
associated economic and political opportunity costs. Alternatives have low 
opportunity costs if they are easily available (Crescenzi 2005) and could be 
European economic partners or Russia with which Kazakhstan participates in a 
Customs Union.  This section argues that Kazakhstan can diversify its trade 
relationships in the long-term but is unable to do so in the short-term, as this 
requires reforming the economic and political sector which is not in the interest of 
the elite. 
Figure 32 illustrates the relative difference in trade volume between Kazakhstan’s 
five biggest trade partners.  Based on Kazakhstani data Italy is Kazakhstan second 
biggest trade partner and would need to increase its current trade volume from 
US$15bn to US$25bn (China’s trade volume of US$20bn plus the difference 
between both countries, US$bn5 in 2011). Based on data reported by trade 
partners, Russia is the second biggest trade partner and would have to increase its 
bilateral trade volume by US$40bn. This illustrates the magnitude of substitution 
required by one or several trade partners together if Chinese trade were to cease 
completely. 
183 
 
Figure 32 Top 5 Trade Partners 
 
Trade in goods and services, especially hydrocarbons, is less fungible than finance 
and geographic factors affect the competitiveness of products more strongly 
because of transportation costs. This is especially pronounced in a landlocked 
country like Kazakhstan. Alternative trade partners to China create significant 
economic and especially political opportunity costs for Astana - a fact that should 
highlight the urgency for Astana to diversify its economy in the long term. The 
following segments primarily analyses exports because they constitute Kazakhstan’s 
most important source of revenue especially so as the country is a Rentier State 
where the ruling elite relies on the redistribution of external rents (Chapters 2,3). 
Although China is Kazakhstan’s biggest export market, Figure 33 shows that 
alternatives exist. Depending on the source of reporting, Italy is currently 
Kazakhstan’s second biggest export destination due to ENI’s 32.5% share in the 
Karachaganak oil field or France. Similarly, either Switzerland or Russia is the fifth 
biggest trade partner. However, in both cases, France and Italy, each trade partner 
would have to more than double their imports from Kazakhstan to substitute for 
trade losses with China. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, it is difficult to 
identify a single substitute market that would absorb the volume of oil and gas 
0
5
10
15
20
25
China Italy Russia Netherlands France
U
S$
 B
ill
io
n
s 
Top 5 Trade Partnersd of Kazakhstan, 2011 
as reported by Kazakhstan and its trade partners 
Kazakhstan Reported Partner Reported
IMF DOTS 2013 
5 15 
184 
 
exports to China, especially not in geographically removed regions such as Europe. 
France, Italy and the Netherlands all have experienced subdued economic growth in 
the period observed. Moreover since 2000 Kazakhstan’s export structure has 
become more concentrated. The number of its export partners has dropped during 
the crisis (World Bank 2013). Thus it is more difficult to substitute for decreases in 
export revenues through existing trade partners as they become fewer.  This 
implies that opportunity costs associated with foregoing existing trade partners 
have become higher since 2009. 
Figure 33 Top 5 Export Partners of Kazakhstan 
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financial crisis and the short and medium term outlook is also unclear in view of the 
current European sovereign debt crisis. By mid-2012, Italy had turned to the ECB for 
aid. However, even if Italy’s economy were to rebound it is unlikely to grow at a 
similar pace to China’s, simply because of a more mature economy and greater 
energy efficiencies. A similar argument can be made for the French and Dutch 
economies. The resilience of Chinese demand was underlined during the financial 
crisis. Although exports to China dropped they only declined by 19% between 2008 
and 2009, whereas Italian exports dropped by 44%, Dutch exports by 52% and 
Russian exports by 43% (IMF DOTS).  
Geography 
The geographic distance to Italy and Kazakhstan’s landlocked position make oil 
exports more cumbersome and expensive than to China or Russia where 
Kazakhstan already has a pipeline system in place. China’s proximity facilitates 
trade, because it reduces transport costs and times for commodities to be physically 
moved. Oil and gas especially require a particular transport infrastructure either 
through pipelines, shipments or via railway. Currently, Kazakhstan exports liquid 
fuels through pipelines via Russia to the Black Sea or to China, by a mix of boat and 
pipeline to Azerbaijan and Turkey and by boat and train to Georgia (EIA 2012). Yet 
pipelines are the most cost efficient mode of transporting oil. By 2012, the vast 
majority of Kazakhstani oil was transported through Russian pipelines (ibid) 
(Chapter 2).  Without Chinese pipelines, Kazakhstan faces a problematic choice. A 
loss of the Sino-Kazakhstani pipeline would hand the export monopoly back to 
Russian which poses the risk of higher transit tariffs - because Russia can dictate 
tariffs for oil destined for European markets but also political risks (see below). 
Similarly, exporting via the Caspian Sea will incur additional transit fees through 
third countries such as Azerbaijan potentially rendering oil production in Kazakhstan 
less competitive. Any cost increases reduce the profit margins of major oil 
corporations, especially during extended periods of subdued oil prices such as in the 
aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. As a result these producers may revise their 
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production and investment plans in Kazakhstan. This affects Kazakhstan’s budget 
directly as it has signed revenue sharing agreements with many IOCs. 
Alternative export partners, such as Italy and France, already import large oil and 
gas volumes from Russia, which may add competitive pressure to an increase of 
Kazakhstani oil supplies and bring down oil prices and thus revenues for Astana.  
Both France and the Netherlands are equally affected by low growth and subdued 
demand for energy in the short and medium term, which calls into question the 
feasibility of accessing alternative markets quickly. Although the EU is interested in 
alternative resource imports from Russia, these are difficult, something which was 
highlighted by the Nabucco Pipeline which, if realised, will import oil from Central 
Asia via Turkey. However, the different foreign policies and political dynamics in 
these transition countries have effectively put the project on hold. In Kazakhstan, 
geographic variables also affect the opportunity costs of shifting or increasing oil 
exports which is a highlight specified asset. 
The export of oil requires a complex infrastructure on land or by sea.  As a 
landlocked country Kazakhstan has to rely on land infrastructure such as railways or 
pipelines whereas pipelines are significantly more efficient than railways in terms of 
cost/bb and capacity. At the same time pipelines require significant upfront 
investments and cannot be shifted to alternative use or users, should China 
decrease its import of Kazakhstani oil.  This specificity of oil further increases 
Kazakhstan’s opportunity costs associated with any export partner for which it has 
export infrastructure in place. For example, if oil exports to China were to decline 
significantly, Kazakhstan in theory should be able to find alternative export markets 
such as Italy or Japan. However, to export to Japan Kazakhstan has to transit oil 
through a third country for a fee or put new infrastructure in place to facilitate such 
exports. Once in place, export infrastructure, especially pipelines, increase 
opportunity costs that are associated with decreasing imports (e.g. from China) and 
make it difficult to shift to alternatives in the short-term.  
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Political opportunity costs 
Export alternatives also have significant political opportunity costs. Increased 
exports to European alternatives may increase political and media scrutiny of 
Kazakhstan’s political system, also because of stronger anti-bribery legislation. The 
European Parliament is already critical of Kazakhstan’s government and its human 
rights record and this may stir more controversy. However, media attention abroad 
has the potential to threaten the regime at home. After the Libyan revolution, the 
current atmosphere in Italy is even more sensitive to what partners Italy seeks 
abroad (Dejevsky 2012). ENI has been under investigation by Italian prosecutors 
since 2011 for corruption in Kazakhstan and prosecutors have asked the court to 
place ENI’s subsidiary, Agip KCO under special administration (D'Alessandro 2012). 
In 2006, Nazarbayev visited the Netherlands to discuss Shell’s involvement in the 
Kashgan oilfield, which triggered demonstrations against him in DenHaag (Interview 
European Diplomat 1).  
It is not clear how much room for manoeuvre Astana has to choose alternative 
export partners. Recent developments in shale gas have the potential to 
dramatically diminish the attractiveness of Kazakhstani oil, which, by international 
comparison, is already more difficult and expensive to export.  The Tengiz oil field, 
for example, has already doubled the initial cost forecast for its oil consortium from 
US$20bn to US$48bn in 2012. Similarly development costs for Kashagan 
Kazakhstan’s biggest oil have more than tripled to c.US$40bn by 2012 and oil 
production has been delayed by more than eight years. It is estimated to come 
online in 2016.  This makes Kazakhstan’s economy very susceptible even to minor 
changes in the international oil market that may drive down prices and thus the 
profitability of oil exploration and production (Dejevsky 2012). The complexities in 
the production and transport of oil render it difficult to shift to alternative export 
partners in the short-term. For example, negotiations for a pipeline to export oil 
from the Tengiz oilfield via the Russian port of Novorossiysk took over six years and 
involved complex political negotiations over tariffs (Yergin 2011:67). This also 
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increased Russia’s grip over Kazakhstan’s export infrastructure and led to the 
dilution of profits from Kazakhstani oil. Light crude exported via Russia “is mixed 
with lower quality oil from Russia before it is exported, decreasing its sale price” 
(Kennedy 2011:10). At the same time changes in the export volume of oil lead to 
declining government revenue in the short or medium term, until alternatives are in 
place. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, Kazakhstan’s regime is vulnerable to 
such revenue shocks, especially in a period of economic crises and subdued 
economic activity such as following 2009 where alternatives are difficult to access in 
the short-term. In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, oil prices dropped 
significantly (Figure 34) and have not recovered to their pre-crises level.  Lower oil 
prices directly translate into lower income for Kazakhstan’s regime which poses the 
risk for political instability (Demkiv 2012). This should significantly increase the 
opportunity costs associated with decreasing bilateral trade volumes, especially 
from the biggest trade partner. These costs are further magnified during times of 
low economic growth. 
Figure 34 World Oil Prices 
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lead to a complete restructuring of the political and economic landscape. However, 
the above analysis aimed to convey that it is relatively difficult to forego trade with 
a specific trade partner in the short or medium term.  Unlike finance, trade, 
especially of commodities, relies on a physical infrastructure for export via third 
countries. 
Imports 
Figure 35 Kazakhstan's Top 5 Import Partners 
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with Russia: Cheap Chinese consumer goods have increased the living standards of 
Kazakhstanis. However, after joining the CU Kazakhstanis have to pay more for 
goods of less quality, which in turn affects their living standards. This has led to 
complaints, demonstrations and petitions. The CU conveyed how difficult it is to 
substitute for Chinese imports. This may also explain why Chinese trade continued 
to increase nevertheless after 2010.  
It is difficult to see how Kazakhstan can seek out alternative trade partners, 
especially in view of its geographic position, the complementary structure of its 
economy, and the economic political opportunity costs associated with decreases in 
Chinese revenue and alternative trade partners. Astana recognises these benefits, 
which is why it supports the expansion of bilateral trade and its petition of the 
Chinese government to participate in technology transfers to boost economic 
development (FMPRC 2009). 
5.1.2 Segment conclusion: Trade Dependence  
This segment established a stark asymmetry in the bilateral trade relationship, 
similar in magnitude to the asymmetry in the finance (Chapter 4). By 2009 China has 
become Kazakhstan’s most important trade partner, the complementarity of both 
economies facilitates the momentum and volume of bilateral trade.  Kazakhstan’s 
market structure on the other hand and its political system associate significant 
opportunity costs with declining Sino-Kazakhstani trade volumes or alternative 
trade partners. It is unlikely that Kazakhstan can increase resource exports to these 
partners in the short or medium term. Moreover, the factors of Kazakhstan’s 
economy are largely resource concentrated and cannot be shifted to alternative 
industries pending significant economic reforms. International comparisons indicate 
that Kazakhstan has among the lowest labour productivity across its economy both 
in the oil and non-oil sectors (Figure 36). As previously mentioned this renders 
Kazakhstan’s non-resource uncompetitive and creates additional obstacles to 
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economic diversification. This diversification in turn is a prerequisite to tap into 
alternative export sources.  As a result Kazakhstan cannot substitute for decreases 
in Chinese exports by focusing on exporting alternatives such as manufactured 
goods. 
A discussion of alternative trade partners showed that these are only feasible under 
economic and, more significantly, opportunity costs, which the elite might not be 
willing to take. Thus, it can be argued that Kazakhstan depends on Chinese trade in 
the short-term, unless it is willing to forego Chinese revenues of US$15bn in 
exports. Given the regime’s susceptibility to revenue disruptions this is unlikely, 
particularly so in an overall subdued economic climate where government revenues 
are already under pressure. 
Figure 36 Labour Productivity in Kazakhstan, 2010103 
 
Lake argues that a failure to diversify trade away from one dominant trade partner 
like China can be interpreted as the “tacit acceptance of the dominant state’s 
potential influence and therefore its legitimacy and authority” (Lake 2009). 
Whether this is the case in Kazakhstan depends on how much effort Astana 
undertakes into the diversification of its trade partners.  Astana tried to balance its 
growing trade volume with China through joining a Customs Union with Belarus and 
Russia.  However, so far this has not produced the intended effect and to the 
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contrary, led to Kazakhstan’s decision to refine its oil in China in the future. 
However, the real problem in Kazakhstan impeding any diversification of trade 
partners or the economy is structural.  The economy is highly resource-dependent, 
which makes it difficult for the government to choose its trade partners more 
freely. These structural weaknesses, however, are intricately linked to the 
neopatrimonial setting.  Although officially the diversification of the economy is a 
national goal, the actions of the elite contradict this, which instead facilitates 
revenue generation in this sector as well as Chinese credit lines that deepen its 
resource dependence even further (Chapter 2,3). Any structural changes in the 
economy are intricately linked to dissolving neopatrimonial structures, which 
facilitate the status quo and create a difficult climate for alternative international 
investors. Thus, it can be argued that as long as the government does not undertake 
the necessary structural political and economic reforms that are the key driver to 
Kazakhstan’s trade and finance situation, it promotes the status quo and thus 
acknowledges the legitimacy of Chinese dominance or at least accepts China’s 
dominance as an acceptable trade-off. 
China’s role as Kazakhstan’s most important trade partner is likely to persist in the 
short to medium term, also backed by substantial Chinese financing, which not only 
benefits the elite but also ensures increased resource exports to China in the long 
run.  This introduces an asymmetrical relationship where China is a key export 
market and thus revenue stream for Kazakhstani goods. The fact that China imports 
more from Kazakhstan than it exports further underlines this argument. As such, 
Kazakhstan is more dependent on access to China than the other way around, 
which generates political leverage for China. Sino-Kazakhstani trade constitutes 25% 
of Kazakhstan’s overall trade; however, for China, this constitutes only 0.7% (IMF 
DOTS). Thus, it is significantly easier for China to break the relationship than for 
Kazakhstan, at least from a mere quantitative point of view. This introduces a steep 
hierarchy (Baldwin, 1996) and Kazakhstan’s high dependence on trade with China 
makes it vulnerable to the influence of China (Lake 2009: 47). 
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5.2 Chinese FDI  
Foreign Direct Investment into Kazakhstan is perhaps China’s weakest economic 
capability, which may be the result of its relatively late entry into the Kazakhstani 
economy or because Beijing’s credit lines mimic FDI and thus may not be captured 
in FDI accounts. Although initially a modest FDI volume compared to the 
Netherlands, for example, China’s investment was strategically and politically 
important. This thesis has touched upon the strategic significance of the Chinese-
Kazakhstani pipeline at various points. Nevertheless, Chinese FDI has increased 
gradually and China is now the fourth biggest provider of FDI stock (see Figure 37). 
Figure 37 Top 6 Source Countries of FDI Stock in Kazakhstan   
 
However, FDI stock can be misleading, because it only measures the accumulated 
sum of all FDI provided to date and thus benefits early entrants into Kazakhstan’s 
economy, such as the Netherlands and the US. As such, FDI stock does not capture 
new FDI flows or recent trends, including changes. FDI flows, on the other hand, 
capture new investments on an annual basis and thus capture changes. For 
example, Figure 38 illustrates that Beijing has increased its FDI commitment to 
Kazakhstan in recent years, whereas investment from other states has stagnated.  
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previous years, but divested from Kazakhstan in 2011. As a result, China is now the 
third biggest FDI provider on an annual basis behind the Netherlands and France. It 
lags behind in overall accumulated FDI stocks because it is a latecomer (See Figure 
37).  However, low Chinese FDI figures may be the result of China’s provision of 
large loans, which serve similar purposes to FDI:  Beijing provides loans to access 
resources, to secure long-term deliveries or to get resources at concessional prices. 
For example, China’s loan to Kazakhmys helps the company to expand its 
production capacity. As Kazakhmys’ biggest customer, Beijing already buys 80% of 
the company’s copper. Through the loan it thus ensures the company can meet its 
greater production capacity, which also benefits Beijing, perhaps even at 
concessional prices. As such, the loan closely resembles FDI. Interestingly, the 
Kazakhstani Ministry for Economics and Industry also refers to FDI stock, where 
China relatively underperforms to alleviate public fears about China’s economic 
expansion (Tengrinews 2011b). 
Figure 38 Gross FDI Flows 
 
Similarly to Chinese finance and trade, China’s FDI status was accelerated through 
the Financial Crisis. This is all the more noteworthy because China itself experienced 
a declining GDP but continued to invest in Kazakhstan nevertheless. This may 
indicate that China recognised the investment opportunities for commodities 
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during the global economic down-turn and by investing throughout, proved itself a 
reliable partner for Kazakhstan even in times of economic crisis (see Figure 39).  
 
 
Figure 39 Chinese FDI and GDP 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
          
          
 
In line with Chinese trade and finance, Chinese FDI is overwhelmingly concentrated 
in Kazakhstan’s resource sector and as such is part and parcel of Beijing’s search for 
resources abroad. 
5.2.1 Alternatives 
Figure 37 illustrates that there are feasible alternative sources to Chinese FDI, 
foremost the Netherlands, France and the US. In the aftermath of the financial crisis 
and with the outcome of the European sovereign debt crisis uncertain, FDI around 
the world has generally stagnated or dropped.  US, French and Russian FDI flows 
slowed significantly, leaving China as one of the few countries on an upward trend 
to continuously expand their FDI in Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, the overall volume of 
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China’s annual FDI is not out of reach. The Netherlands, for example, provides US$ 
7.9bn of FDI, seven times more than Beijing. Thus, it is possible to argue that the 
Netherlands could step in for China if Kazakhstan were to block Chinese FDI to 
counter the risk of economic dependence and/or political leverage. Also, the gap to 
the next biggest FDI provider is relatively modest. The US ranks fourth and provided 
only US$ 200m less in FDI in 2011 than China, which could increase subject to a 
recovery of the US economy. China’s FDI makes up less than 9% of Kazakhstan’s 
annual FDI flows-with 91% provided by other sources. Kazakhstan can likely turn to 
these sources for increased FDI at a low opportunity cost. 
5.2.2 Segment Conclusion: FDI 
China’s FDI entry into Kazakhstan has been relatively late compared to its 
international counterparts, especially the Netherlands and France. This is directly 
linked to the fact that China is an emerging economy and the late entry of Chinese 
oil companies into the Kazakhstani market, which is the primary destination of 
Chinese FDI. Consequently, China only ranks fourth in accumulated FDI stock. 
However, it is catching up quickly and is already the third biggest contributor of 
annual FDI inflows into Kazakhstan, behind the Netherlands and France.  This is thus 
China’s weakest economic capability in Kazakhstan by relative ranking.  By relative 
volume and ranking, the opportunity costs for Kazakhstan are not too high to 
replace Chinese FDI and there are feasible alternative partners who have the 
resources to step in, especially the Netherlands and the US.  However, as the third 
biggest provider and given the momentum of Chinese FDI, China plays an important 
role in Kazakhstan’s economic growth, especially when taken together with Beijing’s 
provision of financing (credit), which sometimes overlaps with FDI. Although 
Kazakhstan is not dependent on Chinese FDI, it adds to China’s overall economic 
influence and thus dependence on Kazakhstan. 
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5.3 Economic Dependence 
The preceding sections have shown how quickly China has increased its economic 
capabilities in Kazakhstan and that it has created economic dependencies in trade 
and finance based on the opportunity costs that the regime might face if Chinese 
credit lines or trade decreased.   
 
It is now the second most important source of new credit to Kazakhstani banks, 
acted as creditor of last resort and has become Kazakhstan’s most important trade 
partner. This has propelled China into a key role in Kazakhstan’s economic growth. 
These economic levers can be weighted differently in their significance to economic 
growth.  Finance is especially relevant because it is the prerequisite of economic 
growth (McKinnon 1973).104 Kazakhstan’s underdeveloped financial sector is a key 
reason affecting the growth of the private sector (World Bank 2013).  Here China’s 
role in Kazakhstan is even more pronounced considering that banks are the most 
important source of funding for businesses in the absence of strong capital markets.  
This overt reliance on bank funding also drives inefficiencies and “a tendency 
towards instability and crisis” (Lipsky 2009), which could be witnessed during the 
financial crises in 2009 (Lipsky 2009).  Thus, a strong financial sector is the 
prerequisite for economic diversification and growth in the long term. Trade, on the 
other hand, provides short and medium term revenues for the elite and thus a 
means to facilitate legitimacy domestically. Thus Beijing’s role has a more 
immediate effect. Arguably FDI flows rank second to trade and finance as FDI drives 
economic growth in the long term. China’s dominant position in both trade and 
finance, and the opportunity costs of alternatives, foster Kazakhstan’s economic 
dependency on China. Although it is difficult to quantify the degree of the resulting 
economic hierarchy, it is possible to conclude that it is highly asymmetrical, based 
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on the fact that Kazakhstan is a net debtor to China, that Sino-Kazakhstani trade 
generates a quarter of Kazakhstan’s income from trade, whereas, conversely, it 
constitutes not even one per cent of China’s trade volume. However, Kazakhstan’s 
position is significantly better where China’s overall resource strategy is concerned, 
which presents a feasible opportunity to level the bilateral hierarchy and increase 
opportunity costs for China. However, as will be seen in the case study, Kazakhstani 
policy makers do not seize this opportunity.  The resulting dependency relationship 
was further confirmed by interviewees in Kazakhstan, who assumed that China 
could afford to lose access to the Kazakhstani market, whereas Kazakhstan could 
not afford to lose access to the Chinese market (Interviews Local Finance Expert 1). 
Although the author somewhat disagrees with this statement, especially in view of 
China’s energy strategy, it is an important recognition of how China and China’s 
economic influence is perceived by decision makers on the ground, which further 
operationalises the link between economic dependence and political power. 
5.3.1 Coordinating Foreign Policy Goals and Actors  
The following segment addresses the key research questions of the thesis. It 
examines the actors that drive China’s economic influence in Kazakhstan and their 
relationship with Beijing to understand whether Beijing can influence the drivers of 
its economic growth and whether Kazakhstan’s economic dependence is the 
outcome of a purposeful policy.    The preceding analysis of bilateral trade already 
suggested that Chinese companies initially shaped the trade relationship until 2005, 
when Beijing became more proactive in diplomatic terms.  This section argus that 
Kazakhstan’s economic dependence cannot be traced back to a coherent 
purposeful Chinese foreign policy (sub-hypothesis), that on the aggregate level, 
Beijing does not control the levers of economic influence in Kazakhstan (sub-
hypothesis) as there is evidence that China’s NOCs proactively enlist Beijing to 
further their economic interest (sub-hypothesis). 
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Leveraging economic capabilities towards foreign policy objectives requires the 
combination of different factors. The economic dependency has to be the outcome 
of purposeful policy (Kahler & Kastner, 2006). Thus Beijing would foremost have to 
direct its economic activity towards Kazakhstan in full knowledge of its implications, 
or, alternatively, recognise what role it plays in Kazakhstan’s economy and perhaps 
even more importantly its elite. However, this thesis could not detect a coherent 
Chinese policy towards Kazakhstan, or any policy at all for that matter rather 
Kazakhstan is viewed as part of Central Asia. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Kazakhstan is subsumed under diplomatic relations with Eurasia and Chinese 
academics tend to view Kazakhstan through a Russian lens (SIIS 2013). Rather, it 
appears that Kazakhstan’s economic dependency is an unintended outcome of 
Beijing’s broader foreign policy to benefit from the investment climate during the 
global economic crisis within its Go Global framework, which focused more on its 
financial institutions after 2009. Arguably, in the financial realm, Beijing must 
acknowledge Kazakhstani financing needs, in order to perceive credit conditionality 
as an option. This occurs mainly from a perception of strength. It is however, not 
clear whether Beijing is aware of Kazakhstan’s specific finance needs or whether 
Chinese foreign policy makers perceive the country through the broader context of 
the Global Financial Crisis, which created financial shortfalls in many countries. 
Although a point could be made that Beijing may have understood Kazakhstan’s 
finance needs, there are no indicators that Beijing is aware of the economic and 
political implications of its trade relationship with Astana. This, however, would be 
necessary if its economic capabilities were to be used to work towards specific 
objectives.  Although Beijing and Astana can quantify this relationship in bilateral 
meetings where they aim to double Sino-Kazakhstani trade, Beijing may not be 
aware of the political implications. As noted beforehand, Chinese academics view 
Kazakhstan from a Russian perspective and thereby perhaps indirectly acknowledge 
that Russia is the dominant power in Kazakhstan. However, this no longer holds 
true, at least in economic terms.   
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A deliberate policy of fostering and using economic dependencies also rests on 
Beijing’s ability to exert control over its economic capabilities (Kahler & Kastner 
2006:524) or at least direct their investment behaviour. The dynamics between 
Beijing and its economic actors also determine whether Beijing can use its economic 
influence as leverage for political ends (Chapter 2). This is also analogous to 
Zakaria’s analysis of the power-sharing arrangements between Congress and the 
President over US foreign policy (Zakaria, 1998) which affected the ability of the US 
to project its power abroad.  Arguably, Beijing can use its economic clout as 
leverage most effectively if it is credible for Kazakhstan that Beijing can cut its 
economic investment, in order to pursue the Kazakhstani government to comply 
with its interests.  This segment argues that the activities of China’s policy banks are 
directed by the Go Global initiative and thus serve directly as instruments to realise 
Chinese objectives abroad, although these objectives are not targeted at an 
individual country. With Chinese SOEs however, especially CNPC, the picture is 
mixed, and SOEs have in fact become active foreign policy actors in their own right 
who enlist Beijing for their investment purposes abroad. This works well where the 
interests of Beijing and the SOEs overlap. Although a number of economic actors 
pursue Chinese objectives in Kazakhstan by acquiring stakes in resources, however, 
they do not act jointly but tend to compete against each other instead. 
Nevertheless, and perhaps surprisingly, interviews confirmed that Astana does not 
recognise the fragmentation of Chinese investors, creditors and the government. 
Instead it perceives China as unitary actor, which only further magnifies the political 
effects of Kazakhstan’s economic dependence on China. This also explains why 
Chinese companies seem less affected by the rent-seeking behaviour of the 
Kazakhstani elite, which perceives Chinese companies to be affiliated with the 
Chinese government, thus risking a diplomatic fall out (Interview Local Finance 
Expert 1, Investment Expert 1). 
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Financial Institutions 
China’s credit lines towards Astana are primarily disbursed by policy banks, 
including China ExIm and CDB, whereas Chinese investment is conducted through 
SWFs including CITIC and CIC. Amongst these, Beijing can arguably exert most 
control over its policy banks. China ExIm and CDB are the most prominent 
originators of Chinese loans to Kazakhstan (Chapter 3). Both are state-owned, 
report to the State Council and are tasked to implement government policy. China 
ExIm struggled with a high NPL ratio until mid-2005, as loans were allocated solely 
to meet political rather than commercial objectives and against little due diligence.  
Although the bank now provides loans under stricter economic principles it is still 
following Beijing’s instructions. Initially, the bank was responsible for financing 
Chinese exports, however, Beijing increasingly uses China ExIm to develop its 
foreign policy abroad or “cujin duiwai guanxi fazhan” (facilitate the development of 
foreign relations) (ExIm 2012), and analysts  estimate that ExIm disbursed US$80bn 
in loans abroad in 2011, thus lending China’s economic capabilities substantial clout  
(Minto 2011). 
Against a widening resource supply gap, China ExIm turned away from simple trade 
finance and instead acts as an international creditor of concessional loans similar to 
the ADB and WB to secure Beijing’s resource security in the medium to long term. 
This has drawn criticism, especially of China ExIm’s activities in Africa, where it 
directs 25% of its annual lending (Minto, 2012).  This increased outward activity is in 
line with Beijing’s Going Out/Go Global (走出去) strategy, which encourages 
Chinese enterprises to invest abroad to access international technology and 
expertise and to modernise Chinese companies (Tenth Five Year Plan 2001-
2005). Although Chinese banks and, increasingly, SWFs play a role in this strategy, 
their mandate was extended during the financial crisis.  Politicians, bankers and 
businesses (Ding 2010) recognised that the crisis presented opportunities to invest 
in a less competitive environment when China also became a key lender to 
Kazakhstan (Xinhua 2009). It is thus likely that Beijing extended credit lines to 
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Kazakhstan as a result of this general perception to seek investment opportunities 
abroad, rather than as a deliberate foreign policy strategy towards Astana. Ma 
Weihua, head of China Merchant’s bank, captured this new perspective in his call 
for Chinese banks to learn to “swim”, instead of standing around the water’s edge 
(Xinhua 2009). However, it was not just bankers but also politicians like Li Lianzhong 
(李连仲), CPC Central Committee Secretary for Economic Policy Research, who 
challenged China’s financial institutions to go global and target resources, especially 
oil, gas, iron and copper, on the back of China’s formidable foreign currency 
reserves and to turn China into a global financial power (Finance.gg.com 2009).105  
Part and parcel of the latter is the internationalisation of the RMB, especially at 
Beijing’s periphery where the People’s Bank of China (PBC) also signed bilateral 
agreements with Kazakhstan (discussed below) (Wang and Zhang 2011). 
Kazakhstan also fits into one other prominent Chinese objective, namely the 
diversification of its foreign currency reserves (Finance.gg.com 2009) . The financial 
crisis brought about a greater focus on diversifying China’s foreign reserves into 
commodity investments abroad (Weiner 2011:89).  Therefore, Kazakhstan’s banking 
crisis provided an ideal opportunity to channel investment into relatively 
conservative, low-risk assets that are also important to sustained Chinese economic 
growth. Walter argues that this is best explained by China’s as yet under-developed 
investment capabilities  which result in a focus on less risky assets, particularly 
commodities (Walter 2010).  The volume of US$3.3tr currency reserves put 
pressure on SAFE and CIC to invest otherwise China risks losses in value through 
currency fluctuations or inflation. However, investing these reserves domestically 
can lead to a substantial inflow of money into China’s economy and thus exert 
inflationary pressure (Howie & Walter 2011).This poses a widely underestimated 
challenge for Beijing: US$3.3tr cannot be easily absorbed globally and there may 
not be enough projects available for Chinese funding.  Interviewees argued that 
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Kazakhstan did not have enough commercial projects in view of Chinese finance 
commitments (Interviews Local Finance Expert 1 and Local Finance Expert 2). 
Consequently Walter argues that “[The reserves are] not worth anything, because 
they [CCP] can’t use it” (Walter 2010). What is left is the search for international 
investment opportunities and in Kazakhstan these investment opportunities overlap 
with a number of items on China’s “agenda of vulnerability” (Kerr 2010: 150), 
namely China’s key strategic interest to maintain energy security, water security 
and regional stability. 
Beijing’s efforts to internationalise its currency and to build a regional financial 
infrastructure can be read in this light as well. There are early signs that Beijing 
integrates Kazakhstan’s financial infrastructure more closely with its own.  In 2004, 
both established a joint financial committee which meets annually to discuss closer 
financial cooperation, including monetary policy coordination (NBK 2012) such as 
integrated payment systems, knowledge transfer from China on its experience with 
taxing financial instruments, the establishment of a special SCO account and 
currency swap agreements (NBK, 2012). Beijing offered Kazakhstan a currency swap 
agreement in early 2011, which has led to closer integration of the Kazakhstani and 
Chinese banking system: Kazakhstan’s central bank can sell Chinese Yuan to 
domestic traders and commercial buyers of Chinese goods.  Beijing has pushed a 
number of high volume currency swaps, which has been interpreted as an attempt 
to diversify away from its dollar surplus. Indeed, it is hoped that the Yuan will 
become an important regional currency by 2020 and Chinese policy makers have 
understood that the current financial climate is conducive to initiate these steps 
(Wang & Zhang 2011). On a practical level, this allows trade partners in Kazakhstan 
to conduct transactions in Yuan. As of June 2012, BTA has opened a Yuan account 
with the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), which allows Chinese and 
Kazakhstani customers to settle directly in Yuan (Xinhua 2012b) and should 
facilitate cross-border trade, where transactions are in small amounts, making 
currency exchanges less cumbersome. Currency swaps also have political benefits 
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and allow Kazakhstan to secure cheaper debt or to hedge against exchange rate 
fluctuations in the long term. Exchange rate shocks have greater impact on 
emerging economies such as Kazakhstan’s (Isakova, 2008). 106 The swap agreement 
gradually decreases Kazakhstan’s level of dollarisation, by replacing transactions in 
US Dollars with Chinese Yuan which decreases the structural power of the US and 
increases China’s. However, interviewees pointed out that the currency swap 
agreement is indicative of more Chinese loans in the future that can be repaid and 
serviced in Yuan (Interview Local Finance Expert 1 ).  
It is not clear whether ‘Going Global’ aims at creating financial dependencies or 
whether these dependencies are merely the result of an increased focus on 
investments and trade in Kazakhstani commodities. In any case, Go Global, along 
with China’s SCO strategy and RMB internationalisation, is creating economic and 
financial dependencies, at least in Kazakhstan.  Although Beijing understood and 
acted upon the global opportunities of the financial crisis, this research could find 
little evidence of a specific foreign strategy towards Kazakhstan; rather, China’s 
growing economic capabilities in Kazakhstan can be viewed through China’s broader 
foreign policy objectives, which are not exclusive to Kazakhstan.  
Whereas a case can be made for Beijing’s strategic use of its policy banks, the 
picture is more mixed were SWFs are concerned, such as CIC, CITIC and SAFE. SWFs 
in general do not report their activity and the only publicly-known investments in 
Kazakhstan were conducted by CIC and CITIC, whose resource acquisition is in line 
with their global investment focus. As such, their investment appears in line with 
Beijing’s Go Global strategy, however, it cannot be answered conclusively if this is 
coincidental or whether Beijing instrumentalises these vehicles directly. CIC has 
closer government ties and US$200bn of assets under management (AuM), which 
could turn it into an effective foreign policy tool. However, unlike SAFE, which is 
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overseen by the PBC, CIC reports directly to the State Council and has a number of 
representatives from different ministries on its board,  which brings it in close 
proximity of the policy-making process (Helleiner & Chin 2008: 90). Victor Shih’s 
extensive research of CIC concluded that in China’s fragmented political system, 
foreign policy objectives gain priority to which fund managers are sensitive (Shih 
2009:328) and which may explain their recent boycott of an IMF meeting in Japan 
(Chapter 1). This implies that the political use of SWFs in China, similarly to policy 
banks, is a realistic option. Although Shih shows how China’s SWFs are 
predominantly subject to domestic objectives, he notes that the “devotion of a 
small share of the SWF’s resources on foreign policy can have a significant 
diplomatic impact, especially in developing countries” (Shih 2009:329), which 
captures the impact of Chinese loans in Kazakhstan very well (Chapter 3).   
More indicators move CIC in proximity of Beijing’s foreign policy process and raise 
questions about its role in China’s foreign policy. In 2009 CIC 107 acquired a 
US$940m stake in KazMunaiGas Exploration Production (KMG EP) (Duce 2009), a 
deal which stirred controversy among KMG EP executives because it was negotiated 
on the political level without the consultation of the company’s senior management 
(Chapter 2). It is not clear whether Beijing was involved in the deal or whether CIC 
sought out Kazakhstani officials themselves. The fact that its acquisition of KMG EP 
was decided in a political meeting implies that CIC must have had political support 
on either side. The acquisition was particularly meaningful because CIC gained a 
personal representation on the executive board of KMG EP and will have a say in 
KMG EP decisions in the future.  In any case, CIC proved that it knows how to 
acquire assets in Kazakhstan through the elite. CIC also acquired the China 
International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) 108 Capital, which in turn set 
                                                     
107
 Through Fullbloom Investment Corp  
108
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such as China CITIC Bank, CITIC Holdings, CITIC Trust Co. and CITIC Merchant Co., Ltd. 
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up a bilateral investment fund with Samruk-Kazyna (discussed below) that 
systematically channels Chinese investment into Kazakhstan. 
CITIC has US$4.4bn AUM and a strong resource focus. CITIC acquired the 
Karazhanbas Oilfield in 2006 for US$1.91bn against substantial Kazakhstani 
opposition that included Baktykozha Izmukhambetov, the Minister for Oil and Gas, 
who rallied that "we must take extreme measures to stop the agreement on the 
Karazhanbas" (AP 2007).  It is unclear how CITIC managed to overcome Kazakhstani 
resistance, especially from such a prominent figure like the Minister for Oil and Gas, 
however, CITIC must have had elite support (Chapter 3).  The incident underlines 
two issues: it confirms that many decisions in Kazakhstan’s political system take 
place in the informal realm. In theory, the Minister of Oil and Gas should be in 
charge of energy acquisitions, yet in the case at hand he was overruled by other 
interests. Moreover, CITIC managed to somehow enlist the support of the relevant 
decision maker in the elite structure to conclude the deal, which illustrates that it 
can also navigate the intricacies of Kazakhstani decision making. It is also possible 
that CITIC enlisted Beijing’s support in order to succeed. Although CITIC mission is 
primarily commercial, it is not clear what links it maintains with the Chinese 
leadership (discussed below).  It is possible that CITIC’s oil acquisition accidentally 
coincided with Beijing’s increased focus on resources or that CITIC sought out 
Kazakhstani energy assets because they are commercially lucrative.  However, this 
distinction is not necessarily relevant. In Kazakhstan, Chinese SWFs and SOEs are 
misperceived as a unitary actor, a view that does not distinguish between Beijing, 
its economic players and their respective dynamics, and thus can create political 
leverage for Beijing in Kazakhstani eyes (Interview Local Finance Expert 1). This is a 
distinctive disadvantage for Kazakhstani politicians since they are likely to 
overestimate the control of the Chinese government over its economic institutions 
and the CPC’s ability to enlist them in its foreign policy.  Yet many Chinese economic 
institutions lack coherence and instead of serving as entities that extend China’s 
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economic capabilities, they often compete with each other and thus produce a 
rather fragmented picture in reality (Interview European Diplomat 1).  
For example, CITIC and CNPC have a competitive relationship, at least in 
Kazakhstan, and it is thus unlikely that either one or both of these firms act under a 
unified government mandate. Both funds competed for the Karazhanbas Oilfield 
(Wilson 2007) and although they pursue the national interest through the 
acquisition of resources, they seek support from Beijing individually (Interview 
European Diplomat 1). Interestingly, Beijing also benefits from Nazarbayev’s 
centralisation of the economy by establishing the CITIC Kazyna Investment Fund, a 
joint investment fund with Samruk-Kazyna in 2009 (Chapter 3). SK manages 
Kazakhstan’s state assets, especially its resources, under a single holding and 
management structure and the CITIC-Kazyna Investment Fund institutionalises a 
direct link between SK and China’s financial capabilities, which provides for Chinese 
direct access to SK and its assets. The fund was created by Nazarbayev and the 
chairman of the Chinese State Council109 and thus originated on the highest political 
level.  It is not clear whether CITIC followed Beijing’s initiative or whether CITIC 
enlisted Beijing’s support to pursue this opportunity; what is certain, however, is 
that there are points of contact. The fund (KCM 2009) is run by Fanglu Wang, who 
also raised capital for the Ministry of Finance and likely has likely close contacts in 
the ministry (CITIC 2012a). CITIC’s initial aim was to attract foreign capital and 
know-how into China, however with the joint venture, it has reversed this role and 
directs finance activities abroad. Due to its history, the fund and its assets are 
closely linked to politics. In any case, CITIC’s activities increase China’s financial 
clout in Kazakhstan.   The fund also further blurs the line between finance (credit) 
and direct investment (FDI). With an initial capitalisation of US$200m, it set out to 
finance infrastructure and non-resource related projects in both countries. 
However, so far, it has primarily invested in Kazakhstan. Despite its emphasis on the 
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 The Fund was established based on an Executive Order President Nazarbayev following a meeting 
with the Chairman of the State Council of China in Kazakhstan on August 17-18, 2007 (KCM 2009). 
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non-resource sector, it currently promotes a sub-fund, CKFI, with an exclusive 
resource focus110. The fund provides credit lines between US$5m-30m with a 
maturity of at least 10 years, with the goal to invest in good companies with 
‘impaired liquidity’ to take advantage of the credit crisis (CITIC 2010). Two 
additional funds are already planned with a capitalisation of US$400m each bringing 
the total investment clout of all CITIC funds to US$1bn.  
Chinese State Owned Companies 
Whilst China’s SWF presented a mixed picture in their relationship with Beijing and 
its foreign policy towards Kazakhstan, the picture is more pronounced where 
Chinese SOEs are concerned, especially CNPC and China Guangdong Nuclear Power 
Group (CGNP). There is evidence that these companies do not execute Chinese 
foreign policy, but to the contrary, actively enlist Beijing to pursue their objectives 
in Kazakhstan. This may be effective because Beijing’s and CNPC’s interests are 
aligned and it is questionable whether CNPC could enlist Beijing, or vice-versa, in 
areas where their interests diverge.  
An anti-Chinese investment climate gained momentum in Kazakhstan after CNPC’s 
acquisition of PetroKazakhstan in 2005 and CITIC’s intention one year later to 
acquire Nations Energy. PetroKazakhstan constituted the most substantial addition 
to CNPC’s portfolio at that point and unlike CNPC’s other overseas assets, was a key 
contributor to CNPC’s reserves and profits (Pala 2006). Prior to this, CNPC had 
accumulated an “unwieldy collection of small assets” (Downs, 2008), which were 
not of interest to other IOCs because of their low potential and profitability, and 
thus meant that CNPC operated in an uncompetitive space. PetroKazakhstan’s 
revenue stream likely drove CNPC’s determination to acquire more oil fields in 
Kazakhstan with a strategy that even Chinese diplomats call “aggressive”(Hoagland, 
2009c). However CITIC acquisitions of Nation’s Energy in 2006 interfered with these 
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 According to the Kazyna Investment Fund brochure, CKIF targets the following industries: 
“Chemical and Metallurgy, Petrochemical, Oil and Gas Equipment and Services, Construction 
Materials, Food Processing, Machinery.  
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plans. Even Nur Otan members openly criticised China’s aggressive expansion into 
Kazakhstan’s hydrocarbon sector (Peyrouse, 2008) and Majilis deputies accused the 
government of risking Kazakhstan’s energy independence. This played into deep-
seated fears that a newly independent Kazakhstan was on its way to become yet 
another resource appendage, this time to China. Despite Energy Minister 
Izmukhambetov’s pronouncement in November 2006 that he would block CITIC’s 
acquisition (KASE 2006) it was completed on 31 December 2006 (Xinhua 2006) and 
according to Majilis’ deputy, this increased China’s share in Kazakhstan’s oil 
production from 28% to 40% (KASE 2006, Konirova 2006). 
Kazakhstani researchers also highlighted the political implications. Murat Auezov 
suspected in later interviews that CNPC’s acquisition of smaller oil fields before 
2005 was less driven by profitability concerns than by a strategy to “develop a 
network in Kazakh territory that will legitimise [Beijing’s] right of inspection over 
Astana in the event of political tension” (Peyrouse, 2008). A string of legislation 
followed aimed at curbing Chinese expansion, including a 2007 law that required 
KMG’s consent in the sale of any Kazakhstani oil and gas stake.  Further, 
amendments to Kazakhstan’s subsoil law permitting the abrogation of resource 
contracts on security concerns were actually aimed at Chinese investment 
(Hoagland 2009c, Kynge, McGregor et al. 2011). Nevertheless, in 2009, and in 
conjunction with Beijing’s credit line, CNPC announced that it had successfully 
acquired MMG in a joint venture with MMG (CNPC 2009) which led Konstantin 
Syroezhkin, Kazakhstan’s eminent China scholar to claim that Kazakhstan had 
become a de-facto resource appendage of China (Syroezhkin 2011:20). CNPC’s 
eventual success, against Kazakhstani opposition and amidst China’s key credit line 
in 2009, leads to the following hypothesis: CNPC enlisted Beijing’s help to overcome 
Kazakhstan resistance and acquire further oil and gas assets. Several points 
substantiate this: Based on the experience that their international acquisition 
success was not driven by money alone, subsidiaries of Chinese NOCs began to 
involve their parent companies because of their closer ties to Beijing, in recognition 
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of the fact that Beijing’s political influence could be helpful (Downs 2008). It then 
follows that PetroChina, CNPC’s subsidiary, was likely aware of the additional 
leverage that it could create with the Kazakhstani government by involving CNPC, 
its parent, and Beijing, in order to overcome Kazakhstani reluctance. CNPC thus 
involved Beijing to include its US$5bn loan for a joint venture with MMG into the 
emergency credit package for Kazakhstan, at a time when Astana was in critical 
need of financing. This brought the loan to US$10bn. A second point focuses on the 
personal links between CNPC and Beijing, especially Jiang Jiemin (蒋洁敏), the 
Chairman of CNPC and head of PetroChina which acquired MMG. Jiang signed the 
agreement with KMG president Kairgeldy Kabyldin on 17 April 2009 in Beijing, only 
one day after Nazarbayev had received the credit line in a meeting with Hu Jintao 
(CNPC 2009).   
Jiang Jiemin is closely associated with China’s aggressive international energy 
expansion also in Kazakhstan and thus likely mobilised all available political and 
economic options to conclude the MMG transaction. More importantly, however, 
as member of the CPC central committee, Jiang is embedded in Beijing’s decision-
making process, giving him access to China’s government and the possibility to 
enlist Beijing’s help, especially when Kazakhstan’s financial crisis presented an 
opportunity. Through the CPC Central Committee, Jiang could also access those 
high-level political figures in Kazakhstan that would be helpful to CNPC’s acquisition 
plans. As such, Jiang met with the Kazakhstani Foreign Minister, Kanat Saudabayev, 
in February 2010, to discuss further gas and oil exploration.  One year later, Hu 
Jintao and Nazarbayev signed an agreement for a joint venture project between 
KMG and CNPC to develop the Urikhtau gas field, which will feed into the Sino-
Kazakhstani gas pipeline (CNPC 2011). Jiang also has access to Nazarbayev himself. 
Both met on the side-lines of a 2012 SCO summit in Beijing (Oil&Gas-Eurasia 2012). 
These personal links are further reinforced through Su Shulin (苏树林), who was 
appointed Senior Vice President of CNPC in 2002 and remained in senior positions 
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with CNPC and then Sinopec until 2011 (ChinaVitae 2012). Su has extensive links to 
the government as an alternate member of the 16th and 17th CPC, Central 
Committee and as Governor of Fujian Province. At CNPC, Su facilitated CNPC’s 
ground-breaking investment in Kazakhstan in 1997 and the construction of the Sino-
Kazakh pipeline (Downs 2008:125). Like CIC and CITIC, CNPC has shown that it can 
navigate Kazakhstan’s elite structure well.  Where market rules apply, CNPC 
channels its bid through the executive board but adjusts its strategy when 
necessary as it has in Kazakhstan (See Political System/Kazakhmys). In view of the 
above, CNPC can be considered an active foreign policy actor in China which lobbies 
the government for support. This finding is in line with recent research into the 
relationship between Chinese SOEs and the CPC. The CEOs of China’s NOCs today 
bear striking similarities with the corporate lobby groups encountered in western 
democracies (Downs 2008: 137) and influence Beijing’s policy-making process. As a 
result, Chinese NOCs have turned into increasingly powerful elements vis-à-vis the 
state and are subjecting the CPC to their own agenda.111   
It is possible to make a similar point for the Guangdong Nuclear Power Company 
(CGNPC). Although data on China’s nuclear deal with Kazakhstan is at best 
indicative, it can be included into a wider pattern of economic and political 
transactions. CGNPC approached KazAtomProm (KAP) as early as 2006 and signed a 
strategic partnership with KAP in the same year. However, the deal received 
political backing in 2007, through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed 
between Hu Jintao and Nazarbayev that allowed CGNP to buy stakes in KAPs’ 
uranium mines. Based on the chronological order of events, it is possible that GNPC 
discovered Kazakhstan as potentially important supplier of uranium in 2006 and 
then received the necessary high-level political support one year later.  
                                                     
111
 Chinese SOEs turned into more powerful actors following their privatization in the 1990s. 
Industrial ministries such as the ministry for mobile communication, steel, railways, etc. were 
abolished and their staff including their membership in the central party committee, transferred into 
these new corporates (McGregor 2010, Howie & Walter 2011, Walter 2011).  
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Another, yet less direct vehicle that facilities China’s economic influence in 
Kazakhstan is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Beijing pledged 
US$10bn through China ExIm in loans for SCO members who struggled with the 
recession in 2009. Kazakhstan itself aimed to attract US$3bn of these funds in 2010, 
however, it is unclear if it was successful  (Kazinform 2010). Astana did at least 
benefit from a known US$400m credit line to finance the modernisation of two 
border crossings, including Horgos. Within the SCO Banking Consortium, China 
promotes the creation of a development bank similar to the WB to disperse loans to 
its member-states. Although in its early stages, Beijing already announced its plans 
to commit US$8bn out of US$10bn to the bank, which would enable it to extend 
more financing into Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, within a multilateral 
umbrella (Shodon 2011). That China is interested in these opportunities was 
underlined at the 2012 SCO summit where Hu Jintao pledged another US$10bn to 
the SCO to finance joint projects in the region (Tengrinews 2012a). However, 
although the SCO offers further opportunities to raise China’s creditor status in the 
region, its multilateral setting also inhibits possibilities to use these credit lines as 
leverage politically.  
This segment discussed the different actors and objectives that drive China’s 
economic capabilities in Kazakhstan and their relationship with the Chinese 
government.  Beijing’s ability to control the drivers of its economic influence is 
mixed. Beijing can employ its policy banks to invest abroad within the framework of 
‘Go Global’ and thus also advance its resource interests in Kazakhstan. Policy banks 
are thus a firm part of Chinese foreign policy.  Although CITIC and CIC invest in 
Kazakhstan in line with the Go Global strategy, it is more difficult to prove whether 
Beijing actively enlists its SWFs or whether these SWFs seek out investment in 
Kazakhstan because of its promise of returns.  However, both CIC and CITIC have 
shown that they understand and manage Kazakhstan’s decision-making process and 
made successful acquisitions against high level political opposition which was 
facilitated through close government contacts, either between these SWFs and 
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Beijing or these SWFS and Kazakhstani elite contacts. CNPC’s investments also fall in 
line with China’s drive for resource acquisitions abroad. However, as this segment 
has shown, it proactively enlists Beijing to overcome investment obstacles in 
Kazakhstan. As such, Beijing’s control over its economic institutions varies greatly 
and it is questionable whether Beijing could force its SOEs or SWFs to divest assets 
in Kazakhstan in order to pursue a political agenda, especially where interests may 
diverge. The research showed that China can leverage its economic influence where 
the interest of NOCs and Beijing align. It was possible for CNPC to gain Beijing’s 
political support, however it is unclear whether Beijing can in turn control CNPC’s 
investment. Given the political and economic power of CNPC in China this is 
unlikely. This applies especially to Kazakhstan, where CNPC has made some of its 
most profitable investments (Downs 2008). This should impede Beijing’s ability to 
use its economic influence to meet foreign policy objectives. Nevertheless, for the 
time being, this distinction may be of greater analytical than practical value as 
Astana likely perceives these different actors as simply state owned and thus part 
and parcel of Chinese government interests and policies (Interview Local Finance 
Expert 1; Chapter 7). Hence, the accumulated economic activity of China’s economic 
institutions drives China’s overall economic power in Kazakhstan, at least in the 
view of the Kazakhstani elite. 
5.3.2 Political Leverage  
The previous segment discussed Beijing’s control over its economic institutions as a 
prerequisite to deliberately deploying its economic capabilities, which are mixed. 
Whereas CNPC has turned into a powerful actor vis-à-vis Beijing, there is greater 
opportunity for the government to exert control in the financial sector, at least 
where its policy banks are concerned. The finance segment has shown that Beijing 
already links specific resource objectives to its credit lines to Kazakhstan, a move 
that can be viewed as a deliberate strategy in recognition of Kazakhstan’s financial 
needs (Chapter 3). Although Beijing recognises such opportunities, it is less clear 
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whether it has driven Kazakhstan’s financial or trade dependencies as part of a 
specific foreign policy. However, Beijing has become more proactive both in 
financial and diplomatic terms in Kazakhstan, as indicated by the string of credit 
lines and agreements that followed Kazakhstan’s financial crisis in 2009. This implies 
that Beijing is taking a greater economic and perhaps political interest in its 
neighbour. 
Figure 40 Trade, Finance and Diplomacy 
 
Perhaps this distinction primarily matters analytically, yet less so in view of its 
practical applicability. Beijing’s Go Global initiative, in conjunction with the 
objective to exploit financial opportunities, can invariably lead to economic 
dependencies, especially in times where alternative sources of funding are limited. 
In addition to Chinese trade and investment, this has de-facto created an overall 
economic dependency of Kazakhstan. Rather, it is Kazakhstan’s domestic 
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circumstances that create ongoing demand for external finance, which Beijing is 
able to meet with its vast foreign currency reserves.  The revenue needs of the elite 
further facilitate the inflow of Chinese trade and investment which increases the 
political opportunity costs of alternative sources of funding and underpins 
Kazakhstan’s economic dependencies (Chapters 3 and 4). 
Nevertheless, Beijing did recognise the opportunities inherent in the financial crisis, 
which left it as one of the few countries with the ability to invest. Based on the 
effectiveness of such financial conditionality, Beijing may draw on these more often 
in the future, thereby creating a stronger link between its financial capabilities and 
foreign policy objectives. The picture is less clear where trade is concerned. Initially, 
Sino-Kazakhstani trade was driven by small traders and subsequently taken over by 
Chinese SOEs, especially in the resource sector (Interview European Diplomat 1). 
This is why until 2005 Beijing did not shape but rather retrospectively 
acknowledged the economic realities on the ground through closer diplomatic 
relations. Following China’s recognition of Kazakhstan as a strategic asset in 
Beijing’s quest to meet its energy demand, China became more proactive politically, 
by embedding energy commodities into bilateral agreements and conditioning 
energy access to loans, at least since 2009. Beijing’s more proactive role in 
facilitating trade is also reflected in its decision to establish the China Kazakhstan 
Cooperation Committee (CKCC) to better organise, guide and control the 
development of bilateral trade (Chapter 6), as well as its political leadership in 
developing cross-border trade, where it initiated the creation of a free trade area 
along with Kazakhstan. 
In summary, China’s deliberate economic strategy rather than a deliberate foreign 
policy strategy facilitated Kazakhstan’s economic dependence. China’s economic 
strategy, roughly subsumed under its Go Global programme, aimed at benefitting 
from investment opportunities of the financial crisis and at investing and 
diversifying its foreign policy holdings whilst meeting its overall increasing energy 
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demand. Yet, at least in the financial realm, there are already some overlaps 
between China’s economic and foreign policy strategies, as its financial 
conditionality has shown. This should open further possibilities for the twain of 
politics and economics to meet in the future and thus, for Beijing to draw on its full 
economic capabilities as part of its foreign policy. Independent of the strategic 
considerations (or lack thereof) behind China’s economic capabilities in Kazakhstan, 
these capabilities have created an economic dependence.  
However, to what degree Beijing should be able to leverage that dependence in its 
favour.  The preceding discussion supported the first part of the lead hypothesis 
that China’s accumulated economic activities have generated a considerable 
economic dependency of Kazakhstan (lead hypothesis). However, the fact that the 
research could not identify a specific foreign policy towards Kazakhstan necessitates 
a modification of the second part:   Beijing can leverage this economic dependence 
politically, if it is aware of these dependencies and if it can control the economic 
activities of its institutions and/or if Kazakhstani policy makers perceive of China as 
a unitary actor that can control its economic institutions.  
It is unclear if Beijing is aware of the extent of its economic influence in Kazakhstan, 
which is a prerequisite to leverage these dependencies for specific political goals. 
However, Beijing is aware of and deliberately uses its economic capabilities in 
general. This is particularly salient in its creditor approach where it links loans to 
resource commitments. Arguably, the experience also demonstrated to Beijing that 
these linkages are effective, thereby confirming China’s creditor status indirectly. 
The thesis already discussed that Kazakhstani decision makers misperceive the 
relationship between Beijing and its economic institutions in Beijing’s favour which 
should incentivise decision makers to acquiesce with Chinese interests, in view of 
China’s accumulated economic power in the country and Kazakhstan’s dependence 
as well as elite expectations on future economic benefits.  
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Economic dependence can be translated into political influence because of the 
opportunity costs associated with the loss or decrease in activity of the economic 
partner which make it too costly for the sub-ordinate economic partner to forego 
the economic relationship. As a result the dependent state is vulnerable to the 
political influence or conditioning of the dominant state. Kahler and Kastner 
maintain that democracies should be particularly susceptible to such political 
influence as overall economic performance plays a role in elections. However, this 
should also apply to elites in a Rentier State. These elites are rational actors who 
base their decisions on cost-benefit calculations with the goal “[t]o come to power, 
to stay in power and, to the extent that they can, to keep control over money" 
(Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2011). In Kazakhstan political and economic 
opportunity costs operationalise dependence into political influence via the risk of 
legitimacy losses and political instability linked to declining income (Demkiv 2012).  
Part I elucidated that Kazakhstan is vulnerable to external revenue shocks such as 
those experienced in the period following the Global Financial Crisis. During this 
period of subdued growth the opportunity costs associated with China increased 
significantly as China has become the lender of last resort and the largest trade 
partner. This incentivises the regime to avoid any conflict of interest with China that 
can put future trade, finance or investment benefits at risk. As such the regime 
should support Chinese foreign policy interests, accede to conditional requests or 
indirectly acquiesce to Chinese interests pre-emptively to create strong/friendly ties 
that may facilitate future investment. This strengthens China’s bargaining power 
vis-à-vis Kazakhstan (Hirschman 1945).  
Before moving on to the second part of the thesis which will test this hypothesis 
along a case study, the following segment will discuss some immediate outcomes 
for Beijing and how Kazakhstan fits into China’s overall strategy. 
 This thesis showed that China controls between 25-30% of Kazakhstan’s daily oil 
production, based on its accumulated ownership in Kazakhstan’s oil fields. In June 
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1997, CNPC outbid Amoco, Unocal and Petronas for a 60.3% share in 
AktobeMunaiGas  for which it paid a signing bonus of US$320m and made an 
investment promise of US$4.3bn (Strecker Downs 2000:15). In 2003, CNPC 
expanded that share to 85.42% and bought PetroKazakhstan for US$4.18bn in 2005. 
PetroKazakhstan owns 12 oil fields and licenses for six oil exploration blocks 
(ATimes 2005). In 2006, CITIC bought Nation’s Energy for US$1.9bn. In 2009, CNPC 
acquired 50% of MMG and CIC bought an 11% stake in KMG EP. In view of the fact 
that 80% of Kazakhstani oil resources are under foreign ownership (Palzuelos & 
Fernandez, 2012), China’s 30% share turned it into the second most important 
foreign player in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas fields after the US, a status it achieved 
within a short period of time, given that it only arrived in Kazakhstan in 1997.112  
However, Kazakhstani oil deliveries currently only constitute 4% of Chinese imports 
but this is set to double by 2020, with CNPC’s plan to build a second oil pipeline to 
source more Kazakhstani oil for China’s domestic market (EIA 2012). Figure 41 
illustrates China’s diversified import portfolio, which would allow it to substitute 
Kazakhstan for other oil exporters and which seems to extend the economic 
asymmetry between Kazakhstan in China. Beijing could arguably break the oil 
relationship more easily than Kazakhstan. However, Kazakhstani resources have 
distinct advantages for Beijing: Kazakhstani oil is relatively cheap because China 
financed the transportation infra-structure and because the consumer at the end of 
the pipeline determines the prices (Interview European Diplomat 1). Beijing’s loans-
for-resources approach further ensures concessional prices that Beijing can lock in 
because of the medium-term maturity of these loans (Rasov 2012) .  Because 
Kazakhstan neighbours China, Beijing can import resources via landlines -which 
protect it against supply chain disruptions. The proximity of Kazakhstan and its SCO 
membership facilitate China’s ability to protect its assets on the ground. The Arab 
Spring has moved the latter point to the forefront of Chinese priorities, where 
political developments forced Beijing to abandon US$18bn worth of projects and to 
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 This calculation excludes the Kashgan Oil Field, which will only come online next year and which is 
developed by a consortium of foreign firms without Chinese presence. 
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evacuate 36,000 Chinese, the biggest evacuation in modern Chinese history 
(Xinhuanet, 2011).113 The incident sparked a broader debate about how Beijing can 
protect its investment abroad and what role the PLA should take in this (Brautigam 
2011). 
Figure 41 Chinese Crude Oil Imports 
 
CNPC’s acquisitions in Kazakhstan allowed CNPC to diversify its upstream and 
downstream portfolio so that it can balance and swap reserves as necessary. In 
addition to its shares in Kazakhstani oilfields, CNPC acquired valuable downstream, 
processing and transportation assets, thereby possessing the entire oil production 
cycle: Kazakhstan only has three domestic refineries, which constrains its processing 
capacity and thus exports oil to Russia for refining, which has led to recent 
disagreements over tariffs in conjunction with the new Customs Union. Kazakhstan 
sought financing from China to expand and modernise its refinery capacity and 
Chinese companies now have stakes in two out of three of these refineries, Atyrau 
and Shymkent (PetroKazakhstan), both of which add valuable processing assets. 
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Most recently, Kazakhstan has started refining crude oil in China at the Dushanzi 
Refinery near the Kazakhstani border, which is an opportunity for Beijing to further 
lock in Kazakhstani oil by integrating it with its own processing network (WKT 2012). 
Through its stake in KMG EP and in the Sino-Kazkh Pipeline, it added distribution 
capacity that can bring refined products to market.  From a global perspective, 
CNPC is immune to oil price fluctuations, especially from rising oil prices, in that it 
can balance and swap reserves around the world  (Hoagland, 2009c).   
Besides the implications of Kazakhstani assets to CNPC, natural gas imports from 
Kazakhstan are even more important in Beijing’s goal to diversify its energy mix and 
to boost cleaner sources. The Central Asian Gas Pipeline (CAGP) connects gas from 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan as well Kazakhstan.  It is the first and, to date, only 
pipeline through which Beijing imports natural gas and thus plays a key role in 
Beijing’s plans to diversify its energy supply by 2020. Currently, the country meets 
68% of its energy demand through coal, which is a high pollutant energy source, 
whereas only 4% of its energy mix is natural gas (EIA 2012). Beijing aims to increase 
the gas share to 10% by 2020. Once completed at the end of 2012, the pipeline has 
a capacity of 40bn meters3/a, which will double China’s natural gas imports and 
thus plays a key role in China’s energy diversification. The CAGP is crucial because it 
feeds directly into China’s West-East pipeline, which is currently under expansion to 
accommodate more imports from Central Asia in the future, including Kazakhstan 
(CNPC 2012). 
This role is even further pronounced regarding nuclear power, where Beijing turned 
to Astana to provide 40% of its uranium needs in the next years. China plans to 
increase the share of electricity generated from nuclear power from 1% (11.3 
Gigawatt [GW]) to 6% (86GW) by 2020 requiring an additional 122 nuclear power 
plants (Hotter 2011). Kazakhstan produced 36% of global uranium in 2011, and is 
the world’s biggest producer, producing twice as much as the second biggest 
producer, Canada (WNA 2012). Kazakhstan also possesses the second biggest 
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uranium deposits in the world and this, combined with its geographic proximity, 
makes it the most suitable supplier for China’s Nuclear Energy Strategy (Chapter 6). 
Beijing recognised Kazakhstan as the key to its nuclear energy plans as early as 
2006, when CGNP and KAP signed a strategic cooperation agreement and CGNP 
bought stakes in KAPs’ uranium mines. KAP has now become CGNP’s main uranium 
supplier. In 2008, CGNP’s subsidiary Sino-Kazakhstan Uranium Resources 
Investment and KAP created a joint venture (Semizbai-U LLP) to finance uranium 
mines (WNA 2012) .Both China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and CGNPC 
hold 49% shares in several uranium mines and purchase at least 20% of KAP’s 
annual uranium output (CGNPC 2009). Interestingly, KAP and CGNPC entered into 
an agreement to establish a company for the construction of nuclear power plants 
in China, after KAP’s initial plans to work with Russia's Atomstroyexport fell 
through. This is interesting, as KAP was also subject to intra-elite struggles, in which 
Russian interests played a role. Atomstroyexport’s refusal to enter into a 
commercial relationship with KAP further reaffirms the trend that Moscow does not 
compete commercially but rather politically in Kazakhstan (Chapter 2 and 3). 
Beijing’s 2009 loan coincided with Kazakhstan becoming the world’s biggest 
uranium producer (WNA 2012) and since then, uranium purchases from China have 
accelerated dramatically, turning Kazakhstan into China’s key supplier. In June 2010, 
Hu Jintao and Nazarbayev signed an agreement to import 24 metric tons of uranium 
to China by 2012 (Weitz 2011).  A year later, in 2011, Nazarbayev agreed to supply 
China with 55 metric tonnes of uranium and promised to meet 40% of China’s 
uranium demand in the future (Hotter 2011), which translated into a 100-fold 
increase of uranium pallet deliveries to China. KAP expects Chinese imports of 
uranium pallets to increase from 2 metric tonnes annually to 220 metric tonnes by 
2013/2014 (Gizitdinov 2011), which also more than doubled KAP’s profits in the first 
half of 2012.  
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Astana’s position in meeting Chinese gas and especially uranium needs should allow 
it to level the economic hierarchy with China. However, most puzzlingly, Astana 
does not seize on this opportunity, as the following case study will demonstrate. 
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 The Background of the Sino-Kazakhstani Water Dispute Chapter 6 
as a Case Study 
Figure 42 Map of Kazakhstan 
 
Source: ezilon maps  
Part II of the PhD addresses the question whether China, in line with the findings of 
Part I, can effectively leverage Kazakhstan’s economic dependence to maximise its 
foreign policy objectives and how, by looking at the ongoing Sino-Kazakh water 
dispute.  This case study will focus on the dispute dynamics between China and 
Kazakhstan and argue that Beijing has managed to meet its foreign policy interests 
at the expense of Kazakhstan’s national interests over the last twenty years. The 
water dispute shows that China can leverage its economic influence to maximise its 
bargaining power which also translates economic influence into political influence 
(Hirschman 1945). 
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The water dispute is suitable because both China and Kazakhstan have conflicting 
foreign policy interests and a political outcome is most visible if Kazakhstan acts 
against its own interests based on its dependency on China, whilst Beijing pursues a 
policy of deliberately exploiting that economic dependency. 
The following chapter provides a background and overview of the dispute. It argues 
that the dispute takes place in the context of environmental cooperation, more 
specifically, international water regimes, an area in international relations that 
although increasingly well regulated, suffers from implementation weaknesses. The 
chapter will discuss the domestic contexts in China and Kazakhstan that shape their 
foreign policy objectives in the dispute but also the dispute outcomes. Kazakhstan is 
interested in restricting China’s abstraction of water from the joint water nexus. It is 
in Beijing’s interest, in turn, to maximise control over its water resources. Beijing 
can realise these objectives fully because of Kazakhstan’s economic dependence 
and the acquiescence of its elite with Chinese interests, which maximises Beijing’s 
bargaining power in the conflict.  
6.1 Context of the Sino-Kazakh Water Dispute  
IR literature discusses increasingly how non-traditional security threats, such as 
freshwater conflicts, shape the foreign policy objectives of nations (Westing, 1989) 
and international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) have put water 
security onto their agenda (Cosgrove 2003). Regionally, the Asia Society in New York 
focuses on the conflict potential of water shortages and the June 2009 Asia Europe 
Meeting dedicated an entire session to non-traditional security threats, where 
water security featured prominently. IR Literature also recognises the link between 
a nation’s domestic water context and its foreign policy stance (Trolldalen, 1992), 
which will be seen in China’s and Kazakhstan’s case. Water security should be 
considered from a global angle as a challenge affecting the majority of the planet’s 
population. A joint study by the International Finance Corporation, McKinsey and 
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the private sector found that without efficiency gains, the gap between demand 
and supply of fresh water will reach at least 40% by 2030 (Water 2030).  Potential 
global problems are foreshadowed on a regional level in areas that are more arid 
and dryer than the global average. Both Kazakhstan, with its arid and dry climate, 
and the northwest of China face prominent water shortages, while competing over 
a shared fresh water nexus made up of 23 transboundary rivers.  
While IR recognises that water disputes can spiral into open conflicts, historically 
such escalations have been limited (Homer-Dixon, 1999). However, the absence of 
violence in a conflict does not necessarily equate to an absence of conflict (Zeitoun 
&Warner 2006). The ongoing dispute between Kazakhstan and China over a set of 
shared transboundary rivers falls into this category. The dispute takes place in an 
increasingly well-regulated field, which experiences effective supranational 
cooperation that transforms the anarchic space of IR. Theoretically, cooperation on 
shared international rivers takes place along a spectrum, from violent conflict at 
one end to international customary law and supranational institutionalisation at the 
other. Common practices among states have led to important changes in 
international customary law, which now stipulates the rules states should follow in 
their activities along shared rivers. While the international legal system still has 
some way to go, transboundary rivers are also home to some of the world’s most 
cooperative and effective institutions (Rhine Agreement, below). Today the 
frequency of cooperation far outweighs the record of conflict (Wolf 2007). Actual 
state practice frequently goes beyond the prescriptions of customary 
environmental law, especially in transboundary river basins.114 For example, Wolf 
has shown that over 3,600 treaties on water related issues exist (Wolf 1998, Wolf 
2007). Over the years, many international basin councils have been created to 
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 “River basins are defined as the area that contributes hydrologically […] to a first order stream 
which, in turn, is defined by its outlet to the ocean or to a terminal (closed) lake or inland sea”.   
River Basins are watersheds (US) or catchments (UK), and include lakes and shallow, unconfined 
groundwater units. ( Wolf, 2007). 
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govern river basins and successfully transform conflict into cooperation (EECCA-
NBO 2012).  
China’s foreign policy stance in the Sino-Kazakh water dispute ignores these 
developments, thus exploiting weaknesses in the implementation of international 
law. As a consequence, China maximises its objective of maintaining unhindered 
access and use over its transboundary rivers, at the expense of Kazakhstan’s 
national interest. This thesis argues that Beijing can only proceed in this manner 
because Kazakhstan’s economic dependence prevents Kazakhstani officials from 
taking a firmer stance against Beijing. 
6.2 Transboundary Water Regimes 
With approximately 260 transboundary river basins globally (Wolf, 2007), there 
exists a clear need for norms to regulate access to transboundary freshwater. 
International environmental cooperation is often depicted as one of the least 
progressive areas of international relations. However, with more than 400 fresh 
water-related agreements signed between 1820 and 2007 (TFDD 2012), this area is 
actually densely regulated. The majority of these agreements are bilateral, and, 
unsurprisingly, their density is highest in Europe and North America. For example, 
the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) is the most far-reaching piece of 
transboundary legislation (EC 2000) regulating the joint control of shared water 
resources across member states and mandating the creation of River Basin Districts 
(RBD) along the geographic river basin across borders. As a result, international RBD 
have been set up for monitoring, planning and the implementation of policies that 
control pollution (quality) and water levels (quantity).  
Perhaps surprisingly, international environmental cooperation has witnessed some 
of the earliest and most effective supranational institution building. For example, 
the Rhine River Treaty of 1804 constitutes one of the first examples of effective 
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supranational cooperation, which mitigated the anarchic dynamics in the 
international system. By the end of the 18th century, commerce along the Rhine had 
become cumbersome. Each city state along the river imposed its own tax system 
and often forced cargo to be transferred onto its own boats. These policies 
inhibited trade and rendered maintenance work and monitoring along the river 
impossible. Spearheaded by France, the hegemonic power of the time, the Rhine 
River Treaty established regulations and harmonised commerce between riparians. 
France and the Holy Roman Empire created an international administrative body in 
Mainz, which oversaw the river’s maintenance taxation and acted as tribunal in case 
of conflicts and disagreements (ZKR 2011). It effectively established a single transit 
tax regime, and eliminated cargo-transfers at each city port. In 1815, that body was 
transformed into the Zentralkommission fuer die Rheinschiffahrt/Commission 
Centrale pour la Navigation du Rhin, to which France and Germany conferred 
sovereign rights and which was headed by an independent official 115 . The 
commission drafted future regulations on the Rhine, independent from their 
principals Germany and France (Spaulding 2000 ).  
In contrast, Asia is one of the least regulated geographies in this respect. In the 
absence of regional agreements, river basins and transboundary rivers fall under 
the wider framework of international conventions and water law, which has made 
significant strides in recent years. A number of international agreements regulate 
transboundary rivers, including the 1992 UN Convention on the Protection and Use 
of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (UNECE 1992), which 
contains a chapter on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context (TEIA), as well as the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997 Convention) (UN 1997). 
These agreements primarily regulate the planning and execution of projects that 
affect transboundary rivers.  Unsurprisingly, Kazakhstan became party to both 
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 Modern Europe’s first supranational official who pledged allegiance to the commission instead of 
his country of origin. Similarly to the EU today, he was not paid by states but rather by the 
commission itself through funds that it generated along the Rhine (Spalding, 2000).  
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conventions in January 2001, likely driven by the necessity of its unfavourable 
geographic position. As a downstream riparian to most of its transboundary rivers, 
Kazakhstan is vulnerable to projects conducted upstream.  
To maintain absolute sovereignty over water resources, China has pursued the 
opposite strategy. Beijing was one of only three countries to vote against the 1997 
UN Convention. Gao Feng116, China’s representative to the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) at the time, argued that the convention infringed on a state’s indisputable 
sovereignty over watercourses that flow through its territory (UN 1997). Westad 
argues that China’s reiteration of the sovereignty principle in international affairs 
has historic roots in China’s concept of justice (Westad 2012). This thesis will show 
that this principle is especially pronounced in China’s foreign policy approach to 
Kazakhstan. In relation to transboundary waters, the sovereignty argument was first 
developed by Attorney General Judson Harmon in 1895 in response to Mexican 
claims at the Rio Grande.117 However, the US quickly retracted its own principle and 
went on to sign several treaties with Canada and Mexico in 1909 and 1906, which 
reflected today’s commonly accepted principle of “equitable utilization” (McIntyre 
2011b:61). The fact that Beijing reverts to the sovereign principle today indicates 
that China’s approach to transboundary water rights is increasingly at odds with 
international developments. In essence, the 1997 Convention acknowledges that 
sovereignty cannot be absolute where shared water resources are concerned and 
that downstream riparians have a right to be protected from random and unilateral 
actions of their upstream riparians. This basic principle is shared by the 
overwhelming majority of states who voted in its favour. In recognition of the 
widespread norm, a recent International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling in 2010118 has 
incorporated some of these principles into customary international law (Chapter 7), 
moving China’s stance even further out of touch with common international 
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 Acting Director-General of the Treaty and Law Department, MOFA. 
117
 He argued that restrictions on the use of the river denies the US the right to exercise full 
sovereignty over its natural territory and imposes restrictors on something that nature had endowed 
to the country (McIntyre 2011b:61). 
118
 ICJ Ruling in Uruguay vs. Argentina 2010 
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practice and the realities of international regimes. The next segment analyses how 
China’s water and development situation has caused it to adopt this foreign policy 
stance in the dispute (Trolldalen, 1992).  
6.3 China 
Water Supply as National and Foreign Policy Objective 
China’s foreign policy objectives and its ‘absolute sovereignty’ stance are first and 
foremost rooted in the fact that large parts of China suffer from a dry climate. The 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) systematically assesses the water 
situation of countries (Figure 43).  For example, Canada’s water supply of more than 
684,000 meters3 per person and year exceeds its water demand, whereas the Saudi 
Arabic peninsula suffers from acute water scarcity which occurs when  
“the amount of water withdrawn from lakes, rivers or groundwater is so 
great that water supplies are no longer adequate to satisfy all human or 
ecosystem requirements, resulting in increased competition between 
water users and other demands “(UNEP).   
Along this spectrum, China’s water supply is under stress, with less than 2,500 
meters3 per person and year (UNEP 2008). However, China is in the advantageous 
position that most sources of freshwater originate within its borders, so that its 
dependency ratio is zero, whereas it is 50% in Kazakhstan (UNEP)119.  
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 50% of Kazakhstan’s sources of freshwater originate outside its borders (UNEP 2008). 
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Figure 43 Global Water Supply in 2008 
 
Source: UNEP (2008).  
Not surprisingly, the key drivers for China’s water demand include rapid 
industrialisation and urbanisation, high electricity and power demand and a policy 
goal of agricultural self-sufficiency, in conjunction with water mismanagement. 
Together, these drivers lead to an acute shortage in fresh water, especially in 
China’s North West, which is set to increase further in the coming years. The Water 
Resources Group predicts that if the status quo is maintained, China will suffer from 
a demand-supply gap of 30% by 2030 ( Figure 44).  
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Figure 44  Water demand and supply gap 
 
Source: 2030 Water Resources Group, Addams et al. 2009 
Approximately 30% of China’s surface area is susceptible to drought conditions 
(Figure 44). Even before the country embarked on a period of rapid economic 
growth, China was regularly affected by droughts (Wu, Lu et al. 2011). Over its 
2,000 year history, China has recorded over 1,000 droughts of varying intensity, 
making them a bi-annual occurrence (ibid.). The challenges of China’s geography 
are magnified by human intervention including industrialisation, massive power 
projects such as the Three Gorges Dam and general water mismanagement. Thus, 
droughts have become more severe in the recent past with experts estimating that 
an additional 13 million tonnes of grain (sufficient to feed 85 million people) will be 
lost each year.  Signs of deterioration are already appearing: as of January 2012, the 
Poyang, China’s biggest freshwater lake, had shrunk to roughly 5% of its original size 
(Thibault 2012, Verkhoturov 2009). Just as recently as 2011, Hunei province and 
some Northern Provinces experienced their worst drought in decades. In 2012, 
another draught hit the Yellow River and Huai River regions, disrupting agriculture 
and leaving at least 4 million people with insufficient drinking water (XinhuaNet 
233 
 
2012). Greater problems may lie ahead, especially in northern China, where glacier 
melts that currently feed up to 40% of China’s northern rivers will decrease in the 
long term due to warmer climate conditions. A dry climate and rapid 
industrialisation exacerbated by manmade water shortages, as shown in the 
following section, together inform China’s foreign policy stance. 
Water Policy in China 
The water situation in China is exacerbated by institutional weaknesses, inadequate 
environmental protection mechanisms and conflicting policy priorities, similar to 
Kazakhstan. Beijing is aware of the environmental costs of its extensive 
industrialisation and urbanisation and is committed, on the surface, to promoting 
‘Green Growth’. However, when environmental concerns conflict with economic 
growth, China prioritises economic growth. 
Institutional weakness in environmental protection leads to a further neglect of 
environmental issues. The State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA), which 
was granted ministerial status in 1998, and incorporated into the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP), is in charge of monitoring water, together with 
the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR). In the past, water-related issues fell under 
the auspices of other ministries, including the ministries of finance, agriculture and 
construction. In 1998, the State Council established the National Coordination 
Committee on Climate Change (NCCCC), an inter-agency committee that brings 
representatives from these ministries under one umbrella. In 2007, the NCCCC 
received an institutional upgrade and became the National Leading Committee on 
Climate Change (NLCCC), chaired by Wen Jiabao (Figure 45). 
However, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is in charge of 
the committee, whose priority is economic growth. As a result of the NDRC’s status 
and political power, the commercially-oriented commission naturally dominates 
SEPA and, by extension, economic policy trumps environmental and water policy. 
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SEPA is understaffed and must rely on local authorities for implementation, leading 
to misaligned incentives and fragmentation (Chen 2009). Local SEPA offices rely on 
funding from the local government, which are incentivised to prioritise growth over 
environmental concerns, since growth is the source of government income and a 
key benchmark for career progression within the CPC (Economy 2007). This may 
explain why, despite stricter regulation and environmental targets, the number of 
companies that discharge waste water illegally into rivers and lakes continues to 
increase, going from 2,500 in 2006 to 60,000 in 2011 (Meng 2012). Arguably, 
replacement costs for water and pollution fines remain too low, making it more 
economical to pay fines in the short-term than to modernise. Industry and 
agriculture are not the only culprits. It is estimated that 20% of the country’s water 
consumption can be attributed to leaky pipes alone. This mismanagement occurs in 
a context where 600 cities in China have insufficient access to water, while over 100 
cities experience severe shortages (Economy 2007). However, pollution poses the 
most significant problem. In 2006, 60% of drinking water was not safe and around 
30% of water was so polluted that it could not be used for industrial purposes, 
threatening the health of around 80m people (Qiu and Li 2009 ) 
Figure 45 National Leading Committee on Climate Change 
 
Mismanagement also extends into water monitoring and research. Accurate data 
on water usage is missing, with experts agreeing that numbers are indicative at best 
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(Chen 2012). Similarly to Kazakhstan, China’s river and data collecting practices are 
highly fragmented and prone to manipulation and bureaucratic turf battles. This 
also affects the Sino-Kazakhstani dispute. The problems in data reporting are well 
documented and result from misaligned incentives on the local level, combined 
with a lack of checks and balances customary to the Chinese political system. For 
example, pollution is known to be under-reported as some local offices supplement 
their income by taking pollution fines. The infractions leading to these side-
payments are then not disclosed to the central government, leading to chronic 
under-reporting (Gang Cheng 2009: 25).  Moreover, data on these rivers, which has 
to be communicated internationally, has to be channelled from the local to the 
regional, provincial and national level where it becomes subject to negotiations 
between administrative departments. These obstacles to data collection also mean 
that it is unclear how much water China abstracts from transboundary rivers. In 
fact, this research has shown that signs of scientific activity on transboundary rivers 
were only detectable in 2011(5izixun.com 2011, XAES 2011) . 
Despite the water mismanagement at the local level, Beijing is aware of the 
potential security implications resulting from water stress. China’s poor, rural 
households spend 50% of their income on food, making them particularly 
vulnerable to droughts that push food prices upward, accelerated by an underlying 
high inflation rate. This can cause social instability and may even intensify 
underlying ethnic tensions over land and access to water, especially in regions such 
as China’s North West.  These tensions may be relevant in Xinjiang, where a huge 
influx of Han Chinese benefits disproportionately from economic growth and 
marginalises the indigenous Uyghur population. In any case, drier weather would 
impede the successful socio-economic development of China’s western regions and 
undermine Beijing’s ‘Go West’ programme. As freshwater resources seize to sustain 
economic growth in agriculture, mining and oil exploration, closing the gap between 
China’s wealthy coastal regions and its poorer west becomes more difficult. The 
potential security implications become salient when tracking the number of 
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spontaneous mass incidents (SMI) triggered by environmental concerns, from 
general pollution to access to safe drinking water. Such SMIs have increased in the 
recent past and have even become the subject of a special hearing of the US China 
Economic and Security Review Commission in 2011 (Economy 2011). Observers 
estimate the number of such incidents with environmental causes at around 90,000 
(Genasci 2012). Historical parallels can be drawn with China’s man-made and 
natural famines sparking revolutions. Access to water has often been at the 
forefront of rebellions against Emperors (Turner 2009) and remains a factor of 
conflict between villages, especially in China’s arid north.  This also affects the 
government’s budget. Beijing is forced to import the harvest shortfall at a relatively 
high cost, given that the Yuan is pegged against the US dollar and considered 
undervalued. Beijing’s purchasing power is thus constrained whilst draughts push 
up grain prices not only locally but also globally. 
6.3.1 National and Foreign Policy Priority 
Beijing is aware that water and resulting food shortages constitute non-traditional 
security threats, which can precipitate social instability. The leadership has 
discussed water supply in a number of high-level policy documents, turning it into a 
national security priority. For example, China’s strategy for the country’s food 
security (2008-2020) identifies water shortages as a key challenge (Xinhua 2008) . 
Food security has always played a key role in China’s economic development and 
the CPC Central Committee considers it crucial to national self-reliance, preventing 
conflict and building a harmonious society (China 2008). In 2009, the standing 
committee of the State Council acknowledged that climate change exacerbates 
water shortages. Chapter 3 of China’s 12th Five Year Plan focuses on tackling these 
shortages, by setting targets to reduce industrial water consumption by 30% (EU-
China 2011).  Beijing’s concerns over domestic water stability inform an 
international policy that prioritises maximum control of its water supply. China’s 
foreign policy aims to ensure unconstrained use of and access to its transboundary 
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rivers and is firmly rooted in China’s sovereignty concept. China’s Water Law from 
1988 further emphasises China’s absolute water sovereignty. In Chapter VII, Articles 
51 120  and 52 121  stipulate that it is Beijing’s prerogative to decide whether 
international treaties are applicable to its transboundary rivers. Moreover, it is up 
to the State Council or Provincial People’s Congresses to formulate rules for the 
implementation of such international treaties (Lehman 2012). The resulting foreign 
policies on transboundary waters directly conflict with China’s neighbours, including 
Kazakhstan, the security implications of which are recognised by Chinese academics 
(Li 2011).   
6.4 Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan is landlocked and its topographic location naturally predisposes it to 
water shortages and droughts. About 80% of Kazakhstan’s topography consists of 
deserts and steppes, the result of a strong continental climate with limited 
precipitation (Aquastat 2011). While Kazakhstan’s geography certainly presents 
water challenges, the natural situation is not as severe as in China. The UNEP 
classifies Kazakhstan as water stressed, a lot less severe than China, which is water 
scarce. 
However, the impact of Kazakhstan’s natural geography is sharply exacerbated by 
poor past and present water management practices, which lead to an overall water 
situation that is arguably more problematic than the stressed classification suggests. 
This section elaborates on the government’s lacklustre attitude to tackling the issue 
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 Article 51: Where any international treaty or agreement relating to international or border rivers 
or lakes, concluded or acceded to by the People's Republic of China, contains provisions differing 
from those in the laws of the People's Republic of China, the provisions of the international treaty or 
agreement shall prevail, except those provisions on which the People's Republic of China has 
declared reservations (Lehman 2012).  
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 Article 52: The State Council may, in accordance with this Law, formulate rules for its 
implementation. The standing committees of the people's congresses of provinces, autonomous 
regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government may, in accordance with this Law, 
formulate measures for its implementation (ibid). 
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by building proper legislative, monitoring and implementation capabilities. The 
historic burden of an aged Soviet water infrastructure is exacerbated by slow policy 
reform, a fragmented bureaucracy a lack of investment and poor human resource 
capacities (Interview Russell Frost). Similarly to China, Kazakhstan’s foreign policy 
needs to be understood with regard to this domestic context. 
Manmade Water Shortages 
Kazakhstan has inherited a number of manmade ecological disasters. Under 
Moscow’s rule, it was a key testing site for radioactive and chemical weapons, as 
epitomised by Semipalatinsk, an area that is radioactively contaminated. 
Additionally, Moscow attempted to turn Kazakhstan into its food and resource 
‘appendage’ with mega agricultural projects such as the Virgin Lands Campaign122, 
which converted 350,000 km2 of steppe into farm land (Seguillon et al 2010:38). The 
resulting over-irrigation has left today’s Kazakhstan with high saline levels in rivers 
and seas. Some of the better known Soviet environmental disasters abroad that 
Kazakhstan inherited include the Aral Sea and Lake Balkash. The Aral Sea, which 
straddles Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, has shrunk by 90%. As a result of Soviet 
economic policies, the newly independent Kazakhstan inherited high pollution 
levels (OECD Report) in its ground water together with a centralised but dated 
irrigation system in urgent need of overhaul (Interview Russell Frost).  
The state of Kazakhstan’s hydrological infrastructure makes it difficult to collect 
reliable data on its water situation. In 2012 only 20 stations took measurements in 
the entire Ili-Balkhash basin, an area of about 500,000 km2, and were sub-optimally 
distributed (TACIS, 2010). To complicate matters further, information on 
Kazakhstan’s surface water flows collected prior to independence is stored in a 
centralised Soviet database, which is not digitised and hence is cumbersome to 
access. However, the current situation cannot be blamed on the Soviet legacy 
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 Khrushchev’s campaign to turn the steppe into farmland for large scale grain production to 
alleviate the food shortages in the USSR. At its peak in 1960 Kazakhstan turned 17,000 km2 of steppe 
into farm land. 
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alone.  Kazakhstan had an uninterrupted record of data from the Irtysh River from 
the 1950s to 1995, when data monitoring began to deteriorate. Monitoring broken 
down completely in 2000, just as Xinjiang’s accelerated development lead to 
increased water abstractions along transboundary rivers. Given the fact that the 
lack of data comes at a high opportunity cost, it is curious that Astana has not 
placed more resources and emphasis on upgrading its hydrometric network. 
Currently, Astana cannot produce data in negotiations with Beijing that quantify 
China’s water abstraction and cannot prove that shallower water levels are the 
result of Chinese intake, rather than normal cyclical variation. International experts 
note that the poor state of Kazakhstan’s water infrastructure is the result of 
underinvestment and neglect by the government (Interview Tim Hannan). The 
government has been slow to undertake the necessary policy reforms that provide 
incentives for more efficient water use and to make the investments to overhaul 
the infrastructure and equipment that allows for adequate data monitoring. 
Kazhydromet operates Kazakhstan’s hydrological stations and is in charge of 
measuring water quantities. Under its auspices, the number of working hydrological 
stations has dropped by more than half, from 506 in Soviet times, to 206 in 2004 
(Berik Baymagambetov Kazakhstan, UNEP, 2005).123 Although the situation had 
improved slightly by 2012, when 291 hydrological sites regularly took samples 
(Kazhydromet 2012), many stations still do not produce reliable data because of 
insufficient, dated and undependable equipment. Moreover, technical station staff 
often lacks the necessary training, leading to transmissions of inaccurate data and 
inadequate accounting of real water usage (UNESCO Course 2011). Experts suggest 
that it would cost KZT 200million (US $ 1.4m) to update and rehabilitate the entire 
system (EU TACIS 2010). Given this sum is a miniscule fraction of Kazakhstan’s GDP, 
the lack of action must be attributed to a lack of political will rather than of financial 
options (Tim Hannan). This lack of political will is a recurring theme in the 
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 This number was presented by Berik Baymagabentov, Kazhydromet at an international workshop 
in 2004. As of 2012 Kazhydromet claims on its website that there are 291 hydrological sites from 
which it takes samples. This could not be verified. Even if true, it indicates slow progress in repairing 
hydrological stations (WMO 2005). 
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negotiation process and undermines Kazakhstan’s credibility in Chinese eyes, 
negatively affecting the bilateral negotiation process (Chapter 6, 7.3.4) 
Dysfunctional equipment is also a key problem in the agricultural sector, where an 
inability to measure irrigation flows leads to waste water (TACIS 2010). In general, 
the country has failed to implement a cost structure on fresh water use that drives 
more efficient consumption, especially in the industrial sector (Russell Frost). This 
pervasive water mismanagement means Kazakhstan suffers from widespread water 
pollution, affecting both ground and surface water. In addition to inheriting 
pollution from Soviet times, present-day heavy mineral resource extraction, an 
under-regulated petro-chemical and manufacturing sector, heavy irrigation and 
fertilisation of agricultural land and inadequate waste water treatment facilities add 
to the problem. In 2005, only 60% of the country had reliable access to safe water 
and sanitation (UNDP Kazakhstan).  Only Astana, Almaty and Atyrau have proper 
municipal waste water treatment facilities, whereas sewage is untreated in the rest 
of Kazakhstan, accounting for 70% of the population. Ironically, Kazakhstan’s waste 
water facilities functioned significantly better during Soviet times and have only 
begun to deteriorate since independence (Interview Tim Hannan). 
As in China, further challenges may lie ahead, with rapid demographic growth 
predicted to increase water demand. With a birth rate of 22.4 per 1,000 women, 
Kazakhstan is growing relatively fast, especially in urban areas. Moreover, 25% of 
Kazakhstan’s GDP is directly derived from resources and is thus extremely water 
consumptive, further increasing demand.  As a result, Kazakhstani experts and 
academics widely recognise that access to water constitutes a key component in 
the country’s environmental security and to Kazakhstan’s long-term socioeconomic 
development (Nysanbek 2005). Worries about excessive pollution are exemplified 
in a recent report by the Asia Pacific Water Forum (APWF), which noted that 
Kazakhstan is not only off-track but regressing in meeting its water-related 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and Index of Drinking Water Adequacy 
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(IDWA) targets (ADB 2007). In fact, Kazakhstan was the only of 12 Asian countries 
off-track in all categories, which span from urban and rural water to sanitation (ADB 
2007). This and other studies demonstrate the water situation is primarily caused 
by bad management practices which have not shown any sign of improvement. This 
lack of advancement is likely reflective of a lack of political will rather than a lack of 
economic means. 
6.4.1 Water Security: Rhetoric and Domestic Regulatory Framework  
While Kazakhstan’s water situation is by no means secure, local politicians tend to 
exaggerate the situation and focus on external factors rather than internal 
mismanagement. On his official website, former PM Massimov claims that 
Kazakhstan suffers from water scarcity (Arystanov 2012). Anatoliy Ryabtsev, head of 
the Committee on Water Resources (CWR) at the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) also 
speaks of “severe water scarcity” both in terms of drinking water and economic 
development. The usage of these technical terms suggests the water situation in 
Kazakhstan is level with that of Saudi Arabia (Ryabtsev 2011).  However, in contrast 
to government language, IOs such as UNEP and the Stockholm International Water 
Institute (Granit, Jägerskog et al. 2010) do not consider Kazakhstan water scarce, 
although UNEP classifies Kazakhstan’s overall water situation as vulnerable. The 
elite may be attempting to enlist domestic and international support for 
Kazakhstan’s water cause with such dramatic rhetoric. A recent OECD report by 
Struan Stevenson, Member of the European Parliament (MEP), adopts the elite’s 
official language, showing some signs of success of this strategy. This may also 
explain why the Kazakhstani government publishes its water numbers per m2 and 
not per capita. As the world’s ninth biggest country, this necessarily produces a 
more dramatic result that implies acute water shortages. In contrast, research 
published by UNDP calculates freshwater availability per person, producing a more 
realistic picture of the implications for the local population. 
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More recently, in 2012, Nurlan Kapparov, the Minister for Environmental 
Protection, told the Kazakhstani parliament that the country already faced a fresh 
water deficit of more than 20% (OOSKAnews 2012). Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
politicians have compensated for inadequate domestic practices by turning to easily 
accessible fresh water sources such as rivers and lakes, thus taking a distinctive 
short-term view of the problem. This also explains why UNEP considers Kazakhstan 
a country that practises excessive water use (Rekacewicz 2002) and whose water 
indicators  show highly overexploited river basins (Rekacewicz 2002, UNEP 2008) 
(Figure 46). Consequently, the Kazakhstani government has shifted its focus to 
ensuring the unimpeded flow of fresh water along its transboundary rivers.  
Figure 46 Exploitation of River Basins 
 
Source: UNDP, Rekacewicz. Modified by author. 
The Kazakhstani government has supplemented its rhetoric with new regulation, to 
halt the steady deterioration of water management capabilities. In 2003, 
Kazakhstan issued a New Water Code, which establishes qualitative and 
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quantitative targets and, more importantly, delineates clear administrative 
competencies, rights and responsibilities for water management on the national 
and local level. However, rather than streamlining responsibilities, the 
implementation of the New Water Code has, in practice, split them, leading to a 
slow and cumbersome implementation of water policies. Today, overall 
management and oversight of water resources falls within the Ministry of 
Agriculture (MoA). The New Water Code further partitions responsibility for 
regulatory policy to the Water Resource Committee (WRC) under the MoA and for 
monitoring to the Ministry of Environment and Protection (MinEP). The MoA is 
responsible, among other things, for ensuring sufficient irrigation for farming, 
arguably making water efficiency a conflicting priority. As the WRC reports to the 
MoA, the power balance clearly falls in the water-consumptive MoA’s favour. Other 
Central Asian states, including China, have established water ministries on equal 
footing, so that they can hold other ministries responsible on compliance. 
Besides conflicts of interests, the division of responsibilities undermines effective 
water management. While the WRC is in charge of the maintenance of water 
infrastructure and the allocation of water resources to different users, the Tax 
Committee within the Ministry of Finance charges fees for usage, and the MinEP 
oversees the quality of water discharges. Further fragmentation occurs as the 
MinEP itself works as a dispersed administration, with branch offices in oblasts and 
cities.   The bureaucratic fragmentation also extends to the management of river 
basins, causing administrative tension, competition and turf battles (UNESCO 2011). 
With the help of UNDP and the WB, nine river basin levels were established in 2004 
to enable their comprehensive management. In practice, the River Basin Councils 
(RBCs) work with varying degrees of effectiveness and interviewees assume that 
only one third of RBCs actually work (Interview Tim Hannan). Another factor which 
hampers data monitoring may be that RBCs only have advisory status, despite 
having the best understanding of the situation due to direct stakeholder 
participation and proximity to the river basin. RBCs lack an organisational structure 
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and operate without a secretariat. Meetings are organised by word of mouth, which 
is why in practice they only take place with the support of IOs (Interview Russel 
Frost). With little travel required, these meetings are not costly to organise. The fact 
that the government does not provide more support reveals a lack of political will, 
an issue discussed in depth in the analysis in the next chapter. Similarly, little 
progress has been made on the implementation of pollution targets. The majority 
of Kazakhstan’s waste water continues to go untreated as non-compliance is 
possible by bribing the local officials (Tim Hannan) in charge of oversight.  
6.5 The Sino-Kazakh Transboundary Water Nexus 
With a dependency ratio of 50%124 half of Kazakhstan’s water supply originates 
outside the country, and in particular, in China. China and Kazakhstan share a water 
nexus of 23 cross-boundary rivers, which originate in China’s Tianshan and Altay 
Mountains. Given Kazakhstan’s disproportional reliance and overexploitation of 
water resources, these transboundary rivers have become extremely important, 
politically and socio-economically (UNEP 2008). As the red circle in Figure 42 
illustrates, large parts of Eastern and Northern Kazakhstan depend on the Sino-
Kazakh water nexus to meet both human and industrial demand. These areas 
encompass more than 25% of Kazakhstan’s population, including Almaty, East 
Kazakhstan, Pavlodar and Astana City (see Figure 42) and more than 35% of GDP 
(see Figure 47). 
                                                     
124
Kazakhstan has a total of 100.5 km3/year of freshwater at its disposal, of which only slightly more 
than half (56.5km/year) are derived from Kazakhstani territory.  
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Figure 47 Regional GDP 2011 
 
In view of Kazakhstan’s susceptible position, it is unsurprising that water policy is 
reflected in Astana’s objectives. While the New Water Code of 2003 and the Law on 
Environmental Protection focuses on domestic water management, Kazakhstan’s 
foreign policy approach towards water management are better laid out in the 
‘Development Strategy 2030’ and the ‘Kazakhstan 2050’ strategy (Nazarbayev 2012) 
as well as the ‘National Plan for Integrated Water Resource Management and 
Water Efficiency 2009/2015’,  which turns water availability and joint management 
of transboundary rivers into long-term government priorities (Massimov 2009). In 
1999, the government amended its 30-year action plan to include “the attainment 
of acceptable agreements on transboundary watercourses” as a national security 
priority until 2002.  In March 2012, in his first meeting of the year with his Security 
Council President, Nazarbayev placed water security at the top of the agenda  
(tengrinews 2012b).  In his address to parliament in the same month, Nazarbayev 
identified water security, especially water allocation of transboundary rivers with 
China and Russia as a burning issue for Kazakhstan because of “a fearful deficit of 
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drinking water” (OOSKAnews 2012). According to the Kazakhstani Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA), the management of the transboundary water issue with 
China is an explicit foreign policy priority because of the implications it has for 
Kazakhstan’s economic and environmental security (MFA 2012a, MFA 2012b). The 
Kazakhstani military also recognises that the distribution of transboundary water 
will increase the potential for conflict in the future (McDermott 2011).   
The perceived and actual water scarcity in both China and Kazakhstan feeds a  
mutually competitive approach to maximise access to transboundary water 
resources (Mirumachi 2007:14,(Mirumachi and Allan 2007). This is a zero-sum 
competition, with Beijing determined to maximise control and use of all water 
sources that originate on its territory, whilst Kazakhstan aims to restrict China’s 
water usage to maximise its own access. In other words, every cubic meter gained 
by China is a cubic meter lost by Kazakhstan. For Kazakhstani foreign policy makers, 
this puts a water-sharing agreement with China at the forefront of their foreign 
policy objectives. China’s rapidly increasing freshwater needs, on the other hand, 
lead to bigger water abstractions from its transboundary rivers, leading to a net loss 
of water for Kazakhstan. This has set the stage for a dispute between both countries 
over finding an agreement to set limits on China’s water diversion. The dispute has 
been underway for nearly 20 years and centres, among others, around a 
considerable irrigation project in Xinjiang, called Project 635.  
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6.6 China’s Water Diversion 
Figure 48 Project 635 in Xinjiang 
 
Project 635 and China’s Go West Strategy  
The transboundary water dispute between China and Kazakhstan dates to the 
1970s, when Kazakhstan, then still part of the Soviet Union, complained about 
China’s increased water intake along the Ili (伊犁河) and Irtysh (额尔齐斯河). 
However, the issue never received priority under the Soviet leadership in Moscow, 
most likely because the Kazakh Soviet Republic did not feature high on the agenda. 
Today, a large-scale Chinese canal network project, known as Project 635, lies at the 
heart of the Sino-Kazakhstani water dispute. Project 635, technically also known as 
the Long Distance Inter-Basin Transfer Project, begins in the Altay region 56km east 
of Fuhai County, at the Irtysh’s mid-stream. It then crosses through the Mongolian 
Autonomous County all the way to Karamay City to provide drinking water and 
irrigation to support agriculture and industrialisation, especially Karamay’s oil and 
gas fields (Baidu 2012, Wen 2012). The decision to build this canal is an integral 
component of Beijing’s Go West strategy, aimed at boosting the economic 
development of its western provinces. Although the strategy was firmly 
incorporated in China’s Tenth Five Year Plan (2001-2005), the government had 
already begun to discuss initiatives to develop its western provinces in the early 
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1990 (CDG 2010)125. Against this backdrop, the project was proposed to the State 
Development Planning Commission in September 1996 and then quickly approved 
by MWR in October 1996.  
The Kazakhstani government has been accused of moving into action too slowly, 
but the exact point at which policy makers became aware of Chinese plans to build 
a canal is unclear. Some analysts, including Kazakhstan’s first Ambassador to China, 
Murat Auezov126, claim that the government had knowledge of construction plans 
already in the early 1990s, during the planning phase of the project. Others claim 
that Astana only knew of the plans in 1998 (Sievers 2002: 2), when Beijing began 
with the actual construction. Given that Kazakhstan submitted a draft agreement to 
Beijing in 1992, it is likely that Kazakhstan had early knowledge of the project 
already. In China, references to the project can be found as early as 1992, in an 
article that analyses the tendering process of the project127. However, Beijing 
formally notified Kazakhstan of its plans for the Xinjiang diversion project only in 
1998, two years after the MWR  approved the project. The original 1996 plan 
foresaw a total length of the main canal of 324km at a width of 22m, with a power 
generation capacity of 32,000 kilowatts. However, more recent reports suggest the 
canal will span a network of 890km, including five reservoirs and three power 
plants, with China maintaining flexibility to expand the canal network according to 
need (Liu 2007). Once in use, the canal will divert at least 840 million m3 to 
transform 70,000-140,000 hectares (700-1,400km2) of desert into arable land, 
primarily for cotton production and the development of oil fields. The plan also 
                                                     
125
 The CCP already recognised the development needs of China's western provinces in the late 
1990s, when Jiang Zemin toured the western regions. The notion to develop China’s west appeared 
in the Chinese media around 1999 (Onishi 2001). 
126
 Murat Auezov was Kazakhstan’s first Ambassador to China between 1992 and 1995. After his 
return to Kazakhstan he co-organised an opposition movement called ‘Azamat’ in response to the 
1995 new constitution and the suspension of parliament. All cofounders where dismissed and 
Auezov had not been offered another diplomatic post (Cummings 2005). Auezov went on to head 
the George Soros Institute in Kazakhstan before setting up the Mukhtar Auezov Foundation to 
commemorate his fathers, who used to be a famous Kazakhstani writer. 
127
 References to the project can be found in academic publications as early as 1992 (Zhen 1992).  
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foresees a 5-10% diversion of the Irtysh River into Lake Ulungur. Lake Ulungur itself 
exemplifies the pressures exerted by Xinjiang’s development on the fresh water 
supply. Over the last three decades, Lake Ulungur shrunk by nearly 60 km2 (World 
Lakes, 2012). Concurrently, a second project is under construction, linking the Irtysh 
with Urumqi to provide more water for the Tarim Basin. The Ili River has also seen 
increased construction of reservoirs and hydropower stations in the last years to 
win more arable land in Xinjiang. There are as many as thirteen reservoirs and more 
than 30 hydro-power stations under construction along the Ili. These developments 
have triggered ever greater water run-offs also along transboundary rivers, which 
the net water loss felt in Kazakhstan.  
Implications for Kazakhstan 
The Irtysh and Ili are by far the two biggest rivers and as such any changes along 
these rivers have a great impact on Kazakhstan’s water supply and ecology. The 
Irtysh originates in the Altay Mountains in Xinjiang’s north east, where it is known 
as the Black-Irtysh. From there, it feeds Lake Zaysan, one of Kazakhstan’s biggest 
lakes, and crosses through Kazakhstan’s Eastern Province and Pavlodar before it 
merges with the river Ob, whose main tributary is in Russian Siberia. This makes 
Russia the second downstream co-riparian and hence a potential stakeholder in any 
pollution or water diversion of its upstream riparian. The Ili originates in the 
Tianshan mountains further west, where it is formed by the tributaries Tekes and 
Kunges. In Kazakhstan, the Ili constitutes the main tributary of Lake Balkhash, where 
the river creates a huge, fertile Delta also known as the ‘Seven Rivers’ (Figure 49). 
250 
 
Figure 49 Irtysh and Ili 
 
Canal projects and generally greater water intakes from the Ili lead to a net loss of 
water for Kazakhstan, exacerbating the already vulnerable situation for the 7.4m 
Kazakhstanis, or 43% of population, who rely on these rivers and lakes as a key 
source of fresh water and who generate >40% GDP. Precise numbers on Chinese 
water abstraction are impossible to ascertain because of Kazakhstan’s weak 
institutional capabilities (see Data Exchange). As a result, this segment must rely on 
expert estimates. The Ili is the main tributary to Lake Balkhash, which, with a size of 
16,000 km2 and a volume of 106 km3, is one of the biggest lakes in the world and 
the key source of fresh water for the 3.4 million people of Almaty Province. The lake 
has already come under stress with the Soviet construction of the 140km long 
Kapchagay Reservoir in the 1970s (Lakenet). After independence, Kazakhstan 
continued to fill the Reservoir, further adding stress to Lake Balkhash. As of now, 
the reservoir is half full (15km3) and, once reaching full capacity, will reach a total 
volume of around 30 km3  Recent and greater Chinese extractions along the Ili have 
put Lake Balkhash’s water levels under further strain. Analysts estimate that 
Xinjiang’s annual water abstraction from the Ili has reached between 3.5 km3-5 km3 
in 2009 and 2010 (EuropeanDialogueXXI 2011) and expect this to increase to 7km3 
in the next few years, which translates into an increase of between 43% and 100% 
Source: www.larussophobe.files.wordpress.com/2009/11/wfm_sts_overview.png, modified by author  
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(Malkovsky128 quoted in Carino 2008). In June 2012, officials in Kazakhstan noticed 
an increase in Chinese construction activity with an estimated 13 new reservoirs 
and up to 39 hydropower stations under construction along the Ili and its tributaries 
(Wang 2012). While the hydropower stations will only affect the timing of water 
flows, the reservoirs will lead to a net loss of water. Conversely, the shallower 
waters have also significantly increased the Lake’s overall salinity, because the 
concentration of pollutants is increasing.  China itself also contributes to these 
pollution levels by feeding untreated waste water into the river at levels which 
appear to be beyond China’s control.  In view of these developments, Kazakhstani 
experts and the media have sounded alarm bells. At the end of 2010, Kuanysh 
Isbekov, Director of the Committee of Fisheries and Research at the Ministry of 
Agriculture, warned that China’s water intake along the Ili will see Lake Balkhash 
follow the same fate as the Aral Lake and disappear in the future  (Sorokoumova 
2010), a comparison that resurfaces regularly in Kazakhstan.129 The shallower 
waters have also significantly increased the lake’s overall salinity  (ILEC 2012) as the 
concentration of pollutants increases. China itself contributes to these pollution 
levels by feeding untreated waste water into the river at levels which appear to be 
beyond China’s control, due to the institutional weaknesses discussed above.130 The 
Irtysh feeds into Lake Zayasan, which is East Kazakhstan’s biggest fresh water lake 
with a surface area of 2,000 km2.131 From there, the river flows through the 
provinces of Eastern Kazakhstan and Pavlodar before it crosses into Russia (see 
Figure 42) (Chinamap 2012). The Irtysh provides fresh water for four of 
Kazakhstan’s biggest cities including Astana, Karaganda, Semipalatinsk and 
Pavlodar, where approximately 4m Kazakhstanis depend on the river for fresh 
water (Weinthal 2006). 
                                                     
128
 Head of Kazakhstan’s Institute of Geography. 
129
 The same dynamics that led to the demise of the Aral Sea are at work at Lake Balkhash: large 
hydropower projects disrupt the regular water flow, excessive diversion takes place to irrigate 
agricultural land, whose pesticides and fertilizers get then re-inserted into an ever smaller water 
volume, leading to rapidly increasing pollution levels and salinity. 
130
 Although this was in 2007 it is questionable whether Beijing has managed to bring the pollution 
levels under control by now because of the institutional weaknesses of SEPA (Milas 2007).  
131
 The lake is over 100km long and 20-40 km wide  
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Kazakhstan’s inadequate monitoring capabilities make it difficult to quantify 
precisely the declining water run-off associated with the canal network (see data 
discussion, below) but current estimates range from 20% to 40% (Weinthal 2006). 
The latter number was provided by Zhou Xiaopei, the former Chinese Ambassador 
to Kazakhstan, who probably intended to reassure that China would not divert the 
entire river. However, the number instead caused outrage in the media and panic 
among environmentalists and is still frequently quoted today. Others estimate that 
Chinese abstractions will reduce the overall water resources in the Irtysh Basin by 8 
km3 in 2030 and by 11.4km3 in 2050, far exceeding declines that experts consider 
dangerous. Moreover, navigation in parts to the Irtysh will become difficult or 
impossible (Mamyrayymov 2012). Experts note that even a 5-10% decrease in water 
levels, as communicated initially by Beijing, will render some hydropower projects 
along the Kazakhstani part of the river infeasible (Sievers 2002:3) while severely 
decreasing the output of the remaining ones (Mamyrayymov 2012). The Russian 
agency for water resources estimates that Kazakhstan currently takes 3.8 km3 
annually from the river. By comparison, the Chinese intake has nearly tripled from 
1.5 km3 to 5 km3 annually since Project 635 entered into use.132   Net water losses 
for Kazakhstan along both the Illi and the Irtysh are likely to significantly worsen in 
the future. Researchers at the Xinjiang Academy of Environmental Sciences (XAESb), 
which conducts all EIA assessments in Xinjiang and has been investigating both 
rivers closely since 2011, point out that the region’s ‘leapfrog’ economic and social 
development will put further strains on the Ili (XAES 2011b). With Project 635 
coming fully on-stream in the next couple of years, increasing net water losses are 
expected to exacerbate Kazakhstan’s water supply shortages and ecological 
problems (5izixun.com 2011).  
Besides the obvious socio-economic implications, China’s increased water intake 
also affects Kazakhstan’s electricity generation capacity. The country already suffers 
                                                     
132
 These are estimates made by the Federal Agency for Water Resources of the Russian Federation 
and the precise number is generally unknown (FWRA). 
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from power shortages because of an aged Soviet electricity grid (Peyrouse 2007). 
This grid is split into incompatible northern and southern parts that cannot transfer 
power between each other. As a result, the northern grid exports electricity to 
Russia while the southern grid, which is prone to particularly severe shortfalls, 
imports electricity from Kyrgyzstan (Peyrouse 2007). Overall, the electricity 
infrastructure has not kept pace with growing demand, leading to a demand and 
supply gap of 200MW in 2009 (2013). Decreasing surface water flows of the Ili and 
Irtysh affect the power output of hydropower stations and exacerbate Kazakhstan’s 
existing electricity problem. For example, the AES Ust-Kamenogorskaya GES LLP and 
the Kapchagaiskaya GES Balkhash hydropower stations along the Irtysh and Ili, 
provide 5% of Kazakhstan’s overall energy supply and are vulnerable to water 
abstractions. Experts predict that China’s water diversion will lead to an 
incremental 25% reduction of hydropower generation along the Irtysh by 2030 and 
a 40% reduction by 2050 (Mamyrayymov 2012). In summary,it can be concluded 
that despite the lack of quantitative measurement data, greater water demand and 
extraction in Xinjiang leads to a net loss of water in Kazakhstan. This magnifies 
Kazakhstan’s already significant environmental problems, from fisheries and power 
generation to water quality and agricultural irrigation.  
6.7 The Dispute Dynamics  
The next segment provides an overview of the dispute and the bilateral 
negotiations. Both China and Kazakhstan pursue a resource-maximising strategy. 
While China attempts to retain unfettered control and access to its transboundary 
rivers, Kazakhstan attempts to maximise the water flow in order to retain access to 
fresh water. The next section provides a chronological summary of the Sino-Kazakh 
negotiations and shows in the subsequent analysis that China thwarts any attempts 
of Kazakhstani policy makers to flatten the asymmetry in their bargaining power. 
The analysis draws parallels with China’s water conflicts with its other neighbours, 
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so as to identify indicators of a systematic Chinese strategy towards transboundary 
water conflicts.  
6.7.1 A Chronology of Negotiations 
First Decade: 1992-2001  
Kazakhstan and China establish formal negotiations over the transboundary rivers. 
Figure 50 illustrates the negotiation timeline. Beijing appears as an active 
negotiation partner who willingly extends cooperation on a wide range of water-
related issues. However, it employs long delays to prioritise economic issues over 
environmental ones and avoids the definite resolution that Kazakhstan seeks, an 
agreement that limits China’s water intake.  
Kazakhstan establishes diplomatic relations with China on 3 January 1992, only 
several weeks after declaring independence. The Kazakh government soon notices 
suspicious activity across the border in Xinjiang, indicating the planning stages of 
what would turn out to be the Project 635 canal. Already in February 1992, 
President Nazarbayev instructs Murat Auezov, Kazakhstan’s first Ambassador to 
China (1992-1995), to submit a draft agreement to Beijing on the mutual use of 
transboundary rivers along with a request to discuss the matter. Common 
diplomatic etiquette stipulates a written response within two months, but Beijing 
delayed a response until after 1995, when it ‘verbally’ assured Kazakhstan it was 
studying the issue133. The 1992 draft agreement was signed nine years later, in 
2001, as the Agreement on Cooperation in the Use and Protection of 
Transboundary rivers (Mamyrayymov, 2012). However, the Xinjiang Ministry for 
Water Resources had approved Project 635 years before, in October 1996.    
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 This is based on Murat Auezov’s account. Auezov returned to Kazakshtan in 1995 when a 
response of Beijing was still outstanding.  
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In 1997, CNPC acquires large stakes in AMG and the Uzen oil field and pledges to 
build an oil pipeline, a crucial step for Kazakhstan in breaking Russia’s export 
monopoly on oil. The deal is hailed the ‘contract of the century’ with an estimated 
value of US$9.5bn (Bluth 1998). In what is unlikely to be a coincidence, a year later, 
in April 1998, both sides sign a border demarcation agreement, where Kazakhstan 
concedes approximately 100-200 km2 of land (Interview Local Expert) to China 
along the Black Irtysh. Later that year, Beijing commences with the construction of 
the 300km Irtysh Karamay Canal. 
In March 1999, President Jiang Zemin receives a private letter from President 
Nazarbayev, asking China to take urgent measures to resolve the question of joint 
water usage. Jiang invites a Kazakhstani expert group to Beijing for the first round of 
official consultations, which take place in May 1999134.  Kazakhstani officials present 
a pre-drafted agreement on the use and conservation of transboundary rivers, 
which Beijing rejects.  Instead, China emphasises that it is committed to a fair and 
reasonable use of transboundary rivers, drawing on international legal language 
also anchored in the 1997 Convention and thus implying that Beijing is aware of 
changes in international environmental law. Beijing assures Kazakhstan that it will 
take its interests into full consideration when planning and executing projects along 
the Irtysh-Karamay Canal. China informs Kazakhstan for the first time about its 
construction plans and quantifies its intention to divert 450 meters3 through the 
canal in 2000 and 1 km3 by 2020. At the second meeting in Almaty in October, both 
sides agree to regularly exchange information about the Ili and Irtysh. The verbal 
agreement does not specify what data should be exchanged and is not formalised 
and signed until 2006. Several more years pass, until in 2011, early signs emerge 
that China is conducting the research necessary to comply with the agreement. 
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 Eric Sievers account is the most authoritative source on these negotiations (Sievers 2002). 
The following discussion closely follows his narrative until 2001. This author expands the narrative 
through supplementary sources where indicated. 
256 
 
In June 2000, at the third round of meetings in Beijing, China and Kazakhstan agree 
to establish a joint expert group to explore and exchange data on transboundary 
pollution. Facing increased criticism from the media, NGOs and opposition at home, 
the Kazakhstani government claims to have scored significant concessions from 
China upon its return home. These concessions include a binding agreement that 
caps China’s water diversion from the Irtysh at 1 km3 of water, prohibits Chinese 
diversions from the Ili and pledges to include Russia in future negotiations.  
In 2001, China completes the first part of the Irtysh canal. Before commencing the 
fourth round of negotiations, Astana retracts all of the alleged “concessions” from 
previous meetings, probably in recognition that this was necessary step if it wanted 
to host Beijing in Astana in March. The government concedes that no agreement 
had been reached on Russia’s participation as a negotiating partner and that no 
guarantees on water diversions from the Ili River had been given. In fact, from now 
on, Kazakhstan refers to the meetings as ‘consultations’ rather than ‘negotiations’ 
(Sievers 2002:6), underlining its powerless position. At this stage, the dispute 
becomes highly politicised, with Murat Auezov publicly accusing the Kazakhstani 
government of incompetence and collaboration with China and alleging outright 
disregard of national interests (Borisov 1999).  Arguably to save face, the 
Kazakhstani government now changes its strategy by drastically downplaying the 
seriousness of the problem. The government now claims that the canal does not 
constitute a threat to its water supply and ecology, directly contradicting its 
previous claims that water diversion of as little as 6% would have disastrous effects 
on Kazakhstan’s water supply, hydropower projects and ecology. Instead, it now 
blames NGOs and the media for wildly exaggerating the situation. Furthermore 
Astana turns the status-quo into a major foreign policy achievement: In June, 
Amanbek Ramazanov, the chair of the CWR, visits Beijing and claims that China 
agreed to significantly decrease water diversions from the Irtysh from 3-5 km3 to 1 
km3. However, China had indicated the 1 km3 cap all along. In any case, as observers 
noted, 1 km3 corresponds to 10% of the flow from China and exceeds the 6% mark 
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previously identified as disastrous by the Kazakh government (Sievers 2002:6). 
Ramanzanov continued to downplay China’s activities (Pilip'juk 2002). 
Ramanzanov’s claims are based on documents the Chinese government presented 
to him in Beijing as during this period, Beijing denied Kazakhstani officials access to 
the canal (Pilip'juk 2002).  In September, Zhu Rongji and Nazarbayev sign the 
‘Agreement on Cooperation in the Use and Protection of Transboundary rivers’ in 
Astana and set up a Joint Commission for the Use and Protection of Transboundary 
rivers (Russian.China.Org.Cn 2010), alongside the expert group in charge of the 
implementation of the agreement (Article 8) (KazakhstaniGovernment 2001). The 
Joint Commission is only staffed with one representative and two deputies from 
each side (Article 8). In the agreement, China makes no commitment to limit its 
water intake and, crucially, the agreement stipulates that Kazakhstan cannot veto 
any Chinese construction plans (Article 4) (Carino 2008). Again, it takes two years 
for the first meeting of the Joint Commission to occur. Cooperation efforts continue 
to focus on water management and pollution, rather than the more important issue 
of extraction. The lack of progress leads international observer Stuart Horsman to 
conclude that  
it is evident that China is unwilling to engage in meaningful cooperation 
or compromise [in] the pursuit of its water demands (Horsman 
2001:76).   
By the end of 2001, responsibility for the WRC is moved out of the MFA and into the 
Ministry of Agriculture, reducing the Committee’s political power. Eric Sievers 
argues that the Committee was moved to help the MFA to save face in the absence 
of progress (Sievers 2002). 
Second Decade: 2002-2012 
The dominant themes of the first decade continue into the second. China and 
Kazakhstan further institutionalise the dispute but Beijing successfully sidesteps any 
water allocation agreement. Cooperation between both countries expands greatly, 
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culminating with the construction of a joint hydropower station in Khorgos and 
technical exchanges on pollution, as well as emergency response and warning 
systems. Yet China maintains control of the negotiation process and continues to 
stall progress on water allocation agreements. 
In 2002, China and Kazakhstan sign a friendship and cooperation agreement, which 
includes a mutual commitment to take practical measures to prevent 
environmental pollution and use of natural resources, in line with international 
treaties. Ten years into the negotiation process, this marks the first explicit 
reference to international treaties.  
The signing of the Five-Year Sino-Kazakh Cooperation Programme (2003-2008) 
follows in 2003. The agreement includes a provision to conduct friendly 
consultations on the protection of transboundary rivers. During 2003, the first 
meeting of the ‘China-Kazakhstan Joint Commission on the Use and Protection of 
Transboundary Rivers’ (Joint Commission) takes place, as stipulated in Article 4 of 
the joint agreement (see 2001). 
In May 2004, both sides establish the China Kazakhstan-Cooperation Committee 
(CKCC), which coordinates all bilateral activities underneath one umbrella, with the 
respective deputy heads of government serving as chairs (Russian.China.Org.Cn 
2010). Also the Committee on Transboundary Water Management (CTWM) falls 
under the remit of the CKCC, however, it would take until 2008 before the first 
CTWM meeting took place under the CKCC umbrella.  In July 2004, the first CKCC 
meeting takes place in Beijing, under the auspices of Vice Premier Wu Yi and 
Kazakhstani Deputy Prime Minister Akhmetzhan Yesimov. In October, the second 
meeting of the Joint Commission on the Use and Protection of Transboundary rivers 
takes place in Almaty. The meeting sees the signing of a memorandum on natural 
disasters, which subsequently leads to an agreement to immediately notify each 
other in case of a natural disaster or emergency along the river (UNECE, 2010). 
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In July 2005, Beijing upgrades its relationship with Kazakhstan to a “Strategic 
Partnership”(FMPRC 2005). The second meeting of the CKCC takes place in Astana, 
again co-chaired by Wu Yi and Akhmetzhan Yesimov. Among the sub-committees 
mentioned in the Chinese press release, transboundary water is not listed, 
indicating China’s lack of prioritisation of the issue.  
In October 2006, the fourth meeting of the Kazakhstan-China Joint Commission on 
the Use and Protection of Transboundary rivers takes place in Almaty (gazeta.kz 
2006). In November, the third CKCC meeting takes place in Beijing, co-chaired by 
Vice Premier Wu Yi and Deputy Prime Minister Karim Massimov. In Wu’s view, the 
CKCC has “actively pushed for mutually beneficial cooperation in all areas and […] 
made positive contributions to the development of bilateral ties” (Xinhua). At the 
same time Kazakhstan pledges continued support China’s security strategy in the 
region to combat the ‘three evils’. The joint Wu and Massimov summary of the 
CKCC activities omits transboundary rivers.135 During Nazarbayev’s December visit 
to Beijing both sides sign ‘The strategy for cooperation in the 21st century and the 
development of economic cooperation’ (Kazakhstani Embassy 2007). A Chinese 
press statement lists the sub-committee’s meetings but no mention of the Joint 
Commission is made. In December, Kazakhstan and China sign an agreement to 
conduct scientific research, which is hailed as a breakthrough by the Kazakhstani 
government (Kazakhstani Embassy in Beijing).  The Chinese Ministry of Water 
Resources agrees with the Kazakhstani Ministry of Environment to exchange 
hydrological data on major transboundary rivers, and also signs an agreement with 
the Kazakhstani Ministry of Agriculture on the development of research 
cooperation on transboundary rivers (Kenshimov 2010). The US embassy dedicates 
an entire cable to the meeting, noting that Nazarbayev again returned home 
without any progress toward a water allocation agreement with China. It further 
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 Wu and Massimov summarised the CKCC achievements in the following fields: economy, trade, 
transportation, ports, science, technology, finance, energy, mineral resources, humanities, security 
and railway(English.Xinhuanet.com 2010). 
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quotes Nazarbayev, referring to his failure to make any progress at the meeting: 
“we cannot say that Kazakhstani-Chinese cooperation is developing in a completely 
positive way" (Milas 2006a).  During this time, the increased water outtake of the Ili 
River becomes noticeable in Kazakhstan’s Lake Balkhash. 
The following March (2007) Astana hosts a meeting with Chinese and Kyrgyz 
officials to discuss a framework for Integrated Water Resource Management 
(IWRM) along the Ili. In a sign of weakness, Kazakhstan tries to buy off China and 
offers China subsidised food deliveries for ten years in exchange for a binding 
commitment to let the Ili flow unimpeded into Lake Balkhash. By demanding to let 
the river flow uninhibited, Astana pursues a strategy of absolute river integrity 
(Wolf, 2007). China rejects the offer and talks break down (Milas 2007a). In the first 
half of 2007, the Kazakhstani government becomes aware of a new Chinese project 
along the Ili River and increases the number of water facilities along the 
transboundary rivers (ibid). Anatoliy Ryabtsev, Chairman of the Committee for 
Water Resources, claims that Beijing admitted that its industrial growth surpasses 
“its ability to prevent the Ili’s pollution”(Milas 2007a). Later that year, in August Hu 
Jintao visits Kazakhstan with Wu Yi, where he meets Nazarbayev and Karim 
Massimov. In the joint communiqué from the meeting, Hu lauds the progress in 
bilateral relations in the areas of trade, transport, security, humanities and energy 
resources, and identifies priority areas for future cooperation, including the 
expansion of mutually beneficial collaboration in trade, the economy, infrastructure 
and energy, followed by the deepening of security ties and closer cooperation with 
international organisations. Again, transboundary rivers are not mentioned (FMPRC 
2007a). In November, the fourth meeting of the CKCC takes place in Astana and is 
again co-chaired by Wu Yi and Kazakhstan’s First Vice Prime Minister, Umirzak 
Shukeyev, who would later become the head of Samruk-Kazyna (Samruk-Kazyna 
2012). By the end of 2007, there is still no evidence that China and Kazakhstan 
exchanged water data, as already agreed in 2001. 
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In August 2008, Hu Jintao meets Nazarbayev on the side-lines of the Olympic 
Games in Beijing.  Hu agrees to incorporate the Joint Water Committee (JWC) into 
the CKCC mechanism and to study the technical requirements for a water-allocation 
agreement. Nazarbayev considered this a turning point (Russian.News.Cn 2010), as 
it marks the first detailed discussion on water quality, pollution prevention and 
water allocation (Gazeta.kz 2008). However, although the JWC falls within the 
responsibilities of higher policy levels at the CKCC, the deputy heads of government 
do not attend water resource meetings in person. Several weeks later in October, 
PM Massimov invites Wen Jiabao to Astana. Wen and Nazarbayev issue a joint 
communiqué from the SCO meeting in Astana, identifying three priority areas for 
bilateral cooperation: energy, non-resource areas and trade. Furthermore, in 
reference to the Global Financial Crisis, Beijing assures Kazakhstan close financial 
cooperation (Article 11).136  Despite the supposed progress, water is not mentioned 
in the communiqué and the year concludes without a meeting of the CKCC.  
In March 2009, the Kazakhstani financial police, the Economic Crimes and Anti-
Corruption Agency, targets the WRC and MinEP with corruption charges. Anatoliy 
Ryabtsev137, then Deputy Chairman of the Water Resource Committee and Nurlan 
Iskakov, Minister for Environmental Protection, are dismissed along with two 
deputies (Asanow 2009). Simultaneously, the financial crisis unfolds, with two of 
Kazakhstan’s biggest lenders, BTA Bank and Alliance, defaulting in April. On 16 
April, during a visit to Beijing, Nazarbayev receives a US$10bn credit line to prop up 
Kazakhstan’s financial system (see China as Kazakhstan’s Creditor). Both sides sign a 
Sino-Kazakh Joint Communiqué, reiterating basic principles of trade and energy 
cooperation (FMPRC 2009). Astana-Finance defaults in May, followed by Temir Bank 
in October. In December, the sixth meeting of the JWC finally takes place as part of 
the fifth meeting of the CKCC. During this set of meetings, the Kazakhstan Institute 
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Both sides agreed that during the subdued economic situation it is important to continue the close 
financial cooperation between the two countries, to strengthen control in the financial sector, to 
share experiences and information exchange to improve the joint opposition to financial risks 
(FMPRC 2008b). 
137
 Ryabtsev pleaded guilty.  
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for Strategic Studies (KISS) hosts a roundtable with the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS), which focuses on economic cooperation. KISS presents its concerns 
on transboundary rivers to CASS, which rebuffs them, instead reiterating that 
bilateral negotiations have yielded significant progress already (KISI 2009).   
Hu visits Astana in June 2010, where he and Nazarbayev praise the achievements 
made since the establishment of the JWC. The two leaders highlight the spirit of the 
“win-win negotiations”. In November, the eighth meeting of the JWC takes place in 
Karaganda, Kazakhstan (MWR 2010). Negotiations focus on further necessary 
technical work before talks about water sharing can commence (Mashin 2010). 
Both sides agree on the joint construction of the Dostyk hydropower station at 
Khorgos. 
In February 2011, China and Kazakhstan issue a joint communiqué, in which 
transboundary water issues feature as number 13 and 14 out of 18 topics. 
Highlighting the low priority of the issue for Beijing, China’s congratulatory note on 
Kazakhstan’s success in the Asian Winter Games appears on the agenda 
beforehand, as item 12. In the same year, Kazakhstan and China sign the 
‘Agreement on the Protection of Water Quality of Transboundary Rivers’, but again, 
this agreement fails to address the crucial issue of water allocation (Gazeta.kz 
2011).  The JWC expresses its intention to promote the ‘Plan for the Technical 
Implementation of Water Allocation of the Sino-Kazakhstani Transboundary Rivers’ 
(Gazeta.kz 2011). Anarbek Oman, Chairman of the Kazakh CWR within the MoA, 
claims that a water allocation agreement will be signed before the end of 2014138. 
Both sides reiterate their appreciation for the work of the JWC and their intention 
to promote the implementation of the Dostyk Hydropower Project. Construction 
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 There is no indication that this might actually happen. Research has not been able to get a version 
of the agreement or any kind of insights into the substance of the agreement. Moreover during the 
meeting both sides praised the achievements of the joint Commission the use and protection of 
transboundary rivers which had been established as far back as in 2001. Again any documentation 
with details on these achievements, is not available in the public domain.  Beijing, however 
mentioned that it was willing to consider the technical conditions for negotiations on water 
allocation.  
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commences shortly thereafter, in April 2011. During this time, the promised 
research activity into transboundary rivers finally commences. The Yili Department 
of Environmental Protection in Xinjiang commissions XAES to conduct an impact 
assessment of local river basins, including the Ili and Irtysh, with the goal of 
improving the monitoring of water quality and building an emergency response 
system (XAES 2011a, XAES 2011b). In June 2011, on the side-lines of the SCO 
meeting in Astana, Hu and Nazarbayev sign a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership, 
an upgrade from the previous ‘strategic partnership’. 
By mid-2012, Talgat Mamyrayymov, Vice President at Kazakhstan’s Centre for 
Humanities and Political Science and other Kazakhstani scientists claim that China 
has started work on thirteen additional reservoirs and hydropower plants along the 
Ili River (Mamyrayymov 2012). In July 2012, the JWC meets in Beijing alongside the 
CKCC to discuss the technical work required for water allocation and to exchange 
views on flood prevention. The meeting renews irritation in Kazakhstan about 
China’s allocation proposals:  Beijing initially proposed to base the split of water 
volumes on the population of each country. Given the vastly different population 
sizes of the two countries, this split implies a 98.7% allocation to China. A proposal 
based on the populations of Xinjiang (20m inhabitants) and the Kazakhstanis living 
along these rivers (6m) 139 would have been more legitimate. 
Beijing did change its allocation approach slightly in 2012, now insisting on a 
division based on each country’s current water demand. This strategy of ‘who will 
consume more, gets more’ is beneficial to China, which, after years of stalling, has 
in the meantime brought numerous canals and reservoirs online. Further increases 
in demand are predicted, since the central government is committed to boosting 
economic and social development in Xinjiang. Other Chinese negotiation techniques 
include counting the Ishim and Tobol tributaries, which originate in the north of 
Kazakhstan, and joining the Irtysh in Siberia before flowing into the Ob. 
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Unsurprisingly, this negotiation approach led to frustration on the Kazakhstani side, 
which argued that rights to historic water use should be upheld, given that 
Kazakhstani water demand has remained relatively stable over the years. In 
particular, Islam Abishev, chairman of the CWR, aired his displeasure at China’s 
maximisation of its self-interest in the media  (KazTag 2012).  
Figure 50 Dispute Timeline 
 
6.8 Celebrated Negotiation Outcomes 
Judging by the number of meetings, China and Kazakhstan are engaged in an active 
negotiation dialogue on the rights to their transboundary rivers. However, the 
length and progress of this dialogue is symptomatic of Chain’s reluctance to 
compromise its sovereignty. A string of technical studies were commissioned to buy 
time for China to continue its building activity. The bilateral nature of the 
negotiations is also noteworthy. As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, 
water cooperation is home to some of the most developed international 
institutions. Furthermore, Russia is a co-riparian to the Irtysh and Ili and thus, is 
equally affected by China’s diversions. Despite these setbacks, however, both sides 
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have found several negotiation outcomes to celebrate and have frequently 
congratulated each other on supposed progress, such as the 2010 praise for the 
‘win-win’ negotiations.  Kazakhstani policy makers often highlight the 
institutionalisation of the conflict and the exchange of data as significant 
accomplishments. However, after nearly two decades of consultations, no progress 
has been made towards finding a binding agreement on water allocation. Instead, 
Beijing has proceeded with its resource capture strategy, unilaterally changing the 
distribution of water in its favour (Zeitoun and Warner 2006): 444) through 
increased water abstraction, on the back of numerous canal and hydropower 
projects. China’s success has come directly at the expense of Kazakhstan’s national 
interests. In a sign that Beijing recognises that Astana’s bargaining power is greater 
than that actually employed, Chinese academics have hailed Beijing’s ability to 
contain the dispute and prevent it from spilling over to other interest areas (Wang 
and Hu 2011). 
One area frequently hailed as a major achievement is the agreement to swap data. 
Initial talks on information and data exchanged began in October 1999, but were 
only definitively specified in 2006. Only in 2011 did tentative signs of research 
activity begin to appear in Xinjiang, where XAES had been authorised by the local 
government to research the province’s transboundary rivers. The long delays for 
the acclaimed progress is merely a public relations vehicle to justify decades of talks 
by at best, inflating small successes or at worst, inventing them. Experts claim that 
institutional weaknesses, especially in Kazakhstan (see China and Kazakhstan, 
above) cast doubt on the effectiveness of these data exchanges (Interview Russell 
Frost). Moreover, data exchanges have been limited to pollution data rather than 
quantitative information on water flows and abstraction, which lay the foundation 
of any water allocation agreement. An earlier portion of this chapter (see 
Kazakhstan, above) discusses the shortcomings in Kazakhstan’s data collections 
capabilities in more detail. These shortcomings undermine Kazakhstan’s position in 
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the bilateral negotiations, thus lending a helping hand in Beijing’s pursuit of its own 
interests (Chapter 6, 7.3.4). 
Kazakhstan cannot rely on Chinese data either, as this is equally prone to 
misreporting.  Data collection challenges in both countries pose an important 
question: what kind of data is actually exchanged (Interview Russell Frost)? If data 
exchanges do in fact take place, their value is likely symbolic rather than practical. 
This puts any workable water allocation agreement further into the future, since 
any such agreement must necessarily be based on a quantitative understanding of 
water abstractions.  
Data exchanges and more generally, negotiation progress, is also delayed by the 
lack of a permanent institutional structure of the CKCC or JWC (Chapter 6). It is also 
unclear which institutions are involved in the data swaps. For example, in 2006, the 
Chinese MWR signed agreements with both MinEP and MoA (see Chronology 2006), 
who have overlapping responsibilities on water in Kazakhstan. But numerous other 
Kazakhstani organisations, with varying reporting structures, carry out research on 
the ground. The Committee for Fisheries and Research, which reports to the MoA, 
examines Kazakhstan’s lakes and rivers. Additionally, Kazhydromet operates 
hydrological stations, yet its reporting structure is unclear. Kazhydromet signed one 
bilateral agreement with China in 1995, which included provisions to exchange 
meteorological but not hydrological data (Kazhydromet 2012). Most likely, data 
from Kazhydromet is channelled through different ministries, if it is exchanged at 
all.  
Crucially, this research did not uncover any signs of data-generating research in 
Xinjiang until 2011, when the XEAS was commissioned to carry out research along 
Xinjiang’s transboundary water nexus. This implies that no data was exchanged 
beforehand, or that the data swaps were based on estimates or at best, weak data. 
Poor data quality is not only an obstacle exclusive to the Sino-Kazakh water nexus. 
China was also criticised for the poor data it provided in the Mekong water dispute 
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(Cronin and Hamlin 2012:32). It is international practice to facilitate the direct 
exchange of data between different countries by setting up Joint River Basin 
Councils (JRBCs). Contrary to common international practice, Beijing has prevented 
the institutionalisation of the CKCC and rejected proposals to set up a bottom-up 
IWRM (UN) mechanism or JRBC (see Second Decade: 2002-2012; 2007). 140 
Interestingly, Kazakhstan has managed to set-up such JRBCs with Russia to manage 
water along the Irtysh and, more prominently, with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, to organise the water management of the Aral Sea 
(EECCA-NBO 2012).  
In summary, it can be concluded that negotiations between Kazakhstan and China 
remain stagnant in the ‘adversarial stage’, with China still defending its right to 
absolute sovereignty over its transboundary rivers (Rothman cited in Wolf, 2007). 
As demonstrated in this chapter, China’s stance comes at the expense of 
Kazakhstan’s national interest. In general, institutionalisation and closer 
cooperation are associated with a better conflict resolution in IR paradigms, such as 
liberalism and constructivism. However, it is against the background of more 
intense bilateral cooperation that negotiations between Kazakhstan and China have 
not made meaningful progress, further lending applicability to a realist narrative. 
This outcome is particularly surprising given that in June 2011, China upgraded its 
relationship with Kazakhstan to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’, thereby 
establishing regular meetings on the prime minister level. 
While Beijing emphasises ‘mutual benefit’ (互利共), ‘win-win negotiations’ (共赢的) 
and the ‘spirit of great responsibility’ (高度负责), this chapter highlights that Beijing 
unilaterally controls the negotiations.  In fact, reports generally describe the conflict 
in terms of David vs. Goliath often depicting Beijing as a regional bully (Blank 2009). 
While Kazakhstan’s position as downstream riparian certainly lowers its bargaining 
position (Zeitoun and Warner 2006), the analysis in the next chapter will show that 
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 see International Commission for the Protection of the River Danube (ICPDR). 
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the situation is far more complex than the David vs. Goliath analogy implies. Astana 
does in fact have recourse to a number of feasible policy options that would 
significantly increase its bargaining power and which the previous chapter briefly 
delineated (Chapter 5). It will be argued that, contrary to the view of Sievers et al, 
Kazakhstan by choice does not pursue an assertive water policy towards Beijing 
(Sievers, 2002). Instead, it allows Beijing to control the negotiations counter to its 
national interest and thus appears complicit in China’s successes. 
This apparent puzzle is best explained through Kazakhstan’s economic dependence 
on China that is driven by the elite’s perception and interests, as well as Beijing’s 
related ability to manipulate Kazakhstani elite interests in its favour. As such, the 
explanatory variables for Kazakhstan’s behaviour are located both on the systemic 
level (economic hierarchy and dependence) as well as on the sub-systemic level in 
Kazakhstan’s elite dynamics.  This implies that China can maintain its water 
sovereignty with limited interference from Kazakhstan. Astana’s failure to object 
may preserve its economic and elite interests in the short-term, including Chinese 
investment, but lock Kazakhstan more firmly into China’s hierarchical power 
structure in the long-term. The next section will provide a detailed analysis of how 
China applies this hierarchical relationship as leverage in its favour. 
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 Dispute Analysis Chapter 7 
The previous chapter showed that Beijing has successfully maintained absolute 
sovereignty over its water resources, even though this approach is increasingly out 
of touch with developments in international environmental cooperation. This 
chapter investigates whether these outcomes are the result of Beijing effectively 
leveraging Kazakhstan’s economic dependence and how. To this end the chapter 
analyses the bargaining strategy that China employs to achieve this outcome. 
Beijing controls the agenda and setting of the dispute negotiations, frequently 
stalling them. However, as informative as Beijing’s strategy, is Astana’s response. 
Astana’s decision makers appear to undertake no meaningful efforts to level the 
hierarchical relationship in order to improve their negotiation position. This can 
only be partially explained by Kazakhstan’s economic dependence. Antagonising 
Beijing could threaten future economic benefits and jeopardise Chinese investment 
in Kazakhstan on which the elite relies (Chapter 5). From Kazakhstan’s overall 
perspective, it could be argued that the cost of water access and quality are 
balanced against the benefits of China’s economic influence. However, the cost-
benefit analysis is much more skewed towards benefits when Kazakhstan’s real 
decision makers, the elite, are considered in isolation. The elite in particular 
benefits from Chinese investment, both structurally and personally but will only be 
indirectly affected by its short-sighted water policy in the dispute. This also 
highlights what appears as the elite’s short-term view on decision making.  This 
short-sightedness is linked to the different rational and cost-benefit calculations in a 
Rentier State, where the elite’s immediate and primary concern is maintaining 
power even if this negates the national interest (Chapter 2 and 5). As a result Beijing 
can pursue its interests and firmly lock Kazakhstan into a hierarchical relationship, 
adding ‘water hegemony’ to magnify Kazakhstan’s subordinate position. 
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The chapter also draws parallels with the Mekong, where China faces another 
transboundary water dispute. Patterns emerge that suggest China may have studied 
its experiences to develop an overall strategy for dealing with water disputes.   
7.1 Theoretical Framework  
 IR literature on conflict and cooperation often applies game theory to 
elucidate the different policy preferences of states in a conflict situation. This 
exposes problems inherent in the dispute structure which can inhibit cooperation, 
such as insufficient communication or risks of defection. Although the water conflict 
would neatly fit into a two-by-two matrix141 with China’s default preference for 
defection and Kazakhstan’s for cooperation, it provides little guidance for analysing 
the ongoing negotiation process between both states. Fearon’s model of dispute 
bargaining, as well as Zeitoun and Warner’s framework of hydro-hegemony inform 
a more fruitful analysis (Fearon 1998, Zeitoun &Warner 2006). By breaking down 
the cooperation process into bargaining and implementation stages, the former, 
under which Kazakhstan and China currently negotiate, can be analysed 
independently of the later implementation stage (Fearon 1998). Fearon’s 
framework is applied to the Sino-Kazakh water dispute. In this dispute, the interests 
of the two sides are opposed. Beijing aims to maximise its use of transboundary 
rivers and pursues absolute sovereignty over its water resources, while Kazakhstan 
tries to minimise Chinese water abstractions and thus pursues a strategy of 
absolute river integrity (Wolf 2007) (Chapter 5). Nevertheless, cooperation can be 
beneficial for both parties. Without cooperation, Kazakhstan runs the risk of losing 
large if not all water volume, along those shared rivers, as China can maximise its 
abstractions.  Beijing’s preference for an agreement is less straightforward but still 
significant.  In the absence of an agreement, Kazakhstan may turn towards the 
international community for help, thus depicting Beijing as an uncooperative 
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 Game theory usually depicts a situation along a two by two matrix that captures the different 
default preferences of two cooperation partners. 
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regional hegemon. More significantly, Beijing runs the risks that Kazakhstan will 
seek an external solution to the dispute, either in a legal forum or in an 
international or regional organisation which reduces China’s ability to influence the 
outcome to its benefit. 
7.2 China’s Bargaining Strategy   
China implements a range of bargaining strategies, many of which are cited in 
Fearon’s model (Fearon 1998): 
 Information secrecy 
 Bilateral negotiations: Beijing controls the agenda and excludes  third 
parties 
 Stalling for time   
 Exploitation of institutional weaknesses inside Kazakhstan   
 Preventing external dispute resolution  
 Isolation of the water dispute   
In theory, Astana could offset each of these strategies, thus mitigating the effects of 
Kazakhstan’s economic dependence. The Kazakhstani government could: 
 Enlist domestic and international public opinion to shame Beijing 
 Multilateralise negotiations through regional and international 
organisations 
 Speed up dispute resolution  
 Seek external dispute resolution by mounting legal challenges 
 Link other issue areas that are more important to China, such as non-
water resources and security cooperation 
 Improve water management and monitoring capabilities 
 Diversify the economy to trade in virtual water 
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However, Kazakhstan only pursues these options sparingly. This thesis argues that 
this is the result of Kazakhstan’s economic dependency on China. Given China’s key 
role in Kazakhstan’s economy, Astana, and particularly its elite, worry that 
antagonising Beijing risks future economic and political benefits associated with 
China.  Beijing’s strategy along the Sino-Kazakhstani water dispute is similar to its 
strategy along other water conflicts from which it has possibly learnt. In particular, 
the Mekong conflict is studied in more detail below. China’s strategy is remarkably 
similar to that applied in Kazakhstan and includes some of the six negotiation 
strategies listed above. While parallels between the two water conflicts emerge, the 
opaque nature of Beijing’s foreign policy process makes it difficult to conclude that 
these are the result of a coherent foreign policy strategy of Beijing. Negotiations 
take place behind closed doors and are treated as state secrets, also inside 
Kazakhstan.  As a result, the question of causality is difficult to answer. These are 
questions on whether Beijing directly uses as leverage Kazakhstan’s economic 
dependence by issuing threats or linking future trade and investment prospects to 
Kazakhstan’s compliance. Or, does the Kazakhstani government deliberately fail to 
level the playing field in anticipation of losing economic benefits in the future?  As a 
lack of disclosure makes a direct analysis impossible, this chapter will study the 
outcomes and the policy tools selected by Kazakhstani officials to shed light on the 
dispute dynamics. By excluding alternative explanations, it becomes apparent that 
the interests of the ruling elite inside Kazakhstan drive the water negotiations, thus 
also further facilitating the hierarchal relationship with Beijing. 
7.2.1 The Mekong Conflict: Emergence of a Chinese Water Strategy? 
China faces a well-documented water dispute along the Mekong, also known as the 
Lancang in China. Research into this dispute reveals interesting similarities to the 
Sino-Kazakh transboundary water conflict, and it is likely that Beijing applies lessons 
learned at the Mekong in Kazakhstan. The opaque nature makes conclusive proof of 
China’s strategy in either water dispute difficult, but there are a number of 
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indicators that support the view: The Mekong dispute predates the transboundary 
conflict with Kazakhstan, and an overlap between the Chinese ministries involved in 
both disputes suggests that likely some institutional learning has occurred. 
Initiatives to set up a committee of riparians along the Mekong stretch back to the 
late 1950. Both the Mekong River Commission (MRC) and the Chinese Ministry of 
Water Resources (MRW) were established in 1958 and have existed continuously, 
albeit in slightly different shape. For over half a century, the MRW accumulated 
expertise along the Mekong, forming many contact points with the MRC and 
individual riparians, at least on a technical level. In addition, the MWR signed a 
number of data-sharing agreements with the MRC  (Shi 2010). Interestingly, the 
MWR is also a key contact point in the Sino-Kazakhstani Water dispute, having 
signed agreements with the MinEP and MoA in Kazakhstan. It participates in the 
China-Kazakhstan Joint Commission on the Use and Protection of Transboundary 
Rivers, the main body discussing transboundary water issues.  The overlap between 
these two disputes extends to individuals such as Jiao Yong, the vice minister of the 
MWR, who co-chaired the meeting of the joint committee in Karaganda, Kazakhstan 
in 2010. The institutional continuity suggests that, at a minimum, Chinese actors in 
the Kazakhstani dispute are aware of issues that arose previously at the Mekong. 
Information awareness between the two conflicts likely extends beyond technical 
committees. Policy questions involving the Mekong are handled through China’s 
MFA, via the Chinese embassy in Bangkok, and it is common diplomatic practice to 
share cables not just to the MFA but also with other relevant embassies. Therefore, 
it is likely that Beijing shares this information with other embassies involved in 
water-sharing disputes, including the one in Kazakhstan. This shared information 
likely includes media commentary. Given the critical press coverage received on the 
Mekong, Beijing has actively followed media commentary on the Mekong dispute 
(Interview International Water Expert). As in Kazakhstan, China is deeply involved 
economically in Laos and Cambodia, two Mekong co-riparians, especially in Laos’ 
hydropower projects. Chinese state-owned hydropower companies, such as 
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Sinohydro, are active in the region and will build four to five of eleven planned 
dams. China ExIm Bank (ExIm), which has emerged as one of the world’s biggest 
financiers of dam projects (International Rivers),142 is funding the construction of 
the Kamchay Dam in Cambodia. Given the economic importance, Beijing is 
incentivised to closely monitor developments at the MRC, as negative press 
coverage could jeopardise lucrative projects. Any lessons learned along the Mekong 
are likely carried over, as the same Chinese companies involved in the financing and 
construction of hydropower dams along the Mekong are also active in Kazakhstan, 
such as China Datang and Sinohydro, both SOEs involved in projects in Kazakhstan 
(Aizhu 2008, Sinohydro 2008, Guo 2011). Especially given the proximity of the SEOs 
to the state council (SASAC), it is possible to assume that the institutional 
knowledge gained along the Mekong is shared and preserved.  These institutional, 
political and economic links in the two water conflicts suggest that any parallels 
found may not be coincidental and are perhaps indicative of a comprehensive 
Chinese strategy on transboundary water disputes. As pointed out by Backer the 
Mekong is not a unique case for Beijing with its many transboundary rivers. It is 
thus concerned that its behaviour or concessions along the MRC may trigger similar 
demands by other downstream riparians (Backer 2007).  This suggests that Beijing 
may take a common approach to its transboundary water disputes. 
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 China ExIm appears in foreign policy records as well and its governor frequently meets with 
Finance Ministers abroad. For example in 2005 Li Ruogu met with Siniora Ben, the State Secretary of 
Finance in Cambodia to discuss projects. This further underlines ExIm’s growing role in Chinese 
Foreign Policy (Exim 2005). 
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Figure 51 Mekong Riparians 
 
Source: http://www.asiawebdirect.com/maps/mekong/index.htm  
The Mekong Dispute 
The Mekong originates in the Himalayas, traverses China and then crosses from 
Yunnan into Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam (see Figure 51). In 
China, the Mekong is known as the Lancang River, which China emphasises to 
communicate its uncompromising sovereignty and control over the river. The 
Mekong conflict originated from the construction of hydropower dams in China, 
which contributed to decreasing water levels and changes in water cycles. These 
changes interfere with local communities and their agricultural planning (Wolf, 
2007), thus creating tensions with downstream riparians including Thailand, Laos, 
Cambodia and Vietnam (McCartan 2010). In response to China’s dam projects, 
these states established a multi-lateral body, the MRC, in 1958 to manage the 
dispute. Although China chose not to join the MRC, perhaps because it sought to 
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maximise its bargaining power in bilateral negotiations, it enjoys observer status 
and participates in meetings. Although, the MRC has limited powers, it facilitates 
knowledge generation and consultations on the use and future of the Mekong. It 
has registered some noticeable successes in this respect, such as pushing Laos to 
suspend the construction of the iconic Xayaburi Dam, a lucrative hydro-dam 
project, in 2011. The Xayaburi Dam is an iconic project, not only because of its size 
and position along the main stream of the Mekong, but also because of the 
controversy and media attention that it has drawn (Interview Kurt Mørck Jensen). 
Today, Vietnam, and to a lesser degree Cambodia, are pushing for a moratorium on 
further dam construction, supported by research and impact studies published by 
the MRC (Interview Kurt Mørck Jensen). The MRC’s ability to draw in civil society 
has contributed to its effectiveness. For example, information published by the MRC 
mobilised Thai civil society, which has become a key opponent to dam projects. 
These developments culminated with Thai environmentalists suing one of the banks 
that provided financing for the Xayaburi Dam, by alleging that the conducted 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) was inadequate. While MRC decisions are 
not binding on China, Beijing has been very susceptible to the mobilisation of public 
opinion. In fact, Chinese hydropower companies have suspended the submission of 
project plans, which were finalised two years ago, to see if Laos will revoke the 
moratorium (Interview International Water Expert 1). 
7.2.2 Lessons Learned  
These developments along the Mekong likely make Beijing nervous, especially since 
the publicity extends beyond the region and has motivated civil society to suspend 
key projects. The stakes in the Kazakhstani water conflict may even be higher, as 
water abstractions there lead to a net loss of water rather than hydropower 
projects leading to a change in water flows. The discussion below illustrates some 
factors that explain why the outcomes for co-riparians along the Mekong were 
more favourable. Interestingly, China has avoided many of these factors in the 
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Kazakhstani conflict, suggesting it is applying the lessons learned at the Mekong. 
One immediate consequence of the multilateral setting at the Mekong is the 
inadvertent internationalisation of the dispute. The MRC has close links to the UN, 
international environmental institutions such as the Environmental Law Institute 
(ELI)143 and a large number of donor countries, including the US, Australia and 
Denmark144. As a consequence, both the US Congress and the Australian Parliament 
have discussed the Xayaburi Dam officially in parliamentary sessions and in 2011, 
the US Senate introduced the following resolution, “Calling for the protection of the 
Mekong River Basin and increased US support for delaying the construction of 
mainstream dams along the Mekong River” (USSenate 2011). This may keep the US 
engaged in the Mekong or even draw the country further into the Mekong dispute, 
which may have geopolitical implications for China. Parliamentary debates on 
China’s actions along the Mekong generate publicity and are not in Beijing’s 
interest. 
The multinational setting along the Mekong also increases transparency, better 
access to data and thus opportunities for research. Because of the international 
setting, protocols are available in the English language, making the dispute 
accessible to a wider, global audience, and which in turn attracts greater academic 
coverage. For example, an active network of experts and professionals called M-
Power145 provides analyses and reports on the Mekong in English. Much of this 
academic and media attention has depicted Beijing in an unfavourable light (MRC 
2010)146, undermining its efforts to cultivate the image of a peaceful, cooperative 
and responsible power. Discontent over China along the Mekong is barely 
concealed, with Thai Senator Prasarn Marukpitak publicly voicing his frustrations in 
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 The Institute runs a China programme that provides training and expertise to Chinese universities, 
lawyers and judiciary (ELI 2008). 
144
 Since its inception in 1958 a number of countries have provided technical and financial assistance 
including  France, Great Britain, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Canada, Australia, The Philippines 
and Japan (Delli Priscolli &Wolf 2009). 
145
 Mekong Program on Water, Environment and Resilience  (M-Power)  
146
Relevant publications Hamlin &Cronin 2012, Hirsch & Mørck Jensen 2006  
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2009 that “China considers itself a big country that doesn’t have to listen to the 
opinions of the people downstream”(RFAUnplugged 2010).  Beijing received 
especially negative press coverage in 2008 and 2010, when the region experienced 
a severe drought. Interestingly, much of the criticism was likely unfounded. MRC 
studies have shown that Beijing’s dams were not to blame for either of these 
dramatic droughts. On the contrary, in January and February of 2010, Beijing 
released water from its reservoirs to counter the adverse effects of the ongoing 
draught and to keep the Mekong navigable for boats. When Chinese reservoirs 
were exhausted and water levels suddenly dropped, the lower Mekong riparians 
assumed China had just ‘closed the tap’. In fact, China itself was probably worse 
affected by the draught than its downstream riparians, as around 30 Chinese 
vessels were stranded along the Mekong (Interview International Water Expert). 
However, because of China’s reluctance to share information, media and Thai civil 
society blamed Beijing’s dam construction for the droughts. A cartoon that ran in 
the Bangkok Post in April 2010 candidly summarised the general attitude at the 
time (see Figure 52). The cartoon depicts China as the greedy water consumer who 
leaves only a few drops for its co-riparians, Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma and Laos. 
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Figure 52 Reputational Repercussions  
 
Kindly provided by International Water Expert  
The negative media backlash is at least partially linked to the opaqueness of China’s 
foreign policy and hence a self-inflicted problem (Chong 2012). Experts believe that 
Beijing now actively follows and manages commentary regarding the Mekong to 
limit media and civil society exposure (Interview International Water Expert 1).  In 
any case, it is clear that the MRC has increased the pressure on Beijing to act 
responsibly. The experience along the Mekong has also created awareness in 
Chinese ministries about the reputational implications related to data secrecy, or a 
lack of transparency and to be viewed as “someone who doesn’t care” (Hirsch & 
Jensen et al 2006). This could both inform Kazakhstani officials how to use 
transparency and internationalisation of the conflict to strengthen their bargaining 
position as well as teaching Beijing how to avoid these pitfalls in future situations. 
Better conflict outcomes at the Mekong are linked to the multilateral 
institutionalisation and transparency of the dispute. However, it is possible that 
differences in the systemic and sub-systemic variables of these coriparians may 
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affect better outcomes as well. This could be related to greater economic 
independence of these states or different types of governments and stronger civil 
societies. An analysis of different regime types and variance in foreign policy 
outcomes warrants further research but is beyond the scope of this thesis and 
needs to be addressed elsewhere. 
7.3 Analysis of the Sino-Kazakh Water Dispute 
The remainder of this chapter analyses the different Chinese negotiation strategies 
and the Kazakhstani response in detail. In summary, China’s approach along the Ili 
and Irtysh suggests that Beijing does in fact apply many of the lessons learned along 
the Mekong. 
7.3.1 Information Secrecy 
China’s foreign policy processes take place out of the public eye. This undermines 
Beijing’s aim to build a reputation as a benign and responsible power, because it 
prefers to keep conflicts that could jeopardise this away from international public 
attention (Chong 2012). With increasing global awareness on climate change, 
transboundary water has become one such controversial issue. China’s position as 
upstream riparian puts it naturally into a more powerful position, which, combined 
with maintaining absolute sovereignty, invokes the image of China as a regional 
bully (Zeitoun & Warner 2006, Zeitoun & Allan 2008).  While it is in Beijing’s interest 
to avoid the negative press it has experienced at the Mekong, Kazakhstan could 
conversely exert pressure on China by introducing more transparency to garner 
international support. Such transparency would demonstrate that Beijing has 
compromised little over the last decades. However, rather than improving 
transparency, the Kazakhstani government appears to undertake great efforts to 
keep the negotiation process out of the public eye, even classifying information on 
transboundary rivers as a state secret. Kazakhstan’s behaviour appears puzzling at 
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first, but can be explained by resorting to Kazakhstan’s economic dependence on 
China and the legitimacy concerns of the elite in Astana (Chapter 2, 3).  Therefore, 
the government has a strong incentive not to antagonise Beijing by drawing 
international attention to China’s continuing water abstraction. This might risk  
future economic benefits (Copeland 1996). Chinese academics agree that 
Kazakhstan is hesitant to confront Beijing, in order to preserve the friendly 
relationship between both countries, presumably because of the benefits inherent 
in such a friendly relationship (Wang &Hu 2011). Kazakhstan’s position is not 
unique. Concerns around decreasing Chinese economic activity are also thought to 
be a key driver of the Laotian government’s actions along the Mekong. Because 
China is a key investor in Laos, Laotian officials have requested a review of MRC 
correspondence with China to ensure that China will not perceive Laos to be 
tarnishing Beijing’s image and will not retaliate by curtailing future investment 
(Interview International Water Expert).147 In addition to fears about alienating 
Beijing, there are likely also strong domestic reasons for the Kazakhstani 
government to keep the water conflict ‘under wraps’.  Despite nearly 20 years of 
negotiations, the government has failed to make any meaningful progress in 
protecting its national interests. Open public knowledge of this failure may expose 
the elite to criticism and even throw into question the elite’s legitimacy. 
Additionally, the issue bears domestic risks to Nazarbayev himself. Given the strong 
undercurrent of Sinophobia among the Kazakhstani population, any perceived 
China-friendly actions could pose critical questions about the motivation and 
incentives of Kazakhstani policy makers. Murat Auezov the former Ambassador to 
China, has repeatedly attacked the government over its failure to exert pressure on 
Beijing and downright accused it of ‘collaborating’ with the Chinese.  Previous 
events have demonstrated that Chinese issues have the power to mobilise society 
even against Nazarbayev himself, despite his overwhelming popularity. 
Kazakhstanis took to the streets in 2009 after media reported that China was 
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 The question to what degree this is driven by China’s economic influence in Laos is beyond the  
scope of this thesis 
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interested in leasing swaths of arable land inside Kazakhstan (Hoagland, 2010b). 
Sinophobia may have increased further, with rumours circulating about illegal 
Chinese immigrants and the exploitation practices of Chinese oil and gas companies 
(Interview Investment Fund). 
Sinophobia, combined with increasing public criticism of fabricated success stories 
of the early negotiations with China, may have caused the Kazakhstani government 
to change strategy in 2002. At that point, the government began to downplay the 
significance of transboundary water issues. For example, the then Prime Minister 
Kassym-Jomart Tokayev issued statements claiming that China’s diversion of the 
Irtysh does not pose any economic or environmental threats. The government went 
further and accused the media and NGOs of widely exaggerating the issue (Sievers 
2002:4). Today, the Kazakhstani government pushes its negotiations with Beijing 
into a “world of disappeared hydro politics” (Allan & Mirumachi 2011:25), treating 
the ongoing dispute as a strict secret by imposing an information embargo on the 
general public. 148 The author’s enquiries about the current state of the negotiations 
or China’s position were widely met with the response that this information was too 
sensitive for sharing and discussing.  Perhaps the government’s decision to demote 
the Committee on Transboundary Water from the MFA via the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Protection to the MoA was part of its strategy to push the dispute 
further into the background. This move not only de-prioritised the issue, but also 
de-politicised the process by giving it a more technical colouring. It also allowed the 
MFA to offload responsibility for the stagnant negotiation process (Sievers 2002). 
The result is that a less influential MoA with weaker capabilities does not have the 
resources or ministerial support to cope with the dispute, certainly not with its 
foreign policy dimensions (Kuanysh Baybolatovich & Cummings, 2005).149  However, 
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 The interviewer’s questions about the state of negotiations between China and Kazakhstan were 
immediately blocked and referred to as “state secret”.  
149
 Cummings ranked the political influence of Kazakhstani ministries from into hierarchies from 
most influential (1) to least influential (7). Accordingly, the MoA only ranks (6) (Cummings 2005:40). 
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relocating the committee into the MoA also has lasting effects beyond the 
negotiation table (discussed below).   
The elite’s preference to mute the dispute is aligned with Beijing’s, because of 
sensitivities around Kazakhstan’s economic dependence and intrinsically linked to 
this the elite’s immediate legitimacy concerns. Although it is not possible to weigh 
both factors precisely, the regime’s survival is likely a more immediate concern. 
Thus, keeping the dispute away from domestic attention prevails over the more 
long-term threat of Chinese retaliations in trade and investment. By acceding to 
Beijing’s preferences, the Kazakhstani government takes a distinctively short-term 
view. One could also argue that water security is an important prerequisite to 
Kazakhstan’s economic growth in the long term, and thus more important than the 
future of Chinese investment. Lending the dispute a higher profile would also be in 
line with its status as a national security objective and explicit foreign policy goal, 
both of which are contradicted by the government’s actual actions. Interviewees in 
Kazakhstan also consistently criticised the distinctively short-term view of the 
government across different issue areas (Interviews Trade Expert, International 
Finance Expert).  
Beijing’s strategy has paid off, and the Sino-Kazakhstani water conflict now unfolds 
inside the “shadow state”  (Mirumachi and Allan 2010:22). Until recently, the water 
conflict has escaped closer academic scrutiny and wider international attention, 
thus leaving the reputation of both governments widely intact. Literature on China’s 
water disputes overwhelmingly focuses on the Mekong and almost completely 
neglects the Sino-Kazakhstani disputes. For example, Yoffe et al. identify the 
Mekong as a future area of conflict but fail to discuss the transboundary dispute 
with Kazakhstan, which, by the time of their publication had been underway for 
nearly ten years (Yoffe, Wolf et al. 2003 ). Eric Sievers’ 2001 treatment of the 
dispute is still the most comprehensive source and a more recent article by Richard 
Stone (Stone 2012) are improving information about the dispute abroad. In China, 
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the dispute does not receive much attention outside policy-making circles. A search 
in the CNKI database only produces a handful of results, nearly exclusively 
published by Xinjiang University (CNKI, 2012). As a result, Beijing can keep the 
dispute in a bilateral setting, supporting its aim of preserving absolute sovereignty 
over its transboundary rivers.  
7.3.2 Bilateral Negotiations 
It appears to be China’s default position to engage in negotiations on a bilateral 
basis. By avoiding multi-lateralised foreign policy discussions, China can use its 
relative size and economic weight to its advantage, a fact also recognised by 
Neoclassical Realists.150  Despite this preference and perhaps by necessity, Chinese 
foreign policy has become more multilateral in recent years, with Beijing now taking 
a more proactive approach towards established IOs such as the UN and even 
spearheading the foundation of the SCO.  Nonetheless, the preference for bilateral 
negotiations remains, especially when territorial claims or resources are at stake. 
This is true in the Mekong conflict, when China declined to join the MRC and likely 
also experienced first-hand how effectively IOs can mitigate hierarchical 
relationships.  In 2000, a number of MRC states and China signed the ‘Agreement 
on Commercial Navigation on the Lancang’ to facilitate commercial navigation along 
the Chinese section of the Mekong by authorising the necessary construction to 
enable bigger ships to navigate the waters. Despite the commercial focus, the 
contractual parties have since used vague articles of the agreement to exert 
pressure on China to release information about its dams along the river 
(International Water Expert 2) 151. Similarly, Burma, Thailand and Laos also enlisted 
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 Accordingly states always strive to maximize their relative position vis-à-vis other states in the 
international system based on the premise that competition for security is a zero sum game. Thus a 
state must always try to seek a favourable security position vis-à-vis other states.  
151
 Relevant articles are Art 21 states that […] representatives of the Contracting Parties […] consult 
and [to] promote cooperation in the following matters inter alia:  (b) measures to increase safety for 
navigation and protection of environment; (f) for the purpose of safe and smooth navigation, 
especially in dry season, to cooperate to a possible extent in the provision of water flow and the 
relevant data […]. 
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the MRC’s help to question an EIA conducted by Beijing, which an independent 
report found “substantively inadequate and in many places fundamentally flawed” 
(Hirsch et al 2006:155). This diplomatic ‘embarrassment’ likely reaffirmed China’s 
preference to conduct discussions in a more controllable bilateral setting.  
The Sino-Kazakhstani water dispute, on the other hand, has produced more 
favourable outcomes for China, likely because Beijing can use Kazakhstan’s 
subordinate position as leverage to control the agenda by keeping the negotiations 
bilateral. It is not necessarily Beijing that uses this hierarchy as leverage, but rather 
Astana’s willingness to do it for Beijing. In contrast, for Kazakhstan, resorting to 
international involvement presents a feasible policy option and should be at the 
forefront of Astana’s FP. Interestingly, Astana has complied with Beijing’s 
preference for a bilateral setting, thereby weakening its own bargaining position 
and puzzling international and domestic observers alike (Sievers 2002). Astana’s 
economic dependence and ‘short-term view’ can explain the reluctance to confront 
Beijing through a regional or global institution. As a result, Astana makes FP choices 
that may be sub-optimal for the country as a whole.  
Third Party Participation 
Zeitoun and Warner argue that “having powerful friends can [itself] be a very 
efficient source of power” (Zeitoun and Warner: 449). At the beginning of the 
dispute, Kazakhstan turned to co-riparian Russia and also Kyrgyzstan for support 
(Sievers 2002). However, Moscow declined to get involved because the Irtysh was 
not a foreign priority at the time. Astana also hoped Kyrgyzstan would use its 
position as an upstream riparian to China to blackmail Beijing into a cooperative 
stance, by threatening to divert its own rivers (Sievers, 2003).  This crude strategy, 
failed.  While Astana did initially attempt to open the dispute to other countries, 
potential candidates such as Russia or Kyrgyzstan were unwilling to get involved. 
However, since then Astana has not reached out to other countries such as the US, 
another prominent regional power. Rather, since 2001, Astana only half-heartedly 
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and unsuccessfully attempted to include other nations in the conflict, which was 
consistently blocked by Beijing. Today, officials in Kazakhstan, including Serik 
Akhmetov at the MinEP, consider the inclusion of Russia a viable strategy 
(Kenshimov 2010). However, Beijing has rejected these requests without offering 
Kazakhstani negotiators any concessions in return  (Ryabtsev 2011). This also 
reflects the complex geostrategic context of Central Asia, where closer intra-
regional cooperation and integration has largely failed (Allison 2004), and Russia 
and China exert influence in different ways whilst also seeking closer relations with 
each other. Attempts to balance Russian and Chinese interests are thus becoming 
more difficult for Kazakhstan. An analysis of the geo-strategic implications of 
Kazakhstan’s economic dependence on China, which initially “provide[d] an 
alternative to the excessive dependence on Russia […]” (Kerr 2010) is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
International Forums 
Beijing’s outstanding response to Kazakhstan’s 1992 request to discuss 
transboundary waters indicated that the issue did not rank high on Beijing’s agenda 
(see Chronology of Negotiations) and the vague response in 1995 to ‘study’ the 
issue further underlined this. Shortly thereafter the ‘Shanghai Five’ held its first 
meeting in April 1996, which would have provided an ideal platform (Analitika 2007) 
to address the water dispute (People'sDaily 2000). Yet, interestingly, Nazarbayev 
did not raise the issue (Sievers 2002). Perhaps Kazakhstan’s diplomatic corps was 
too inexperienced and overwhelmed to raise the issue only five years after 
independence. However, this explanation is unsatisfactory given Kazakhstan’s 
otherwise proactive and multilateral foreign policy within the same issue area 
during that period. Earlier in 1992, the government initiated a meeting of the water 
ministries of Central Asian countries in Almaty to set up the Interstate Commission 
for Water Coordination (ICWC) to facilitate the joint use and management of water 
resources. The ICWC has since been supported by a wide range of international 
organisations and NGOs including USAID, ESCAP, GEPF, NATO, GTZ, EU, the Asia-
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Pacific Water Forum and the International Network for Basin Organizations 
(ICWCCA 2009, ICWCCA 2012). This demonstrates that Astana acknowledged water 
supply as a strategic challenge early on and successfully conducted a pro-active and 
multilateral foreign policy in response. A more promising explanation is Astana’s 
acquiescence to Chinese interests to facilitate future investments.  Interestingly, the 
Shanghai Five meeting occurred only one year before CNPC made its investment in 
Kazakhstan with strategic implications for Astana. It acquired a 60.3% stake in 
AkotbeMunaiGas (AMG) and, more importantly, offered to construct the export 
pipeline that broke Russia’s monopoly. It is likely Kazakhstan was aware of CNPC’s 
interest already in April 1996, as oil companies generally undertake multi-year 
feasibility studies before bidding. Moreover, this acquisition constituted CNPC’s 
biggest overseas investment at that point and included financing for a complex 
infrastructure project. Therefore, CNPC likely conducted an investment feasibility 
study and was in talks with the Kazakhstani elite, which controlled AMG. It is thus 
conceivable that Nazarbayev did address the water dispute more visibly at the 
Shanghai Five to avoid jeopardising the imminent CNPC investment. Chapter 3 
discussed the strategic value of CNPC’s pipeline project to Kazakhstan. 
Several years later, Kazakhstan did table the water issue twice at the SCO, first in 
Tashkent in June 2004 and again in 2012, where Kazakhstan proposed the 
establishment of a water and food committee (Baigarin 2012). With its focus on 
traditional and non-traditional security threats, the 2004 summit was an ideal 
platform, as water security is a central issue to most SCO member states. However, 
in its Tashkent Declaration, the SCO subsumed ‘water management’ under the 
lower-profile topic of ‘cooperation in general environmental protection’, possibly 
because of China’s opposition, given that the interests of the remaining SCO 
members were aligned on the issue. Member states agreed vaguely that effective 
regional water resource management should be addressed together, but did not 
specify in more detail (SCO 2004). In 2012, Beijing also blocked the discussion of its 
dispute with Kazakhstan (Ryabov 2012). In view of Beijing’s preference to negotiate 
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on a bilateral basis, its efforts to suppress discussion of the dispute within the SCO 
may not be surprising. The SCO’s multilateral setting mitigates the hierarchical 
relationship with Kazakhstan in Astana’s favour. Beijing’s ability, in turn, to exclude 
discussions on water allocation at the SCO, likely attests to Beijing’s economic and 
financial clout in the organisation (Ryabov 2012). However, by suppressing any 
substantial discussion of the issue at the SCO, Beijing undermines its commitment 
to the SCO in particular and to multilateralism in general. Less than a month after 
the 2004 SCO summit Qian Qichen, the former Vice Premier, dedicated an entire 
speech at a global conference to China’s belief in multilateralism as the best way to 
manage challenges and security threats in the future (Qian 2004). 
Other International Institutions 
Given Kazakhstan’s failure to raise the profile of transboundary water issues at the 
SCO, it could resort to a number of other regional and global bodies, such as the 
Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC),  ADB, OECE, CIS or UN ESCAP. The EAEC has 
a strong investment focus. Its core activities include the improvement of common 
hydro-energy complexes and the Central Asian water supply and thus would 
provide a suitable forum, particularly to address the implications for Kazakhstan’s 
hydropower stations (EurAsEC) . Furthermore, the membership, which includes co-
riparian Russia but not China, makes it more likely that Astana would garner 
support. Given that EAEC also has observer status at the UNGA, it could serve as a 
platform to discuss the dispute more widely. However, Kazakhstan has not raised 
the issue at the EAEC or at any of the other IOs identified by the Chairman of the 
CWR as ideal institutions to develop a regional dialogue to solve transboundary 
water issues with China, such as the UN, SPECA, IFAS, ESCAP and ICWC (Ryabtsev 
2011). Nevertheless, in the end, the government ignored the advice and criticism of 
some of its own officials and solely opted for the low-key and behind-the-scenes 
involvement of UNDP, which assists Kazakhstani negotiators through technical 
expertise and preparatory briefings for meetings with their Chinese counterparts 
(Interview Local Expert).  Consequently, Kazakhstani officials go out of their way to 
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avoid antagonising Beijing (Stone 2012). This can be explained through Kazakhstan’s 
economic dependence on China as the discussion of alternative explanations will 
show. However, this dependence is most effective because of Kazakhstan’s 
domestic context: raising the profile of the dispute through IOs could shine an 
unfavourable light on the government’s achievements so far. 
Alternative Explanations 
In his assessment of the first decade of Sino-Kazakh negotiations, Eric Sievers 
concluded that Kazakhstan’s’ reluctance to engage international organisations was 
the result of a lingering Soviet legacy of conducting foreign affairs, which prefers 
power politics over multilateralism (Sievers, 2002). A lack of data and insight into 
this early period makes it difficult to categorically reject this argument. Arguably, 
Kazakhstani diplomats had no faith in international regimes at that stage. Astana’s 
early achievements in multilateralism including the ICWC, however, call this 
argument into question. Even if the Soviet legacy drove Kazakhstan’s early foreign 
policy behaviour, this certainly is no longer the case today. Kazakhstan is now an 
active participant in regional and international multilateral organisations, especially 
in the environmental realm, where it has managed to garner significant support for 
its Green Bridge Initiative in ESCAP and at the UN. Astana became a proactive 
proponent of environmental cooperation in general.  It has acceded to a number of 
global environmental initiatives, including the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol in 2009 and has offered to host a 
sub-regional Central Asian office of UNEP (UNPM). Beyond environmental 
initiatives, Astana has also used IOs to boost its image abroad. In a considerable 
diplomatic achievement, Kazakhstan chaired the OSCE in 2011, the first former 
Soviet Republic to do so. Similarly, it also founded the Conference on Interaction 
and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), which has a permanent 
secretariat in Almaty and annually brings together its 24 member states, eight 
observer states and three observer organisations including the UN, the Arab League 
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and OSCE.152 Summit participants include heads of states, such as Vladimir Putin 
and Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Not only does Kazakhstan’s active 
involvement in other IOs contradict the hypothesis on Soviet style politics, it is also 
inconsistent with Kazakhstan’s conduct in its other transboundary water disputes, 
including along the Chu and Talas rivers, which originate in Kyrgyzstan and to which 
Kazakhstan is also a downstream riparian. The water dispute centres on reservoirs, 
dams and canals in Kyrgyzstan and has been resolved in a mutually beneficial way. 
UN ESCAP and UNESCE assisted with the establishment of the Chu-Talas Water 
Commission in 2006, which has a permanent secretariat and expert working groups, 
headed by government officials from both countries (Chu-Talas-Commission 2012). 
A range of IOs provide technical and managerial support and the secretariat fully 
institutionalised the dispute. Kazakhstan agreed in 2000153  to share maintenance 
and operating costs of dams and reservoirs in Kyrgyzstan, in accordance with how 
much water it receives (OSCE et al. 2006, Chu-Talas-Commission 2012).  These 
examples illustrate that Kazakhstan does not in general shy away from IOs but 
rather recognises their efficacy, yet in practice decides against using them in the 
dispute. The bilateral negotiation setting is at odds with Astana’s otherwise pro-
active engagement of IOs. Hence the at best indirect multilateralism practised by 
the Kazakhstani government, where UNDP provides support mainly through 
information sharing, is not the result of inexperience, reluctance or capacity 
constraints regarding IOs. A more satisfactory explanation is Kazakhstan’s economic 
dependence on China and Astana’s concern that the involvement of an IO would 
introduce transparency that could also feed criticism at home. As a result, China can 
successfully keep the dispute bilateral and institutionally weak (no permanent 
secretariat), thus maximising the inherent power asymmetry between both states, 
which is also reflected in its control of the agenda. 
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 An overview of recent activities can be found on the CICA website (CICA 2010). 
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 Agreement on Utilization of the Water Facilities of Interstate Use on the Chu and Talas  
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Beijing has prioritised oil and energy interests over the transboundary water 
dispute, consistently relegating the topic to the bottom of the agenda. In joint 
statements and communiqués of bilateral meetings since 2002, transboundary 
rivers are sometimes omitted and only once appear in the top third of the agenda 
(FMPRC 2002). In the 2004 meeting, transboundary rivers are at best alluded to in a 
segment where both sides commit to the responsible use of resources (FMPRC 
2004). Rather than outlining a potential solution to the transboundary water 
conflict, the strategic partnership of 2005 only notes the achievements of the JWC 
and a commitment for continued cooperation (FMPRC 2005). The 2006 
communiqué constitutes an outlier in this regard and mentions the water conflict in 
the top third of bilateral issues, where both sides underline their willingness to 
further strengthen cooperation (FMPRC 2006). However, from 2007 onwards, the 
issue dropped but could still be found in the top half of the joint communiqué 
(FMPRC 2007a,2007b). In 2008, the conflict was again relegated to the bottom 
quarter of the agenda, after the Beijing Olympics and agricultural cooperation 
(FMPRC 2008a, 2008b). The issue has remained towards the bottom in joint 
communiqués in subsequent years (FMPRC 2009, FMPRC 2010, FMPRC 2011a, 
2011b). In 2012 the water dispute was discussed as the last item in section three 
out of seven. Both sides agreed that they will promote the implementation of the 
technical work necessary for water allocation (FMPRC 2012). However, it is unclear 
whether the agreement has any effect. 
The reason for the apparent uptick in importance of the transboundary water issue 
in 2006 is unclear. At this point in time, CNPC was tendering for the Uzen field, a 
deal which CNPC successfully closed one year later. Around 2005, the investment 
climate in Kazakhstan had turned more anti-Chinese and perhaps Beijing assigned 
greater importance to garner some goodwill. Aside from 2006, however, Beijing 
seemed in control of the bilateral setting and the agenda of this water dispute.  
China’s ability to set the agenda and to continuously prioritise its economic 
interests in Kazakhstan can be explained either through Kazakhstan’s inability or 
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disinterest to push the transboundary water dispute higher up on the agenda.  
However, although analytically helpful, both explanations are based on the same 
key variable: Kazakhstan’s economic dependence on China.  
In parallel to the negotiation process, China has become more important to 
Kazakhstan’s economic growth, but also to Kazakhstan’s elite, which relies on rents 
and stable revenues to stay in power. It is thus possible to assume that Kazakhstani 
officials did not attempt to get the water dispute higher up on the bilateral agenda 
to avoid antagonising Beijing, which could risk crucial economic benefits.  Weiner, 
for example, showed how Beijing’s used its financial influence to set the agenda in 
its bilateral meetings with the US. Thus, it is likely that Beijing’s financial clout over 
Kazakhstan can exert a similar effect (Weiner, 2011).  Despite its unfavourable 
position, Kazakhstan has the ability to significantly increase its agenda-setting 
power (discussed below). However, it deliberately decides not to use this ability, 
which further corroborates the hypothesis.  
7.3.3 Stalling for Time 
Throughout the dispute, Beijing has withheld information about its construction 
plans, refused to grant Kazakhstani officials access to construction sites154 and 
generally stalled the negotiations as long as possible without appearing outright 
obstructive. In Fearon’s terms, China led a war of attrition (Fearon 1998). Already in 
1992, the Kazakhstani Ambassador Murat Auezov delivered a water-sharing 
proposal request to Beijing (see Chronology of Negotiations). Breaking with 
diplomatic etiquette, Beijing delayed a reply until 1995, when it verbally ensured it 
would study the issue. In another example, both sides agreed to regularly exchange 
                                                     
154
 In 2001, during his visit to Beijing, Ramazanov was only granted access to documents and data 
about the canal but he was denied access to the building site itself. Nevertheless, Ramanzanov 
considered this a success and claimed that the canal didn’t pose a threat. At least until 2001 
Kazakhstani officials had not been granted access to the site in Xinjiang.  
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data in 1999, but only twelve years later, in 2011, did tentative signs emerge that 
the relevant research is underway in Xinjiang.   
China’s stalling strategy serves two purposes. Firstly, it delays any binding 
agreement that restricts China’s water intake. Secondly, it buys time for China to 
proceed with its construction plans, thus creating a new negotiation reality on the 
ground. For example, concurrently with Beijing assuring Kazakhstan that it was 
studying the transboundary water issue, it drafted plans to build the Karamay Canal 
(Chapter 5). Part and parcel of this strategy is China’s demand for time to conduct 
its own technical studies (Interview Local Expert) and its refusal to share data with 
Kazakhstan that could facilitate the negotiations. The lack of political will in 
Kazakhstan to improve hydrological data collection plays into the hands of Beijing, 
by providing the pretext on which Beijing can request scientific studies. Again, the 
Kazakhstani government does not object and plays further into the hands of Beijing. 
This hydrological situation can be viewed as a typical outcome of Rentier State 
dynamics, where capital often gets misallocated, which in turn introduces 
institutional weaknesses from which China can benefit (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) 
The MRC Experience  
The MRC experience also demonstrated to Beijing to question and to verify claims 
made by negotiation parties and/or their civil societies but also illustrated that 
these technical studies draw out negotiations. Beijing also saw that a lack of data 
transparency can create unwanted and perhaps unwarranted criticism where civil 
society is actively involved in the dispute; NGOs claimed that China’s dams along 
the Mekong caused bad flooding in 2008 and worsening draughts in 2010. In 
response, Beijing published its own study, to contradict these claims (Xinhua 2010) 
by drawing on the global context of climate change and a higher frequency of more 
severe droughts that occur ‘naturally’. Similarly, an independent study 
commissioned by the MRC later confirmed that Chinese dams were not to blame 
for the draughts (Interview International Water Expert 1). However, instead of 
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exchanging more data following the Mekong example, Beijing appears to have 
stalled the negotiations by requesting further studies. International observers in the 
Sino-Kazakh dispute accuse Beijing of turning these technical studies into a 
deliberate strategy to “purposefully drag its feet” (Interview Local Expert). While 
the studies are ongoing, Beijing can finish its construction projects, which “create 
new facts on the ground that are irreversible” (Interview Local Expert). When after 
the completion of yet another technical study both parties return to the table, 
Beijing, has de-facto changed the realities on the ground and thus created a new 
basis from which to negotiate.  Analogously along the Mekong, Beijing considered 
MRC membership only after it had already completed four dams and thus created 
irreversible facts. Now it is approaching the MRC to better manage these dams.  
Beijing also combines the stalling approach with a policy of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ 
(Interview, Kurt Mørck Jensen). China does not share its plans, data or impact 
assessments and does not ask other states for permission with respect to works and 
plans that affect the flow of transboundary water. As a result, other states, 
including Kazakhstan, cannot anticipate changes to their water flows or address 
these plans in negotiations before construction commences. Once projects have 
been executed, it is difficult to reverse them. Furthermore, co-riparians do not have 
access to data points that could allow them to push negotiations forward 
(Kenshimov 2010). ‘Don’t ask’ captures Beijing’s reluctance to ask for data or impact 
assessments from its co-riparians, which might force Beijing to act upon this 
information.  China’s stalling strategy is so effective because the studies it carries 
out do not concern themselves with the core problem of the dispute, the allocation 
of water. Instead, Chinese studies deal with all other areas of transboundary water 
management such as pollution, hydropower and emergency systems. These studies 
often lead to subsequent follow-on studies, buying more time for Beijing. The string 
of studies is so long-winded because Beijing refuses to set a timeline for the dispute 
resolution. It seems that this strategy is clearly recognised by Chinese scholars, who 
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urge the government to continue to avoid setting a deadline for the resolution of 
the dispute (Wang and Hu, 2011). 
When Beijing does address transboundary water allocation in its studies, it does so 
in issue areas which are not as relevant to the dispute resolution, which naturally 
prolongs the negotiations further. The chronology of negotiations in the previous 
segment showed that Beijing agreed to swap data where pollution is concerned, or 
where data is necessary to create an early warning emergency system along 
transboundary rivers (Chapter 5). These numerous technical studies provide the 
further advantage of shifting the focus from the political aspects of the conflict to 
technical and scientific elements, which thus de-politicise the dispute and give it a 
technocratic colouring instead. Kazakhstani negotiators point out that the scientific 
and technical angle also generally better suits Beijing’s technocrats and their mind 
sets (Nurgali Ashimov, Kazakhstani Minister of Environmental Protection). 155 IR 
literature considers the de-politicising of a dispute a feasible step towards finding a 
solution, especially when arguments get heated and easily spill over into civil 
society. For example, in the Mekong dispute, the technical cooperation between 
the MRC and China has worked well (Interview International Water Expert 1). 
However, this may be primarily because along the MRC, Chinese hydropower dams 
only affect flooding cycles but do not lead to a net loss of water as in Kazakhstan’s 
case. In other words, the relatively smooth technical cooperation along the Mekong 
works well because the stakes are lower. In the Sino-Kazakh dispute, by contrast, 
de-politicising the issue has simply led to the pushing the dispute further into the 
background and down the political agenda, which seriously impedes progress (see 
(1) Information Secrecy, above). So far, Beijing has successfully managed to stall the 
negotiations and delay any measures or meaningful data input that could lead to a 
water allocation agreement in the conflict. Astana is aware of China’s strategy 
which one analyst candidly summarises as follows:  
                                                     
155
 Ahimov was quoted in the media as saying: “negotiations between [my] country and China 
[…]were moving forward “with great difficulty” (OOSKAnews,2011)     
 .  
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“China is not set up to find a speedy resolution to the problem, perhaps 
this is why China approaches the use and protection on transboundary 
rivers through technical positions at the interagency level” and “It 
seems China’s position on the allocation and protection of 
transboundary rivers was informed by their desire to delay the time and 
implement water development projects in Xinjiang” ((Talgat 
Mamyrayymov cited in (Bachische 2012)). 
It is easy for Beijing to stall the negotiations because the dispute parties have not 
set a timeline or road map to arrive at a dispute solution. Kazakhstan’s inability to 
speed up the negotiation process lies in its avoidance of challenging China more 
aggressively, which is rooted in Kazakhstan’s economic dependence on China and 
decision makers’ anxieties of risking Chinese revenues. Interviewees in Kazakhstan 
confirmed that Astana considers China a key source of future revenues (Interview 
NBK) and that there is an understanding that it would be easy for Beijing to forego 
its investments in Kazakhstan (see Part I) . One interviewee summed it up in his 
assessment that “we are peanuts” (Local Finance Expert1 ).  
However, Kazakhstan’s domestic context, especially the elite’s lack of political will, 
further facilitates Beijing’s efforts to stall any progress that would lead to a 
commitment to restrict its water intake. Kazakhstan’s own weak water 
management capabilities provide China with the pretext to conduct further studies 
before an agreement can be reached, and to question Astana’s motivation. The 
next segment discusses how Astana is complicit in China’s negotiation success. 
7.3.4 Exploitation of Institutional Weaknesses   
Kazakhstan’s weak water management capabilities, especially its dated hydrometric 
system, give Beijing a pretext to doubt Kazakhstani data and deny water allocation 
demands (discussed below). Even Kazakhstani officials themselves occasionally 
acknowledge that this critically undermines their negotiation position in two ways 
(Sorokoumova 2010): Firstly, Beijing can argue that it should not bear the 
responsibility and compensate for Kazakhstani water inefficiencies and 
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mismanagement by providing it greater access to its own water resources 
(Interview Russell Frost). Failing to improve water management and efficiencies at 
home raises suspicions in China that Kazakhstan seeks a free ride off Chinese 
resources (Interview ibid.). This also extends to any discussions on pollutants. 
Kazakhstan complains about high levels of untreated waste water that enter the Ili 
and Irtysh in China but the government “has no leg to stand on” given the dire state 
of waste water facilities in Kazakhstan (Interview, Tim Hannan).  
Secondly, although Chinese activities lead to a net loss of water, Astana cannot 
quantify this loss which must form the basis of an allocation agreement (Russel 
Frost). Thus, Astana cannot credibly put forth demands.  Experts agree that 
convincing Beijing to sign a water allocation agreement requires Kazakhstan to 
credibly demonstrate by what volumes China abstracts. Other issue areas have 
shown that Beijing takes data quality seriously and that negotiation partners with 
inadequate or partial data lose credibility in Beijing’s eyes.156 China is likely aware of 
Kazakhstan’s poor data-monitoring practices because of multiple contact points 
exist between Chinese and Kazakhstani experts. For example, a high-level workshop 
in Almaty jointly organised by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and 
UNDP was attended by both Chinese officials including Renhe Zhang, President of 
the Chinese Academy of Meteorological Sciences (CAMS),157 and Chao Qingchen, 
from the China Meteorological Administration (CMA) as well as their Kazakhstani 
counterparts. At the workshop, Berik Baymagambetov, director at Kazhydromet, 
reported frankly about the state of hydrometric stations inside Kazakhstan (WMO 
2005). Not only does Astana lose credibility, but Kazakhstan’s weak institutions 
provide a legitimate pretext for Beijing to question Kazakhstan’s position and 
demand further studies, thus buying more time.  
                                                     
156
 Conversation with a EC Diplomat in Beijing, 2004 
157
 CAMS is the research arm of the China Meteorological Administration.  
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Political Will  
What is perhaps most surprising is that Astana has the ability to rectify both issues 
to lend its demands the necessary credibility, yet does not act accordingly. 
Deteriorating waste water practices in Kazakhstan are indicative of political 
mismanagement, rather than the Soviet legacy or a lack of economic means 
(Chapter 6). The government’s reluctance to implement recommendations from IOs 
further supports the view that a lack of political will is the cause. What appears as 
lack of political will can be explained through the different cost-benefit calculations 
that inform decisions in a Rentier State, where the elite’s immediate concern is the 
preservation of power in the short-term (Chapters 2,5). In the past, several IOs have 
attempted to help Kazakhstan improve its water management capacity, to gain 
credibility in negotiations with China. The EU alone has supported more than 300 
projects worth €140m to provide policy advice and technical assistance to various 
ministries, including the MinEP (EU 2012). For instance, the EU’s River Basin 
Management project under the Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (TACIS) 158  initiative 159  is one of the biggest programmes 
underway in Kazakhstan. In its scope and objectives, the project also refers to its 
benefits regarding Kazakhstan’s negotiations with China. 
“Although the transboundary management issue lies outside the remit 
of the EU funded project, the external threat provides a strategic 
backdrop to the pilot project. The pilot project presents an opportunity 
to develop a core of knowledge and management tools that could 
contribute to Kazakhstan’s strategic negotiations with China on 
transboundary water management” (EU Doc 1 2006:1).160 
                                                     
158
 Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS), was the first 
cooperation framework guiding EU programmes for the CIS region. In 2006 it was replaced with the 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) whose guiding principles are the EU’s 
Development Cooperation Instruments (DCI).  
159
 In  2002 EU TACIS was replaced with the EU’s Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)  
160
 “The European Union’s Tacis Central Asia Action Programme 2006 for “Republic of Kazakhstan”. 
Development and Improvement of Policy Instruments for Environmental Protection, Republic of 
Kazakhstan, Result 3.1:Ili-Balkhash LEAP”. 
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Given that external institutions recognise the damaging effect that Kazakhstan’s 
poor water management record has on the negotiations with China, it is almost 
inconceivable that the Kazakhstani government is not aware itself.  Within TACIS 
the EU has extended its project focus on river basin management, explicitly 
identifying the core objective to “[…] systematically collect information and create a 
database on the river basin in the Ili-Balkhash Basin”, (UNDP 2012) thus explicitly 
aiming at improving Kazakhstan’s data capabilities. Although the programme has 
made recommendations, Astana has so far shown little interest in their 
implementation (Interview Russel Frost). Astana’s lacklustre attitude towards 
improving its negotiation position permeates the negotiations.  For example, in 
2010, the EU project suggested Kazakhstan create urgently a unified water 
management body (UWMB) to overcome the conflicts of interests between 
different ministries currently sharing responsibility and to facilitate better 
monitoring and water usage along the river basins. The project found that the cost 
of establishing such a body to be marginal, since it would simply combine functions 
already carried out by different ministries (TACIS 2010)(EuropeAid 2006). Astana 
failed to follow the EU’s advice and further, has not undertaken any other 
significant steps to improve its water management capabilities, further illustrating a 
lack of political will rather than a lack of funds. This is particularly puzzling in view of 
the negative consequences for the transboundary dispute. 
By exploiting Kazakhstan’s weak water institutions, Beijing can both successfully 
rebuff Kazakhstani demands for water-sharing agreements and delay any 
agreement by insisting on further scientific studies. On the other hand, Beijing can 
control the negotiations because it is not n sharing its data, which could facilitate 
progress (Cascao & Zeitoun 2010).  This is also consistent with its behaviour along 
the Mekong. While Kazakhstan’s economic dependence on China can explain both 
the government’s lack of motivation for challenging Beijing and its unwillingness to 
push for a resolution timeline, it does not explain its reluctance to improve the 
country’s own water management capabilities. Improving water institutions would 
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have positive ramifications beyond the water conflict including improved water 
access in Kazakhstan and thus, less pressure to find a solution with China. As it 
stands right now, Astana actually runs the risk of antagonising Beijing over water 
diversion claims, which Kazakhstan can inflate disproportionally without hard data. 
That this possibility is also reality is frequently seen in the official depiction of the 
water supply situation in Kazakhstan, with claims that the country suffers from 
water scarcity, whilst the UN considers Kazakhstan only water stressed (Chapter 6). 
Instead, the lack of motivation to undertake the necessary changes reflects the 
short-term view on policy that this thesis discussed in the beginning and that is 
inherent to Kazakhstan’s neopatrimonial political system (See Chapter 3).   
7.3.5 Preventing External Dispute Resolution  
China pursues absolute sovereignty over its rivers also beyond the dispute (UN 
1997). For example, when the ADB moved to endorse the Convention on the Law of 
the Non-Navigational Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes 
(1997 Convention), China dispatched a large delegation to the ADB conference in 
Manila. At the conference, Beijing strategically broke up the attendees into smaller 
sub-groups in order to communicate its strong opposition to the 1997 Convention 
(Interview Kurt Mørck Jensen).  Nonetheless, Chinese attempts to exploit legal 
weaknesses associated with the implementation of international environmental 
regimes are increasingly at odds with developments of customary international 
environmental law, common state practice and public opinion, none of which 
consider absolute sovereignty to be unlimited, especially where state actions 
negatively effects another state. Thet sovereignty stance also undermines its 
commitment to the Sino-Kazakhstani Good-Neighbourly Treaty of Friendship and 
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration of 1992 which it co-authored   
“States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their 
own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental 
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policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. “  (Chee 
Yoke 2012). 
Although China opposed the 1997 Convention, a recent ICJ ruling transferred key 
elements into customary international law in acknowledgement of the fact that 
they reflect customary practice among states. Whether its principles find 
enforceable application to Beijing’s conduct along the Irtysh and Ili rivers depends 
on whether jus cogens161applies, which remains subject to debate. Either way, the 
implications are considerable for China.  In Article 2 of its 2001 agreement with 
Kazakhstan, China committed to finding a solution based on the equitable and 
reasonable utilisation of the rivers (Government 2001), thereby referring to the two 
cardinal principles of international environmental law (McIntyre, 2011), based on 
the understanding that transboundary rivers are “shared resources” (McIntyre, 
Jägerskog et al. 2010), an interpretation already widely accepted before the ICJ 
ruling in 2010. Accordingly, agreements between states should reflect these 
principles, which include an obligation not to cause significant harm and a duty to 
notify and exchange information (Raadgever, Mostert et al. 2008). The ICJ 
confirmed that states violate these principles “if the interests of the other riparian 
State in the shared resource and the environmental protection of the latter were 
not taken into account" (ICJ 2010):  
“[a] practice, which in recent years has gained so much acceptance 
among States that it may now be considered a requirement under 
general international law to undertake an environmental impact 
assessment where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity 
may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in 
particular, on a shared resource. Moreover, due diligence, and the duty 
of vigilance and prevention which it implies, would not be considered to 
have been exercised, if a party planning works liable to affect the 
regime of the river or the quality of its waters did not undertake an 
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 Jus cogens describes  an absolute, peremptory legal norm which cannot be violated under any 
circumstances and thus has applicability throughout the world. 
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environmental impact assessment on the potential effects of such 
works.” 
It further defined the due diligence162 process necessary to prevent significant harm 
to the co-riparian. Accordingly, states have the duty to notify, consult, exchange 
information and conduct a transboundary environmental impact assessment (TEIA) 
prior to commencing construction, particularly when proposed industrial activities 
are expected to have a significant adverse impact on the co-riparian (McIntyre 
2011, ICJ 201). Advanced notification and EIAs are now customary practice among 
states and, with the ICJ ruling, part of international law, demonstrating that the 
sovereignty approach [is] “at best an anachronism that has no place in today’s 
interdependent, water scarce world” (McIntyre, Jägerskog et al. 2010:62).  China’s 
violation of customary international practice brings Beijing’s commitment to 
mutually beneficial cooperation into question. After all, Beijing did not notify 
Kazakhstan about future projects along the transboundary water nexus, including 
the recent building of reservoirs and hydropower dams (Kenshimov 2010), but 
rather leaves it to Kazakhstani officials to ‘detect’ such activity (Chapter 5,).  
Furthermore, Beijing has not conducted any TEIAs before executing its projects, 
again violating customary international law and practice.163   
Despite the advances in international environmental regulation, questions remain 
around enforceability and jurisdiction remain and the ICJ only has jurisdiction if 
both parties consent. Beijing’s consent to an external dispute resolution is unlikely 
and enforceability depends on whether the international community will interpret 
these norms as ius cogens. In the meantime, Beijing can exploit these legal 
uncertainties. Nevertheless, Beijing must still consider international common 
                                                     
162
 States have to inform a riparian as soon as possible of any project that might have transboundary 
effects which means as soon as it is in possession of plans, this includes “reasonable efforts by a 
state to inform itself of factual and legal components that relate foreseeably to a contemplated 
procedure and to take appropriate measures in timely fashion to address them. Thus, states are 
under an obligation to take unilateral measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or 
minimise the risks (McIntyre 2011:140). 
163
 Also confirmed in an email conversation with an International Legal Expert who specialises in 
International Environmental Law and Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessments (TEIA).  
303 
 
practice, as non-compliant behaviour can generate a reputational problem, similar 
to the one China experienced along the Mekong. Beijing may consider this 
especially risky in Central Asia, where such behaviour may feed into underlying 
suspicions about China’s expansion and abuse of power. Interestingly, the official 
language used by China in the water dispute with Kazakhstan seems to pay homage 
to these recent changes in international law. In meetings, both parties hold that the 
principles of ‘equitable’ and ‘reasonable’ use of the water should inform the dispute 
(Chapter 5). However, instead of applying them, these principles appear to be 
rhetoric at best. A lack of substantive actions on Beijing’s part indicates that 
perhaps China merely wants to create the impression that it is complying with 
international standards.164  
Despite the weaknesses of international environmental law, Beijing does take these 
developments seriously enough to build capabilities in international water law, to 
prepare for potential legal challenges that might arise from its transboundary rivers. 
Beijing’s circumvention of customary international environmental law provides 
Astana with a number of opportunities to challenge Beijing in front of an 
international body. Although enforceability of international environmental law 
remains weak, Astana may gain concessions from Beijing by simply threatening with 
a legal challenge. Independent of the prospects of such a law case, the resulting 
publicity would lift the dispute to a global level, increasing attention from 
academics and the media. Despite an awareness of the international legal situation, 
this research has not uncovered a single Kazakhstani initiative to resort to 
international law.  In fact, the government has come under pressure domestically 
for missing these opportunities (Borisov, 1999).  
China’s line of action in the conflict also violated pre-existing legal agreements, such 
as the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1957, to which Kazakhstan succeeded after the 
dissolution of the USSR (Sievers, 2003). This treaty covers the ‘Regime of 
                                                     
164
 This is not an isolated case. China turns to adopt legal international language, such as ‘freedom of 
religion’ or ‘human rights’, however giving them a completely different interpretation.  
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Commercial Navigation on Border Waterways and Tributary Streams and Lakes’ 
(Slusser & Triska 1959:395), and both parties agree not to interfere with the 
navigability of their transboundary rivers. However, Beijing’s water diversion lowers 
the water levels of the Irtysh and Ili, thus risking their navigability (Sievers 2003: 
184). China has violated not only the Sino-Soviet treaty in substance, but also more 
recent agreements in spirit. China has signed an agreement with Kazakhstan and 
committed to find an “equitable and reasonable” solution to the transboundary 
water dispute (Article 2, Joint Agreement), but ongoing construction activity 
appears to undermine this promise.  
As sceptics on international environmental law frequently note, even bilateral 
environmental agreements are difficult to enforce, because they often lack clearly 
defined obligations, based on which a case could be built. Nevertheless, and as 
stated above, Kazakhstan could initiate a legal discussion on the international level 
to shift public opinion in its favour, thus putting Beijing under pressure as the MRC 
did. Especially since international law now enshrines the concept of equitable use of 
transboundary rivers, Astana should be confident that public opinion would be 
receptive to its case. It could be expected that at a minimum, Beijing would need to 
demonstrate that it has taken Kazakhstan’s interests into consideration when 
planning and constructing its reservoirs, canals and hydropower dams. However, 
beyond international water law and the Sino-Soviet Treaty, legal scholars have 
identified a number of alternative legal options that Kazakhstan could pursue. 
These include conventions signed by both China and Kazakhstan that indirectly 
touch on water issues. For example, Astana could submit challenges under the 
“Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought 
and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa” (UNCCD 1994) the UN “Convention on 
Biological Diversity” (CBD 1992) or the UNESCO “Convention Concerning the 
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (UNESCO 1972). These 
conventions would allow Kazakhstan to make the case that China’s water 
abstraction threatens biological diversity along its south-eastern water nexus, which 
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is fed by the Irtysh and Ili (Sievers 2003). This might be a feasible strategy, given 
that Lake Balkhash and Lake Zaysan have been widely recognised for their unique 
biodiversity. Some experts believe the lake was created over 65 million years ago, 
potentially making it the world’s oldest lake. Lake Balkhash, on the other hand, is 
home to over 120 bird species, twelve of which are officially endangered. Yet 
another possibility rests with private Kazakhstani citizens, who can sue China or 
Chinese companies over any transboundary harm caused by China’s water 
abstraction.  For example, the fishing industry in Lake Balkash is adversely affected 
by shallower waters, which affect spawning cycles.  In theory, any affected person 
could litigate either against the company who built the canal or against the Chinese 
state under whose jurisdiction the harm has occurred (Nollkaemper et al 2008:5). 
Such litigation could be brought forward against China in Kazakhstani courts. 
However, this has not occurred thus far and it is questionable whether Kazakhstani 
courts would cooperate in such litigation, given their lack of independence and the 
possible implications this may have for the Sino-Kazakhstani relationship. 
Despite these favourable developments, Kazakhstan has not resorted to the 
international legal system to address deadlock with China. This decision 
undoubtedly comes with costs for Kazakhstan, especially in the long run. As time 
passes, the provision of international law for the equitable and reasonable use of 
transboundary waters will work in China’s favour, because it takes population needs 
into consideration. The rapid socio-economic development in Xinjiang will likely 
continue to increase Xinjiang’s population also through an influx of Han Chinese. 
Given that Kazakhstan’s population growth has been slower in comparison, China 
will be entitled to a greater share of water intake going forward (Sievers, 2003). 
Especially in the early stages of the conflict, Astana was questioned for not resorting 
to the international legal system. Today, criticism has become more muted, perhaps 
because the government has managed to push the dispute out of the public eye.  
Interestingly, calls for reverting to international law are more prominently coming 
from Chinese academics, who recommend that China consult international law, 
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specifically the 1997 Convention, to solve the dispute (Wang and Hu, 2011). This 
might stem from China’s positive experiences of international settlement 
mechanisms such as the WTO, which settled several high-profile trade disputes 
against the US and the EU in Beijing’s favour (Miller 2011). 
Kazakhstan’s economic dependence as well as the elite’s reluctance to challenge 
Beijing can also account for Astana’s reluctance to resort to IOs and international 
law. This can be further substantiated by ruling out alternative explanations. One 
often cited explanation for Kazakhstan’s behaviour is the relative lack of expertise 
of Kazakhstan’s diplomatic corps. After independence, Kazakhstan did lack an 
“indigenous foreign policy elite” (Cummings 2003: 139) and thus the relevant 
expertise in international environmental law. The matter was further complicated 
by the fact that international environmental law only made significant 
achievements later, following the 1992 Rio Declaration and the 1997 Convention.  A 
lack of expertise may also explain why Kazakhstan did not manage to nudge Beijing 
to the negotiation table earlier. However, over the last ten years, Kazakhstan built 
significant expertise in international law, with a large number of Kazakhstani 
students studying law abroad. The popular Bolashak scholarship programme sends 
up to 1,000 students abroad annually, all of whom are committed to return home 
and work in Kazakhstan for several years. Former US Ambassador Hoagland 
summaries the impact of the programme as follows:  
“The so-called BOLASHAK Generation is apparent now throughout the 
public and private sectors -- bright, globalized, young people, almost all 
speaking English, who are in positions just a level or two away from 
decision-making authority “(Hoagland, 2009j). 
Today, Kazakhstan is home to several reputable international law firms with 
qualified local staff. Perhaps most tellingly, some legal experts demonstrated early 
on that Beijing was in violation of international customary law (Sievers 2002). In 
addition, Kazakhstan is actively involved in a number of legal frameworks at the UN. 
For example, it has been an active member of the UN Committee on the Peaceful 
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Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPOUS) since 1994, even serving as an annual co-sponsor 
and an outspoken proponent of drafting legislation to regulate outer space rights 
(UN 2010). Having served as the USSR launching pad for space flights, including the 
first manned space flight under Yuri Gagarin, Kazakhstan recognises the prestigious 
aspects of its historic link to questions of outer space. Here Kazakhstani 
involvement also extends to water issues with Kazakhstan, advocating the benefits 
of using space technology for water management on the ground (UN 2010).165  
Kazakhstan also has significant diplomatic representation at IOs beyond the UN, 
such as UNESCO and OSCE. There are currently 73 Kazakhstani embassies and 
consulates abroad. As for staffing on specifically international environmental issues, 
there appears to be no lack of enthusiasm or man power.166  Kazakhstan actively 
encourages fellow Central Asian countries to accede to the Helsinki convention, 
even making “concerted efforts to engage China” (UN 2008: 27). In fact, 
Nazarbayev’s Greenbridge initiative epitomises Astana’s explicit priority to become 
a leader in international environmental cooperation. This initiative aims to link the 
environmental efforts of Asia and Europe, spanning 95 countries and two thirds of 
the world population (UNECE 2011). Nazarbayev launched the initiative at the 
UNGA, and his diplomatic corps has successfully lobbied ESACP, as well as United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) for full support. In this case, 
Kazakhstani diplomats certainly demonstrated the expertise to successfully navigate 
IOs to enlist international support. The active and successful involvement of Astana 
contradicts the lack of actions taken in the Sino-Kazakh water dispute. However, the 
very personal nature of the Greenbridge Initiative, which is a key effort by 
Nazarbayev to build his legacy, suggests that Kazakhstan mobilises its resources 
where the elite interests are the strongest and where they additionally overlap with 
the national interest. Here it is also in Astana’s interest to keep the faltering 
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 For example a UN report states that “Kazakhstan also is active in developing bilateral and regional 
cooperation in environmental protection, as well as in a greater role in international organizations 
and forums. Many of its efforts are focused on the particular importance of transboundary water 
issues to regional cooperation” (UN 2008).  
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negotiations with China out of public view, as this would cast doubt on Kazakhstan’s 
leadership qualities in the field of effective international environmental 
cooperation, possibly revealing double standards. 
Kazakhstan has also demonstrated that it has the legal expertise to defend its 
interests in a host of international litigation cases, and is considered the most 
experienced CIS country in international investment arbitration (Usoskin 2012). 
Four cases involving Kazakhstan are currently pending at the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) at the WB alone (WorldBank 2012b). 
In 2010, Kazakhstan won a complaint against a previous tribunal decision 
concerning a bilateral investment agreement with Turkey.167 The current case 
against Mukhtar Ablyazov168, the former head of BTA, shows best how effectively 
Kazakhstan can mobilise legal capabilities in a foreign jurisdiction if elite and 
national interests are aligned.  
Another possible explanation for Astana’s lack of recourse to IOs is that the 
government is put off by the burden of proof in environmental cases, which 
currently rests with the affected states. Kazakhstan would have to present detailed 
data showing how China’s water diversion affects Kazakhstan’s access to fresh 
water. As previously discussed, Kazakhstan is not in the position to provide this 
data. However, this problem is not insurmountable, as the government could 
undertake the necessary policy changes and investments in the hydrological sector. 
Nonetheless, Kazakhstan has not drawn on any legal regimes, institutions or 
conventions at its disposal. This is even more telling as international law seems to 
be moving in Kazakhstan’s favour, with attempts to shift the burden of proof from 
the affected states gaining traction  (Sands 2003:273). Although China may soon 
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 Republic of Kazakhstan vs. Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri 
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 Mukthar Abliazov had been Energy Minister and head of Temirbank before being embroiled in 
the opposition and exiled to Russia, from where he returned to head BTA bank. During the credit 
crunch, BTA defaulted which the Kazakhstani government blamed on large scale embezzlement of 
the bank’s funds by Abliazov, who is currently standing trial in the UK. 
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find itself in a position where it must prove that its irrigation projects do not cause 
significant harm to Kazakhstan, there are no signs Astana’s strategy is about to 
change.  
The above examples illustrate that Kazakhstan does not lack the capabilities or 
staffing to pursue legal avenues. It has, in the past, garnered international support 
for its environmental and other initiatives, making the alternative explanations 
presented unsatisfactory. The differentiating factor between the issue areas 
successfully pursued via IOs and the Sino-Kazakhstani water dispute is the elite 
interest (discussed below). Only when the issue is very close to the Kazakhstani 
leadership’s interests does Astana operate effectively in international regimes, as 
strongly exemplified along Astana’s Greenbridge Initiative.  The Sino-Kazakhstani 
water dispute, on the other hand, is driven by Kazakhstan’s economic dependence 
on China and Kazakhstani anxieties around endangering future benefits, as well as 
Kazakhstan’s elite, which lacks the political will to even undertake the domestic 
changes necessary to improve the country’s water management capabilities and 
hence, its position in the dispute. 
The most obvious outcome for the water dispute is that Beijing successfully averts 
any legal challenge and the risk of internationalising the dispute. By refusing to 
address the deadlocked dispute through a broader international mechanism, 
Kazakhstan plays into the interests of Beijing and re-affirms the hierarchic 
relationship with China. However, given the wider context of changes in 
international environmental law, the tide of global public opinion on the subject 
may shift to Beijing’s disadvantage. China may soon find itself in a position, where it 
will be asked to justify the effects of its water abstraction on downstream riparians. 
This has in fact already happened along the Mekong.  
Beijing is aware of the changing international legal framework and is actively 
preparing to mitigate the effects by developing the relevant expertise in 
international water law. For example, Professor Patricia Wouters, from the UNESCO 
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Centre for Water Law, Policy and Science at Dundee University, has been invited as 
a returning scholar by Xiamen University to lecture specifically on these issues 
(Dundee University 2011). By stalling the negotiations as long as possible, Beijing 
has actually bought itself time to develop the legal capabilities necessary should 
Kazakhstan decide to address the dispute in a legal context. 
7.3.6 Isolation of the Water Dispute 
Perhaps most strikingly, China also manages to isolate the water dispute from other 
areas of bilateral cooperation, such as access to resources and security cooperation. 
Here Kazakhstan’s elite possibly plays the most prominent role in facilitating China’s 
interests.  In these areas, the Sino-Kazakhstani relationship should be less 
hierarchical (Chapter 4) and by isolating the water dispute, China maximises the 
effectiveness of Kazakhstan’s economic dependence which increases the 
opportunity costs for Astana. This may be one reason why the JWC was excluded 
from the CKCC structure until 2009 to prevent any issue linkages. Technocrats in 
particular in Kazakhstan highlight Kazakhstan’s lack of leverage in negotiations with 
Beijing and call on the government to improve its bargaining power (Stone 2012) 169. 
A viable option, and one successfully practised by other states, is to link the dispute 
to other issues where Kazakhstan might have advantages vis-à-vis China (Daoudy 
2009:365): this could be areas that are important to Beijing, such as supply of non-
water resources and regional security cooperation, where the power relationship is 
reversed or at least one of interdependence.  Kazakhstan’s non-water resources, 
especially uranium and gas and to a certain extent oil, play an important role in 
China’s medium and long-term energy strategy. This thesis has discussed 
Kazakhstan’s role in Beijing’s attempts to diversify its energy mix and to seek energy 
imports through more reliable overland supply chains (Chapter 4), as well as 
Beijing’s uranium needs. As a result, Chinese NOCs have heavily invested in pipeline 
infrastructure in Kazakhstan, which should increases Astana’s role and bargaining 
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power vis-à-vis Beijing, in line with Lake’s theory on relationally specific assets 
(Lake, 1998). This applies even more to nuclear power. As the world’s second 
biggest producer, Kazakhstan is in a unique position to be the key supplier to 
Chinese demand (WNA 2012). Beijing cemented that relationship in 2011, when 
Nazarbayev agreed to supply China with 55,000 tonnes of uranium and promised to 
meet 40% of China’s uranium demand in the future (Hotter 2011). This provides 
Kazakhstani policy makers with an opportunity to level the playing field, by linking 
the terms of the long-term uranium supplies to concessions in the water dispute. 
This strategy could be successful as alternative uranium suppliers are limited. Other 
options for China include Australia, Canada and Niger, but Kazakhstan produces as 
much uranium as these countries combined (WNA 2012).   
Astana has a strong position in gas exports. The Central Asian Gas Pipeline (CAGP) 
for example, delivers gas from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan but must transit to 
large parts of Kazakhstan (See Figure 53).  It is currently the only natural gas 
pipeline into China, and is thus a key part in Beijing’s plans to diversify its energy 
supply away from its heavy reliance on coal. Completed at the end of 2012, the 
pipeline has a capacity of 40bn meters3/annually and has doubled China’s natural 
gas imports. Beyond the immediate energy benefits, China is heavily invested in 
both the oil and gas pipeline project, which costs around US$7bn. By far the longest 
part of the pipeline, 1115km or 60% of its length, runs through Kazakhstani 
territory, giving Astana a prominent role in its management and security, thus 
creating opportunities for Kazakhstan to use it as a bargaining chip (Figure 53).  
In 2007, Kazakhstan launched one tentative attempt to link the water issue to food 
deliveries. At a meeting with Chinese and Kyrgyz officials on the Ili Basin Integrated 
Water Resource Management (IWRM), Astana proposed to deliver subsidised food 
to China for ten years, in return for Beijing’s commitment to allow free flow of 
water along the Ili (Milas 2007a). However, Beijing flatly rejected the offer. It is 
possible that Beijing did not want to be perceived as being bought off in the 
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presence of a third party (Kyrgyzstan).  Food items, on the other hand, are likely not 
persuasive enough, since food imports are not as hard to come by for Beijing as 
other resources, such as uranium, oil and gas - which are more suitable for levelling 
the playing field.  Energy resources in particular may be a powerful bargaining chip. 
Chinese NOCs are interesting in tapping into more Kazakhstani energy resources in 
the future, as underlined by CNPC’s plan to build another pipeline to access the 
energy resources farther away in the Caspian (Interview Energy Expert). Linking 
further resource agreements, such as a Caspian pipeline to progress in the water 
negotiations, is arguably a low-risk strategy for Astana. Having established the CKCC 
as meta-structure to coordinate various components of the bilateral relationship, 
should facilitate efforts to link  different issues.  
Figure 53 China's First Natural Gas Pipeline 
 
Astana can link regional security issues. Beijing highlighted on numerous occasions 
that it values Kazakhstan’s support in fighting the Three Evils, terrorism, extremism 
and separatism (Xinhuanet 2009),  which affect Xinjiang, because of its intertwined 
history with Central Asia and China’s “weak constitutionality” (Kerr 2008) in this 
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region. As a consequence, political instability caused by the Three Evils in Central 
Asia may spill over into Xinjiang. 
China managed to broaden support for this fight throughout Central Asia because 
Kazakhstan and other SCO member states have adopted Beijing’s rhetoric (SCO 
2012). Perhaps as a result, SCO member states have agreed to extradite foreigners 
if they are accused of one of the Three Evils (HRIC 2011). However, Astana’s security 
cooperation has domestic and international costs. Kazakhstan is home to a large 
Chinese Uighur population, which is also represented in the elite (Karim Massimov). 
Beijing is concerned that this exile group can organise resistance at home and has 
frequently asked Astana to extradite Uighurs. However, these Uighurs are 
sometimes recognised as refugees by UNHCR, and thus receive a minimum level of 
legal protection against extradition. Astana has come under strong criticism 
domestically and internationally for its refoulement of ethnic Uighurs back to China, 
where they often face prosecution if not execution (Amnesty 1998). While the 
Kazakhstani population sometimes associates Uighurs with illegal Chinese labour, 
Uighurs are in general very well integrated. Over 300,000 strong, ethnic Uighurs 
constitute one of Kazakhstan’s largest and fastest growing ethnic minorities. They 
are politically very well organised and have, for example, staged protests against 
China in Almaty, following the 2009 riots in Xinjiang. Given the Sinophobia already 
present in Kazakhstan, the Uighurs put Astana under further pressure by 
highlighting its cooperation and involvement with Beijing. Given the domestic and 
international costs associated with this practice, it is interesting that Astana has not 
asked for concessions in return, at least not publically. By not pursuing this option, 
Astana misses an important opportunity to improve its negotiation position with 
Beijing and to level the playing field. There is a precedent of successfully linking 
water issues to security cooperation. In its dispute over Turkish dam projects along 
the Euphrates and Tigres, Syrian negotiators linked Turkey’s Kurdish security 
concerns to the dispute, which led to a water allocation agreement in 1987 (Daoudy 
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2009: 375).  Prior to the agreement, Syria had supported the PKK and its operations 
in Turkey. 
Kazakhstan also has one of the longest borders with China and Astana’s security 
cooperation is paramount for Beijing. For example, the spread of Islam through 
Central Asia to Xinjiang is a further concern for Beijing, and Kazakhstan’s 
cooperation is thus a potential negotiation point. Cheng Guoping, the former 
Chinese Ambassador to Kazakhstan, emphasised in conversation with the US 
Ambassador, Richard E. Hoagland:  
"Kazakhstan's role and importance is growing daily and is of great 
significance to China for political, economic, and security reasons." 
(Guoping quoted in Hoagland, 2010e) 
This sums up a number of options for Kazakhstan to level the playing field. Astana 
could peg its security cooperation, both bilaterally and within the SCO, to progress 
in the dispute. However, instead, Astana pledges to support China’s diplomatic 
initiatives within IOs, such as the UN, CICA and SCO, in bilateral communiqués. For 
example, Kazakhstan supported China’s boycott of the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony 
for Liu Xiaobo in 2010. Similarly, Nazarbayev echoed Beijing’s calls to replace the US 
Dollar as the global reserve currency within two weeks of China’s high-level 
criticism. Nazarbayev called for a replacement of the US Dollar as the world’s 
reserve currency in March 2009 (Muzalevsky 2009) and again during the OSCE’s 
annual international economic forum in Astana in 2010170. This closely followed 
Beijing’s initiative.  On 23 March 2009, Zhou Xiao Chuan (Zhou 2009), the governor 
of the People’s Bank of China (PBC) called for the creation of a new international 
reserve currency and the de-facto abolishment of the US Dollar, which cause much 
international attention (Anderlini 2010).  The proximity of both public statements is 
interesting. Nazarbayev floated the idea on 10 March 2009, just two weeks earlier. 
This poses the question as to whether both statements were co-ordinated, or 
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whether Beijing and Kazakhstan had discussed the issue previously, for example in 
the SCO.  
Some scholars attribute Astana’s success in getting Beijing to the negotiation table 
at all to Kazakhstan’s resources and their value to Beijing (Economy quoted in Stone 
2012). There is no direct evidence that Astana actually generates such issue 
linkages, for which it also has been criticised domestically.  An alternative 
explanation for Beijing’s willingness to sit at the negotiation table is China’s concern 
both for reputational risks in the region and the risks of losing control over the 
dispute to a third party or international regime. This was highlighted by Mang’s 
testimony before the US Congress where she demonstrated that Beijing is keenly 
aware of how negative overseas environmental impact caused by its SOEs damages 
its public diplomacy and soft power.171 This concern is also reflected in China’s 
stance at the MRC, where an attitude of “we don’t want to look like someone who 
doesn’t care” (Hirsch & Jensen et al 2006) has increased ministerial interest to 
comply with demands for data transparency. While the reputational concerns of 
Beijing can explain the fact that negotiations are taking place, this research has not 
uncovered any instances where Astana proactively linked diplomatic collaboration 
and support for the transboundary water dispute with other issues, where it is in a 
much stronger position vis-à-vis Beijing.  Chinese scholars rightly celebrate this as a 
foreign policy success, as the water dispute has not spilled over to other issue areas, 
affecting the broader scope of Sino-Kazakh “good neighbourly” relations (Wang and 
Hu, 2011).  
This section has illustrated that there are numerous issue areas, spanning energy 
resources to security interests, where Kazakhstan’s strategic role results in 
significant opportunity costs for Beijing if Kazakhstan were to defect. These issue 
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areas also explain why Beijing may be interested in fostering dependencies with 
Kazakhstan (Lake 1999:9). By default, this means that Kazakhstan has bargaining 
power and could link these issues to the water dispute, yet Astana has continuously 
failed to include any of these elements in its conversations with Beijing, aside from 
a half-hearted attempt in 2007. China’s success in isolating the water issue is 
demonstrated by the fact that 19 years of negotiations have yielded no binding 
water allocation agreement. By refusing to level the playing field, Beijing has 
managed to lock Kazakhstan into the hierarchical relationship, which will also 
prevent Astana’s costly defections in issue areas where Astana, can increase China’s 
opportunity costs and mitigate the effects of economic dependence. Oil, gas and 
uranium are difficult and costly to substitute given their specificity (Crescenzi 2005), 
role in China’s energy security, and the late arrival of NOCs on the international 
resource stage. More so uranium, as Kazakhstan is not bound to a complex export 
infrastructure like in oil and gas (Chapter 5). Chinese NOCs must compete with IOCs 
established in resource-rich geographies for a share of the remaining non-
nationalised hydrocarbon assets. Limiting competition for Kazakhstani energy 
resources by locking Kazakhstan into a hierarchical relationship is an effective 
strategy for China and its NOCs (Lake 1999).  
 
7.4 Dispute Outcome   
China has consolidated its control over water resources outside the realm of 
military power. In effect, Beijing has translated its economic power into political 
objectives, such as maintaining absolute sovereignty over transboundary waters, 
turning China into a hydro-hegemon which itself further magnifies the asymmetrical 
relationship (Cascao & Zeitoun 2011). Hydro-hegemony describes the domination of 
a co-riparian over disputed water resources, a status often achieved through 
exploiting existing power asymmetries between co-riparians (Zeitoun & Warner 
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2006). Figure 54 depicts the different forms of hegemony that a co-riparian can 
exert over transboundary waters. In the positive form a benevolent hegemon 
provides public goods, such as infrastructure for cooperation (Zeitoun & Warner 
2006), which corresponds to a liberal interpretation of the hegemonic stability 
theory (Kindleberger, 1973). 
China exercises a negative form of hydro-hegemony (Zeitoun & Warner 2006), 
whereby it unilaterally captures water resources without meaningful concessions. 
By doing so, Beijing exploits weaknesses in the enforceability of international 
environmental law and the absence of significant resistance from Kazakhstan.  In 
theory, China can further its hydro-hegemony as leverage to exert pressure on 
Kazakhstan in other areas (Zeitoun & Warner 2006). For example, Beijing can 
condition a water-allocation agreement to Kazakhstani concessions in other areas, 
such as further access to Kazakhstan’s resource sector, especially in the Caspian, 
which Beijing has failed to access to date (Interview European Diplomat 2) or other 
foreign policy objectives such as support in the fight against the Three Evils. By 
creating links to other issues, such as uranium deliveries, Astana could stymie 
Beijing’s ability to maintain absolute sovereignty over its rivers. However, in its 
current position as hydro-hegemon, Astana risks Beijing ‘turning the tables’ to 
exploit Kazakhstan’s water vulnerabilities by demanding additional concessions 
from Astana itself.  
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Figure 54 Forms of Hydro-Hegemony 
(Zeitoun &Warner 2006) 
China’s behaviour is a missed opportunity to transform the dispute into a positive 
from of hegemony, similarly to France’s role in developing the Commission for 
Rhine Navigation (Chapter 6). China could facilitate cooperation along the Irtysh 
and the Ili and act as positive hydro-hegemon by shaping and retaining the 
monopoly on the rules of the game (Warner &Zeitoun 2006) whilst promoting 
regional cooperation. This would lend its win-win diplomacy (hezuo gongying) real 
weight. Whilst China appears cooperational  (Biba 2007) on the surface, is has made 
not actionable and binding commitment to restricting its own water intake and 
allocating water with Kazakhstan.  Similarly Beijing’s reputation can be at stake if it 
continues with the status quo. In case of a transfer of power, a more transparent 
political system in Kazakhstan may reveal China’s uncompromising stance at the 
expense of Kazakhstan’s national interest.  An expert from the China Institute for 
International Strategic Studies (CIIS) summed this up as follows:  “how to properly 
deal with and solve this dilemma [of conflicting water needs with Kazakhstan] will 
test China’s diplomatic acumen and its ability to govern” (Han, 2011). Kazakhstan’s 
economic dependency can explain why decision makers “show no inclination to 
antagonize China” (Stone 2012: 407) in order to secure the goodwill of Beijing and 
benefit from the perceived economic opportunities.  However, these calculations 
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may not necessarily pay off.  Here the Mekong serves as an informative example. 
The parties to the Agreement on Commercial Navigation on the Lancang-Mekong 
River172 acceded in the hope this would increase trade with China. However, there 
is now a suspicion, at least in Thailand, that the agreement disproportionally 
benefits Chinese exports to Thailand, whilst China refuses to facilitate imports from 
Thailand in return (Hirsch 2006). This may serve as an important lesson to 
Kazakhstan. 
Beijing seemingly appreciates the hierarchical setting with Kazakhstan and its 
benefits. This is most obvious in China’s preference for a bilateral negotiation 
setting, which allows Beijing to maximise the hierarchical relationship and China’s 
reluctance to advance the negotiations. If water inefficiencies in both countries 
remain unchanged, this will further fuel the conflict potential of the dispute in the 
future as China and Kazakhstan may not have the resources to trade in virtual water 
(Allan, 1992), to depoliticise the dispute.    
 
The next section investigates whether these dispute outcomes are the result of 
direct threats from Beijing and are related to the research question of how China 
 can leverage Kazakhstan’s economic dependence.
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7.5 Deliberate dispute outcomes? 
The dispute outcome depicts China as a hydro-hegemon, which is the result of its 
foreign policy objective to maximise sovereignty over its transboundary rivers. 
Although Beijing pursues a number of negotiation strategies the degree of intent or 
the causality in generating these successes is less clear. Meeting minutes or 
protocols do not exist in the public domain, save for officially released statements 
which could be aimed at manipulating public opinion by exaggerating any progress. 
Limited press freedom in both countries further supresses a public debate and 
critical analysis of the negotiations. Consequently, it is difficult to dissect the 
decision-making process and assess where the causal link is located: does Beijing 
issue threats to Kazakhstan in meetings or does Kazakhstan pre-emptively comply 
with Beijing’s agenda to ensure it can maximise perceived future economic 
benefits? Given the lack of direct data, the thesis is limited to the observation of 
outcomes on the ground to infer Chinese objectives. Unless the processes within 
the MFA are known in greater detail, any such analysis necessarily relies on 
circumstantial evidence. Nonetheless, this thesis argues that outcomes are likely 
driven by the pre-emptive acquiescence of Kazakhstan’s elite to Chinese interest or 
what Baldwin has termed “the rule of anticipated reactions”, where 
"one actor, B, shapes his behavior to conform to what he believes are the desires of 
another actor, A, without having received explicit messages about A's wants or 
intentions from A or A's agents.” (Baldwin1980: 499) 
Although the causal pathway differs from direct intent or threats, the outcome 
remains unchanged: China can pursue and maximise its foreign policy interests, at 
least in the water dispute with Kazakhstan. It is unlikely that China issues any direct 
threats in the dispute because the reputational risks associated with direct threats 
are likely too high. 
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Reputational Risks 
Economic threats, once they become known, carry reputational risks for Beijing, 
which are most likely only worth taking in cases where sensitive interests, such as 
its national security, are at stake. Beijing is determined to develop a reputation as a 
peaceful rising power in the region and cannot afford to be seen as a regional bully. 
This concern came to light when, in response to Kazakhstani media criticism of 
China’s water abstractions, Chinese academics complained that Beijing is 
misunderstood and that critics conveniently abuse the China threat theory (Wang & 
Hu, 2011). Threatening stances could set off a wave of Central Asian countries 
seeking assurances from Russia or inviting the US deeper into Central Asia which 
would contradict Chinese intentions to detach the US from the region (Kerr 2008). 
The detrimental effects of perception as a more assertive power were observable in 
the aftermath of the Global Crisis of 2008. Driven by a newfound self-confidence, 
China sharpened its rhetoric and territorial claims of the Sprately and Diaoyu Islands 
with the issuance of economic threats and increased military activity. This 
prompted a renewed US commitment to Asia, possibly by invitation of regional 
countries. While Beijing certainly considers a strengthened US presence in Asia 
undesirable, perhaps the sensitive security issues at stake more than compensate 
for the sub-optimal outcome. In other words, threats to China’s territorial integrity 
are likely worth the opportunity costs of damaging its reputation. Transboundary 
water, on the other hand, does not rank as highly on China’s agenda, making it 
unlikely that Beijing would use explicit economic threats if that risked increased 
Russian and US interference and its perceived sphere of influence.  
Similarly, Beijing has made direct economic threats against states that have 
critiqued China’s human rights record, received the Dalai Lama or awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo (Chapter 1). Such threats have proven effective in 
the past and analysts point toward Beijing’s increasingly sophisticated carrot and 
stick strategy (Chapter 1).  At the time of writing China successfully averted an anti-
322 
 
dumping case initiated by the EU solar industry, using the “lure of commercial 
contracts and the threat of retaliation”(Chaffin and Wiesmann 2012).  
Fuchs and Klann demonstrated in a regression model of 159 states that received the 
Dalai Lama that exports from the host country to China drop by 8.1-16.9% on 
average in the two years following a high-level reception. It takes typically two 
years for trade to rebound (Fuchs and Klann 2010:4). Interestingly, this correlation 
is only statistically significant between 2002 and 2008, the period of Hu Jintao’s 
leadership, and exclusively affects machinery exports. This particularly affects 
machinery exports. However, it is unclear whether exports drop because Beijing 
instructs SOEs to order their machinery from alternative sources or whether 
Chinese companies and consumers themselves boycott these goods in the wake of 
changing political sentiment at home. Yet Kazakhstan should be less susceptible to 
this effect because it predominantly exports resources which are essential to 
China’s economic development. While machinery imports are easy to substitute, 
the high specificity of resources makes it harder for Beijing to seek out alternatives 
without opportunity costs (David A Lake, 1998). Uranium, oil and gas are only 
available in a limited number of countries and difficult to substitute. Additionally, 
Beijing’s existing investment in Kazakhstan’s energy sector means it sunk costs, 
which it would forfeit through decreasing imports. CNPC made a significant 
investment in a US$7bn oil pipeline, which will only be recouped through its long-
term usage and deliveries. While it is likely that the Dalai Lama effect is not credible 
when resource imports are at stake, it is also possible that the Kazakhstani 
government has not grasped its immunity yet (Fuchs and Klann 2011).  
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7.6 The Elite also Facilitates China’s Objectives 
‘Energy resources are a much higher priority in Astana’s psyche than water’  
(Tim Hannan) 
 
Kazakhstan’s behaviour in the dispute can be explained through its economic 
dependence on China. Kazakhstan likely fears antagonising Beijing over the water 
dispute, thereby risking future economic trade-offs such as decreased revenue 
streams to which it is particularly vulnerable as a Rentier State even more so during 
economic crises (Chapter 2). 
However, Astana also displays an astonishing unwillingness to shore up its own 
water management capabilities to improve its bargaining power vis-à-vis China 
(Mirumachi & Allen 2010) which suggests a complete lack of political will (Borisov 
1999) and leaves Kazakhstan in an exceptionally weak bargaining position for which 
its economic dependency cannot fully account for. This not only allows Beijing to 
fully leverage Kazakhstan’s economic dependency, but also facilitates and further 
consolidates the hierarchical dynamics, undermining Kazakhstan’s national interest 
in the short and long term (hydro-hegemony). This puzzle cannot be fully 
understood without taking Kazakhstan’s elite into consideration.  
In the water dispute elite interest conflict with and negate the national interest and 
water sovereignty.  The elite’s short-term concern for economic and political 
survival which are in line with Rentier State dynamics (Chapters 2 and 5) not only 
disincentives decision makers from a more aggressive negotiation stance, but also 
invariably aligns the elite interest with China. The link between revenues and elite 
legitimacy should give economic and political influence to any foreign economic 
actor who can provide such revenues (Chapter 2), especially after 2008.   Chinese 
trade, finance and investment helped the elite to consolidate and maintain its 
power by providing it with discreet and easily accessible revenues and which gave 
China significant influence in Kazakhstan’s economy and politics (Chapters 2 and 3). 
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This can also explain why the Kazakhstani government “abnormally” favours 
Chinese investment (Alida Ashimbaeva, cited in Peyrouse, 2008).   
The lack of political will to overhaul its hydrological infrastructure and thus maintain 
the status quo instead, which may be due to the misallocation of capital that is 
typical in a Rentier State strengthens China’s bargaining position. Because the 
patronage system creates looser accountability links with the constituency and 
suppresses free media reporting, Kazakhstan’s elite can take these decisions 
without consequence. As a result of the elite structure, Kazakhstan cannot draw on 
many of the bargaining options discussed above. For example, the government 
cannot introduce greater transparency into the dispute to enlist public support, 
without facing embarrassment over how little progress has been made in the 
negotiations. This is especially acute given the underlying Sinophobia of 
Kazakhstanis.  
Beijing also indirectly benefits from Kazakhstani elite dynamics. In 2009, the MinEP 
and the Water Resource Committee (WRC) became the target of the government’s 
new anti-corruption efforts. The Economic Crimes and Anti-Corruption Agency, 
better known as the financial police, carried out a high profile corruption campaign, 
which also targeted Anatoliy Ryabtsev (Asanow 2009)173, the Chairman of the WRC, 
Nurlan Iskakov, Minister for Environmental Protection and his two deputies. Both 
institutions are key partners in the Sino-Kazakhstani negotiation process and the 
dismissal of their leadership likely affected their effectiveness. Chinese negotiators 
prefer to build relationships with individuals and not institutions. Thus a change in 
personnel slows down cooperation until a new relationship of trust is established 
(Interview International Water Expert 1). This is observable at the MRC. After every 
CEO change, Beijing deploys a cautious approach to the organisation where “not 
much happens” and cooperates more actively further along in the CEO’s term if the 
candidate has been found as trustworthy or unbiased (Interview International 
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Water Expert 1). It is unclear why the anti-corruption campaign targeted these 
individuals, as none of them are known to be critics of the President. However, 
analysts argue that the anti-corruption campaign was politically motivated and 
symptomatic of an ongoing inter-elite struggle (Economist 2009). These officials 
may have been made scapegoats to help the government save face amidst an 
unfolding string of embezzlement scandals at the time (Chapter 3). As officials in 
institutions with relatively little policy power, they were possibly considered 
‘disposable’. The timing of the anti-corruption campaign further supports this view. 
The campaign was launched in 2009, when the financial crisis peaked and a string of 
corruption scandals at the country’s biggest banks forced the government into 
action.  
Decision making often takes place in the informal realm in Kazakhstan, favouring 
personal vs. institutional decision making processes (Chapter 3). It is possible, then, 
that personal contacts facilitate China’s interests more directly to delay any water-
allocation agreement. Previous chapters have shown that economic players such as 
CNPC, CITIC and CIC are apt at working along and through the Kazakhstani elite and 
its decision-making process to close deals (Chapter 5).  Unfortunately, the water 
dispute takes place behind closed doors and it is difficult to draw any further 
conclusions about elite contacts. However, there are indicators for personalised 
decision making in the dispute as well. Nazarbayev sent a personal letter to Jiang 
Zemin in 1999 to bring Beijing to the negotiation table in the first place.  By doing 
so, Nazarbayev shifted the dispute to a personal level, which, judging by the 
outcome, was successful. The personalised approach is also reflected in the CKCC, 
which is now in charge of the JWC. Media and analysts in Kazakhstan criticise the 
CKCC and suspect that its lack of transparency allows China to directly buy decisions 
and decision makers (Peyrouse, 2008). High-level elite alignment can also explain 
why dispute management and strategy have not received a higher profile and 
remained on a low-technical level, embedded in government institutions with little 
policy power, such as the MoA. Transboundary water management and water 
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supply are officially national and foreign policy priorities and should thus be dealt 
with at much higher government levels. This would also explain why it is only lower-
ranking officials and technocrats, located at the periphery of the elite network, who 
criticise the negotiations. Murat Auezov is the notable exception. Instead the task 
falls with officials from the MoA who express their frustrations:  
"The [JWC] meets every year without results." (Dostay, Zhakybay, 
Kazakh Institute of Geology and Geography, quoted in Ryabtsev 2011) 
IR research shows that successful strategies for solving ongoing water disputes lie 
beyond the river basin itself, in the political economy of the subordinate riparian.  A 
diversified economy allows water-scarce states to trade in virtual water as the most 
effective way to overcome water scarcity and thus, the driver for water disputes 
(Mirumachi & Allan 2010).  Singapore, for example, has to import 95% of its water 
needs. To achieve water security, Singapore signed long-term treaties with Malaysia 
to import water via Johor, where it invested in shared water-treatment plants. A 
strong and diversified economy allows water-scarce countries to trade in such 
virtual water (Allan 2002). A highly-skilled labour force is, in turn, the precondition 
for a diversified economy and allows states to seek viable alternatives to meet its 
water security demands (Allan & Mirumachi 2011:17). Yet, here, Kazakhstan relies 
disproportionally on foreign investors to provide training for the local labour force. 
Kazakhstan’s local content law enforces a quota on international investors to 
employ at least 80% local staff. The law has caused much discontent among ICOs, 
less because of their unwillingness to employ local staff but more because of the 
widespread lack of qualified labour. 174  This is an interesting difference to 
Azerbaijan, which is a similarly resource-driven economy, however invests heavily in 
the education of its work force and thus has managed to maintain a more diverse 
economy, according to an expert (Interview Regional Expert).  
                                                     
174
 Conversations of the author at the Kazakhstani Investment Day in London, 2011. 
327 
 
As a result the elite is incentivised to facilitate Chinese interests or, at a minimum, 
not to antagonise Beijing over the water dispute. This may explain Kazakhstan’s 
reluctance to pursue meaningful options to improve its negotiation power. If a state 
is economically dependent, it should be in the national interests to mitigate these 
dependencies. The thesis has shown that Kazakhstan is in a position to level the 
asymmetry with China by recourse to its energy and security cooperation. By failing 
to do so, Kazakhstan’s bargaining position is much weaker than can be explained by 
the country’s economic dependence alone.  The sub-systemic context provides an 
additional lever that facilitates the effectiveness of Kazakhstan’s economic 
dependence.  In the absence of a discrete Chinese foreign policy towards 
Kazakhstan, it is possible that this effectiveness is entirely driven by the Kazakhstani 
elite and its perception of Beijing. 
Instead of challenging Beijing to pursue national interests, Kazakhstani policy 
makers go out of their way to support China’s interests. In 1998, Kazakhstan 
conceded 100-200 km2 of land to China along the Black Irtysh, amidst Beijing’s 
refusal to start a conversation with Kazakhstan over Transboundary Rivers 
(Interview Local Expert). In May 2000, Nazarbayev wrote a letter to President Jiang 
Zemin, suggesting that the next meeting of the Shanghai Five would take place in 
Shanghai the following year. The meeting was diplomatically significant because the 
SCO would take the significant step of becoming firmly institutionalised. 
Nazarbayev’s suggestion to have this founding/key meeting in Shanghai could have 
been aimed at appeasing Beijing. Moreover, Nazarbayev suggested the summit 
focused on economic themes, thereby taking the option to discuss transboundary 
water issues in a multi-lateral setting off the table.175 
An alternative explanation for the slow negotiation process could be a lack of 
awareness in Beijing of how important the dispute is for Kazakhstan. The lacklustre 
motivation of Kazakhstan’s elite to confront Beijing more strategically could raise 
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the impression in Beijing that this is not a key issue for Kazakhstan and thus, they 
have decided to ignore it. However, this explanation does not hold. Academics in 
China write about the dispute and draw an accurate picture of the negative 
consequences of China’s water abstractions for Kazakhstan and acknowledge 
openly that this poses a security threat for Astana (Wang and Hu 2011). Moreover, 
commentary can be found on Chinese micro blogs, which describe problems that 
Project 635 causes Kazakhstan (Baidu 2011). Kazakhstani and Chinese experts have 
regular points of contact outside bi-lateral settings of the dispute, such as in expert 
working groups, which are organised by international institutions such as the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO 2005) or the UN to discuss the overall water 
situation in the region more generally. The ongoing attempts of Kazakh negotiators 
to table the issue at SCO meetings and to get Russia involved should have signalled 
clearly to Beijing that the issue is of national importance. 
On the surface, China’s negotiation strategy has been successful. It has managed to 
maximise its foreign policy objectives to maintain absolute sovereignty over its 
water resources, whilst Astana, conversely, loses access to water.  Beijing controls 
the agenda and has prevented the multi-lateralisation, externalisation and cross-
linkage of the dispute. Moreover, by exploiting Kazakhstan’s institutional 
weaknesses, Beijing has been able to stall for time, which shifts the legal situation in 
Beijing’s favour in view of Xinjiang’s socio-economic developments. Concurrently, 
building activity has continued unhindered, which has allowed Beijing to create a 
more advantageous starting point to any water allocation agreement in the future 
(Zeitoun & Warner 2006:44).   Astana is likely deterred by China’s economic 
dominance, fearing that exerting pressure on Beijing in the water dispute could risk 
current and future revenues (Weiner, 2011; Copeland, 1996 and Snyder, 2006). 
While economic dependency is one explanatory variable, it cannot explain why 
Astana has not undertaken any domestic steps to improve its water management 
capabilities, especially monitoring. This thesis has demonstrated that elite interests 
are an intervening variable, something which can explain the lack of will to 
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challenge Beijing and the short-term focus of Kazakhstani policy making (Chapter 3). 
The elite’s lack of motivation to challenge China is likely rooted in its indirect and 
direct benefits from China’s growing economic involvement in the country, which 
allows the elite to maintain the status quo and aligns its interest with China, thus 
creating a conflict with Kazakhstan’s national interest.  
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 Conclusions Chapter 8 
The thesis investigated whether China can translate its economic influence into 
political power and used Sino-Kazakhstani relations as a case study. The mechanism 
that translates/operationalises economic influence into political influence is the 
presence economic dependencies of one state on another, in this thesis, 
Kazakhstan’s economic dependence on China. Economic dependencies in turn are 
the outcome of bilateral economic asymmetries that create significant opportunity 
costs for the subordinate economic partner (Kazakhstan). The thesis found that 
China has indeed created economic dependencies in Kazakhstan which it can 
leverage towards foreign policy objectives. The second part of the thesis illustrated 
this along a transboundary water conflict between both countries where China can 
maximise its bargaining position and thus foreign policy objectives. However, the 
causal pathway that facilitates China’s ability to translate Kazakhstan’s economic 
dependency into foreign policy gains appears more indirect. It is unlikely that 
Beijing issues direct threats in the dispute but rather the Kazakhstan pre-emptively 
acquiesces with Chinese interests.  
Kazakhstan’s particularly political context as a Rentier State is an important 
intervening variable that both facilitates China’s growing economic influence in 
Kazakhstan and China’s ability to leverage that dependency towards its foreign 
policy objectives.  
8.1 Economic Dependency 
This thesis has found evidence for the hypothesis that China’s accumulated 
economic activities have created an economic dependency in Kazakhstan as well as 
its sub-hypotheses. However this is only partially the result of a deliberate process.  
China’s rapidly-growing economic involvement in Kazakhstan has been accelerated 
in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. The stark asymmetry and associated 
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opportunity costs have created strong economic dependencies in Kazakhstan. 
China’s influence is most clearly pronounced in its role as Kazakhstan’s number one 
trade partner and creditor of last resort. On the other hand, Kazakhstan’s presence 
in China’s economy is barely discernible, introducing a stark asymmetry.  However, 
raw numbers may underestimate Kazakhstan’s influence, given the elevated role it 
plays in China’s overall energy strategy.  While trade, finance and investment data 
demonstrates the existence of an economic dependency, the degree of Beijing’s 
deliberateness in establishing this dependency was more difficult to establish.  In 
fact, this thesis could not uncover a comprehensive Chinese foreign policy strategy 
towards Kazakhstan, or Beijing’s control over its economic institutions that would 
be required to deliberately pursue economic dependencies on the aggregate level.  
While central government control does appear to be present in some sectors, such 
as Chinese policy banks, whose credit lines directly link the provision of finance to 
resource access, Beijing’s control over other Chinese economic institutions in 
Kazakhstan, such as SOEs, appears to be more tenuous.  Instead, Kazakhstan’s 
economic dependency is the outcome of a confluence of factors in both China and 
Kazakhstan.  While China’s relative economic capabilities and its shifting foreign 
policy priorities may have incentivised Chinese trade, finance and investment 
abroad, it is Kazakhstan’s domestic political system, especially its status as a Rentier 
State that further engrained Beijing’s presence.  Over the course of this research, 
the elite has emerged as an important intervening variable which facilitates 
Kazakhstan’s economic dependence on China as well as China’s ability to leverage 
that dependence towards political ends. The political dynamics and legitimacy 
considerations in a Rentier State increase the opportunity costs associated with 
decreasing Chinese economic activity (see below). 
Beijing’s ‘Go West’ and ‘Go Global’ frameworks, coupled with China’s energy 
security requirements, desire to diversify its foreign currency reserves and interest 
in regional stability, led Chinese actors to pursue investment opportunities in 
Kazakhstan. Chinese politicians and bankers grasped the opportunities presented by 
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the retrenchment of western sovereigns and banks in the wake of the Global 
Financial Crisis and encouraged their financial institutions to go out and ‘swim’ 
(Xinhua, 2009).  Given Kazakhstan’s immense resource endowment and proximity 
to western China, it was a natural destination, and the volume of credit lines to 
Kazakhstan increased significantly after 2008 (Chapter 4).    The Kazakhstani elite 
welcomed increased Chinese investment.  Kazakhstan’s neopatrimonial political 
system facilitates China’s economic dominance, as the elite relies on external 
revenues to both legitimise its own power and possibly to enrich itself.  Beijing’s 
relative economic capabilities allowed it to make available its deep coffers in 2008, 
when alternative sources of finance fell sideways and Kazakhstani mismanagement 
exposed revenue gaps. This effectively turned China into the lender of last resort 
(Sub-hypothesis 1).  Interviewees noted Astana’s repeated over-optimism in its 
budget forecasts, which incorporated revenues from the Kashgan Oilfield (Interview 
European Diplomat 1) that did not materialise due to years of delays. Production 
and associated revenues may finally come online in 2013.  Astana’s financial 
mismanagement extended to structural weaknesses in the banking sector, 
Nazarbayev’s renationalisation programme and questions on the true size of 
Kazakhstani savings (Chapter 2 and 3). China’s economic interests in the resource 
sector allowed Astana to make up for these shortfalls without cutting spending or 
increasing taxation, thus allowing the elite to maintain the status quo without 
risking political reforms.  
Another factor that facilitated the emergence of Kazakhstan’s economic 
dependency on China was the emergence of more stringent anti-corruption laws in 
the west.  Chinese finance and investment, by contrast, is more discrete and less 
likely to become the subject of corruption scandals (Chapter 2).  In Kazakhstan’s 
neopatrimonial system, investment decisions are frequently made in the informal 
realm of personal elite contacts rather than in the corporate boardroom (Chapters 
2 and 4).  While foreign investors had difficulties navigating the centralised 
economic structures of Samruk-Kazyna and the elite power dynamics (Chapter 2), 
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CIC, CITIC and CNPC successfully managed Kazakhstan’s complex power structure 
(Chapter 4) to advance their investment objectives and thus China’s aggregate 
economic power.  After all, Chinese economic institutions likely enjoyed Astana’s 
consent and they aided the elite in consolidating and maintaining its power 
(Chapters 2, 3 and 4).   In addition, China benefits from a prominent supporter in 
Karim Massimov, who built his steep political career on his ability to channel 
Chinese investment into Kazakhstan. It is possible that the personal and opaque 
nature of decision making in Kazakhstan suits China better than western 
democracies (Interview International Water Expert 1).  
As discussed in Chapter 5, Kazakhstan’s economic dependence is only partially the 
result of a deliberate process. Whilst Beijing’s macro-economic policies created 
incentives to seek investment abroad, these were not targeted at Kazakhstan 
specifically. Until 2005 Beijing’s economic influence in Kazakhstan was mainly driven 
by small traders and NOCs. However, there a signs that Beijing has become more 
proactive in facilitating its economic influence in Kazakhstan after the financial 
crisis, especially in finance (Sub-hypothesis 3). While China’s economic dominance 
in Kazakhstan may not be the result of a deliberate Chinese foreign policy, the 
discernible fit between Beijing’s desire for energy security and diversification of 
foreign currency reserves and Astana’s need for additional revenues allowed that 
dependency to develop more spontaneously.  In fact, it is interesting that China’s 
role in Kazakhstan’s economy is not yet more pronounced (Interview Local Finance 
Expert 1).  One interviewee suggested that Russia’s “invisible hand” 
counterbalanced Chinese economy forays into Kazakhstan rather than Astana 
(Interview, European Diplomat 2). China is now deeply involved in Kazakhstan’s 
economic and by extension its political life. This necessarily also has implications for 
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Kazakhstan’s and China’s respective relationship with Russia. However, a detailed 
analysis of the geopolitical consequences is beyond the scope of this thesis.176 
Although Beijing may not have deliberately created economic dependencies in 
Kazakhstan, it may nevertheless deliberately leverage the existing dependency for 
political gain. However, Beijing’s ability to exert this leverage critically hinges on 
both its credible control over the economic institutions that drive this dependency 
and its grasp of Astana’s revenue needs. Another research question of this thesis 
was whether China can control the economic levers that underpin its economic 
influence in Kazakhstan. Chapter 5 found evidence that China’s economic 
capabilities are fragmented between various economic institutions where Beijing’s 
level of control varies significantly. As a result it is unlikely that Beijing control the 
levers of economic influence in Kazakhstan, which was identified as a criterion for 
the ability to translate economic influence into political power (Chapter 5, Sub-
hypothesis 4). 
Moreover, the depth of Beijing’s understanding of Kazakhstan’s specific revenue 
needs is unclear.   China’s call for its financial institutions to seek out investment 
opportunities abroad may reflect a broad understanding of finance needs in a world 
of stretched public budgets post-2008 rather than an in-depth understanding of the 
revenue intricacies in Kazakhstan. This thesis observed two cases of political 
leverage, Chinese credit lines conditioned on resource deliveries and the Sino-
Kazakhstani transboundary water conflict.  In the former case, Chinese policy banks 
China ExIm and CDB acted in close links with Beijing’s interests, demonstrating that 
China does indeed leverage Kazakhstan’s dependence towards immediate 
outcomes, including access to resources. On the other hand, Beijing’s control over 
its SWFs and SOEs is less certain. These actors have shown that they can enlist 
Beijing’s political support to overcome obstacles to their investment objectives. 
Both CNPC and CITIC have used Beijing to overcome the anti-Chinese investment 
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climate in Kazakhstan (Sub-hypothesis 5).  This strategy was successful, but perhaps 
only because the interest of Beijing and its economic institutions overlapped.  
However, Beijing’s reach over these institutions is less clear if, for example, it were 
to instruct these entities to abandon planned projects in Kazakhstan. While this 
would not be in the interests of Chinese SWFs and SOEs, it would be necessary if 
Beijing were to credibly seek to use its economic capabilities as leverage for political 
gain. However, as the case study on the Sino-Kazakhstani transboundary water 
dispute has shown, China’s actual control over its economic institutions may not be 
as relevant as Astana’s perception of such control.  Indeed, it became clear through 
interviews in Kazakhstan that Astana perceives China and its economic institutions 
as a unitary actor and believe that Beijing can indeed exert control over its 
economic institutions (Sub-hypothesis 6).This led to a modification of the lead 
hypothesis: China can leverage these dependencies if it effectively controls the 
drivers of economic influence or if Kazakhstani policy makers perceive of such 
control (Chapter 1). 
In the latter case, Beijing manages to leverage Kazakhstan’s economic dependency 
to pursue absolute sovereignty over its transboundary rivers and reinforce the 
existing hierarchy between both countries.  Beijing actively pursues negotiation 
strategies that allow it to maintain the hierarchy and block Kazakhstani attempts to 
level the playing field. For example, Beijing opposes multilateralising the 
negotiations by including Russia, who as a down-stream riparian is equally affected 
by Chinese water abstractions. Instead, Beijing cooperates only enough to prevent 
Kazakhstan from abandoning the negotiations and seeking an external dispute 
resolution.  At odds with developments in international environmental cooperation, 
Beijing exploits weaknesses in the enforcement of transboundary water regimes to 
exert absolute control over its transboundary rivers, establishing Beijing as a hydro-
hegemon (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006) and further facilitating the bi-lateral hierarchy. 
Although Beijing leverages Kazakhstan’s economic dependency in the 
transboundary water conflict, Astana has shown little inclination to challenge 
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Beijing or to conduct the domestic changes necessary to improve Kazakhstan’s 
negotiating position (Chapter 6).   This thesis presented circumstantial evidence 
that China’s ability to leverage the economic dependency is further facilitated by 
Kazakhstan’s elite, as many of its interests are aligned with Beijing.177  As Chapter 3 
discussed, the elite frequently consents to China’s increased economic involvement 
in the country, due to Beijing’s role in assisting the elite to consolidate and maintain 
power at home. The associated conditionality of Chinese economic activity is more 
acceptable to the elite than those of alternative sources of investment (Chapter 3). 
The elite are susceptible to revenue disruptions especially severe shocks brought 
about by an economic crisis such as 2008. Because of uncertainties inherent in the 
Kazakhstani political system (Chapter 2), immediate revenues take priority over 
long-term revenues which can explain the “lack of political will” to challenge Beijing 
more forcefully along its transboundary rivers. The elite also lend a helping hand to 
Beijing in the water conflict by failing to acknowledge China’s fragmented power 
dynamics and by failing to improve the domestic variables that weaken its 
bargaining position vis-à-vis China. By presenting Chinese corporations and Beijing 
as a unitary actor, Astana provides greater leverage for Beijing than likely exists in 
reality. However, the perception in Astana could change in the future and would 
likely allow Kazakhstan to exploit the increasingly fragmented political dynamics 
that are emerging in China.  The failure to improve domestic variables such as 
Kazakhstan’s poor hydrological framework as well as general water inefficiencies is 
likely the result of misallocated capital which is typical for a Rentier State (Chapter 2 
and 3).  
Kazakhstan’s economic dependence can account for the success of China’s 
bargaining strategy over the disputed transboundary water resources. However, 
interestingly research suggested that this unlikely due to direct Chinese threats but 
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rather due to the pre-emptive acquiescence of the elite with Chinese interests or 
what Baldwin calls the “rule of anticipated reactions” (Baldwin 1980). 
Although China uses its relative economic power to its advantage in the water 
conflict and in obtaining resources at concessional prices, Beijing does not appear 
as yet to ‘maximise’ its aggregate economic leverage over Kazakhstan. At least, this 
thesis could not find evidence in the public domain. This may be due to Beijing’s 
unawareness of the extent of its economic influence or the absence of a 
comprehensive foreign policy towards Kazakhstan to take advantage of it.  
However, the preconditions to use this economic hierarchy as leverage in the future 
are in place.  Past successes, for example in obtaining resources, may hasten 
Beijing’s interest in doing so.   
Whether deliberately established or not, the current environment of growing 
Chinese involvement in Kazakhstan’s economy provides Beijing with increasingly 
powerful levers to promote its interests, even at the expense of Kazakhstan’s 
overall development and national security.  Similar situations are seen in other 
countries, such as Cambodia and further afield in Africa, where Beijing combines 
close relationships with the local elite and its deep financial pockets to exploit 
resources on the ground. China’s behaviour in the transboundary water dispute 
with Kazakhstan is thus an interesting testing ground for Beijing’s foreign policy and 
leadership ability, even beyond Kazakhstan or Central Asia. 
8.2  Implications for Chinese Foreign Policy 
The establishment of an economic hierarchy implies that China has become a 
crucial stakeholder in Kazakhstan’s economic, and by extension its political 
landscape, with Chinese investment exposed to domestic changes in Kazakhstan. 
Nazarbayev is currently the sole guarantor of political stability, and uncertainties 
around his succession persist (Chapter 3). The open succession question and 
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ongoing inter-elite conflicts may lead to a prolonged leadership transition 
accompanied by open competition for power, which is likely to affect international 
investment on the ground (Interview Finance Expert).  While this does not 
necessarily mean that violent incident will erupt, it is possible that political changes 
may destabilise Kazakhstan’s biggest companies.  Given the elite frequently has a 
stake in corporations, even including the LSE-listed ENRC and Kazakhmys, political 
turmoil in Kazakhstan is likely to lead to changes in shareholders and board 
representatives. Even now, international investors are occasionally pulled into the 
elite conflict, as Uranium One and Nation’s Energy demonstrated (Chapter 2).  This 
uncertainty presents a challenge to China’s foreign policy approach and links into 
the ongoing debate on non-interference versus interference in sovereign nations.    
A vital part of the debate on the merits of interference to protect Chinese assets 
abroad, in case of a regime collapse or conflict, is the military’s role.  The Arab 
Spring and events in Libya leading to the mass-evacuation of Chinese nationals 
(Xinhua 2011a) reinvigorated this debate and proponents of a more ‘assertive 
foreign policy’ argue that improvement of PLA capabilities would be in China’s 
economic interest.  Chen Xiangyang from the Chinese Institute of Contemporary 
International Relations suggested that China should develop a “Large Periphery” 
strategy to safeguard stability along its borders (Lin 2011).  However, calls for 
military readiness now extend beyond China’s border to protecting its interests 
abroad. Chinese military leaders now discuss the possibility of intervening in Central 
Asia, should a conflict threaten Chinese investment (Lin 2011).  Chinese newspapers 
argue that Beijing should consider the military significance of railway exports in 
enhancing China’s military power projection (Lin 2011). In fact, during a SCO Peace 
mission in 2009, China moved troops into Kazakhstan using the same railway 
infrastructure that it helped to finance and build.  China’s ability to refit its 
economic investments for military purposes has also been recognised on the other 
side of the border.  Konstantin Syroyezhkinan, an influential China expert at 
Kazakhstan’s Institute of Strategic Studies (KISS), has raised concerns that China 
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could use its infrastructure investments to deploy troops to Kazakhstan should its 
investment and interest be seriously threatened through a crisis or unforeseen 
regime change (Syroezhkin 2010) 178 . International analysts, such as Robert 
McDermott, observed that during the SCO Peace Mission China already 
demonstrated these capabilities, and surmised that this could extend to a unilateral 
intervention by Beijing, in case its assets might be at risk  (Kucera 2010).   
However, since the Arab Spring, this debate is no longer confined to military circles. 
Members of China’s resource industry increasingly call for the protection of Chinese 
energy resources abroad. There is now widespread recognition in China that its oil 
and energy investments are often in countries that are susceptible to conflict, 
competing interests and unstable regimes, making it crucial for China to be able to 
defend its interests. (Wu 2011). The conflict in Libya highlighted the risks of China’s 
energy security strategy, and the parallels with Kazakhstan are obvious. At a 
minimum, businessmen and legal scholars demand that Beijing develop early 
warning systems and political risk assessments for China’s overseas’ investments 
(Wen 2011).  Kazakhstan and China signed a number of military agreements, which 
could also be driven by Beijing’s desire to stay close to political and military 
developments within Kazakhstan.  On the back of these agreements, there is 
regular contact between special service and law enforcement agencies.  A number 
of Kazakhstani officers undergo training courses at China’s elite military schools. A 
protocol on the provision of military assistance between the defence ministries of 
Kazakhstan and China is in place, and both sides cooperate to protect the Central 
Asia-China Pipeline (Kazinform 2011). Although Beijing does not directly protect its 
assets in Kazakhstan, it arguably is closely enough involved to step in and protect its 
assets directly should the need arise. China holds regular consultations with the 
security departments of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, trains security 
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personnel and provides equipment and weapons including to Kazakhstan’s KNB to 
protect its pipelines (Hoagland, 2010e).  
Nevertheless, this thesis also reveals an interesting gap between China’s actual 
economic and political influence in Kazakhstan and its limited official foreign policy 
towards Kazakhstan.  Perhaps Beijing assumes that in the case of a political crisis, 
Russia will maintain stability in Kazakhstan. Yet recent events across Central Asia 
cast doubt on Russia’s commitment and ability to intervene or to provide the 
financial support necessary to keep the Kazakhstani regime in power.  In 2010, 
during the Kyrgyz civil war, Rosa Otunbayeva, Kyrgyzstan’s interim President, 
appealed to Russia for military help, which Moscow declined. Similarly, when 
Nazarbayev turned to Russia for help during the financial crisis, Moscow was not 
forthcoming (Chapter 3). These events question Russia’s commitment to the region.  
Beijing’s lack of a coherent, communicated foreign policy for Kazakhstan stands in 
stark contrast to the deep economic ties between the two nations. It seems Beijing 
is unable to match its policy making to the rapid growth of its economic actors’ 
involvement in Kazakhstan’s economy and political system. Beijing is undoubtedly a 
dominant economic force in Kazakhstan, and its presence helps to keep the local 
elite in power.  However, the absence of a comprehensive foreign strategy is 
striking and carries economic and potentially political risks. It is possible that China 
may decide to rely instead on other foreign powers to maintain a stable economic 
and political environment conducive to its own interests. Yet, this can put Chinese 
investment at risk if such a third party rescue is not forthcoming in a crisis.  Beyond 
jeopardising Beijing’s ability to protect its assets in Kazakhstan in a potential crisis, 
any political instability may spill over into Xinjiang and feed into Uighur 
secessionism. Moreover, Beijing’s failure to acknowledge the true extent of its 
influence in Kazakhstan implies that it may not be aware of the implications of the 
actions of its economic institutions. This disconnection could increase Kazakhstanis’ 
perception of a China as a threat. 
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As such China’s growing economic influence in Kazakhstan falls in line with its wider 
foreign policy objectives which include foremost maintaining political stability and 
securing energy resources. Political stability refers to combating the Three Evils, 
terrorism, separatism and extremism which have repercussions for the political 
stability of Xinjiang , its most western province. By providing economic investment 
to a Rentier State and acting as lender of last resort Beijing invariably also props up 
Kazakhstan’s elite and the political system itself which may pre-empt the risks of 
regime change (democratisation) at its borders. To what degree Beijing deliberately 
contributes to the diffusion of authoritarian regimes along its borders through its 
economic influence should be addressed in another research project.   
 
Absolute Sovereignty  
This thesis also provides insight into China’s general approach to international 
relations and disputes, particularly into the Chinese principle of absolute 
sovereignty. The Sino-Kazakhstani transboundary water dispute exemplifies China’s 
stand on upholding absolute sovereignty.  However, the conflict also illustrates that 
this stance is increasingly at odds with international developments, such as the 
recognition that transboundary rivers are shared resources.  Although the principle 
of non-interference has marginally softened in recent years under pressure from 
the UN, China continues to block or abstain when it comes to votes on sanctions 
and military interventions. This view may be rooted in China’s own territorial 
challenges and its concern that it could find itself at the receiving end of such 
interventions. However, the non-interference principle also has strong historical 
roots in China’s concept of justice (Westad, 2012 page?), the idea that states in the 
international system interact along a certain order and obey certain rules.  
Irrespective of its roots, the non-interference policy increasingly clashes with 
China’s desire to safeguard its economic investments abroad. The recent experience 
in Libya turned this apparent contradiction into a reality for China.  Kazakhstan has 
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the potential to provide challenges for Beijing that are greater than those in Libya. 
In Kazakhstan’s case, a number of Chinese security concerns coincide, ranging from 
energy security to territorial security concerns involving separatist activity in 
Xinjiang.  
The reality of China’s desire to maintain absolute sovereignty in the Sino-
Kazakhstani transboundary water dispute and in its foreign policy more broadly, 
stands in stark contrast to China’s rhetoric. It is difficult to reconcile Beijing’s foreign 
policy with its principles of ‘hu li’ mutually beneficial (互利 )  or ‘gong ying’ win-win 
(共赢)  cooperation. In the water conflict, Beijing has missed opportunities to 
proactively foster cooperation and provide benign leadership as a regional 
hegemon who provides public goods (Chapter 7). Instead of levelling hierarchies, 
Beijing insists on keeping negotiations in a setting where it can maximise 
Kazakhstan’s subordinate position. Its ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ approach further 
questions its commitment to driving the negotiations towards a solution. By 
providing Kazakhstan’s elite the means to consolidate its power, China has become 
not only a stakeholder on the ground but an accomplice in the corruption and 
rentierism in Kazakhstan’s domestic politics. This may pose a reputational problem 
in the long term, especially if a new generation of politicians takes the helm of 
Kazakhstani politics.  Judging by its outcome of resource extraction, China’s foreign 
policy towards Kazakhstan resembles that of a traditional colonial power. Beijing 
exploits Kazakhstan’s institutional weaknesses and elite dynamics to foster 
economic dependencies that can be leveraged for political gain, even to the 
detriment of Kazakhstan’s national interest. Its conditional credit lines lock Astana 
into oil and gas deliveries at concessional prices in the medium to long-term. Today, 
former colonial powers appear more committed to bringing about political and 
economic improvements on the ground through a variety of means, including 
foreign aid, lower tariffs (African Growth and Opportunity Act), and technical 
assistance. Yet China appears to do little to benefit Kazakhstan’s political and 
economic development. Rather, it exploits the dysfunctional economic and political 
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context it encounters. China’s involvement in Kazakhstan further exacerbates the 
“resource curse” (Auty 1993), and undermines Astana’s efforts to diversify its 
economy, hardly a ‘win-win’ scenario. 
8.3  Implications for IR Theory 
A Neoclassical Realist perspective allowed the thesis to elucidate variables on the 
systemic and sub-systemic level, which can explain how China could create an 
economic dependency with Kazakhstan. The asymmetry in the Sino-Kazakhstani 
relationship is the result of the specific revenue needs of the Kazakhstani elite and 
its consent to Chinese investment, which was made possible thanks to China’s 
relative economic capabilities. These dynamics are also important for 
understanding how Beijing benefits from Kazakhstan’s economic dependence 
across different foreign policy objectives. These range from access to energy 
resources to exercising absolute control over its water resources. Other IR 
paradigms overlook these factors and cannot provide a similarly satisfying 
explanation.  
Since Kazakhstan’s independence, Beijing and Astana have built an ever closer 
relationship, marked by such milestones as the comprehensive strategic 
partnership, regular parliamentary level visits, military exchanges and joint military 
missions under the umbrella of the SCO. The two parties also institutionalised the 
transboundary water dispute through annual meetings. In a neo-liberal or 
constructivist framework, this institutionalisation should help enable dispute 
resolution. However, the lack of any relevant agreement after twenty years is 
puzzling and can be better explained through a neoclassical realist narrative.  
Shortcomings are also apparent under a realist framework. Chinese foreign policy 
interests in the region, such as the maintenance of resource security, would lend 
themselves naturally to a realist analysis. However the ‘means’ and ‘manner’ with 
344 
 
which China pursues its political goals, by fostering economic dependencies and 
manipulating elite interests in Kazakhstan fall outside the Realist lens. In the water 
dispute, for example, the conflict dynamics do not only reflect existing economic 
and power asymmetries in international relations, but are also the result of 
structural weaknesses inside Kazakhstan (Chapter 6). Increased Chinese investment 
in Kazakhstan’s hydrocarbon industry directly benefits the ruling elite in two ways: 
firstly, it allows the elite to consolidate and maintain power in the absence of free 
and fair elections and, secondly, it contributes to the accumulation of personal 
wealth.  Sino-Kazakhstani negotiation outcomes cannot be explained through 
classic realist frameworks that consider all states like-units (Kenneth Waltz). Rather, 
Beijing can exploit Kazakhstan’s economic dependency because of the behaviour 
and interests of Kazakhstan’s ruling elite. This invariably creates a situation where 
elite interests shape Kazakhstan’s foreign policy behaviour. For example, 
Kazakhstan does not follow the usual power-maximising positions, but rather 
foregoes opportunities to improve its bargaining position with China because 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is shaped to a certain degree by the elite interest.  As 
such, Kazakhstan’s behaviour can be better compared to that of a Middle Eastern 
Rentier State or a Petro State (Yergin 2011). The thesis elucidated how the context 
of a Rentier State creates specific revenue needs but also introduces vulnerabilities 
to external revenue shocks (Karl Lynn 1997, Demkiv 2012). The vulnerabilities 
increase the opportunity costs associated with revenue shortfalls from a key 
economic partner, especially during a period of economic crisis such as following 
2008. Kazakhstan’s banking system was particularly vulnerable during this time 
which is also the result of misallocated capital which is typical for a Rentier. As such 
the thesis demonstrated that economic dependencies are not only effective in 
democracies (Kahler and Kastner 1996) but can be equally and perhaps even more 
effective in a non-democratic setting such as a Rentier State.  
Neoclassical Realism captures these sub-systemic variables, which are not only 
relevant for understanding how China established the economic dependency, but 
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also for comprehending how China can use these dependencies to advance its 
foreign policy goals. Economic dependence remains at the centre of the analysis as 
a form of fungible power (Guzzini 1998:137), linked to a state’s overall relative 
material capabilities (Rose 1998). Thus, the central tenet of the analysis remains the 
distribution of power in the international system. China’s rise in the international 
system is intricately linked to the development of its economic capabilities, which in 
turn are a prerequisite for exerting economic influence in Kazakhstan. It is China’s 
relative material capabilities that establish the ‘basic parameters’ of its foreign 
policy (Rose 1998:145).  On the unit level, neoclassical realism distinguishes 
between different power capabilities and foreign policy preferences and interests 
(Rose 1998:146). China’s foreign currency reserves and strong economic growth 
enabled it to expand economic trade and investment, while Kazakhstan’s historic 
economic partners withdrew. However, neoclassical realism also captures the 
elite’s favouritism of China and the discreet nature of its investments.  After an 
economic dependence has been established, neoclassical realism elucidates the 
domestic factors that inhibit or facilitate Beijing’s ability to operationalise the 
dependency. The incorporation of domestic factors enhances analytical clarity and 
shows that when Beijing exerts direct control over its economic institutions, such as 
its policy banks, it can effectively advance its overall energy objectives. Neoclassical 
realism further takes into account the perception of policy makers in Kazakhstan, 
who do not distinguish between China’s economic institutions and Beijing and who 
perceive of China as a future source of revenue. Both factors facilitate China’s 
ability to operationalise Kazakhstan’s economic dependence towards foreign policy 
objectives. By adding sub-systemic factors to the classic systemic factors such as the 
distribution of power, neoclassical realism can better explain why Beijing can 
leverage Kazakhstan’s economic dependence effectively in the water conflict. The 
thesis has shown that a neoclassical realist framework is most suitable in addressing 
the question of whether China can enlist its economic capabilities to advance 
foreign policy objectives.  
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This thesis has shown that the independent variables that inform the economic 
hierarchy between Kazakhstan and China can be located both in China and in 
Kazakhstan. It is difficult to assess which weighs more heavily towards a satisfactory 
explanation of Kazakhstan’s economic dependence. A discussion of Kazakhstan’s 
domestic context establishes that the neopatrimonial system generates revenue 
needs, which in theory should benefit any external source able to extend such 
revenue. However, Beijing’s relative economic capabilities, particularly the world’s 
biggest foreign currency reserves, have enabled it to increase these revenues even 
throughout the Global Financial Crisis when alternative sources disappeared, whilst 
offering opportunity costs that are acceptable to the Kazakhstani elite.  
8.4 Outlook   
While China derives resources and geopolitical interests from the Sino-Kazakhstani 
relationship, the long-term benefits for Kazakhstan are less clear-cut. The 
Kazakhstani elite’s preference for easily-generated revenue from Chinese resource 
investment has left the country resource dependent (Palazuelos & Fernandez 2012) 
and undermines any diversification of the economy. Officially, the government aims 
to diversify its economic partners by 2020, when no single economic partner should 
enjoy a share of greater than 5% in Kazakhstan’s economy (Interview Investment 
Expert 1). Economic diversification is essential for generating sustainable long-term 
growth and for de-linking Kazakhstan’s economic success from the price and 
availability of energy. The potential successful exploration of shale gas in the US 
and, going forward, in China, which is home to reserves, could exert downward 
pressure on Kazakhstani resource revenues. Moreover, diversification would 
improve Kazakhstan’s ability to trade in virtual water, as discussed in Chapter 6, and 
thus become less dependent on a positive outcome in the Sino-Kazakhstani water 
dispute (Mirumachi, 2010).   
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The economic dependency on China also undermines Kazakhstan’s multi-vector 
foreign policy, which strives to balance the interests of the major powers against 
each other. Currently, China has replaced Russia along all economic indicators.  This 
thesis has demonstrated that China’s economic weight in Kazakhstan is exacerbated 
by the short-term view and rent-seeking behaviour of elite. The power structure in 
Kazakhstan incentivises elites to be more concerned with their short- and medium-
term survival than long-term sustainable policies (Interview Trade Expert, 
International Development Expert).   The elite’s desire for self-enrichment has led it 
to extract money from investors through frequent and intransparent tax changes 
and fines. The government’s renationalisation programme further alienated 
western IOCs and, perhaps as a result, CONOCO Philips abandoned the Kashagan oil 
field in 2012.  Chinese companies appear to have enjoyed some immunity from 
these threats to foreign businesses (Interview Trade Expert). Since Kazakhstani 
decision makers perceive Chinese IOCs, such as CNPC, as more closely linked to 
their government, they have been hesitant to subject them to fines and other forms 
of interference. This disparate treatment of foreign IOCs further increases China’s 
economic dominance in Kazakhstan. 
In parallel to this thesis’ argument that the elite structure in Kazakhstan facilitates 
the country’s economic dependence, the solution to Kazakhstan’s economic 
challenges lies in the reform of this elite structure. Given the absence of an obvious 
succession, Nazarbayev’s death may provide an opportunity for a new generation of 
leaders to introduce greater economic and political liberalisation. The field research 
for this thesis has shown that a generation of talented Kazakhstanis has entered the 
political and economic system, a generation who are determined to succeed based 
on their abilities rather than elite affiliation.  A leadership transition can provide the 
necessary inflection point for these individuals to move into key decision-making 
positions and transfer Kazakhstan’s economy into a post-resource era.  However, 
other analysts are more sceptical and foresee a distinct possibility that the next 
leadership in Kazakhstan will continue with the same policies (Conversation Risk 
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Analyst). Yet, even under the current leadership it is feasible to imagine a reform of 
the private sector, as long as the political power of the elite is kept intact. 
Meritocracy in the private sector, particularly better managerial oversight over 
Kazakhstan’s banks, would reinstall investor confidence in Kazakhstan’s banking 
sector and potentially open up alternative sources of finance besides China.  
Limiting rent-seeking behaviour may make the overall investment climate less 
volatile and attract western IOCs, thus counteracting Chinese influence in 
Kazakhstan. 
Another outcome of China’s economic influence is Kazakhstan’s invariably closer 
integration with China’s economic and financial infrastructure. Chinese 
infrastructure, especially the railway system, has undone the historically close 
integration with Moscow and will thus support trade and people links with Beijing in 
the future. Kazakhstan’s financial sector is now better integrated with China 
because of closer bilateral cooperation, currency swap agreements and Chinese 
efforts to build a financial infrastructure throughout Central Asia via the SCO.  The 
construction of a number of pipelines from Kazakhstan to China combined with 
medium-term financing integrates Kazakhstani resources increasingly into China’s 
infrastructure, especially the West-East pipeline. The recent fallout between Russia 
and Kazakhstan, over tariffs for Kazakhstani oil refined in Russia, has led Astana to 
decide to refine oil in China (Chapter 4). Militarily, Kazakhstan cooperates closely 
with China under the SCO umbrella but also increasingly bilaterally, with China 
providing security training and equipment to Kazakhstan to protect its pipelines. 
This may exert a greater pull for security integration with China as well.  As a result, 
economic ties between the two nations are increasingly expanding to the spheres 
of infrastructure, finance and also security.  
The thesis demonstrated that the complementary nature of both economies drives 
growing bilateral trade and investment. One potential obstacle to further 
integration is the role of Russia. The Customs Union between Kazakhstan and Russia 
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is still relatively young and it remains to be seen whether Russia will regain trade 
share at the expense of China. Moreover, there are uncertainties about China’s 
economic growth, which may have peaked by 2012 and is likely to continue at 
slower rates in the future, which may also slow down Sino-Kazakhstani trade and 
hamper China’s ability to invest abroad. Equally, changes in Kazakhstan’s political 
landscape could bring about the necessary structural changes to create a more 
sustainable economy, where no a single foreign country plays a predominant role. 
Alternatively, Astana may attempt to link different issues in its engagement of 
Beijing, such as uranium deliveries or security cooperation, to dispute concessions, 
thus mitigating the hierarchal relationship.   
The introduction of this thesis discussed the historic precedent of China’s trade-
centred foreign policy, which also created a hierarchical system along its periphery 
with China at its apex (Chapter 1).  During the Qing Dynasty, China projected 
economic power into Central Asia and integrated the area firmly into its tribute 
system, which established China as a regional hegemon. There may be similarities 
between China’s renewed economic dominance in Kazakhstan today. To what 
extent such historic parallels are coincidental or reflect the continuation of an 
underlying Chinese way of conducting foreign affairs is a topic that needs to be 
addressed elsewhere. 
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Stockholm International Water (Eds.), Transboundary water management: 
principles and practice (pp. 13-27). London: Earthscan. 
Mirza, M. Y. (2013). Five pillars of prosperity : essentials of faith-based wealth 
building. Ashland: White Cloud Press. 
Morrison, W. M., & Labonte, M. (2008). China’s Holdings of U.S. Securities: 
Implications for the U.S. Economy CRS Report for Congress (pp. 16). 
Washington D.C.: Congressional Reserach Service. 
Mukhtarov, D. (2012). Per capita income increases almost by 20.5 per cent in 
Kazakhstan. Trend. 12 April. Retrieved 13 January, 2013, from 
http://en.trend.az/regions/casia/kazakhstan/2013666.html 
Mundy, S. (2011). Kazakhmys outlines $700m spending plan’. Financial Times. 29 
March. Retrieved 23 June, 2012, from 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9cb92f2a-59dd-11e0-ba8d-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1LpoKhTja 
Murray, L. (2012). Peace Corps and Failure. Retrieved 9 January, 2013, from 
http://lisainkazakhstan.blogspot.co.uk/ 
380 
 
Muzalevsky, R. (2009). Nazarbayev calls for single global currency. Central Asia-
Caucasus Analyst. 26 March. Retrieved 2 December 2012, from 
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5073 
MWR. (2010). The 8th Meeting of China-Kazakhstan Jiont Commission held in 
Karaganda. 16 November. Retrieved 20 November, 2012, from 
http://www.mwr.gov.cn/english/news/201011/t20101116_245627.html 
National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK). (2006). The second meeting of the Kazakh-
Chinese Subcommittee on Financial Cooperation (kazahstansko-kitajskogo 
Podkomiteta po finansovomu sotrudnichestvu). 05 January. Retrieved 9 
January, 2013, from http://www.zakon.kz/67932-informacija-o-provedenii-
vtorogo.html 
National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK). (2009). Balance of Payments and External Debt 
Republic of Kazakhstan 2009 (Platezhnyj balans i vneshnij dolg Respubliki 
Kazahstan za 2009 god) (pp. 157). Almaty: National Bank of Kazakhstan 
(NBK). 
National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK). (2010a). Balance of Payments and External Debt 
of Kazakhstan 2009 (Platezhnyj balans i vneshnij dolg Respubliki Kazahstan 
za 2009 god) Annual Report of the NBK (30 June ed., Vol., pp. 130). Almaty: 
National Bank of Kazakhstan. 
National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK). (2010b ). National accounts and external debt 3 
Q 2010 (Platezhnyj balans i vneshnij dolg Respubliki Kazahstan za 9 mesjacev 
2010 goda). Retrieved 19 November, 2011, from 
http://www.nationalbank.kz/cont/publish480150_6461.pdf 
National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK). (2011). Financial Stability Report of Kazakhstan 
2011 (Otchet o finansovoj stabil'nosti Kazahstana, dekabr' 2011) (pp. 3). 
Almaty: National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK). 
National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK). (2012). Balance of Payments and External Debt 
Republic of Kazakhstan H1 2012 (Platezhnyj balans i vneshnij dolg Respubliki 
Kazahstan za 1 polugodie 2012 goda). Almaty: National Bank of Kazakhstan 
(NBK). 
National Fund of Kazakhstan (NF). (2000). Official Website. Retrieved 29 December, 
2012, from http://prosites-
kazakhembus.homestead.com/National_Fund.html 
Nazarbayev, N. (2006). Address of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
Nursultan Nazarbayev, to the People of Kazakhstan. Retrieved 8 January, 
2013, from http://www.akorda.kz/en/page/page_address-of-the-president-
of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-nursultan-nazarbayev-to-the-people-of-
kazakhstan-march-1-2006_1343986805 
Nazarbayev, N. (2012). Message from the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan-
"Strategy-2050" (Poslanie prezidenta Respubliki Kazahstan-strategija 
381 
 
«Kazahstan-2050»). Retrieved 12 January 2013, from 
http://www.kazeu.kz/ru/content/poslanie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazahstan 
Nollkaemper, A. (2008). Cluster-Litigation in Cases of Transboundary Environmental 
Harm. In M. l. Faure & S. Ying (Eds.), China and international environmental 
liability: legal remedies for transboundary pollution. Northampton, MA: 
Edward Elgar. 
Nurshayeva, R. (2008). Kazakhstan, China to speed up oilfield agreement. Reuters. 
31 October. Retrieved 19 December, 2012, from 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2008/10/31/china-kazakhstan-darkhan-
idINLV52445420081031 
OECD. (2010). Kazakhstan Sector Competitiveness (E. C. Programme, Trans.) (pp. 
28). Paris: OECD. 
Office of the United States Attorney (Justice Department).(2003). United States of 
America vs. James H Giffen. New York City Department of Justice Retrieved 
from http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/giffen/04-02-
03giffen-indict.pdf. 
Oil&Gas-Eurasia. (2012). Jiang Jiemin pays an official call on President of Kazakhstan 
Nursultan Nazarbayev in Beijing. 12 June. Retrieved 13 December, 2012, 
from http://www.oilandgaseurasia.com/news/jiang-jiemin-pays-official-call-
president-kazakhstan-nursultan-nazarbayev-beijing 
Olcott, M. B. (2002). Kazakhstan: unfulfilled promise. Washington, D.C: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. 
Olcott, M. B. (2005). Central Asia's second chance. Washington, D.C: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. 
Oneal, J. R., & Russett, B. M. (1997). The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, 
Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985 International Studies Quarterly, 
41(2), 267-294.  
Onishi, Y. (2001). China’s Western Development Strategy: Issues and Prospects. 
Spot Survey. Retrieved September 29, 2012, from 
http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Spot/22.html 
OOSKAnews. (2011). China, Kazakhstan Sign Agreement on Trans-Boundary Rivers. 
2 March Retrieved 3 January, 2013, from 
http://www.ooskanews.com/international-water-weekly/china-kazakhstan-
sign-agreement-trans-boundary-rivers_17446 
OOSKAnews. (2012). Kazakh President Calls for Water Saving Due to “Fearful 
Deficit”. 05 September 2012. Retrieved 10 September 2012, from 
http://www.ooskanews.com/daily-water-briefing/kazakh-president-calls-
water-saving-due-fearful-deficit_24181 
Orange, R. (2010). Kazakhstan President granted immunity as 'Leader of the Nation'. 
12 May. Retrieved 13 December, 2012, from 
382 
 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/kazakhstan/7715719/Ka
zakhstan-President-granted-immunity-as-Leader-of-the-Nation.html  
Orange, R. (2011). ENRC could face row over £1.3bn Chinese aid. The Telegraph 
Online. 28 March. Retrieved 09 January, 2012, from 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/mining/840985
2/ENRC-could-face-row-over-1.3bn-Chinese-aid.html 
Orange, R. (2011). Kazakhstan state power over miner ENRC grows with £1.3bn 
China loan. Telegraph Online. 23 February. Retrieved 24 July, 2012, from 
November 6, 20120 from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-
business/8343679/Kazakhstan-state-power-over-miner-ENRC-grows-with-
1.3bn-China-loan.html  
Ordway, J. (2008). Turmoil at KMG- First VP Idenov may be out the door. US Cable. 
14 April. Retrieved 10 June 2012, from 
http://wikileakskz.wordpress.com/2008/04/15/08astana754-turmoil-at-
kmg-first-vp-idenov-may-be-out-the/  
O'Rourke, B. (2004). Kazakhstan: Abikaev Is Suddenly The Number-Two Man. 11 
March. Retrieved 07 January, 2012, from 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1051855.html 
Pala, C. (2006). China Pays Dearly for Kazakhstan Oil. 17 March. Retrieved 25 
December, 2012, from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/17/business/worldbusiness/17kazakh.ht
ml?_r=0 
Palazuelos, E., & Fernandez, R. (2012). Kazakhstan: Oil endowment and oil 
empowerment. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 45(1-2), 27-37. doi: 
10.1016/j.postcomstud.2012.02.004 
Park, M. (2011). Nazarbayev fell into the trap of his own system this week 
(Nazarbaev popal v lovushku sistemy, kotoruju sam vystroil: Kazahstan za 
nedelju). Regnum. 5 July. Retrieved 12 January 2013, from 
http://www.regnum.ru/news/1421859.html 
Paxton, R. (2011). Update 2-Kazakhmys secures $1.5 bln China copper loan. 13 June. 
Retrieved 3 January 2013, from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/13/kazakhmys-china-
idUSLDE75C01J20110613 
Paxton, R. (2012). China lends $1.1 bln for Kazakh refinery upgrade. Reuters U.S. 
Edition. June 6. Retrieved 6 November, 2012, from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/06/oil-kazakhstan-china-
idUSL5E8H667N20120606 
Paxton, R. (2012, 17 July 2012). UPDATE 2-Kazakh drought sounds alarm for grain 
crop. U.S. Retrieved 5 August 2012 
383 
 
Paxton, R., & Gordeyeva, M. (2012). UPDATE 4-ConocoPhillips to exit Kazakh oil 
field - minister. Reuters. 2 October. Retrieved 15 October, 2012, from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/02/oil-kazakhstan-
idUSL6E8L20K920121002 
People’s Daily. (2000). "Shanghai Five" Nations Sign Joint Statement. 06 July. 
Retrieved 22 December 2012, from 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200007/06/eng20000706_44803.html 
Peyrouse, S. (2007). The Hydroelectric Sector in Central Asia and the Growing Role 
of China. China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 5(2), 131-148.  
Peyrouse, S. (2008). Chinese Economic Presence in Kazakhstan: China's Resolve and 
Central Asia's Apprehension. China Perspectives, 2008(3), 34-49.  
Pickens, H. (2011a). PCV Anthony Sharp. Retrieved 6 January 2013, from 
http://researchandideas.com/index.php?title=PCV_Anthony_Sharp 
Pickens, H. (2011b). The Peace Corps “Sharp Incident” in Kazakhstan Retrieved 6 
January, 2013, from http://peacecorpsworldwide.org/pickens-writes-
writes/2011/12/22/the-peace-corps-%E2%80%9Csharp-
incident%E2%80%9D-in-kazakhstan-part-4-conclusion-of-the-incident/ 
Pilch, J., & De Los Fayos, G. (2012). Kazakhstan's regime grows impervious as it jails 
Vladimir Kozlov Quick Policy Insight. Brussels: European Parliament, 
Directorate-General for External Policies. 
Pilip'juk, O. (2002). Who will quench our sorrows? (Kto utolit nashi pechali?). 
Gazeta.Kz. 18 February. Retrieved 7 October, 2012, from 
http://articles.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=12621 
Pistor, K., & Spicer, A. (1996). Investment funds in mass privatization and beyond: 
evidence from the Czech Republic and Russia. Harvard Institute for 
International Development. Harvard University. Boston, MA.  
Pomfret, R. W. T. (2006). The Central Asian economies since independence. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Poor's, S. P. S. (2012). Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Kazakhstan. 15 
May. Retrieved 07 January, 2013, from 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HT
ML&assetID=1245333605360  
Porter, M.E. (2005) 'Building the Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity: Findings 
from the Business Competitiveness Index', in M.E. Porter, K. Schwab and A. 
Lopez-Claros (eds.) The Global Competitiveness Report 2005–2006, Palgrave 
Macmillan, World Economic Forum: New York, pp: 43–77. 
Project on Government Oversight (POGO). (2011). POGO Letter to Attorney General 
Eric Holder Requesting an Investigation of Possible Unlawful Foreign Funding 
of Members of Congress. 2 June. Retrieved 14 December, 2012, from 
http://www.pogo.org/our-work/letters/2011/gc-ii-20110602.html  
384 
 
Qian, Q. (2004). Multilateralism, the Way to Respond to Threats and Challenges -
Statement by H.E. Mr. Qian Qichen, Former Vice Premier of China At the 
New Delhi Conference. 02 July. Retrieved 18 November, 2012, from 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjsxw/t142393.htm 
Qin, Y. (2010). Why is there no Chinese international relations theory? . In A. 
Acharya & B. Buzan (Eds.), Non-Western international relations theory: 
perspectives on and beyond Asia. London: Routledge. 
Qiu, X., & Li, H. (2009 ). China’s Environmental Super Ministry Reform: Background, 
Challenges, and the Future. Environmental Law Reporter, 39(2), 10152-
10163.  
Raadgever, T., Mostert, E., Kranz, N., Interwies, E., & Timmerman, J. (2008). 
Assessing Management Regimes in Transboundary River Basins: Do They 
Support Adaptive Management? Ecology and Society, 13(1).  
Radio Free Asia (RFA). Mekong Project-Multimedia. Retrieved 14 December, 2012, 
from http://www.rfa.org/english/multimedia/MekongProject/experts 
Radio Free Asia Unplugged (RFAUnplugged). (2010). Mekong River Commission 
Wants New Dam Construction Put On Hold. 4 June. Retrieved 13 December, 
2012, from http://www.rfaunplugged.org/2010/07/04/mekong-river-
commission-wants-new-dam-construction-put-on-hold/ 
Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (RFERL). (2006). Kazakhstan's Fallen Opposition. 4 
October. Retrieved 10 December, 2012, from 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1071795.html 
Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (RFERL). (2011). A Customs Union or a longing for 
the USSR (Tamozhennyj sojuz ili toska po SSSR). Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty (RFERL). 30 June. Retrieved 11 January 2013, from 
http://rus.azattyk.kg/content/article/24250812.html 
Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (RFERL). (2012). Witness In Zhanaozen Riots Case 
Found Dead. 15 October. Retrieved 19 October 2012, from 
http://www.rferl.org/content/kazakhstan-zhanaozen-riots-witness-
dead/24739983.html 
Rasov, S. (2012). Russia not happy with duty-free export (Rossiju besposhlinnyj 
jeksport ne ustraivaet). Respublika Online. 09 October. Retrieved 01 
November, 2012, from http://www.respublika-
kz.info/txt/news/business/25859/ 
Regan, J. (2011). Analysis: Big miners make brave bet on record commods boom. 
Reuters. 18 February. Retrieved 07 January, 2013, from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/18/us-commodities-miners-
idUSTRE71H16V20110218 
385 
 
Rekacewicz, P. (Cartographer). (2002). The percentage of the total renewable water 
stock at the beginning of the year 2000. Retrieved from 
http://www.unep.org/dewa/vitalwater/jpg/0223-usage-excessif-EN.jpg  
Rekacewicz, P. (Cartographer). (2002). Water stress Indicator (WSI) in major basin:. 
Retrieved from http://www.unep.org/dewa/vitalwater/jpg/0222-
waterstress-overuse-EN.jpg 
Reporters Without Borders (2012). Press Freedom Index. Retrieved 27 December, 
2012, from http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2011-2012,1043.html 
RFI France (RFI). (2008). China threatens trade ties if Sarkozy meets Dalai Lama. 4 
Decemeber. Retrieved 10 December 2012, 2012, from 
http://www.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/108/article_2327.asp 
Rittberger, V. (2001). German foreign policy since unification : theories and case 
studies. Manchester, New York , New York: Manchester University Press, 
Distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave. 
Roberts, S. R. (2008). "Puppet Master" Mr. Utemuratov comes out of the shadows: 
Understanding Kazakhstan’s Billionaires on the Forbes List. The Roberts 
Report on Central Asia and Kazakhstan. 14 March. Retrieved 06 January, 
2013, from http://roberts-report.blogspot.co.uk/2008/03/puppet-master-
mr-utemuratov-comes-out.html 
Rose, G. (1998). Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. World Politics, 
51(Generic), 144-172. doi: 10.1017/s0043887100007814 
Ross, M. (2006). A closer look at oil, diamonds, and civil war. Annual Review of 
Political Science, 9, 265-300.  
Russian.China.Org.Cn. (2010). Foreign Ministry: China attaches great importance to 
the reasonable use and protection of Sino-Kazakh Transboundary Rivers 
(MID KNR: Kitaj pridaet ser'eznoe znachenie racional'nomu ispol'zovaniju i 
ohrane vodnyh resursov kitajsko-kazahstanskih transgranichnyh rek). 
29.01.2010. Retrieved 2012, 15 July, from 
http://russian.china.org.cn/government/txt/2010-
01/29/content_19328048.htm 
Ryabov, A. (2012). Who to blame if there is no water left in the Irtysh? (Esli v rechke 
net vody, ili kto vinovat v obmelenii Irtysha?). 9 June. Retrieved 15 
December, 2012, from http://ugrainform.ru/materials/trend/17213/ 
Ryabtsev, A. D. (2011). Threats to Water Security in the Republic of Kazakhstan in 
the Transboundary Context and Possible Ways to Eliminate Them. In C. 
Madramootoo & V. Dukhovny (Eds.), Water and Food Security in Central 
AsiaNATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security 
(pp. 69-77). Dordrecht: Springer.  
Sala-i-Martin, X. (2011). The Global Competitiveness Report 2011–2012. In K. 
Schwab (Ed.), (2011 ed., pp. 544). Geneva: World Economic Forum. 
386 
 
Samruk Kazyna (SK). (2010). "Samruk-Kazyna" looks forward to the growth of 
Chinese loans in the oil and gas sector in Kazakhstan («Samruk-Kazyna» 
nadeetsja na rost kitajskih kreditov v neftegazovuju sferu Kazahstana). 1 
July. Retrieved 2 January 2013 
Samruk-Kazyna (SK). (2012). Today Karim Massimov has assigned Umirzak Shukeyev 
as the Chairman of the Board of «Samruk-Kazyna». Retrieved 23 December, 
2012, from http://sk.kz/event/view/92?lang=en 
Sands, P. (2003). Principles of international environmental law. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Sapiev, E., & Mazhitova, O. (2011). The China Lobby in Kazakhstan (Pro "kitajskoe 
lobbi" v Kazahstane). 06 June. Retrieved 26 May, 2012, from 
http://respublika-kaz.livejournal.com/1275392.html 
Satpaev, D. (2007). An Analysis of the Internal Structure of Kazakhstan’s Political 
Elite and an Assessment of Political Risk Levels. In T. Uyama (Ed.), Empire, 
Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia .Slavic Eurasian Studies. Sapporo: 
Hokkaido University, Slavic Research Centre. 
Sceats, S., & Breslin, S. (2012). China and the International Human Rights System 
(pp. 89). London: Chatham House. 
Schweller, R. L. (1998). Deadly imbalances: tripolarity and Hitler's strategy of world 
conquest. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Scissors, D. (2009). Drowning in Cash, Chinese Foreign Investment: Who, What and 
Why -- Part 1 of 3. 15 June. Retrieved 17 August 2012, from 
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/06/drowning-in-cash-
chinese-foreign-investment-who-what-and-why-part-1-of-3 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). (2004). Tashkent Declaration of heads of 
SCO members. 17June. Retrieved 23 December 2012, 2004, from 
http://www.sectsco.org/RU123/show.asp?id=96 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). (2012). SCO sets blueprint for next 
decade. 08 June. Retrieved 29 December, 2012, from 
http://www.scosummit2012.org/english/2012-06/08/c_131640161.htm 
Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS). (2013). Research Areas- Russian 
and Central Asian Studies Centre (yanjiu lingyu – eluosi zhongya yanjiu 
zhongxin). Retrieved 2 January 2013, from 
http://www.siis.org.cn/Lingyu_View.aspx?lid=78 
Sharip, F. (2007). Godfather of Kazmunaygaz joins top echelons of power. Eurasia 
Daily Monitor, 4(229).  
Sharip, F. (2009). Customs Union with Russia and Belarus Raises Doubts in 
Kazakhstan. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 6(224).  
387 
 
Sharip, F. (2011). Chinese Pawns on the Kazakh Political Chessboard: Massimov 
Versus Kulibayev? Eurasia Daily Monitor, 8(94).  
Sharip, F. (2011). Russia Pressures Kazakhstan’s Ties With Georgia. Eurasia Daily 
Monitor, 8(93).  
Shelley, L. (2000). Corrupt Oil Practices Implicate President Nazarbayev. Central 
Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 2000(July 19, 2000).  
Shi, X. (2010). China will host the MRC member countries flood disaster prevention 
training courses (zhongguo jiang juban meigonghe weiyuanhui 
chengyuanguo honglao zaihai fangzhi peixueban). Xinhuanet. 2 April. 
Retrieved 23 December 2013, from http://news.xinhuanet.com/2010-
04/02/c_1215263.htm 
Shih, V. C. (2009). Factions and Finance in China: Elite Conflict and Inflation: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Shih, V. (2009). Tools of Survival: Sovereign Wealth Funds in Singapore and China. 
Geopolitics, 14(2), 328-344.  
Shodon, R. (2011). SCO interbank consortium meets in Kazakhstan to discuss 
establishment of SCO bank. news.tj. 21 February. Retrieved 11 January, 
2013, from http://news.tj/en/news/sco-interbank-consortium-meets-
kazakhstan-discuss-establishment-sco-bank 
Shustow, V. (2013). Kazakhstan Seeks Russia Oil Product Import Cut. RiaNovosti. 30 
January. Retrieved 02 February 2013, from 
http://en.rian.ru/business/20130130/179124175.html 
Sievers, E. W. (2002). Transboundary jurisdiction and watercourse law: China, 
Kazakhstan, and the Irtysh. Texas International Law Journal, 37(1), 1.  
Simpson, G. R., & Susan, S. (2008). Kazakhstan Corruption: Exile Alleges New Details. 
22 July. Retrieved 04 January, 2013, from 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121667622143971475 
Singer, D. J. (1961). The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations. World 
Politics, 14(1), 77-92.  
Sinohydro. (2008). Sinohyrdo-Our Companies Jiajiang Hydraulic Machinery Co.,Ltd 
Retrieved 9 January 2013, from 
http://eng.sinohydro.com/en/idems/companyDetail.asp?ArticleID=24&Class
ID=23 
Slusser, R. M., & Triska, J. F. (1959). A calendar of Soviet treaties 1917-1957: With 
the assistance of George Ginsburgs, Wilfred O. Reiners. Palo Alto: Stanford 
University Press. 
Smith, S. A. (2007). Leadership Transition in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan: 
Implications for Policy and Stability in Central Asia. (Thesis), Navel 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.  
388 
 
Snyder, S. (2006). Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement 
Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait. Journal of 
Peace Research, 43(5), 523-541. doi: 10.1177/0022343306066778 
Snyder, S. (2009). China's rise and the two Koreas: politics, economics, security. 
Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Sorokoumova, N. (2010). Lake Balkash falls under the fence (Balhash «sdyhaet» pod 
zaborom). 29 November. Retrieved 3 August, 2012, from 
http://megapolis.kz/art/Balhash_sdihaet_pod_zaborom  
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (SWF). (2013). Kazakhstan National Fund. 
Retrieved 7 January, 2013, from 
http://www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/kazakhstan-national-fund/ 
Spaulding, M. R. (2000). Anarchy, Hegemony, Cooperation: International Control of 
the Rhine River, l789 -l848. http://www.ccr-
zkr.org/files/histoireCCNR/21_anarchy-hegemony-cooperation.pdf 
Spratlen, P. L. (2010). Kazakhstan: GE executive discusses regional plans. US Cable. 
Retrieved 19 December, 2012, from 
http://cablesearch.org/cable/view.php?id=10ASTANA159&hl=origin%3AAst
ana+ExIm 
Stiftung, B. (2012). BTI 2012 — Kazakhstan Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann 
Stiftung. 
Stodghill, R. (2006, ). Oil, Cash and Corruption. New York Times. 5 November. 
Retrieved 4 March, 2012, from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/05/business/yourmoney/05giffen.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0 
Stone, R. (2012). Transboundary Rivers- For China and Kazakhstan, No Meeting of 
the Minds on Water. Science, 337(27 July), 405-407.  
Strecker Downs, E. (2000). China's quest for energy security. Santa Monica, CA: 
Rand. 
Syroezhkin, K. (2010). China’s Expansionist Policy Toward Kazakhstan Takes a New 
Turn. Eurasia Daily Monitor. 17 November Retrieved 12 January 2013, from 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5
D=37181 
Syroezhkin, K. (2011). China’s Presence in Kazakhstan: Myths and Reality. Central 
Asia’s Affairs Quarterly, 1(42).  
Taukina, R. (2012). Lukpan Akhmedyarov: "The judicial system has become a way of 
hounding independent news media". 12 October. Retrieved 14 January, 
2013, from http://en.rsf.org/kazakhstan-lukpan-akhmedyarov-the-judicial-
12-10-2012,43533.html 
389 
 
Tengrinews. (2010). Head of "Samruk-Kazyna" talks about the destination of 
Chinese loans (Glava "Samruk-Kazyna" rasskazal o rashodovanii kitajskih 
kreditov). 14 June. Retrieved 3 January, 2013 
Tengrinews. (2011a). Average wages in Kazakhstan are over 92 thousand Tenge. 
Retrieved 13 January, 2013, from http://en.tengrinews.kz/finance/Average-
wages-in-Kazakhstan-are-over-92-thousand-tenge-4355/ 
Tengrinews. (2011b). No threat of Chinese expansion: Kazakhstan’s Ministry of 
Industry and New Technology. Tengrinews Online. 27 May. Retrieved 12 
January 2013, from http://en.tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/No-threat-of-
Chinese-expansion-Kazakhstans-Ministry-of-Industry-and-New-2062/ 
Tengrinews. (2011c). Umirzak Shukeev appointed to head Samruk-Kazyna Sovereign 
Wealth Fund. 27 December. Retrieved 29 November, 2012, from 
http://en.tengrinews.kz/companies/Umirzak-Shukeev-appointed-to-head-
Samruk-Kazyna-Sovereign-Wealth-Fund-6391/ 
Tengrinews. (2012a). China to give SCO member-countries loans worth $10 billion. 
08 June. Retrieved 3 January, 2013, from 
http://en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/China-to-give-SCO-member-countries-
loans-worth-10-billion-10589/ 
Tengrinews. (2012b). Nazarbayev held the first meeting of the Security Council in 
2012 (Nazarbaev provel pervoe v 2012 godu zasedanie soveta 
bezopasnosti). 6 March. Retrieved 13 January 2013, from 
http://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/nazarbaev-provel-pervoe-v-2012-
godu-zasedanie-soveta-bezopasnosti-209678/ 
Teorell, J., Samanni, M., Holmberg, S., & Rothstein, B. (2012). The Quality of 
Government Basic Dataset made from The QoG Standard Dataset version 
6Apr11. Retrieved November 8, 2012, from University of Gothenburg: The 
Quality of Government Institute http://www.qog.pol.gu.se 
Thibault, H. (2012, ). China's largest freshwater lake dries up. Guardian Weekly. 31 
January. Retrieved 04 August, 2012, from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jan/31/china-freshwater-
lake-dries-up 
Tinibai, K. (2010). China and Kazakhstan: A Two-Way Street. Bloomberg 
Businessweek. 28 May. Retrieved 9 October, 2012, from 
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/may2010/gb20100528_1
68520.htm 
Today", W. W. K. (2012). Kazakhstan to refine its oil in China. West Kazakhstan 
Today. 5 October. Retrieved 16 December, 2012, from 
http://www.azh.kz/en/news/view/184 
Tomz, M. (2007). Reputation and international cooperation: sovereign debt across 
three centuries. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. 
390 
 
TPI. (2012). Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Retrieved 7 January, 2013, from 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/  
Tran, T. (2010). China warns Nobel official: Don't honor dissident. 28.09. Retrieved 
12 November, 2012, from 
http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2010/09/28/china_warn
s_nobel_official_dont_honor_dissident/ 
Transboundary Freshwater Database (TFDD). (2012). International Freshwater 
Treaties Database. Retrieved 13 December, 2012, from 
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu 
Trend.Kz. (2006). Kazakhstan, China create joint fund to finance projects. Trend.Kz. 
Retrieved from http://en.trend.az/regions/casia/kazakhstan/869418.html 
Trend.Kz. (2006, 20 November). Kazakhstan, China create joint fund to finance 
projects. Retrieved 09 February, 2013, from 
http://en.trend.az/regions/casia/kazakhstan/869418.html 
Tuchman, B. W. (1962). The guns of August. New York:Macmillan. 
Tucker, R. W. (1977). The inequality of nations. New York: Basic Books. 
Turner, J. L. (2009). Asia’s Next Challenge: Securing the Region’s Water Future: Asia 
Society, Leadership Group on Water Security in Asia. 
UK Trade and Investment (UKTI). (2012). Bribery and Corruption. Retrieved 03 
March, 2013, from 
http://www.ukti.gov.uk/export/howwehelp/overseasbusinessrisk/briberyco
rruption.html 
UNESCO. (1972). The World Heritage Convention. Retrieved 23 November, 2012, 
from http://whc.unesco.org/en/convention/ 
UNESCO. (2011). Presentation on Integrated Water Resource Management 
(Upravlenie vodnymi resursami po bassejnovomu principu). 30 June. 
Retrieved 07 August, 2012, from 
http://www.unesco.kz/science/2009/IWRM_course/6_bassin_managment.p
df 
United Nations (UN). Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). Retrieved 
2 November, 2012, from http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/iwrm.shtml 
United Nations (UN). (1997). Convention of the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses. Video Resources- Statement by Mr. Gao Feng 
(China). Explanation before the vote. [Video ]. New York City United Nations, 
Audiovisual Library of International Law. 
United Nations (UN). (2008). Kazakhstan-Country Analysis. Retrieved 13 August, 
2012, from 
http://www.un.kz/userfiles/kaz_country_analysis_final2008_eng.pdf 
391 
 
United Nations (UN). Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes (1992). 
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). (1994). United 
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification. Retrieved 13 November, 
2012, from http://www.unccd.int/en/about-the-convention/Pages/About-
the-Convention.aspx 
United Nations Development Program in Kazakhstan (UNDP). Integrated Water 
Resource Management (IWRM). Retrieved 9 January, 2013, from 
http://www.caresd.net/iwrm/new/en/about.php 
United Nations Development Program in Kazakhstan (UNDP). (2012). Promoting 
Integrated Water Resources Management and Fostering Transboundary 
Dialogue in Central Asia- Transboundary Dialgoue and Cooperation in the Ili-
Balkash. Retrieved 13 December, 2012, from 
http://centralasia.iwlearn.org/project-components-initiatives/national-
component-in-kazakhstan/ili-balkhash 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). (2011). Green Economy: 
from theory to practice- Event Programme. Retrieved 23 November, 2012, 
from 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/efe/Astana/InformalDocuments
/FS_GreenBridge_e.pdf 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). (2005). Report of the GCOS 
regional workshop for Central Asia on improving climate monitoring 
systems, Almaty 24-25 March 2004 Almaty: World Meteorological 
Organisation (WMO) and UNEP. 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). (2008). Vital Water Graphics- An 
Overview of the State of the World’s Fresh and Marine Waters. In S. Diop, P. 
M’may & P. Rekacewicz (Eds.), (2nd ed.). Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP. 
United Nations Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan (UNPM). (2012). Position of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan on the Main Issues of the Agenda of the 65 th 
Session of the UN General Assembly. Retrieved 29 November, 2012, from 
http://kazakhstanun.org/press-releases/position-of-the-republic-of-
kazakhstan-on-the-main-issues-of-the-agenda-of-the-65-th-session-of-the-
.html 
United States Congress (US Congress). (2012).China’s Global Quest for Resources 
and Implications for the United States, 112th Congress, Second Session Sess. 
193 (2012). 
United States Senate (US Senate). (2011). Resolution - Calling for the protection of 
the Mekong River Basin and increased United States support for delaying the 
construction of mainstream dams along the Mekong River. Washington, 
D.C.: Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
112sres227rs/pdf/BILLS-112sres227rs.pdf. 
392 
 
Universal Newswires (2010). China proposes $10B SCO development bank. Central 
Asia News Wire. 2 December. Retrieved 3 January, 2013, from 
http://www.universalnewswires.com/centralasia/viewstory.aspx?id=2513 
University of Dundee (2011). Dundee academic identified as one of One-Thousand 
Talents. 29 September. Retrieved 19 November, 2012, from 
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/pressreleases/2011/september11/talents.htm 
University of Wuhan. (2007). Alumni Karim Massimov is Kazakhstani Prime Minister 
(xiaoyou maximofu churenzongli). Retrieved 23 November, 2012, from 
http://whu.cuepa.cn/show_more.php?doc_id=1234 
Usoskin, S. (2012). ICSID Tribunal Refuses Jurisdiction in a Dispute Against 
Kazakhstan. CIS Arbitration Forum. 14 June. Retrieved 29 December, 2012, 
from http://cisarbitration.com/2012/06/14/icsid-tribunal-refuses-
jurisdicion-in-a-dispute-against-kazakhstan/ 
Vlasov, A. (2007). Vladimir Tasmagambetov. 5 November. Retrieved 1 November, 
2012, from http://www.ia-
centr.ru/archive/commebea.html?type=public&id=965 
Volkov, V. (2010). Protests against the Customs Union in Kazakhstan: too early or 
too late? (Protesty protiv Tamozhennogo sojuza v Kazahstane: slishkom rano 
ili slishkom pozdno?). 04 January. Retrieved 30 December 2012, from 
www.dw.de 
Wall Street Journal (WSJ). (2010). S&P Lifts Kazakhstan's ratings on government's 
resiliency The Wall Street Journal. 30 June. Retrieved 27 December, 2012, 
from www.online.wsj.com 
Walter, C. E. (2010). China’s Reserves are Worthless Because They Can’t Use Them. 
The China Boom Project. Retrieved 19 December 2012, from 
http://chinaboom.asiasociety.org/period/overdrive/0/233 
Walter, C. E. (2011). Do China’s Stock Markets Matter? Public lecture at the U.C. 
Berkeley School of Law. Retrieved 13 December, 2012, from 
http://thenetwork.berkeleylawblogs.org/2011/11/25/lecture-series-carl-e-
walter-%E2%80%93-do-china%E2%80%99s-stock-markets-matter/ 
Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of international politics. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley 
Pub. Co. 
Wang, J., & Hu, Y. (2011). Transboundary Water Resource Disputes between China 
and Kazakhstan: Origin, Progress and Chinese Countermeasures (hongha 
kuajie shui ziyuan zhengduan: yuanqi,jinzhan yu zhongguo duice. Journal of 
Xinjiang University (Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences), 2011(5), 6.  
Wang, J., & Zhang, H. (2011, ). The RMB "going out" strategy creates opportunities 
but faces new challenges (renminbi “zouchuqu” zheng tuijin jiyuqi mianlin 
xintiaozhan). Forex.Hexun.com. 09 May. Retrieved 08 January, 2013, from 
http://forex.hexun.com/2011-05-09/129413971.html?from=rss 
393 
 
Wang, T. (2012). More than 30 hydropower stations suspended to protect the 
environment of the Xinjiang Ili river basin (wei baohu shentai huanjing 
xinjiang yilihe liuyu ting jian 30 yu zuo shuidianzhan). Xinhuanet. 5 
November. Retrieved 02 February, 2013, from 
http://www.xj.xinhuanet.com/2012-11/05/c_113608187.htm 
Weiner, E. J. J. (2011). The shadow market: how sovereign wealth funds secretly 
dominate the global economy. Oxford: Oneworld. 
Weinthal, E. (2006). Human Development Report 2006/32-Water Conflict and 
Cooperation in Central Asia. (pp. 36): UNDP. 
Weisskopf, A. (2011). The Customs Union with Kazakhstan is not encouraging 
(Tamozhennyj sojuz ne vnushaet optimizma kazahstancam). 4 July. 
Retrieved 5 February, 2013, from http://www.dw.de 
Weitz, R. (2010). Afghanistan in China’s Emerging Eurasian Transport Corridor. 
China Brief, 10(14).  
Weitz, R. (2011). China’s Uranium Quest Part 2: The Turn to Foreign Markets. China 
Brief, 11(16).  
Weitz, R. (2012). Kazakhstan-China Transportation Opportunities and Challenges. 
Eurasia Daily Monitor, 9(35).  
Wen, B. (2012). Project 635 Engeneering Works (yine jike wu gongcheng 635 
gongcheng). 08 July. Retrieved 07 January 2013, from 
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5341c71d0100am3y.html 
Wen, Z. F. (2011). Protecting Chinese FDI in the Energy Sector and Preventing 
Political Risk (woguo nengyuan haiwai zhijie touzi zhengzhi fenxian falu 
fangfan). Magazine on economic and technoloical cooperation 1 March 
Retrieved 23 November 2012, from 
http://www.jjykj.com/wenzhang/viewnews.asp?id=11651 
Westad, O. A. (2012). Restless empire: China and the world since 1750. London: 
Bodley Head. 
White, G., Mason, R., & Andrews, A. (2011). ENRC 'more Soviet than City', says 
ousted board member Ken Olisa. The Telegraph Online. 9 June. Retrieved 23 
November 2012, from 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/epic/enrc/8564697/ENR
C-more-Soviet-than-City-says-ousted-board-member-Ken-Olisa.html 
Wilson, E. (2007). How Citic oiled the wheels of Kazakh M&A. Euromoney. May. 
Retrieved 3 January 2013, from 
http://www.euromoney.com/Article/1330553/BackIssue/51464/How-Citic-
oiled-the-wheels-of-Kazakh-M-
A.html?Type=BackIssueArticle&ArticleId=1330553&ID=51464 
Wohlforth, W. C. (1993). The elusive balance : power and perceptions during the 
Cold War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
394 
 
Wolf, A. T. (1998). Conflict and cooperation along international waterways. Water 
Policy, 1(2), 251-265. doi: 10.1016/s1366-7017(98)00019-1 
Wolf, A. T. (2007). Shared waters: Conflict and cooperation. Annual Review of 
Environment and resources., 32(1), 241-269. doi: 
10.1146/annurev.energy.32.041006.101434 
Wolf, M. (2010). The Eurozone needs more than discipline from Germany. Financial 
Times. 21 December. Retrieved 5 May, 2011, from 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8453024e-0d3e-11e0-82ff-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2EgIl7oEz  
WorldBank. (2011). World Development Indicators (WDI), 1960-. Retrieved 13 
December, 2012, from http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators 
WorldBank. (2012a). Assessment of Costs and Benefits of the Customs Union for 
Kazakhstan- First Report under the Study of International Practice of 
Integration/Customs Unions (pp. 91): World Bank. 
WorldBank. (2012b). ICSID International Center for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes- List of Pending Disputes. Retrieved 23 December, 2012, from 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsR
H&actionVal=ListPending 
WorldBank. (2012c). World Bank- Kazakhstan Partnership Program Snapshot 
(October ed., pp. 27). Astana: World Bank. 
WorldBank. (2013a). World Bank- China Development Indicators. Retrieved 16 
March, 2013, from http://data.worldbank.org/country/china 
WorldBank. (2013b). World Bank- Kazakhstan Development Indicators. Retrieved 16 
March, 2013, from http://data.worldbank.org/country/kazakhstan 
World Bank. (2013c). Beyond Oil: Kazakhstan’s Path to Greater Prosperity through 
Diversifying. 
World Bank Institute (WBI). (2010). Kazakhstan Overview. 5 May. Retrieved 02 
January, 2013, from 
http://www.worldbank.org.kz/en/country/kazakhstan/overview 
World Bank Institute (WBI). (2012). Country Data Report for KAZAKHSTAN, 1996-
2011 Worldwide Governance Indicators. Washington, D.C.: World Bank 
Institute. 
WorldBank & IMF. (2009). Kazakhstan - Financial Sector Assessment. Retrieved 23 
June, 2012, from http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3058 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO). (2005). Report on the GCOS Regional 
Worshop for Central Asia on Improving Climate Monitoring Almaty 24-26 
May 2004 (Otchet regional'nogo seminara GSNK dlja Central'noj Azii po 
395 
 
uluchsheniju sistem nabljudenij za klimatom). Almaty World Meteorological 
Organization.  
World Nuclear Association (WNA). (2012). World uranium mining. Retrieved 17 
December, 2012, from http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf23.html 
World Trade Organization (WTO). (2012). Assessment of Costs and Benefits of the 
Customs Union for Kazakhstan. 3 January. Retrieved 19 September, 2012, 
from 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2722/6597
70ESW0P1230on0Final0jan0302012.pdf?sequence=1 
Wu, Q. F. (2011). Protecting oil interests abroad (baohu haiwai shiyou liyi yao ganyu 
liang jian). 31 March. Retrieved 13 November 2012, from 
http://app.chinamining.com.cn/Newspaper/E_Mining_News_2011/2011-
03-31/1301551687d49490.html 
Wu, Z. Y., Lu, G. H., Wen, L., & Lin, C. A. (2011). Reconstructing and analyzing China's 
fifty-nine year (1951-2009) drought history using hydrological model 
simulation. Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, 15(9), 2881-2894. doi: 
10.5194/hess-15-2881-2011 
Xinhua. (2006). CITIC buys Kazak oil assets for $1.9b. 31 December. Retrieved 18 
December, 2012, from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-
12/31/content_772608.htm 
Xinhua. (2008). The Long Term Plan for Food Security (2008-2020) ((guojia liangshi 
anquan zhongchangqi guihua gangbao (2008-2020nian)). Retrieved 9 
November, 2012, from http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2008-
11/13/content_1148414.htm 
Xinhua. (2009). Domestic and international financial executives discuss how 
financial institutions go out (guoneiwai jinrong gaoguan changtan zhongguo 
jinrong jigou ruhe zouchuqu). 12 June. Retrieved 01 January, 2013, from 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2009-06/12/content_11529023_1.htm 
Xinhua. (2010). China to boost co-op with downstream Mekong countries. 04 April. 
Retrieved 10 November, 2012, from 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-04/04/content_9685698.htm  
Xinhua. (2011a, ). 35,860 Chinese evacuated from unrest-torn Libya. Xinhuanet. 03 
March. Retrieved 14 December, 2012, from 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-
03/03/c_13759456.htm 
Xinhua. (2011b). China Development Bank loans millions to Kazakhstan copper 
company. Retrieved 18 December, 2012, from 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2011-12/17/c_131312655.htm 
396 
 
Xinhua. (2012a). China, Kazakhstan vow to enhance strategic partnership. 
Xinhuanet. 06 June. Retrieved 13 January, 2013, from 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-06/06/c_131634849.htm 
Xinhua. (2012b). Kazakh BTA Bank opens yuan account in China' ICBC bank. 19 June. 
Retrieved 20 December 2012, from 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-06/19/c_131661377.htm 
Xinhuanet. (2004). Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 07 January. Retrieved 2 
January, 2013, from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-
06/07/content_1512104.htm 
Xinhuanet. (2009). Chinese top legislator meets Kazakhstan's first deputy PM. 12 
April. Retrieved 12 January, 2013, from 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-12/04/content_12591080.htm 
XinhuaNet. (2012). Drought hits Yellow-Huai regions, affects agricultural 
production. English.xinhua.net. 21.06.2012. Retrieved 01 July, 2012, from 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-06/21/c_131668876.htm 
Xinjiang Academy for Environmental Protection Sciences (XAES). (2011a). Major 
public projects (zhongda zhuanhong xiangyu gongyi xiangmu yanjiusuo). 
Retrieved 06 January, 2013, from http://www.xjaeps.com/about.asp?id=27 
Xinjiang Academy for Environmental Protection Sciences (XAES). (2011b). Research 
Briefing (keyan gongzuo jianbao). 31 January. Retrieved 23 December, 2012, 
from http://www.xjaeps.com/view.asp?id=1001 
Yang, A. (2010). Cambodia: China not behind Mekong floods. China Daily. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2010-11/19/content_11574875.htm 
Yergin, D. (2011). The quest: energy, security and the remaking of the modern 
world. New York: Penguin Press. 
Yermukanov, M. (2007). Constitutional Amendments Bolster Nazarbayev's 
Presidency. The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst (CACAI Analyst). 30 May. 
Retrieved 1 June, 2012, from http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4627 
Yoffe, S., Wolf, A. T., & Giordano, M. (2003). Conflict and cooperation over 
international freshwater resources: Indicators of basins at risk. Journal of the 
American Water Resource Association, 39(5), 1109-1126.  
Yongjin, Z. (2001). System, empire and state in Chinese international relations. 
Review of International Studies, 2001(27), 43-63.  
Zakaria, F. (1998). From wealth to power: the unusual origins of America's world 
role. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Zeitoun, M., & Allan, J. A. (2008). Applying hegemony and power theory to 
transboundary water analysis. Water Policy, 2008(10 Supplement 2), 3-12.  
Zeitoun, M., & Warner, J. (2006). Hydro-hegemony – a framework for analysis of 
trans-boundary water conflicts. Water Policy, 2006(8), 435-460.  
397 
 
Zentralkommission fuer die Rheinschifffahrt (ZKR). (2011). Introduction 
(Einfuehrung). Retrieved 11 December, 2012, from http://www.ccr-
zkr.org/11010100-de.html 
Zhao, H. (2007). Central Asia in China's Diplomacy. In E. B. Rumer, D. Trenin & H. 
Zhao (Eds.), Central Asia: views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. 
Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe. 
Zhen, Y. (1992). Analysis of the supervision and bidding of Project 635 in Xinjiang 
(gongcheng xiangmu jianli zhongzhao toubiao gongzuo de sikao). Journal of 
Construction and Supervision, 1992(5).  
Zhou, X. (2009). Zhou Xiaochuan: Reform the International Monetary System. 23 
March. Retrieved 11 December, 2012, from 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/956/2009/20091229104425550619
706/20091229104425550619706_.html 
Ziegler, C. E. (2006). The Energy Factor in China’s Foreign Policy. Journal of Chinese 
Political Science, 11(1), 1-23.  
Zweig, D. (2012). David Zweig on Environmental Protests. China Water Risk. 7 
August 2012. Retrieved 04 September, 2012, from 
http://chinawaterrisk.org/interviews/david-zweig-on-environmental-
protests/ 
 
